The Global Justice Movement/s in Europe
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Democracy and the Global Justice Movements: Some Hypotheses in Context

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The central aim of this report is to refine the definition of our dependent variable, develop our explanatory model by singling out potentially relevant independent and intervening variables, as well as deepen and update our knowledge on contemporary social movements in each country and at the transnational level.

The first part of the report will suggest a definition of the global justice movement as well as of the main dimensions in their conceptions and practices of internal and external democracy. We shall then single out two main sets of variables that appear to influence our explanandum: an internal and an external set. On both, we shall suggest some first, very provisional hypotheses, based upon a review of the relevant social science literatures, as well as proposing the operationalisation of the independent variables, on the basis of available data bases. Although hypotheses on the relationship between external opportunities and movements’ conceptions of democracy are very preliminary, the data we present on political, social and cultural opportunities for the global justice movement/s could be useful to explain their national characteristics (in terms of strength, strategies, structures and frames) as they will emerge from the second part of this report, containing our six country chapters as well as a chapter on the transnational mobilisations. All these chapters are based on a secondary analysis of existing studies on the formation and evolution of the global justice movement/s, locating them in the national evolution of the relevant social movement families.

1. Defining our dependent variable: conceptions and practices of democracy in global movement/s

Our research focuses on the conception and practices of democracy in contemporary social movements, in particular those focusing on issues of global justice and a “globalisation from below”. We will therefore, in turn, discuss the definition of the movement/s and of the main dimensions of conception and practices of democracy we want to investigate.

1.1. The global justice movement/s

We define social movements on the basis of three main elements: networks, common belief and identities, and use of protest. We can indeed consider social movements as interactions of mainly informal networks based on common beliefs and solidarity, which mobilise on conflictual issues by frequent recurrence to various forms of protest (della Porta and Diani 1999, chap. 1). In Sidney Tarrow’s definition (2001, 11), transnational social movements are “socially mobilised groups with constituents in at least two states,
engaged in sustained contentious interactions with power-holders in at least one state other than their own, or against an international institution, or a multinational economic actor."

Global social movements can be defined as transnational networks of actors that define their causes as global, and organise protest campaigns and other forms of actions that target more than one state as well as international governmental organisations. The global justice movement is the loose network of organisations (of varying degrees of formality, and including even political parties) and other actors, engaged in collective action of various kinds, on the basis of the shared concern to advance the cause of justice (economic, social, political and environmental) among and between peoples across the globe.

We can in fact operationalise our definition of our field of study in terms of identity, non-conventional action repertoires, and organisational networks by looking at the following elements:

a) a fundamental characteristic of a social movement is its ability to develop a common interpretation of the reality able to nurture solidarity and collective identifications, as well as a collective attempt to change or resist changes in the external environment. Outside the routine, the movements develop new visions of the world and systems of values alternative to the dominant ones. New conflicts emerge then on new values. In particular, from the seventies onwards, "new social movements" started to be seen as the actors of new conflicts, in contrast to the "old" workers' movement that was by then perceived as institutionalised. While Marxist analyses have traditionally upheld the centrality of the struggle between capital and labour, post WWII changes have increased the importance of social stratification criteria – such as gender and generation – which are not based on class status. Contemporary societies are usually described as highly differentiated systems that invest increasing resources in order to make individuals into autonomous centres of action, but which also need increased integration, extending control to the very motivations of human action (Melucci 1989). Within these societies, new social movements attempt to resist state and market intervention in daily life, claiming the right for individuals to decide upon their own private and affective lives against all-pervasive systemic manipulation. Gender difference, defence of the environment and co-habitation among different cultures are some of the issues around which social movements have been formed recently. The establishment of a global movement requires the development of a discourse that identifies both a common identity – the us – and the target of the protest – the other – at supranational level. On this issue, observers' opinions differ: some see the beginnings of global identities while others speak of an (almost opportunistic) adjustment by mainly national actors to a territorially multilevel government; some see mobilisation on globalisation as a left-over from the past and others, instead, see it as the movement of the future. More in general, the social, generational and ideological heterogeneity that was already evident in Seattle is considered by some as an indication of the strength of the mobilisation, able to connect different identities, and by others as a sign of fragmentation and an indication of weakness. As far as the framing of the action is concerned, we are interested in our project in those groups/individual activists that frame their action in terms of global identity and concerns: they identify themselves as part of a “global movement”, targeting “global enemies”, and within a global enjeu field of action. Operationally, we are interested in groups/activists that have been named, in different countries, as alter-global, no global, new global, global justice, globalizierungskritikern, altermondialists, globalisers from below, etc. The declinations of these global issues vary: some groups targets neoliberism and others capitalism; some advocate social justice, others socialism or
anarchism; some are mainly concerned with workers’ rights, others with environmental disasters. We are however concerned with those who define their actions as part of a global movement/s, as defined above. In this way we parallel past research in social movements that, for instance, defined as part of the environmental movements those groups/individuals that acted within protest networks, on environmental concerns.

b) social movements are characterised by the use of protest as a means of pressure on the institutions (e.g. Rucht 1994). Anyone who protests addresses public opinion even before the elected representatives or public bureaucracy. While with the creation of the nation state protest actions were concentrated at national level, globalisation may be expected to generate protest at transnational level against international actors. Here, too, however, results of empirical research are unclear. First of all, the protests that get national press coverage still target the state or sub-state level of government (Imig and Tarrow 2002; Rucht 2002a) as it has been confirmed for various types of movements from environmental (Rootes 2002) to anti-racist ones (Giugni and Passy 2002). Furthermore, it has often been emphasised that organisations active at transnational level adopt conventional types of action, oriented more towards discreet lobbying than street protests. On that basis it has been retained that mobilisations such as Seattle or Genoa are to be considered as episodic events with collective action still dominated by increasingly institutionalised NGOs and “normalised” action repertoires. In our operational definition, we consider organisations and individuals that have participated in contentious actions organised by the groups/activists with a global concern, as defined above (see point a). Again, here we parallel past research that has focused upon those groups/actors that have taken part in protest activities (although they might have used other forms of collective action, e.g. lobbying, as well). In most countries, there have been protest campaigns focusing on poverty, taxation of capital, debt relief, fair trade, global rights, reform of IGOs: we are interested in those actors who took part in these protest campaigns.

3) social movements are informal networks linking a plurality of individuals and groups, more or less structured from an organisational point of view. While parties or pressure groups have somewhat well defined organisational boundaries, enrolment in a specific organisation normally being ratified by a membership card, social movements are instead composed of loose, weakly linked networks of individuals who feel part of a collective effort. Although there are organisations that refer back to movements, movements are not organisations but rather network of relationships linking various actors, which encompass organisations (also but not only) with a formal structure. One distinctive characteristic of social movements is the possibility of belonging to them and feeling involved in collective action without necessarily having to be member of a specific organisation. It follows, therefore, that a global movement should involve organisational networks active in different countries. In point of fact, scholars of social science have increasingly adopted the term "transnational" to emphasise the role of actors different from the national governments that are traditionally considered the only relevant subjects in international relations. Globalisation has enhanced the power of some of these actors (such as multinational enterprises) but it has also fostered the emergence of a "global civil society". Recent surveys point to an increase in the number of transnational organisations linked to social movements (often “global” in the sense not of covering the whole globe, but of involving membership from various countries) from 110 in 1963 to 631 in 1993 (Smith 1995), a trend which is particularly vigorous in the south of the world (Smith 2001). The greater influence wielded by these organisations is beyond doubt but opinions vary on
the extent to which they are able to "get networked" more than just sporadically. Some authors have questioned the stability of these networks (e.g. Fox and Brown 1998; on immigration, Guiraudon 2002). Therefore, a highly flexible organisational structure, with demonstrations organised via the Internet by ad hoc co-ordination committees, is seen by some as the best solution for adapting to global trends while others perceive it as the sign of an inability to build a durable organisation. Operationally, we are interested, in each country, in the groups and organisations that have built one or more networks on the global issues mentioned above and acted via protest. Once again, there is a reference to definition adopted in parallel research on other social movements. Especially since we are dealing with movement/s that address different specific issues (labour rights, GMO, women’s lib etc.), their being part of networks that address these issues within global frames has a relevant, discriminating value. Participation in European social forums (or national/local social forums) and/or similar/parallel events or umbrella organisations could be part of the operational definition.

Summarising, we aim at assessing the presence of a social movement defined as an attempt of a networks of individuals, groups and organisations that, based on common beliefs and a collective identity, seek to change society (or resist such a change) mainly by the use of protest (see Diani 1992; Rucht 1994, 77; della Porta and Diani 1999, 16). We focus in particular on movement/s as networks which participate in protest campaigns on the issue of global justice. For our movement/s, the ultimate frame of reference is indeed the globe: although specific actions often have a narrower scope, solutions are sought at the global level and specific claims are embedded into visions of global change. Within this global dimensions, the main aim of the movement/s is the struggle for justice—a general term which encompasses more specific domains of intervention, such as human rights, citizens rights, social rights, peace, environment etc. Our empirical research will also address the issue of the density of the trans-issue and transnational networks, as well as of their degree of strategic and ideological diversity, discussing to which extent we can talk of one movement or more movements focusing on global justice.

1.2. Conceptions and practices of democracy

Focusing on these types of actors, the project addresses the forms of democracy as they are elaborated “from below” and implemented both in the internal organisation of social movements and in experiments of public decision-making. In particular, the project analyses the issue of active democracy as it emerges in the theorization and practices of the movements asking for a “globalisation from below”. For these movements indeed the stress on radical forms of democracy emerges as a common meta-frame. Two main conceptions of democracy—alternative to the dominant definition of democracy—will be central focus for our analysis: participatory and deliberative conceptions. These conceptions will be analysed at three levels: a) democracy within movement organisations; b) democracy within movements as networks; c) democracy in public institutions. Although we expect some degree of consistency between the three levels, we shall in this report focus especially on the first and second levels.

In our research we address in particular the conceptions and practices of democracy that has developed in the global justice movement/s mobilising transnationally and demanding social justice and participatory democracy. The ensuing debate on democracy is particularly relevant both for the development of a civic society, and for the legitimisation
of political institutions at local, national and supranational levels. The research — focusing on six European countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain and Switzerland), and the EU level — consists of an analysis of documents pertaining to both movements and public institutions, websites, semi-structured interviews with nongovernmental organisations and public administrators, surveys of movement activists, participant observation of movement groups and the experiences of participatory decision making.

Social movements criticise the fundamentals of the conventional practices of politics, and experiment with new models of democracy both in their internal structure and in the way they interact with political institutions. It has been claimed that social movements do not limit themselves to developing special channels of access for themselves but that, more or less explicitly, they expound a fundamental critique of conventional politics, thus shifting their endeavours from politics itself to meta-politics (Offe 1985). From this point of view, social movements affirm the legitimacy (if not the primacy) of alternatives to parliamentary democracy, criticising both liberal democracy and the “organised democracy” of the political parties: “The stakes and the struggle of the left and libertarian social movements thus invoke an ancient element of democratic theory that calls for an organisation of collective decision making referred to in varying ways as classical, populist, communitarian, strong, grass-roots, or direct democracy against a democratic practice in contemporary democracies labelled as realist, liberal, elite, republican, or representative democracy” (Kitschelt 1993, 15).

Democracy is usually considered as a system of power (kratos) that is of/by/for the people (demos) as it comes from the investiture of the people, is controlled by the people and should be oriented to the common good. In contemporary democracy, the public institutional decision making is considered as democratic when the power is based upon free, competitive and frequent elections of decision makers. In political science, this mainstream definition (see among others Dahl 1998) has been defined as minimalist (since it only ensures minimal conditions for democracy), based on the input side (in that it operationalises democracy only on the basis of the respect of the fact that power comes from the people-electors, irrespective of the way in which it is used), and procedural (focusing the attention on the respect of formal procedures). Indexes of the quality of democracy have been constructed in order to measure to which extend specific democratic regimes respect the rule of law and are able to reduce inequalities (for instance, Morlino 2003).

Although allowing for different degrees of complementarity between different models of democracy, social movements in general consider a representative conception of democracy as at least insufficient, focusing on democracy as a process. Traditionally, social movements have indeed emphasised a participatory conception of democracy, stressing the importance of an increasing of participation in direct forms. In the social sciences, a main tenet of the participative theory is that citizens be provided with as many opportunities to participate as there are spheres of decision making (Pateman 1970). In strong democracies, citizens participate (at least some times) in the decisions that affect their lives (Barber 1984). There must be, therefore, access to decision-making arenas, and participating citizens must be able to influence the public decisions (i.e. participation must be intense).

In this line, social movements assert that a system of direct democracy is closer to the interests of the people than liberal democracy, based on delegation to representatives who can be controlled only at the moment of election and who have full authority to decide
between one election and another (O’Donnell 1994). Moreover, social movements criticise the “organised” democratic model, based on the mediation by mass political parties and the structuring of “strong” interests, and seek to switch decision making to more transparent and controllable sites. In the social movement conception of democracy the people themselves (who are naturally interested in politics) must assume direct responsibility for intervening in the political decision-making process.

According to the representative democracy model, citizens elect their representatives and exercise control through the threat of their not being re-elected at subsequent elections. The direct democracy favoured by social movements rejects the principle of delegation, viewed as an instrument of oligarchic power. Moreover, while in a representative democracy representatives decide on a whole range of matters for citizens; delegation relates instead only to a particular issue in a system of direct democracy. Representative democracy foresees the creation of a specialised body of representatives; direct democracy opts for continual turnover. Representative democracy is based on formal equality (one person, one vote); direct democracy is participatory, the right to decide being recognised only to those who demonstrate their commitment to the public cause. Representative democracy is often bureaucratic, with decision making concentrated at the top, direct democracy is decentralised and emphasises that decisions should be taken as near as possible to ordinary people’s lives.

It has been stressed that the global justice movement criticises the functioning of advanced democracies, in at least two directions. First of all, it contests the lack of democratic accountability (according even to representative democratic standards) of Intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) (della Porta et al. 2005, chap. 7). As for domestic democracy, the criticism addresses in particular the oligarchic functioning of political parties, the exclusionary implications of majority rule, the monopolisation of public spheres of communication, and the exclusion of minority groups and issues from their practice of democracy (ibid.). Movement organisations, however, do not usually aim at abolishing the existing political parties, nor do they - in general - seek to found new ones; they demand instead a sort of democratisation of the old politics and institutions, parties, and trade unions, and they propose the constitution of alternative, open public spheres where different positions could be developed, analysed, and compared on an openly-stated ethical basis (such as social justice, in the case of the participatory budget in Porto Alegre). An effective, pluralistic media system would be a minimum requirement for the development of this type of public sphere. In this sense, contemporary social movements are also a response to problems which have emerged in the system of interest representation, “compensating” for the tendency of political parties to favour interests which pay off in electoral terms, of interest groups to favour those social strata better endowed with resources while marginalising the rest, and of the mediated public sphere to be highly commercialised.

In recent theorisation and practice, the traditional conception of participatory and direct democracy has been linked with the emerging interest in deliberative democracy—concerned, in particular, with the quality of communication. Deliberative theories have developed from concerns with the functioning of representative institutions. In Habermas’

\[\text{1} \text{Recently, the concept of Empowered Deliberative Democracy has been suggested: it combines attention to participation, quality of discourse, and citizens’ empowerment (Fung and Wright 2001).}\]
discursive conception (1996), democratic deliberation is based on good communication, that is on the reason and the strength of best arguments, and therefore on the capacity of going beyond a conception of politics as conflict between different interests. In this sense, politics is not only the use of power, but also the use of reasons; in Elster’s conception (1986), deliberation is capable of producing new preferences, instead than just counting or negotiating pre-existing ones. Politics deals therefore also with the formation of identities: while Habermas stresses the procedures (based on reason), Elster pays more attention to the effects of the process in the reformulation of preferences.

Scholars of deliberative democracy disagree on the locus of deliberative discussion, some being concerned with the development of liberal institutions, others with alternative public spheres free from state intervention (della Porta 2005a). Juergen Habermas (1996) postulates a double-track process, with “informal” deliberation taking place outside institutions and then, as public opinion, affecting institutional deliberation. According to some authors, however, deliberation takes place especially in voluntary groups (see for instance Cohen 1989). A strong supporter of the latter position and an expert in movement politics, John Dryzek (2000) has indicated social movements as best placed to build deliberative spaces that can keep a critical look upon public institutions. Jane Mansbridge (1996) also stated that deliberation should take place in a number of enclaves, free from institutional power—including that of social movements themselves. If social movements nurture committed, critical attitudes towards public institutions, deliberative democracy requires citizens “embedded” in associative networks able to build democratic skills among their adherents (Offe 1997, 102-103). As the experiment of Porto Alegre indicates, in the movements for globalisation from below, deliberative practices have indeed attracted a more or less explicit interest.

Della Porta (2005b) has suggested to speak of a participatory and deliberative decision making when, under conditions of equality, inclusiveness, and transparency, a communicative process based on reason (the strength of a good argument) is able to transform individual preferences and reach decisions oriented to the public good (della Porta 2005b). Some of the dimensions of this definition (such as inclusiveness, equality, and visibility) echo those included in the participatory models we have described as typical of new social movements, while others (above all, the attention to the quality of communication, and the transformation of individual preferences by reference to public good) emerge as new concerns.

First, as in the social movement tradition, empowered participatory democracy is inclusive: it requires that all citizens with a stake in the decisions are included in the process and able to express their voice. This means that the deliberative process takes place under conditions of a plurality of values, where people have different perspectives on their common problems. Taking the participatory budget as an example, assemblies are held in all districts and open to all citizens; the choice of the time and place aims at facilitating participation of all interested people (even kindergarten are organised in order to help mothers and fathers to participate).

Additionally, all participants are equals: deliberation takes place among free and equal citizens (as “free deliberation among equals,” Cohen 1989, 20). In fact, “all citizens must be able to develop those capacities that give them effective access to the public sphere,” and “once in public, they must be given sufficient respect and recognition so as to be able to influence decisions that affect them in a favourable direction” (Bohman 1997,
Deliberation must exclude power deriving from coercion, but also from an unequal weighting of participants as representatives of organisations of different size or influence. In this sense, this participatory conception of deliberative democracy opposes hierarchies and stresses direct rank-and-file participation. In the participatory budget, rules such as the limited time for each intervention or the presence of facilitators are designed to allow equal chances for participation to all citizens.

Moreover, the concept of transparency resonates with direct, participatory democracy. In Joshua Cohen’s definition, a deliberative democracy is “an association whose affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its members” (1989, 17, emphasis added). In deliberative democratic theory, publicity pushes to “replace the language of interest with the language of reason” (Elster 1998b, 111): the justification an opinion before a public forces one to look for reasons linked to common values and principles.

What is new in the conception of deliberative democracy, and in some of the contemporary movements’ practices, is the emphasis on the quality of communication and/or the preference (trans)formation, with an orientation to the definition of the public good. In fact, “deliberative democracy requires the transformation of preferences in interaction” (Dryzek 2000, 79). It is “a process through which initial preferences are transformed in order to take into account the points of view of the others” (Miller 1993, 75). In this sense, deliberative democracy differs from conceptions of democracy as an aggregation of (exogenously generated) preferences. Some reflections on participatory democracy have also included practices of consensus: decisions have to be approved by most of the participants, after a long discussion—in contrast with majoritarian democracy, where decisions are legitimated by (more than 50% of) votes. Deliberation (or even communication) is based on the belief that, while not giving up my perspective, I might learn if I listen to the other (Young 1996).

Especially, in the Habermas’ definition, deliberative democracy stresses the importance of the reason: people are convinced by the force of the better argument. In particular, deliberation is based on horizontal flows of communication, multiple producers of content, wide opportunities for interactivity, confrontation on the basis of rational argumentation, and attitude to reciprocal listening (Habermas 1981, 1996). In this sense, deliberative democracy is discursive. According to Young, however, discourse does not exclude protest: “processes of engaged and responsible democratic participation include street demonstrations and sit-ins, musical works and cartoons, as much as parliamentary speeches and letters to the editor” (2003, 119).

Consensus is, however, possible only in the presence of shared core values and a common commitment to the construction of a public good (such as the common value of social justice in the participatory budget). In a deliberative model of democracy, “the political debate is organised around alternative conceptions of the public good,” and, above all, it “draws identities and citizens’ interests in ways that contribute to public building of public good” (Cohen 1989, 18-19). A deliberative setting facilitates the search for a common end or good (Elster 1998a).

Empowered participatory democracy has been discussed as an alternative to top-down imposition of public decisions, which is increasingly seen as lacking legitimacy and becoming more and more difficult to manage, given both the increasing complexity of problems and the increasing ability of non-institutional actors to make their voices heard. Deliberative processes should in fact allow the acquisition of better information and
produce more efficient decisions, as well as fostering the participation and trust in institutions that representative models are less and less able to provide. Indeed, scholars highlight a “moralising effect of the public discussion” (Miller 1993, 83) that “encourages people not to merely express political opinions (through surveys or referendum) but to form those opinions through a public debate” (ibid., 89). Deliberation as a “dispassionated, reasoned, logical” type of communication promises to increase citizens’ trust in political institutions (Dryzek 2000, 64).

If we cross the two dimensions of participation (referring to the degree of inclusiveness and equality) and deliberation (referring to the quality of communication and the orientation of decision making), we build a typology whose heuristic relevance will be checked in our research. In particular, we dichotomise the two variables as following: on the first dimension, we can distinguish participatory conceptions that stress inclusiveness of equals (high participation) from conception based upon delegation of power to representatives (low participation); while on the second dimension of the typology, we distinguish conceptions that pay little attention to deliberation and transformation of preferences, and instead highlight the aggregation of conflicting interests (low deliberation) vis-à-vis a conception that pays more attention to the quality of communication, stressing consensus building (high deliberation) (see Figure 1). We have therefore four conceptions of democracy, which more or less reflect internal democratic practices: in the associational model the assembly chooses the executive body and the president of the association, while the everyday politics of the group is managed by delegates who make decisions in a process that leaves little space to argumentation and consensus building. When delegates, elected by the assembly, make decision on a consensual basis we speak of deliberative representation. Especially in social movements organisations, decisions are often taken directly by the members in the assembly: when they decide with majority rule, the model is the classic assembleary one, while when consensus, reasoning and discourses prevail, the type of decision-making can be called deliberative participation. In our research we will try to assess under what conditions these conceptions of democracy (especially, but not only as far as internal decision making in movements is concerned) take one form or the other.

Figure 1. Typology of conceptions of democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation</th>
<th>Deliberation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
2. The explanatory model: what influences movement conceptions and practices of democracy

This part of the report is devoted to explore possible causal relations between independent variables and our dependent variable: global justice movements view of democracy. We classified those independent variables as following: endogenous variables, which refer to internal features of social movement organisations (SMOs) such as the type of organisation, ideology, and strategy; and exogenous variables which refer to the national political, social and cultural contexts, and the influence of transnational opportunities upon them. Exogenous variables define the micromobilisation potential for global justice movements (operationalised with the degree of trust citizens express in global justice movements), cultural domestic features such as the relevant cleavages within each country, the degree of cultural homogeneity etc., political opportunity structure such as institutional features and configuration of political alliances that may influence global justice movements vision of democracy; and the social opportunity structure with which we labelled the social capital for mobilisation in the forms of both associational traditions and
repertoires of action. Especially for endogenous variables—that we expect to be more relevant in defining the conceptions and practices of internal democracy of social movement organisations and networks—we have relied upon the existing social science literature in order to develop more specific hypotheses. For exogenous variables, we mainly aimed at presenting indicators that might or might not emerge in our future research as relevant for the explanation of movement conceptions of democracy at the country level. Our definition of hypotheses at this level is therefore to be read as a more tentative and open ended process.

The order with which those sets of variables are presented reflects the degree of proximity to the dependent variable. More distant variables have often only indirect impact on global social movements vision of democracy (see figure 2).

3. Social movement traditions and political opportunities

Social scientists have singled out some characteristics of social movements that and political opportunities that might influence their conceptions and practices of democracy. As we are going to see in what follows, however, no univocal opinion emerged on the effects of organisational structures, ideological believes, and practices of action on conceptions and practices of democracy.

3.1. Movement organisational structures

The organisational structure affects conceptions and practices of democracy. Since an organisation is also a "context for political conversation" (Eliasoph 1998), it is worth investigating which type of organisation favours, and which reduces, spaces for deliberation. We can single out here the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 1.a. Deliberative participation as a form of democracy is more widespread in loose networks structure than in hierarchical types of organisation. Centralised organisations tend towards an associational model but might choose a deliberative representation model for coalition building**

Mansbridge (2003) suggests a decision making based on consensus is the best way to make decisions in organisations that do not have other legitimate tools for convincing members to act collectively. Habermas (1984), among others, agrees that less bureaucratic and less centralised models are better suited for bringing the discussion into the life world of the members. Comparing two environmental movement organisations, one more informal (Earth First) and the other one hierarchically organised (Friend of the Earth—FOE), Andrew Whitworth (2003) demonstrates that FOE is less able to develop communicative rationality into practice. As for the global justice movement in Italy, a recent research underlined the emphasis on consensus in decentralised networks such as Lilliput (a ecopacifist group) (Veltri 2003). Organised in a more centralised way, Attac-Italia shows instead a tension between an “associational model” and a “deliberative representation” type of decision-making. In Attac Italia, there have been also tensions between support for a more decentralised structure versus preference for a centralised structure as a way to reach effective decisions (Finelli 2003). In the most informal and
loose network such as “centri sociali” (squatted centres), the lack of rules brings about an assemblage model of decision-making, where *de facto* leadership is selected on a charismatic basis, although more recently attention has been paid to the consensus model (Becucci 2003; Andretta 2005b). In a study that compares three different federations of unions in Korea, Doowon Suh (2003) concludes that an "excessive centralisation" seriously erodes solidarity between unions and weakens the support of affiliated members, by obstructing a democratic decision making and reducing the interest of the members for collective action. Nonetheless, an "excessive decentralisation" weakens the solidarity between unions by reducing the possibility of coordination. According to this scholar, the "moderate" level of centralisation, which characterises one of the selected Korean federations, increased solidarity between unions because it succeeded in keeping equilibrium between the autonomous grassroots activism and the collective action of the federation. Some studies on the global justice movement mobilisation stressed that when they mobilise for global issues at transnational level (countersummits or social forums), they tend to adopt a deliberative decision-making, integrating different organisations with the construction of master-frames (della Porta, Andretta, Mosca and Reiter 2005; Andretta 2005a). Mobilisation in specific campaigns at the national or local level (against the war, for immigrant rights or on labour issues) includes however often moment of negotiations between representatives of social movement organisations (associational model) (Andretta 2005b).

*Hypothesis 1.b Deliberative participation as form of democracy requires the development of specific but flexible rules*

A lack of rules about internal communication and decision-making jeopardises deliberative interaction, since it can leads to a leaderism that weakens the decisional power of the members (Freeman 1973). Several scholars suggest indeed that deliberation depends on the specification of rules, which facilitate the free expressions of opinions, and people’s participation in the discussion. John Elster (1998) speaks of “deliberative settings” when rules for deliberation (time of speech, presence of moderators) are institutionalised, either formally or informally. For instance, in the experimental models of deliberative participation in local decision-making, rules and moderators (or more often facilitators) are considered very important for successful decision-making (Allegretti 2003; Bobbio 2002). As Gastil contends “A democratic group develops a set of bylaws or unwritten group norms that protect it against undemocratic manoeuvres, and both new and old need to learn and appreciate the letter and spirit of these procedures” (1993, 20). The already mentioned Italian Rete Lilliput has formalised in documents the rules that must be followed for a consensus to be reached in the internal decision-making process (Veltri 2003). Interviews to activists who participated in the Genoa Social Forum meetings, before the Genoa protest of July 2001, confirm that rules are even more important when many organisations with different frames, ideologies and traditions, join together in a collective decision making. The rules however must be flexible, that is when conflict arises on the rules, the discussion on their change must be kept open, in this way activists of different organisations learn to trust each other (Andretta 2005b).

3.2. Movement discourses and identities

The ideology of a movement affects its view of democracy. The resource mobilisation approach emphasises the role of the institutionalisation for the achievement of
movements' goal, but little attention has been paid to how cultural processes influence the internal organisational structure (Minkoff 2001). Not only the resource mobilisation approach tends to present social movement organisations as homogeneous entities, without paying too much attention to the variation of forms, but "the spirit of Michels infuses resource mobilisation arguments through a sort of syllogism: organisations are resources; effective organisations are hierarchies, therefore, hierarchical organisations are valuable resources for movements" (Clemens and Minkoff 2004, 156; see also Gamson 1990). Indeed, only recently organisational forms have been analysed in relation to the cultural meaning that activists give to them. If Clemens (1993) claims that organisational forms are part of a broader social movement repertoire, Breines (1989) shows that the organisation may have a "prefigurative" function, by embedding the social relations that activists would like to see in the world outside. Polletta (2002) claims that the way in which activists solve their organisational problems strongly depends on the cultural meaning they give to social relationships inside their collectives (friendship, tutorship, religiosity). If these meanings are challenged this might bring about organisational crises: for instance, if friendship is the basis around which students organised the activity of the Student Non Violent Coordinating Committee, increasing in its scale resulted in an organisational crisis precisely because friendship could not work anymore as the "moral basis" of the organisation.

Hypothesis 2.a. Cultural traditions of antihierachical values, and ideologies which positively frame inclusion in decision-making, facilitate the development of conception of deliberative participation

The search for consensus increases with the presence antihierarchical values. In a critical analysis on social movements structure and effectiveness, Peter Gundelach (1989) concludes that antihierarchical values of participants produce a decentralised decision-making based on consensus, although this structure prevents them from influencing public decision making. A study on autonomous, direct-action movements in Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland and West Germany shows that the "autonomous" ideology (in which autonomy is defined first and foremost as independence from political parties and trade unions) leads to a conception of democracy which focuses on direct and spontaneous participation (Katsiaficas 1997). This does not assure a deliberative outcome: inclusion may lead to either an assembleary model or to a deliberative participation structure, depending on the quality of internal communication.

Inclusive values tend to produce inclusive models of decision-making. Christine Eber (1999) contends that indigenous women movements in Chiapas, although organised separately from men, build on local culture beliefs about social responsibility and gender complementarity. In this way women organisations elaborate an inclusive view of political participation that make them accept the collaboration with men or predominantly men organisations. Thus, the classical separatist view has been overcome and even in their autonomous decision-making women managed to include in their discussions the male point of view. Deliberation is reflected in the way women communicate to each other, in their reinterpretation of traditional culture and in their dialogue with an absent interlocutor (on the importance of deliberation with absent points of view, see Gastil 1993). Another example of the impact of ideology on social movement internal decision-making is given in the analysis by Belinda Robnett (1999) on the women inclusion in the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in the USA. The author contends that in contrast to groups whose ideology affirms a centralised leadership, SNCC empowered women by
emphasising consensus and participatory democracy. Women formerly not involved in the decision-making process were able to make their voice heard because the SNCC adopted a participatory view through a decentralised leadership. Eventually with the rise of the black power movement, which emphasised a centralised hierarchy, rather than a participatory style of democracy, women were again marginalised. In this last case, an ideology based on hierarchical values discouraged an inclusive decision-making.

Activists’ values are particularly relevant. The post-materialist cognitive revolution theory suggests that a new middle class (free from materialist concerns) arises new demands based on the need for self-expression (Inglehart 1990). If this is true, we may expect that new-middle class activists push to be involved in the internal decision-making. According to Siddharamesh Hiremath (1994), who analysed 156 unions in India, the decision making is influenced by the educational background of the members: a higher level of education predicts a higher will to participation in the unions decision-making, and this in turn effects the type of organisation which is more participatory when members press for their inclusion. Others contend that even in professional social movement organisations, members with a value-system that emphasises individual participation and inclusion in the decision making process push for the participation in the decision-making (Cohn, Barkan and Halteman 2003). In fact, especially in small groups, commitment to democratic values among members pushes towards deliberative participation in their organisations (Gastil 1993, 7).

**Hypothesis 2b.** In multi-issues movements, heterogeneous frames facilitate the development of conceptions of deliberative participation. Single-issue organisations (especially those based on technical knowledge) tend instead to centralise their decision-making, although they might follow a model of deliberative representation

Pluralistic movements tend to stress deliberation as an organisational principle that allows the respect of differences. Daniel Faber and Deborah McCarthy (2001) underline that movements which bridge different issues and frames (such as the environmental justice movement) elaborate more inclusive internal decision-making with strong empowerment effect for resource-poor organisations and individuals (as the US black and poor people). Donatella della Porta (2005b) has also stressed, on the basis of her analysis of local Social Forums in Italy, that the development of tolerant identities pushes towards consensual conceptions of democracy. Environmentalists which deal with social justice have been proved to elaborate a particular view of democracy which stresses fair democratic procedures, inclusion and equal treatment (Salazar and Alper 2002). Research on the decision-making process of international protest events (such as countersummits), involving many and different groups, indicated that consensus decision-making allowed for the development of a master-frame which connected the different meanings given to the protest, and culturally integrated the different organisations (della Porta, Andretta, Mosca and Reiter 2005; Andretta 2005a). Vice-versa, single-issue movements are less participatory-oriented. Staggenborg (1988) and Kriesi (1996) found a correlation between decision-making centralisation, professionalisation and specialisation. When dealing with technical knowledge, single-issue organisations centralise their decision-making in technical bodies, since decisions need to be justified on the basis of the opinion of experts. Many NGOs which are involved in what Keck and Sikkink (1998) call "information politics" are organised in such a way. The decision-making can however be consensual or deliberative, since experts use rational and technical arguments to make their point, and
their decisions are problem solving oriented. Following Majone (1996), in fact, technical body oriented to problem solving are intrinsically non-majoritarian institutions, where ideas play an important role.

**Hypothesis 2c. Emphasis upon protest mobilisation (versus policy achievements) facilitates the development of conception of deliberative participation, while emphasis on effective decision-making and lobbying favours delegation of power**

Other things being equal, emphasis on protest brings about a “logic of membership” that favours participatory models. Studies on union democracy show that "radical" unions are more prone to advocate larger participation by members (Heckscher 2001). Class ideology and collective experiences (participation in strikes and demonstrations) significantly increase workers interest in workplace democracy (Collom 2000; 2003). Of the eight women's movement organisations examined by Jennifer Disney and Joyce Gelb in the USA (2000), those who privilege the mobilisation of women and cultural changes are more inclined to renegotiate internal decision-making in an inclusive way. Groups that use more disruptive forms of direct action, such as Earth First!, tend to be more able than moderate ones to implement internal communicative rationality (Whitworth 2003). A research on local movement organisations shows that the more a group emphasises the need for effective decisions and lobbying, the less their decision-making will be inclusive (Andretta 2005b).

**Hypothesis 2d. The framing of organisational difficulties as “crises of participation” favours a turn towards participatory models, with the development of either deliberative participation or assembleary models**

Francesca Polletta (1994) shows that faced with a programmatic crisis in 1964-65, the members of the Student Non-Violent Committee (SNCC), responded in three ways: by shifting the discussion from program to structure; by exhorting each other to let the people decide, and by rejecting a national role for an exclusively local one. The shift toward a more inclusive participation at the local level derived from activists framing of the crisis as a participatory one, for which centralised decision-making at the national level was held responsible. Stefano Becucci (2003) suggests that during the nineties the Italian centri sociali reacted to the crisis of their ideologies (developed in the seventies) with the elaboration of more open identities and more inclusive forms of participation, as well as with a more pragmatic view of the relation with the social environment and the institutions.

**3.3. Repertoires of action**

Movement repertoires of action have an impact upon conception of democracy.

**Hypothesis 3a. Non-violent or/and creative repertoires of direct action are often linked with deliberative conception of democracy**

Especially social movements that embrace non-violent ideologies and practices—stressing value change—emphasise consensual internal decision-making (Kats and Kendrick 1990; Mushaben 1989). Indeed, consensus methods of decision-making are seen as a non-violent organisational strategy, which does not repress internal minorities (Veltri 2003). Violent forms of action instead require discipline and hierarchical values, as the case of left-wing terrorist organisations shows (della Porta 1995). More generally if there is a search for innovative and creative forms of action, deliberation may be useful, because it
gives everyone the possibility to freely express his/her ideas. In an interesting experiment Walter Podilchak (1998) shows that when a group search for intrinsically rewording form of protest (such as happenings etc.), it develops a circle of inclusionary organising, consensus decision-making, interpersonal collective bonds and personal attachment.

Hypothesis 3b. *The use of new technologies (such as internet) facilitate the decentralisation of internal decision-making and the direct participation of members*

New technologies help implementing a deliberative style of democracy. Measuring the quality of communication democracy by the degree of information access, preferences weight, deliberation and group mobilisation, Damian Tambini (1999) shows that this is the case for civic networks in Europe and US. This hypothesis is also consistent with the work by Bennett (2003) on transnational social movements, and it proved useful also in traditionally more hierarchical organisations such trade unions. Daniel Cornfield (1994) for instance, by focusing on examples from Australian, Swedish, West German and U.S. unions, confirms that the introduction of the new technologies allows for members to be more involved in the decision making process (for a case study on Brazil, see also Martinez-Lucio 2003). This hypothesis has been confirmed for international regulatory organisations too. According to Hans Klein (2001), the Internet Corp for Assigned Names and Numbers, a regulatory organisation with a globe scope, approached an internal democratic decision-making via the Internet, which is missing in other international regulatory organisations. However, two factors affect the communicative outcome of the Internet use: the type of organisation (centralised vs. decentralised) and the age of the organisation (old organisations tends to incorporate the use of internet into the old logic of internal communication, while new ones tend to use internet in order to improve internal communication) (Ward 2001). Besides Internet, also traditional radio when used for political activism has been found as an important vehicle of radical democracy (Howley 2000).

Summarising, the following sets of variables emerge as relevant for our research (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Specification of the explanatory model for democratic conception (based upon internal movement characteristics)

**Ideology/frame/identity:**
- anti-hierarchic vs. hierarchic values
- heterogeneous vs. homogenous frames
- multiple vs. single issues
- emphasis upon mobilization vs. lobbying
- crisis of participation

**Organizational structures**
- Decentralised vs. centralised structures
- Existence of rules of internal communication/decision

**Action:**
- Non-violent vs. violent repertoires
- Creative vs. non creative tactics
- Use of new technologies

**Democracy**
Conception and practices of democracy (see figure 1)
Beyond internal characteristics, various sets of external resources and opportunities influence movements’ conceptions and practices of democracy.

The micromobilisation potential influences movement conceptions and practices of democracy. Social movements mobilise constituencies that share a critical view of the political world. Bert Klandermans (1988) has defined the *micromobilisation* potential as the people within a society that sympathise with social movements means and ends. Social movements elaborate frames that interpret the political situation in a way that justifies the mobilisation of people against perceived injustice (Snow et al. 1986; Gamson 1992). For social movements to be successful in the mobilisation process, it is necessary a "linkage of individual and SMO interpretative orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals and ideology are congruent and complementary" (Snow et al. 1986, 464). Finally social movements micromobilisation potential is larger when people are also convinced that collective action is an effective means for overcoming the sources of grievances—what McAdam (1982) calls the "efficacy" side of “cognitive liberation”. Potential for mobilisation within a society can be grasped by looking at citizens’ perception of the reality, and its degree of proximity to social movements frames. In particular, do citizens see the global justice movements as positive carriers of their demands (carriers of protest)? And, do citizens think that social movements are effective actors? There are of course intervening factors that complicate the picture and must be taken into consideration. The amount of citizens sharing to social movements’ views does not directly translate into mobilisation "potential". First, when social movements are more visible they polarise opinions. Second, the presence of shared views may be either a potential for mobilisation, or an effect of the mobilisation itself. Third, citizens who share similar opinions must be reachable by social movements messages in order to be mobilised. With these caveats in mind, we could assume that:

*Hypothesis 4a. The more widespread the trust in the global justice movement, and the higher the belief that it is effective, the higher the propensity to participate in it. This increases the internal plurality of the movement, as well as the desire to address different publics. Both participation and deliberation would be favoured.*

Traditionally, the more isolated a movement, the more sectarian and secretive its organisational structure (della Porta 1995). To the opposite, the larger the mobilisation potential for a movement, the more open its organisational structure. An indicator of the mobilisation potential for the global justice movement is citizens' opinions on it. Social movements are rarely trusted by the majority of citizens, but the global justice movement seems to be an exception: according to a Eurobarometer Survey, concluded in 2003, as many as 51% of citizens in France, 47% in Spain, 41% in UK, 36% in Germany and 33% in Italy declare to trust it. Strong trust, however, is much lower ranging from 14% in Spain to 6% in Germany (table 1). Besides, many citizens think that the global justice movement should have more influence on the process of globalisation: 61% of respondents in Italy, 55% in Spain, 48% in Germany, 47% in France, but only 36% in UK, state, in fact, that the global justice movement does not have enough influence on globalisation (table 2). More than 70% of citizens in each country thinks that the global justice movement raises points that deserve to be debated, and over 60% of the citizens (except for the Spanish: 49%), thinks that it raises awareness of certain aspects of globalisation, while between 47% (France) and 32% (Italy) thinks that they propose concrete solutions to globalisations (table
3). For what concerns the “efficacy side” of this trust, between 41% (France) and 29% (Spain) think that the global justice movement is successful in influencing national political decision-makers; and, finally, more than 35% of citizens in all countries, except Italy (19%) thinks that it even manages to slow down the process of globalisation (table 4). These data tell us that there is in each considered country a large sector of population that trusts the global justice movement. Besides, there are many who think that global justice activists are not only right on the issues they raise, but also that they are also efficient in influencing decision-making and in slowing down the process of globalisation. Support for global justice activists seems somewhat higher in France and Spain, while the other three countries follow in various orders. According to our hypothesis, then, in all countries the global justice movements might experience pressures towards inclusive participation in the decision-making, although this will depend on how many citizens effectively join those organisations.

Table 1. Opinions on global justice movements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Do not trust</th>
<th>Don’t know/answer</th>
<th>Absolutely trust</th>
<th>Absolutely do not trust</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>45%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
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<td>56%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>42%</td>
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<td>14%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: our adaptation from “Flash Eurobarometer” on “Globalisation” (2003).

Table 2. Opinions on global justice movements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Too much influence</th>
<th>Not enough</th>
<th>The right level</th>
<th>don’t know/answer</th>
<th>Rank (not enough)</th>
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<td>18%</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: our adaptation from “Flash Eurobarometer” on “Globalisation” (2003).
Table 3. Opinions on global justice movements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Raise points that deserve to be debated</th>
<th>Raise your awareness of certain aspects of globalisation</th>
<th>Propose concrete solutions to globalisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes, rather</td>
<td>Don’t know/answer</td>
<td>Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Succeed in influencing national political decision-makers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, rather</td>
<td>Don’t know/answer</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Yes, rather</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage to slow down the process of globalisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, rather</td>
<td>Don’t know/answer</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Yes, rather</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: our adaptation from “Flash Eurobarometer” on “Globalisation” (2003).

3.5. Political opportunities

One of the most relevant theoretical approaches in the social movement literature has stressed the role of Political Opportunities (POS). The basic assumption is that the more a political system offers opportunities for social movements (open), the more moderate, single issues and open-structure they will be, and vice versa, the more a political system reduces access for social movements (closed POS), the more radical, ideological and closed-structure (della Porta and Rucht 1995). Drawing on previous research, we expect political opportunities to influence the level of mobilisation (Kriesi 1991; Tarrow 1989;
Kriesi et al. 1995), the strategies (Eisinger 1973; Kitchelt 1986), the ideologies/framing and
behaviour (Della Porta and Rucht 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995) and the organisational structures
of social movements (Rucht 1996; Kriesi 1996).

Applied to the global justice movement, we can expect the POS to account for
countries variation in three ways: a) by affecting the organisational dimension of this
movement, i.e. the size of mobilising structures within the movement, the
heterogeneity/homogeneity of the organisational frames (Clemens 1996) embedded in those
structures (formal/informal, centralised/decentralised, professionalised/participative and so
on), and their degree of coordination; b) by affecting the ideology of this movement, i.e. the
heterogeneity/homogeneity of political culture, ideas, and frames of the mobilising
structures within it, and the level of "cultural integration" (Gerhards and Rucht 1992), i.e.
the extent to which they elaborated a shared "master frame" (Snow and Benford 1988); c)
the action repertoire, i.e. the degree of radicalisation and innovation of those mobilising
structures. As we have seen before, these variables may have in turn a direct impact on our
dependent variable: visions of internal and external democracy, and internal democratic
practice.

Three dimensions of political opportunities appear as relevant: 1) the institutional
variables, such as the degree of territorial centralisation and functional distribution of
power (majoritarian versus consensual model of democracy); 2) the prevailing strategies of
the state in dealing with challengers; and 3) the alliance structure. We shall analyse those
three dimensions below, assessing the position of each country.

3.5.1. The institutional opportunities

Among the institutional variables considered as relevant for social movements are
the territorial division of competences and the functional division of power (Kriesi 1995;
Kriesi et al 1995; Rucht 1994; Rucht 1996). Territorial centralisation and functional
concentration of power reduce institutional channels for challengers; and vice versa.

3.5.1.1. Degree of territorial centralisation

Decentralised states tend to produce decentralised movement organisations. However, as Dieter Rucht (1996, 192) argues, "In the long run, this [decentralisation] encourages the formalisation of centralised and professional interest groups within the
movement (and movement parties)", while "strong executive power structures in a given
political system tend to induce a fundamental critique of bureaucratic and hierarchical
political forms, which is then reflected in the movements' emphasis on informal and
decentralised structures". Moreover, comparing France, West Germany and United States,
Rucht (1996, 198) found that in the two federal states the grassroots level of the movements
is much stronger than in the centralised France. In the USA and Germany, Rucht also found
a very strong interest groups’ type of social movements structure. This means that in
federal states we have both professional and a grassroots organisational structure, with all
together more space for participation. We can therefore put forward the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5a. Decentralised states induce decentralised social movements where it is
easier to implement participation. However, centralised states sensitise movements to the
critique of hierarchical models of democracy, and produce more explicit calls for participatory model of democracy. Finally, federal states in the long run encourage social movements professionalisation and this may shift internal decision-making toward an associational or a deliberative representation model.

Various indicators have been proposed for measuring the degree of decentralisation of local governments: demographic and geographical size of the local units; division of power with the centre, controls and financial relationships between the different levels of government. It was noticed however that, besides legal competencies, the peripheries might exercise an influence on the central state via political resources. If in the UK the local governments have, for instance, more legal competence, in France and Italy, however, the local governments have important political resources to play against the centre (Page 1991, 1-2). Looking at a mesolevel of territorial power, federalist and unitary states have been distinguished. According to William H. Riker (1964, 11), federalism is a political organisation in which the activities of government are shared between regional governments and a central government in such way that (1) two levels of government command above the same territory and the same persons; (2) every level has at least an area of responsibility in which it is autonomous and (3) there is some guarantee of autonomy in the sphere proper of every government. Western democracies have converged: if federal states became more coordinated, unitary states—such as France, Italy and Spain—developed a regional level of government (della Porta 2002). As indicated in the table below, our countries may be divided into unitary (France, Italy and UK), semi-federal (Spain) and federal (Germany and Switzerland) (table 4). However, Italy and France have recently increased the power of the regional level, as has the UK vis-à-vis Scotland.

Table 4. Degree of federalism and decentralisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Unitary</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Unitary</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Semi-federal</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unitary</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Our elaboration based on Lijphart (1999, 209)

3.5.1.2. Functional division of power

Political opportunities are also defined by the degree of functional division of power—what Arendt Lijphart (1999) synthesised in his "majoritarian" versus "consensus" models of democracy. As it is well known, a majoritarian model is characterised by such elements as concentration of the executive power: single-party governments; prevalence of the executive power; bipartisan system; majoritarian electoral system; pluralist systems of interest representation; unitary and centralised government; asymmetrical bicameralism or
monocameralism; no written constitution; parliamentary sovereignty in the legislative function; central banks dependence on the executive. If the majoritarian model is based upon a principle of exclusion of the minority, in the consensus one the dominant logic is the protection of the minorities. The consensus model foresees in fact: dispersion of the executive power in governments of large coalitions, equilibrium between executive and legislative power, multi-party systems, proportional electoral law, neocorporatist interest representation, federalism and territorial decentralisation, balanced bicameralism, rigid constitutions, constitutional control of the legislation, central banks independent from the executive. Functional concentration of power might impact on social movements visions and practices of democracy. While social movements are often critical of the way in which democracy is implemented at the institutional level (representative democracy), they tend to adopt organisational frames which align with the dominant and institutional organisational frames (Clemens 1996). Neoinstitutionalists would call this phenomenon "isomorphism" (Powell and Di Maggio 1991). In particular, we could discuss if:

Hypothesis 5.b. Consensus models of democracy offer institutional arenas and norms that facilitate consensus-building, and therefore deliberative conceptions of democracy. They however emphasise organised forms of democracy, where consensus is especially found among leaders of strong organisations with loyal members

Using some of Lijphart’s indicators, we observe that the degree of centralisation of power in the executive governments varies in our countries. A first indicator of the centralisation of power is the electoral system. A majoritarian (plurality) electoral system indicates a majoritarian model of democracy, in so far as it reduces the potential channels of access to decision-making; a proportional system instead increases (or, better, reflects) pluralism and facilitates social movements visibility (Kriesi 1995). On this variable, our countries include the UK, a typical majoritarian system, followed in the majoritarian side, by France and Spain. Switzerland, Germany, and Italy have a tradition of proportional electoral system, although in the latter the institutional reforms of the nineties introduced a mainly majoritarian electoral system (table 26A in appendix).

The electoral system is related to the type of coalitions in government. Consensus models are characterised by large coalition; single party governments with minimal winning coalition are instead indicators of majoritarian model. Moreover, the executive power tends to be stronger when there are single-party governments that potentially reduce the space for internal struggle, multiparty systems offer instead more point of access. Switzerland and Italy (especially before the electoral reform) belongs to the consensual tradition of large coalitions, Germany scores in the middle; France, Spain and the UK have high percentage of minimal winning coalition-governments (table 1A in appendix). The electoral law also influences the type of parliament. On the basis of the number of chambers, role of the committees, number and compactness of the parties in parliament, political scientists distinguished between two types. Adversarial parliaments are unicameral (or with only formal bicameralism); the committees have scarce power; there is a bipartisan system with very compact parties. This generally hands to an identification between majority and government (monoparty), with scarce autonomous power of the parliament. Polycentric parliaments are bicameral; plus have a strong system of committees and an elevated number of parties with a scarce internal cohesion. This strengthens the autonomy of the parliament vis-à-vis the government, by weakening the relationship between the parties that compose the majority and the government. The presence of a bi-cameral
symmetric parliament is an indicator of a consensual democracy. Among our countries, the UK is a typical example of adversarial type of parliament; Italy, to the contrary, had traditionally a polycentric type of debate (table 27A in appendix). Majoritarian models of democracy are indeed characterised by a bipartisan system; the number of parties increases in consensus models. The number of effective parties is traditionally high in Switzerland, Italy, and France; lower in Germany, Spain and (especially) the UK. In Italy, despite the mentioned reform of the electoral law, the number of parties is still high (table 28A see appendix). Synthesising the position on the different indicators into an index (calculated by summing up ranking position on the different variables), we have Switzerland and Italy characterised by a high degree of division of power, followed by Germany, and then Spain, France, and the UK leaning more towards the majoritarian model (table 5). Italy is distant from Switzerland because of the conflictual attitudes of elites, however. Thus, if other things were equal, consensus models of democracy would facilitate consensual decision making in Germany, Italy, and – especially - Switzerland.

Table 5. Index of functional separation of power between Parliament and Government (1=high separation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>points</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Our elaboration based on Lijphart (1999, 97)

3.5.2. Prevailing strategies

Another set of variables, however, intervenes to complicate the balance of political opportunities available for movements.

A number of scholars have emphasised that social movements are shaped by the political culture of the systems in which they mobilise (Kriesi et al. 1995; della Porta 1995; see della Porta and Diani 1999, 202-207, for a review). Hanspeter Kriesi has conceptualised this dimension by referring to state prevailing strategies, which he defines as "an overall understanding, among those who exercise effective power, of a set of precise premises integrating worldviews, goals and means". In his view the members of a polity elaborate different strategies in dealing with challengers, and "national strategies set the informal and formal rules of the game for the conflict between new social movements and their adversaries" (1989, 295). We can therefore hypothesise that:

Hypothesis 5c. Inclusive prevailing strategies provide norms and arenas for public deliberation, where however mainly bureaucratised and centralised associations will participate.
Historically, an inclusive tendency brought about more pragmatic and moderate challengers; vice versa, a repressive attitude brought about the prevalence in the left of the most radical ideologies (Rokkan 1982, 187-188). In general, most radical ideologies have been present in countries with low parliamentarisation, high obstacles in the representative system and political isolation of the working class movement (Bartolini 2000, 565-566). If in the UK and the Scandinavian countries, open and pragmatic elites avoided extreme forms of repression, in Germany, Austria, France, Italy and Spain they instead made recourse to violence in order to exclude the new groups from political representation. The effect has been a more polarised political culture in the latter countries. Bartolini (2000, 391-415, see table 7.15, 394) argues that levels of repression have been higher in France, Italy and Germany (to which we can add Spain). It is important to note that the logic of prevailing strategies move beyond the historical moment in which they have been shaped, since they are self-reproducing and self-perpetuating through political socialisation and interaction (Marks 1989). As Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani put it, “the tendency of national strategies to live on beyond the conditions which gave rise to them would help to explain reaction to new social movements. Political systems characterised by inclusion would be open to these new challengers as they had been to the old; systems with excluding strategies, in contrast, would continue to be hostile to newly emerging claims” (1999, 204). Prevailing strategies change, however. West Germany (along with Austria and the Netherlands) “immediately after the Second World War, if not earlier ... learnt to recognise as legitimate and even formalised interest groups representation and the influence that trade unions and employers exert over governmental decision making” (Flam 1994, 309). In France, Italy and especially Spain (with its late transition to democracy), exclusive tradition lasted longer, discouraging the development of consensual norms and deliberative arenas at the institutional level.

3.5.3. Alliance structure: the party system

The more the political system is closed, the more institutional allies are crucial for social movements. Besides, while institutional variables cannot predict the more fluctuating variation in social movements visibility and degree of conflict, the configuration of allies can (della Porta and Diani 1999, 213-222). As far as the alliance structure is concerned, many scholars contend that particular attention should be paid to the configuration of power in the Left. As Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani argue, "a whole series of potential exchanges develop between social movements and the parties of the left. As mediators between civil society and the state, the parties of the left need to mobilise public opinion and voters. For this reason they are far from indifferent to social movement pressure" (1999, 215). Allies facilitate social movements mobilisations, and help shaping their strategies. Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani (1999, 202-207) by reviewing the broad literature on social movements and left-wing parties relations isolate six factors that influence the propensity of the parties of the Left to act as social movements allies: the strength of left-right cleavage, the existence of party divisions within the Left, electoral instability, proximity to government, weight of the Left in the governmental coalitions, and its openness toward reform politics. When the Left is in the opposition, and/or it is open to reform politics, the electoral situation is instable and various left-wing parties compete with each other, the left would be more tempted to ally with movements. The social movement sector will be therefore more heterogeneous in terms of types of organisation involved in it,
including (centralised) political parties, the ancillary associations linked to them, and trade unions. In this case, the associational model of the more established organisations can be criticised from within by their rank and file activists with process of “social appropriation” and shift towards more participatory structures (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). Besides, a heterogeneous social movement sector can also push different organisations with different decision making styles in a dense network of interactions, which facilitates interorganisational communication and the adoption of a consensual method of decision-making at the interorganisational level. Indeed, this is what happened in Italy with the movement against neoliberal globalisation (della Porta, Andretta, Mosca and Reiter 2005).

We can therefore control if: 

Hypothesis 5d When the Left is in the opposition, internally divided, or anyhow open toward reform politics, the movement structure will be more heterogeneous, with a pressure towards more participation, as well as the creation of deliberative arenas

In a recent study of parties manifesto, all left-wing parties of western society appear to become more moderate, moving toward the centre of the political spectrum (Budge et al. 2001). This is also confirmed by a close look at the evolution of the left in most European countries (Bell and Show 2003). The movement toward the centre is especially evident in the UK where the New Labour in government turned toward a political position closer to that of the Conservative Party (Bara and Budge 2001): in issues such as social conservation (law and order), government efficiency and market economy the New Labour manifesto is not that far from the Conservative one. In Germany, the social democrats in government combine attempts towards welfare reform with statements in defence of social justice and environmental sustainability (Padget 2003); the anti-war position of the left-wing government reflects an opening towards social movements. In France, the Socialist party openness toward a plural left coalition makes it sensitive toward some of the issues raised by the movement against neoliberal globalisation—at least, one party fraction claims that working class and popular votes must be recaptured through more pronounced leftist policies, and Blair’s ”Third Way” is explicitly repudiated (Bell 2003). In Switzerland the Social Democratic Party advocates the protection of the socially weak and the environment, but the consociative government of which it is part constrains its range of action (Ladner 2001). In Italy, the DS, the strongest party of the centre-left oppositional coalition (which includes moderate parties, a communist party and a green party), has moved toward a centre position, by embracing ”economic modernisation and the liberal socialism associated with the ‘third way’ politics” (Bull 2003, 69; see also Favretto 2000). Here as well, a minority fraction presents a more leftist profile, proposing a programmatic alliance with the greens and the two communist parties. Finally in Spain, the Socialist Party with its long government experience from the eighties till the nineties, combined an orthodox economic policy with a certain emphasis on welfare state (especially after the unions general strike of 1988) (Kennedy 2003; Astudillo Ruiz 2001). After its electoral victory, Zapatero opened towards the movement on peace issues and individual freedoms.

While moderate-left parties have long been mistrustful of the global justice movement, “critical” left-wing parties (Communists and Greens) tended to ally with the movement (Andretta, della Porta, Mosca and Reiter 2002; 2003). These are however weak parties. In Italy Rifondazione Comunista got 5.0% of the vote in 2001, an another communist party (PCDI) which was born after a split inside the former party, got another 1.7% of votes. In France, the Communist Party reached its historical minimum in 2002,
with 5% of votes. In Spain, the Communists allied with the Greens (Izquierda Unida) had only 5% in 2004 national elections. Germany has a comparable (ex) communist presence, with the PDS getting 4.6% of vote in 2002 (table 6), but there is a great variation between the west and the east of the country: while in the former DDR the PDS gets about 13% of the votes, in the western states it takes only about 1%. As for the Green, in Germany and Switzerland they reach about 8% of the votes, although in Germany most of the votes are concentrated in the west side (only about 4% in the east). In Italy and Spain their votes have always been less than 3%, while in France they score about 5% (table 6). Other important allies are parties with extra parliamentary posture, that is the Trotskyite parties, which are stronger in France, where they achieved a 10% of votes in the last presidential election, but to some extent also visible in UK, where they do not participate in the electoral game, but play a visible role within social movements—see the Socialist Workers Party and their network, Globalize Resistance in the global justice movement we analyse. In the period under examination, the left is in the opposition in Italy, France and Spain (till 2004); the only potentially sympathetic government are the German and since 2004 the Spanish ones, while in the UK the New Labour has positions very distant from those of the global justice movement, and in Switzerland there is an all-party coalition (table 7).

Table 6. Leftist parties votes in the last two national elections, and their position within the political system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (Parliament)</th>
<th>Parti socialiste</th>
<th>Parti communiste</th>
<th>Ecologistes</th>
<th>Government/Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France (Assemblee nationale)</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (Camera dei deputati)</td>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Rifondazione Comunista</td>
<td>Verdi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Government (since 1998 RC opposition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (Bundestag)</td>
<td>Sozialdemokrat. Partei</td>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>Die Grunen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain (Cortes)</td>
<td>Partido Obrero</td>
<td>Izquierda Unida</td>
<td>Catalunia Green</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (House of Commons)</td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus, we should find more supporting conditions for participatory and deliberative models in France, Italy and Spain, where heterogeneous organisation models interact with each other. In Switzerland and UK we should find more autonomous global justice movements with weak relations with left parties.

Table 7. Typology of alliance structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main parties of the left</th>
<th>Divided left</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opposition</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.6. The policing of protest

The police forces often constitute the State’s most immediate face in the eyes of demonstrators, influencing their strategic choices: traditionally, very repressive strategies are reflected in radicalisation of forms of protest. At the same time, protest policing is a key feature for the development and the self-definition of the police as an institution and as a profession.\(^2\) Research has pointed out significant changes in protest policing in western democracies in the second half of the last century. The dominant model for controlling public order up to the 1970s, escalated force, gave low priority to the right to demonstrate, innovative forms of protest were poorly tolerated, communication between police and demonstrators was reduced to essentials, there was frequent use of coercive means or even illegal methods (such as agents provocateurs). In reaction to the “1968” protest cycle, a new model of negotiated control began to emerge, which saw the right to demonstrate

\(^2\) For a definition of protest policing see della Porta 1995, chap. 3. For a discussion of the various styles of protest policing in Europe and in the United States see della Porta and Reiter (1998).
peacefully as a priority, even disruptive forms of protest were tolerated, communication between demonstrators and police was considered basic to peaceful conduct of protest, and coercive means were avoided as far as possible, emphasising selectivity of operations (McPhail, Schweingruber and McCarthy 1998, 51-54; della Porta and Fillieule 2004). To these dimensions one might add the type of information strategy police forces employ in controlling protest, with a distinction between generalised control and control focusing on those possibly guilty of an offence. It should be stressed, however, that even “policing by consent” (Waddington 1998; della Porta and Reiter 1998), which became the dominant protest policing model in western democracies in the 1980s, is still a police strategy to control protest, albeit respecting demonstrators’ rights and freedoms as far as possible. The new strategy was also applied selectively, with harsher modes of intervention surviving in the interaction with small antagonist groups and, above all, with football hooligans.

After decades of apparent “normalisation” of the confrontation between police and protest, what was seen by many as the consolidated “post-68” standard, no longer in debate, proved fragile faced with the new challenge of a transnational protest movement (della Porta and Reiter 2004; della Porta et al. 2005, chap. 6). Indeed, in the history of the movement for “globalisation from below”, clashes between police and demonstrators have been frequent. The authorities mostly attributed responsibility for those clashes to the extreme fringes of the movement, alleged to have used urban guerrilla tactics, but also to the movement as a whole, accusing it of ambiguous positions on the question of violence. The police have, on the other hand, been criticised by the movement and a sizeable part of public opinion for disproportionate actions infringing the civil rights of the great bulk of peaceful demonstrators.

Criticism of the police extends to operations during the preparatory phase of demonstrations. They have been accused of trying to impede demonstrations (either by a ban or by obstructing access to the demonstration site; suspending the free movement of people inside the EU by reintroducing border controls; dubious intelligence activities and intrusive Internet surveillance; indiscriminate searches of private homes and organisations’ offices, on a feeble legal basis; and various acts of intimidation. It was however media images of police intervention during demonstrations that focused the attention of world public opinion on the conflict between police and protest. The police were accused of excessive use of force and indiscriminate use of teargas and less-lethal weapons, also on protestors not involved in violent behaviour or posing any threat to property or the police. The high point of escalation was marked by the use of firearms, first at Gothenburg (EU summit, June 2001) and then at Genoa in July 2001. Reports of unjustified arrests and, above all, disrespect for the rights of people in police custody, from verbal abuse to physical maltreatment, also accompanied numerous demonstrations. In our countries, since the 1970s the policing of protest has been tougher in Italy and Spain, softer in France, Germany, Switzerland and the UK, where however experiences with escalation of violence were far from rare. After 1999, coercive forms of police control have been deployed,

3 For a detailed account of the Genoa days see Gubitosa 2003.

4 Criticism was also raised with regard to the judicial proceedings: while for the trials of demonstrators some have talked of “judicial repression”, in connection with judicial proceedings against members of the police forces various human-rights organizations and institutions have warned of a climate of impunity; police faking of evidence against demonstrators was alleged in connection with proceedings concerning the events in Gothenburg, in Genoa and in Saloniki (EU-Summit, June 2003).
besides Genoa, especially in Switzerland (see Davos countersummits), France (Evian and Nice), Spain (Barcelona). On the basis of previous research, we can expect that experiences with repression have an impact on movement strategies and identities. We can discuss to which extent:

Hypothesis 6. In countries with repressive tradition, and lower trust in representative institutions, there is less availability for associational models of democracy, and, vice versa, propensity for direct action and participation

3.7. Cultural Opportunities

The political opportunity approach has been criticised for failing to recognise that “cultural and strategic processes define and create the factors usually presented as ‘structural’” (Goodwin and Jaspers 2004a, 27). Cultural factors filter the external reality, so that the opening of opportunities might pass unperceived or, alternatively, activists might perceive closed opportunities as being open (Kurzman 2004). Even former proponents of the concept of political opportunity structure have recently written that “opportunities and threats are not objective categories, but depend on the kind of collective attribution that the classical agenda limited to framing of movement goals” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, 45). The debate, however, goes beyond the role of perceptions to address the restrictive effect that the focus on political opportunities has had on social movement studies (Goodwin and Jasper 2004b). The emphasis on the political context has in particular obscured the role of discursive opportunities, such as the capacity of movements’ themes to resonate with cultural values. The cultural opportunity structure has indeed been defined as “the playing field in which framing context occurs” (Gamson 2004, 249). While they are also structural (in the sense that they are beyond the movement’s sphere of immediate influence), discursive opportunities are distinct from political institutions (Koopmans 2004; Polletta 2004). Cultural environments define the resonance of movements’ demands (Williams and Kubal 1999), and tend to be stable in time (Schudson 1989). The deeply embedded conception of citizenship as inclusive (that is, citizenship based on territorial criteria—”soil”) or exclusive (citizenship based on the conception of Volk, or “blood”) explains much of the mobilisation of the racist as well as the anti-racist movements (Koopmans and Statham 2000); the abolitionist movement succeeded when it could link its moral claims to dominant values (d’Anjou and van Male 1998); the way in which the abortion issue was discussed in Germany and the United States resonated with general themes of the national political cultures (Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards and Rucht 2002); the return of public opinion toward a general support of the public (versus the private) helped the development of the global justice movement (della Porta, Andretta, Mosca and Reiter 2005). To assess cultural opportunities for the global justice movement, we shall mainly look at: a) degree of pacification of old cleavages; b) polarisation of the political culture; c) frames of grievances.
3.7.1. Degree of pacification of old cleavages

The movement against globalisation could either represent the emergence of a new cleavage between winners and losers from the intensification of global communication and interaction (Bauman 1998, Kriesi 2003) or interact with other existing cleavages. An hypothesis is that when old cleavages (labour-capital, church-state, rural-urban, centre-periphery, perhaps also materialist/postmaterialist) have been pacified/accommodated, there is more space on the political and media agendas for the emergence of a new conflictual dimension (Kriesi et al. 1995). However, we can also expect that conflicts on globalisation and regional economic integration do overlap with pre-existing cleavages (e.g. the class cleavage and the centre-periphery one), especially when the latter have not been pacified. We shall therefore control if,

*Hypothesis 7.a. The deeper the class cleavage, the larger the presence of the “old left” (and its well-structured ancillary associations) in the global justice movement. In general, the less pacified the old cleavages, the more differentiated the configuration of actors within the GJM.*

According to Lijphart’s data (table 8), the socio-economic cleavage is still strong in all countries; the State-Church cleavage in Italy, Germany, and Switzerland, the ethnic one in Spain, the post-materialistic one in Germany. The index of religious fragmentation is low in Spain and Italy, high in Switzerland and Germany (table 3A); however, the State-Church cleavage is traditionally politicised especially in Italy, France and Germany. But while in Germany this cleavage has been pacified with the creation of a Christian-Democratic Party, which includes both Catholics and Protestants, in France and Italy the cleavage has mostly overlapped with the class-cleavage (for France and Germany, see Kriesi and Duyvendak 1995). If religious fragmentation varies, with higher values in Germany and Switzerland, interreligious conflicts are still open in the UK (see table 3A in appendix). The centre-periphery cleavage has more potential in Switzerland and Spain, with more radical forms in the latter. Although traditionally postmaterialistic attitudes have been considered as less widespread in Southern countries, little systematic cross-national difference emerges in the post-1970 cohorts (see table 2A in appendix).

Table 8. Cleavages in the party system (1945-1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>H</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Our elaboration based on Lijphart (1999, 101)

The class cleavage has been important for all European countries for two or more centuries. But, as a result of the “mid-century compromise” after world war II (Crouch
2001), and the building of an effective welfare state throughout Europe, both the transformation of the class structure and the increasing standard of living reduced the conflict between the workers and the bourgeoisie, and, as a consequence, the impact of this cleavage on the electoral behaviour (Franklin et al. 1992). Nevertheless the degree to which this old cleavage has been considered as “pacified” (or, at least, channelled into institutional politics) varies cross-countries: in Germany and Switzerland, with social democratic parties in power for long periods of time, modern systems of industrial relations institutionalised the role of the unions, reducing the salience of class conflicts (Kriesi and Duyvendak 1995). Class conflict remained instead more visible in France, Italy and Spain—countries characterised by a more exclusive tradition in dealing with the labour movement (see above the POS dimensions). In the UK, starting from the eighties, the class cleavage has largely overlapped with the regional one. The labour vote is concentrated in the North and the West of the country, while the Conservative vote is confined in the South-East. This was caused by the concentration of industrial activities in the North-West, and the third sector of the economy (services) in the South-East. This way class and regional cleavages tended to overlap (Budge 1992). Besides, in Italy and France (as well as in Spain) the split in the Left between socialists and communists, which had to compete with each other for the support from the same class, made this line of conflict more vigorous. If we look at the number of strikes and lockouts, and the number of workers involved in them, we find a cluster of countries which express high levels of labour conflict, such Italy, France, Spain, with Germany and Switzerland, with a less mobilised labour force; and the UK somewhere in the middle (tables 12A-14A in appendix). It is worth noticing, however, that protest on labour issues still account for very high percentage of unconventional participation even in countries where the class cleavage has been considered as tamed (for Germany, see Rucht and Neidhardt 2002). Postfordist evolution of the labour market and the crisis of the welfare state seem moreover to produce a remobilisation of the class cleavage (Andretta, della Porta, Mosca and Reiter 2003). Recomposing different cleavages implies the use of deliberative tools in order to develop common master frames. Discourse and consensus are necessary in order for this master frame to be built (della Porta, Andretta, Mosca and Reiter 2005; Andretta 2005a).

3.7.2. Polarisation of political culture

Another component of discursive opportunities for movements is the traditional degree of openness of the dominant culture towards challengers. A consensual culture is inclusive and open to compromise, adapting to emerging demands; vice versa, exclusive culture tends to repress opposition. As for our concern, we can discuss to which extent, ceteris paribus:

Hypothesis 7.b. Consensual culture facilitates discursive models of democracy, providing arenas for deliberation as well as norms favouring consensus building

Political scientists have tried to measure the degree of consensual political culture on the basis of the distance of positions in the party system: the traditions of our countries range from high distance in Italy, France, and Spain to low distance in the UK, Germany and Switzerland (table 29A in appendix). More recent data, referring to support for extreme parties, indicate less polarisation in UK, and Germany, medium in Spain and Switzerland, high in Italy and France (table 9). If we look at the distance between the strongest right-wing party and the strongest left-wing party again Italy, Spain and France appear to be
more polarised than the other countries (table 10).

Table 9. Polarisation index: support for communist, left-socialist, populist and ultra-right parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Our elaboration based Lane and Ersson (1999, table 5.4, 145).

However while in Switzerland and to a less extent in Germany a low polarisation is combined with a consensual democracy and an inclusive culture, in UK the low polarisation is combined with a strongly manipulative representation system, which marginalises minorities.

Table 10. Right-left scale distance between the strongest right-wing party and the strongest left-wing party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>1983 distance</th>
<th>1993 distance</th>
<th>Change %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>PS-RPR</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>-25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>PCI/PDS-DC</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>+10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>SPD-CDU</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>PSOE-PP/AP</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>-18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Lab-Con</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>-34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: our elaboration based on Mair (1997, 133)

3.7.3. Framing grievances

Citizen's visions of the problems are crucial. In particular, a) How much do citizens agree with social movements opinions on relevant issues (grievances)? b) How much do citizens agree on which institutions and collective actors are responsible for the problems they complain about (targets)? c) And do they trust the institutions of representative democracy (trust in institutions)? These dimensions are meant to capture the degree of agreement between citizens and global social movements on issues and actors. We assume that the more sensitive the public opinion to the grievances expressed by the movement, and the more congruent their perception of solutions with those proposed by the movements, the more a movement would moderate its frames in order to find large support. We can discuss if:

Hypothesis 7c. The larger the support for movement aims, the more a movement would try
to speak to a large audience, and therefore the higher the orientation towards consensus building, and the tendency to build deliberative forums (which can however be more or less participatory)

The recent European Social Survey (2002/2003), confirms that concerns expressed by the global justice movements are shared by a majority of the national public opinions, with however significant differences between our countries: 58.2% of the Germans, 62.5% of the Britts, 63.6% of the Swiss, 79.6% of the Italians, 79.7% of Spaniards, and 83.3% of the French think that their governments should reduce differences in income levels; between 65.8% (UK) and 77.5% (France) believe that "employees need strong trade unions to protect work conditions/wages"; and, finally, between 32.7% (UK) and 55.5% (Spain) believe that "economic growth always ends up harming environment." A contrario, a minority (larger in Germany and in Switzerland) agrees with the sentence "the less government intervenes in economy, the better for the country" (see table 11).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Government should reduce differences in income levels</th>
<th>Employees need strong trade unions to protect work conditions/wages</th>
<th>Economic growth always ends up harming environment</th>
<th>The less government intervenes in economy, the better for the country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Our elaboration from European Social Survey, [www.europeansocialsurvey.org](http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org)

The data collected in the PEW Global Attitudes Project (Spain and Switzerland are not included) also indicate that public opinions tend to see issues of inequality as urgent--many citizens in each country think that things changed for the worse in 2002 in issues such as jobs, working condition and gap between rich and poor. Germans and French are particularly pessimistic on unemployment and working conditions; the British public opinion is more afraid of cuts in pensions. The “critical” citizens are everywhere more than 60% on the issue - crucial for global social movements - of the gap between rich and poor (see table 12).
Table 12. Change for the better, and worse 2002 (Percent saying situation has gotten better or worse over past 5 years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Getting Worse</th>
<th>Getting Better</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>Working condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>77% 64%</td>
<td>58% 82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>53% 48%</td>
<td>54% 64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>80% 68%</td>
<td>50% 90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>47% 33%</td>
<td>59% 68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Thus, citizens share many concerns that are central in the public discourse of the global justice movements (see della Porta, Andretta, Mosca and Reiter 2005). In order to mobilise, however, they have to perceive those problems as being politically tractable, they must be interested in politics, and they must also be informed about politics. According to the European Social Survey, politics is important for 37.9% of the people in Switzerland, 42.3% in Germany, 24.9% in Spain, 25% in France, 24.4 in UK, and 33.2% in Italy\(^5\). Besides, 25% of respondents in Switzerland, 27.7% in Germany, 26.3% in UK, but only 10% in Spain, 15% in France, and 15.3% in Italy declare that they could take an active role in a group involved with political issues.\(^6\) This means that in Italy, Spain and France citizens are at same time more concerned with social problems and less available to (traditional) political involvement. The Pearson's correlations between the degree of agreement on the different grievances, the importance politics has for citizens and the extent to which citizens could imagine to take active role in groups dealing with political issues (tables 4A and 5A in appendix) show that the concern with the environment is significantly correlated with potential involvement in politics in each country, although more in France, Italy, Switzerland and the UK; the concern with inequality is correlated only in France, Germany, UK and Switzerland; while in no country the perceived need for strong trade unions is correlated with political potential activism.

A most important concern for the global justice movements is the effect of globalisation on own country. According to the PEW Global Attitudes Project (2002), in France 36% of the citizens think that those effects are "bad", in Italy 30%, in Germany 26% and in UK 21% (see table 13).

---

\(^5\) This variable is an 11 points scale between "Extremely unimportant" and "Extremely important". We summed up the percentage of people self anchoring from 6 to 11.

\(^6\) For this variable percentages show "probably" plus "definitely" respondents.
Table 13. Opinion on the effect of globalisation on own country 2002 (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Effect of globalisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


More recent data (2003), from a “Flash Eurobarometer” focused on “Globalisation”, allow measuring citizens’ awareness of the globalisation process, and the opinions attached to it. The awareness of the process of globalisation (inversely correlated with the percentage of citizens who do not answer to the different questions) is much higher in France and in Italy than in the UK, with Spain and Germany somewhere in the between. There is no significant cross-national difference in the percent of citizens declaring to be opposed to globalisation, the range of variation being between 27% (UK and Germany) and 33% (France) (table 14).

Table 14. Degree of awareness of, and opinions on, globalisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Heard of globalisation (Yes %)</th>
<th>Opinions on development of globalisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In or rather in favour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: our adaptation from “Flash Eurobarometer” on “Globalisation” (2003).

The global justice movement defines globalisation as a threat: this opinion is shared by about one third of citizens in each country, with the exception of France, where as many
as 58% are afraid of globalisation (table 15). Most citizens agree with the movements’ claim that globalisation needs more regulation: percents are particularly high in Italy and France, where about two thirds of the citizens agree with this statement (and about 50% in the UK and Germany) (table 16). The majority of citizens in each country agrees that regulating the process of globalisation is not only desirable but also possible. National differences can be found, however, if we consider the strong opinions, with the greatest amount of citizens saying that regulation is "certainly" possible in Italy and France (Table 6A in appendix).

Table 15. Opinions on globalisation as opportunity or threat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Globalisation is a good opportunity</th>
<th>Globalisation is a threat</th>
<th>Don’t know/answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: our adaptation from “Flash Eurobarometer” on “Globalisation” (2003).

Table 16. Opinions on regulation of globalisation (2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>More regulation</th>
<th>Less regulation</th>
<th>Current regulation sufficient</th>
<th>Don’t know/answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: our adaptation from “Flash Eurobarometer” on “Globalisation”

If we now consider the citizens’ perception of globalisation effects, the global justice movement finds consistent support for their opinion that globalisation has a negative impact on economic growth, employment, solidarity between countries, democracy at a world-wide level, public services, disparities between Northern and Southern countries, and the environment. On average, people seem to fear especially the effects of globalisation on
employment and inequality between North and South, as well as environmental problems. Fears for the negative impact of globalisation are particularly widespread in France, with the Germans more concerned with unemployment, the Italians with worldwide inequalities (tables 16A-21A in appendix).

Global justice movements blame different actors as responsible for the negative impact of the globalisation process, multinational corporations, financial circles and international institutions being the most targeted. The almost totality of citizens in each country under analysis (with a lower 75% in the UK) believe that multinational corporations benefit from the process of globalisation (table 22A in appendix), and an almost equally high percent believes that the financial markets benefit from globalisation (table 23A in appendix). At the same time large majorities in each country consider that multinationals have too much influence on the process of globalisation (with a lower 45% again in the UK) (table 24A in appendix). About two thirds of the citizens do not trust multinationals to ensure that globalisation goes in the right direction, while citizens who absolutely distrust them range between 39% (Spain) and 24% (UK) (table 25A in appendix). International institutions appear as more trusted, although 46% in Germany, about 40% in Spain and UK, and about 35% in France and Italy remain distrustful (table 8A in appendix). Altogether, citizens of France, Italy and Spain appear as more sensitised to the negative aspects of globalisation, sharing (being they aware of it or not) the movement’s concerns.

Social movements have been described as actors of democracy and allies of political parties but also, more and more, as surrogate for the declining capacity of representative institutions and parties to command loyalty and identification from their citizens. We can put the following hypothesis forward:

Hp. 7d. The more citizens are dissatisfied with the functioning of representative democracy, the stronger the movements’ appeals for alternative ones.

As far as satisfaction with democracy is concerned, in 2004 in Italy there is a strong majority of people dissatisfied with democracy in their own country, while the historical trend shows a slow decline. Germany falls on the scale of dissatisfaction with many ups and downs in time – with a decided jump up between 2001 and 2004. French rank of dissatisfaction is average and stable. In the UK, citizens’ dissatisfaction with democracy declines during the nineties, but increases between 1998 and 2004. Spain shows the lowest level of dissatisfaction with democracy in 2004, while its historical trend takes a U-reversed shape, with increasing dissatisfaction from 1992 till 1997, and then again a decline. Moreover, in all countries there is a large group of people who are not satisfied with the way in which democracy works in their own countries (table 17, and figure 4), and the opinion that national governments and national parliaments are not reliable is quite widespread in all countries (table 9A).

A large percent of citizens is also dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy at European Union level—in 2004, we find highest levels of dissatisfaction in Germany, followed by the UK and France. Italians have a middle position, and Spaniards show the least dissatisfaction. It is worth noticing, however, that there is a high volatility of opinions, and different trends in different countries (with a strongly-growing acceptance in Spain).
Table 17. Dissatisfaction with democracy in own country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UE</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Several Eurobarometer issues. The question was “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (your country)? Would you say you are ,,, ?”. Percentage are “not at all satisfied” + “not very satisfied”.

Figure 4. Trends of dissatisfaction with democracy in own country 1990-2004.
Table 18. Dissatisfaction with democracy in European Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>FR</th>
<th>IT</th>
<th>UE</th>
<th>DE</th>
<th>ES</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another indicator of trust in representative democracy is participation in elections, which shows a declining trend. Electoral participation is, in the nineties, still high in Germany and Italy, lower in the UK, Spain and France, and very low in Switzerland. A look at the last elections shows that electoral participation is still high in Italy, Germany and Spain, lower in France and UK, and still very low in Switzerland. A comparison between the last election in the nineties and the first election after 2000, reveals that electoral participation declined dramatically in UK, followed by Germany and France (Table 19).

Table 19. Electoral participation in % (1940s to 1990s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>First elections After WWII</th>
<th>Last elections in the 1960s</th>
<th>Last elections in the 1990s</th>
<th>Last election</th>
<th>rank</th>
<th>Difference between the 1990s and the 2000s</th>
<th>Decline rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>(1946) 71.5</td>
<td>(1968) 68.2</td>
<td>(1997) 68.0</td>
<td>2002 (64.4)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>- 3.6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>(1946) 89.1</td>
<td>(1968) 92.8</td>
<td>(1996) 82.9</td>
<td>2001 (81.3)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>- 1.6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>(1949) 78.5</td>
<td>(1969) 86.7</td>
<td>(1997) 82.3</td>
<td>2002 (79.1)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>- 3.2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>(1977) 78.8</td>
<td>(1996) 77.4</td>
<td>(1996) 77.4</td>
<td>2004 (77.2)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>(1945) 75.8</td>
<td>(1966) 75.8</td>
<td>(1997) 71.6</td>
<td>2001 (59.4)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>- 12.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>(1947) 72.4</td>
<td>(1967) 65.7</td>
<td>(1999) 43.3</td>
<td>2003 (45.0)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>- 1.7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: della Porta 2001; for Switzerland Bundesamt fuer Statistik 2002. For Spain 2000 data are available online: www.parties-and-elections.de/index

According to these data, we can only say that in all countries global justice grievances resonate with widespread public discourses. Resonance on global issues is somewhat higher in France, Italy and Spain, while resonance with existing critics of democracy is higher in Italy, Germany and France. This is consistent with what we know about the comparative strength and visibility of global justice movements in each country.
We can discuss during our research to which extent large potential mobilisation pushes the global justice movement to experiment with new forms of inclusion in the decision making process, in order to ensuring that this potential is translated into activism within SMOs.

3.8. Social Opportunities

Social opportunities are here understood as the availability of social capital for mobilisation in the forms of both associational traditions and action repertoires. The extent to which citizens act collectively and participate in associational life is important for block mobilisation in movements. Besides, the more citizens are used to participate in groups’ activities, the less the costs of collective action for social movements. Finally, the degree of participation in social organisations also indicates to what extent people share one of the most important instrument for social movements: collective action.

3.8.1. Associational membership

Traditions of high associational membership tend to be reflected in a large presence of hierarchical types of organisations, with consequences on widespread models of democracy. We can discuss if:

*Hypothesis 8a. Traditions of widespread associationism reduce the emphasis upon direct participation*

We can distinguish between three forms of associational participation: party membership, trade unions membership and membership in voluntary associations, SMOs, NGOs and the like. If at the dawns of the democracy the parties were loose aggregates of notables, gathered primarily around electoral committees, the development of representative democracy brought about the ideological mass party, with its permanent organisational structure, professional politicians and strong ideological membership. This type of party accomplished a function of social integration: it was not only able to represent its members, but also to offer them collective identities (Pizzorno 1996, 1018). The dense network of associations near to the party intervened in the most different aspects of the daily life. Research on the political parties has pointed out however that the ability of the parties to build identity has declined (della Porta 2001). The parties have evolved toward a “catch all model” (or professional-electoral, or cartel party) directed to conquer the largest number of electors through ideological moderation and the use of mass media.

Party membership varies however cross-nationally. Party membership is particularly low in France and the UK, but the decline in party membership in absolute members has been especially strong in France and Italy, while vice versa Spanish parties have gained members (table 20). In the European Social Survey, citizens who declare to be member of a party are very few: about 3%, with a very low 2% in France and a somewhat higher 3.6% in Italy.
### Table 20. Changes in party membership between 1980 and 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country*</th>
<th>% of members upon electors in 1980</th>
<th>% of members upon electors in 2000</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Changes in %</th>
<th>Changes in absolute numbers</th>
<th>Membership decline in %</th>
<th>decline rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-3.48</td>
<td>1,122,128</td>
<td>-64.59</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>9.66</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-5.61</td>
<td>2,091,887</td>
<td>-51.54</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-1.59</td>
<td>-174,967</td>
<td>-8.95</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+2.22</td>
<td>+808,705</td>
<td>+250.73</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-2.20</td>
<td>-853,156</td>
<td>-50.39</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-3.90</td>
<td>-90,800</td>
<td>-50.39</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The first elections oscillate between 1977 and 1980, the final one between 1998 and 2000.

Source: Our elaboration based on Mair e van Biezen, 2001. For Switzerland, source: Ladner 1995. According to Gruner (1977), there are about 390,000 party members in the mid 1970s (cited by Ladner 1999, 245). If we divide this number by the Swiss citizens, i.e. persons entitled to vote (3,735,037 persons in 1975), we get an organisational rate of about 10.4%. In relation to the number of electors, i.e. citizens who participated in the election, this rate amounts to about 19.9%. According to a survey among the presidents of cantonal parties, Switzerland counts about 299,200 party members in the mid 1990s (Ladner 1999, 246). Divided by the number of Swiss citizens (4,596,209 persons in 1995), one can think of an organisational rate of about 6.5%. If we take the number of electors, i.e. citizens having participated in the election, this rate amounts to about 16.1%.

### Table 21. Trade union density between 1950 and 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Trade union density 1 (% based on employed)</th>
<th>Trade union density 2 (% based on dependent work)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22. Organisational density, membership density, International non-governmental meetings and number of paid workers and unpaid volunteers of Non-profit section

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>NGOs: Organis. density for million of population</th>
<th>Only International NGOs: Membership density per million of population</th>
<th>Number of International non-governmental meetings according to the country in which the event was held</th>
<th>Number of paid workers and of volunteers of total non-profit-section in 1995/1996</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>29.4 25.6</td>
<td>73.7 110.4</td>
<td>857 963 723</td>
<td>959,821 1,021,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>8.2 10.4</td>
<td>67.0 102.7</td>
<td>462 549 443</td>
<td>597,655 565,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>9.3 11.4</td>
<td>51.5 78.5</td>
<td>715 656 502</td>
<td>1,440,850 978,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>4.2 7.5</td>
<td>87.1 139.4</td>
<td>366 421 356</td>
<td>475,179 253,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>25.3 31.6</td>
<td>68.1 105.8</td>
<td>754 765 510</td>
<td>1,415,743 1,120,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>98.6 96.1</td>
<td>477.9 726.5</td>
<td>286 365 301</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to official statistics, unions are stronger in terms of members in UK, Italy and Germany, followed by Switzerland; much weaker in Spain and France (table 21). The data from the mentioned European Social Survey (table 24) partially correct this picture: union membership emerges there as high in the UK and Germany (around 15%), and very low instead in Spain (around 5%), with the other countries in the between (around 8%).

As for associational membership, traditionally it has been considered as high in Switzerland, UK and France followed by Germany, with Italy and Spain showing the lowest scores (see table 22, and 10A to 11A in the appendix). The most recent survey, however, indicates a different trend: Germany ad Italy score higher than UK for humanitarian organisations, and although Spain and Italy have the lowest number of citizens in environmental/peace/animal and other voluntary organisations, in Germany membership in those types of associations is as high as, if not higher than, in France and in UK (table 23). This picture is somehow confirmed by data from other surveys (tables 24, and 10A, 11A in appendix).
Table 23. Citizens declaring to be member of different type of associations (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Trade Unions</th>
<th>Humanitarian orgs.</th>
<th>Environmental /peace/animal orgs.</th>
<th>Other voluntary orgs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: our elaboration from European Social Survey (2002/2003)

If we try to summarise the results with the help of a typology (table 24) based on party membership decline and the level of other and newer associations membership, we see that in Italy a high party membership decline is not compensated for by a high level of association membership. In this country there seems to be a high micromobilisation potential for new organisations that are able to include new members in the decision-making process (remember that Italians are the least satisfied with democracy in their country). Alternatively, old organisations may try to involve new members by opening up their decision-making. In France, UK and Switzerland, many members abandoned political parties and joined NGOs, environmental organisations and so on. In Germany we find a stable situation where people do not abandon parties, but at the same time strongly affiliate to other associations. Finally in Spain most of the people continue to join parties (hierarchically organised) instead of other forms of associations.

Table 24. Party membership decline and association membership level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties membership</th>
<th>Other associations membership level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong decline</td>
<td>low Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>high Spain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.8.2. Citizens repertoires of collective action

As already pointed out, mobilisation potential is also a function of citizens’ proximity to social movements forms of protest. An indicator is the extent to which citizens internalise and legitimise protest. We can control to which extent:

Hypothesis 8.b. The larger the support for forms of protest, the larger the attention to mobilisation (versus lobbying), and therefore the higher the tendency towards participatory conceptions of democracy

Opinion polls indicate cross-national differences in the degree and forms of protest,
within a common trend towards an increasing use of non-electoral forms of participation from the 1950s to the 1990s. In the 1990s, British respondents declare the higher percent of engagement in forms of political participation beyond votes (77), the Spanish ones the lowest (32), with all other countries near to 55% (table 25). More recent data indicate that while conventional actions such as signing a petition are widespread in all countries (except for Spain), Germans, Italians, Spaniards and French are more keen to participate in lawful demonstrations and more prone to join official strikes, and Italians and French (followed by Spaniards) more frequently than the others occupy buildings (table 26). World Values Survey data for the period 1995-1998 show two clear patterns: on one hand we have countries where conventional actions are more widespread (Switzerland and UK), on the other hand countries which score better as far as challenging acts (lawful demonstrations, boycotts, unofficial strikes, or occupying a building) are concerned (France and Italy), with Germany scoring high in both types, and Spain scoring low especially on moderate forms of action (table 27). As far as the labour conflicts are concerned, ILO data on strike (tables from 12A to 14A in appendix) indicate higher degree of conflict (in terms of number of strikes) in France, Italy and Spain (see figure 5). We don’t have data on number of strikes for Germany, but comparison in terms of workers involved in and days lost for strikes confirm Italy and Spain as the most conflictual countries (tables 13A and 14A in appendix).

Table 25 Participation beyond vote between 1959 and 1990 (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 26. Extent to which people have taken different political action for or against a particular cause

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1990-1993</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In percentage of all respondents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sign petition</td>
<td>Join boycott</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1990-1993 data West Germany only.
** UK excluding Northern Ireland for 1990-1993 data.


Figure 4. Number of strikes and lockouts each 10,000 paid employers
Table 27. Cross-national levels of Unconventional Political Participation (percentage active) during the nineties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Signed a petition</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Challenging act</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>51*</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36*</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>42*</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>37*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE (west)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE (east)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>75*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25*</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: Entries in the second column are the percentage of respondents who have engaged in at least one of the following acts: a lawful demonstration, a boycott, an unofficial strike, occupying a building. (ibid.)

The European Social survey data from 2003 somehow confirm those patterns: in Italy and Spain the number of those who sign petitions and participate in boycott is smaller than in other countries, while Swiss and British are less keen to attending public demonstrations. Finally, citizens used to illegal actions are very few in each country; only in France and in Italy they are more than 2% (table 28). Boycotts are however very much used also in Germany and Switzerland as well as in the UK. Summarising, we have a higher support for more disruptive forms of collective action in Italy, France and Spain; for more moderate repertoire in Switzerland and UK, and for both moderate and radical actions in Germany. As far as radical actions don’t become violent, and considering that when organisations focus on direct actions they are likely to adopt participatory decision-making (see endogenous variables), we could expect more propensity toward participation in Italy, France and Spain, less in Switzerland and the UK and middle or mixed in Germany.

Table 28. Citizens action repertoire in 2002/2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Signed a petition</th>
<th>Public demonstrations</th>
<th>Boycotts</th>
<th>Illegal protest activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Our elaboration from European Social Survey.
4. The cross national comparison: An introduction to what follows

We have until now defined the main dimensions of our research, developed some hypotheses and presented some data for cross-national analysis. We might add that we do not aim at locating our research within a strictly causal explanatory model, but more at producing empirically grounded observation referring to our sets of hypotheses. In the following part of this report, we shall see how these political, cultural and social opportunities interacted in the development of social movements, in general, and the global justice movement in particular. The remaining chapters are an original accounts on the characteristics of the left-libertarian movement family in all countries (women’s, ecology, peace, solidarity are covered in all reports), linking them to the respective labour movement. What emerges, together with the cross-country peculiarities, is an interesting picture of the diversities between the single movements in each country.

Some common cross-national paths are first of all evident in the timing of the movements’ evolution, with the radical 1970s, followed by the institutionalisation of the 1980s, and then the re-emergence of conflicts in the 1990s. In all country chapters, the 1990s emerge as the decade in which some characteristics of the global justice movement/s developed more or less at the margins of the main movement families: a) the return of direct action (e.g. in antiroad protest); b) the organisational networking in hybrid campaigns, platforms, coalitions (among which, peace and anti-war); c) the framing of “broker issues”, on which different movements converged. In all countries, transnational campaigns such as the anti-MAI, anti-Gatts, Jubilee 2000, as well as the Intergalactic meeting organised by the Zapatistas are relevant milestones in this process. The relevance of the transnational networks is rightly stressed in the chapter referring to transnational mobilisations. Relevant in all countries is moreover the mobilisation of a new generation of activists, that met with the (traditionally committed) ’68 generation.

Offering a first attempt at summarising the relevant characteristics of the global justice movement/s (GJM) in six European countries and at the transnational level, the remaining chapters cross-timely describe the main characteristics of the global justice movement/s in their respective contexts. They converge in singling out the presence of global justice movement/s—with a) well (and increasingly) networked groups, b) development of common meta frames on anti-neoliberalism but also global justice and radical democracy c) mobilisation in common campaigns. With different emphasis, the various chapters also seem to agree on the presence of some common characteristics of the various groups such as demands of participatory democracy, skills in communication, emphasis on knowledge, preference for loose networking (all visible, for instance, in the functioning of the social forums). All chapters stress however also some tensions in these mobilisations: ideological heterogeneity, but also deep differences in the conception of (internal) democracy and the repertoire of action. Indeed, the internal divisions in the global justice movement do not seem to refer mainly to the traditional movements as we have constructed them (the ecologists, the women’s, the peace movements etc.), but much more to other cleavages such as the direct action versus lobbying strategy (this is very clear in the UK), the “disorganisation” versus NGOs model (which emerges in Spain, but also in Italy, and the UK), etc.

Beyond these similarities in singling out some strengths and weaknesses in/of the global justice movement/s, specific national images emerge. At the risk of some simplification, we can single out the presence of two different constellations of GJMs: on
the one hand, the cases in which the national social issues seem more central (Italy, France and Spain); on the other, those in which they are less central or emerged later (UK, Germany, Switzerland). In the first constellation, protest dynamics appear as more dominant, unions are (more) present in the GJM, both in the forms of the “critical unions” that emerged in an already fragmented system of industrial relations, and in that of the left-wing component of the traditional unions. In general, the political opportunities appear as closed, and forms of action more radical. The GJM is stronger in terms of its capacity to mobilise in the street, more heterogeneous and decentralised, framing the struggle against neoliberism at home within a global discourse. In the second constellation, with more institutionalised systems of industrial relations, critical unions are weak or nonexistent and traditional unions, involved in neocorporatist agreements, remain more distant from the GJM (with the exception of public sector and metal workers unions). The role of strong associations and NGOs is more visible, although not unchallenged. With more open political opportunities, the GJM tend to prefer moderate, conventional forms, relying less on street mobilisation. The global justice issues are framed especially (although not only) in terms of solidarity with the South.

There are, however, also national peculiarities within each constellation.

A characteristic of the Italian movement seems to be its networking of the most diverse organisations and groupings, that converge in the critique not only of a right-wing government of a very special type, but also of the inconclusiveness of the centre-left in opposition and, even more, its neoliberal twist when in government. The development of alternative discourses and strategies within the Left, as well as the opposition to the centre-right government seems to be particularly relevant in keeping together groups that are very different in terms of organisational structures and repertoire of action.

The chapter on the Spanish case, although emphasising the internal cleavage between decentralised, disorganised groups and more (socialist)state-sponsored ones, also points at a convergence in the GJM of old and new families of leftwing movements, explaining at least its mobilising capacity by the support of the PSOE (then in opposition), and the decline in mobilisation as a consequence of the new (centre)left government. Forms of action and organisations reproduce the split between an institutionalised part of previous movements (well integrated in state agencies etc.) such as the women’s movement, and the permanence of radical conceptions of struggles.

In France, the role of ATTAC as well as of “Le Monde Diplomatique” seems to have helped painting an image of the GJM as mainly formed by intellectuals, even though interested in “social issues”. On the basis of the French report, but also the two books recently published on the GJM in France (Agrikoliansky, Fillieule and Mayer 2005; Agrikoliansky and Sommier 2005), it seems that although social issues have emerged as central in France in the two different frames of the movements de sans and the unions’ defence of the welfare state, these networks still feel marginal in the main initiatives of the GJM and dominated by intellectuals. The traditional strength of “old” social movements (and the weakness of the new ones) as well as the centralisation of French politics and the role of intellectuals seem to be reflected in this picture of the GJM characteristics.

The chapter on the global justice movement in the UK describes the crossing of (and tensions between) a network of formalised and well-established organisations, and the survival (or even radicalisation) of direct action groups (antiroad, but also the Liverpool dockers) whose identity is strongly focusing on the organisational and strategic choices that
differentiate them from NGOs practices. In the Jubilee 2000 campaigns this tension is very visible, and it seems that—even if reduced—is never resolved.

The chapter on Germany stresses the rootage of the GJM in issues of development and solidarity with the South, represented by the BUKO as a central arena. However, the public image of the GJM is dominated by the German Attac branch, that has experienced an enormous rise. Forms of action and organisational structure seem to reflect the high degree of institutionalisation of the German movement family/ies, with the dominance of well structured and resource rich church sponsored as well as ecological groups, although with tensions with some more radical, anarchist groups. Due to the fragmentation of the left a coherent networking that would include the complete spectre could not develop.

Similarly, the Swiss movement appears as characterised by a strong role of well established Third World and ecological associations, although with strong divisions with a more radical (and less structured) component. In both cases, unions are present—and this represent to some extent a novelty—but occupy a less central role than in Southern countries.
References


Princeton University Press.


New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kriesi Hanspeter, Koopmans Ruud, Duyvendak Jan-Willem, and Marco Giugni, eds. 1995.
New Social Movements in Western Europe. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press.


**Web-Sources for statistics**

Data on political parties and elections, various years: http://www.parties-and-elections.de/index

Eurobarometers (democracy), various years: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/standard_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/standard_en.htm)


European Social Survey, 2002/2003: [www.europeansocialsurvey.org](http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org)

International Labour Organization (ILO)’s data, various years: [http://laborsta.ilo.org](http://laborsta.ilo.org)

### Appendix

Table 1A. Single party government with minimal winning coalition (1945-1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Our elaboration based on Lijphart (1999, 334)

Table 2A. Distribution of postmaterialistic attitudes by cohort 1973-91 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohorts born in</th>
<th>1901-10</th>
<th>1911-20</th>
<th>1921-30</th>
<th>1931-40</th>
<th>1941-50</th>
<th>1951-60</th>
<th>1961-70</th>
<th>Post 1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lane and Ersson (1999, 122)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3A. Religious fragmentation index 1900-1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Our elaboration based on Barrett, 1982; Encyclopedia Britannica, 1995 in Lane and Ersson (1999, table 2.2, 46)

### Table 4A. Degree of politisation of different issues (Pearson correlations between agreement in different sentences and how important is politics in your life)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Government should reduce differences in income levels</th>
<th>Employees need strong trade unions to protect work conditions-wages</th>
<th>Economic growth always ends up harming environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>.07**</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>.06**</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>0.7**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>.08**</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>.12**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Our elaboration from European Social Survey, [www.europeansocialsurvey.org](http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org)

### Table 5A. Degree of politisation of different issues (Pearson correlations between agreement in different sentences and could take an active role in a group involved with political issues)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Government should reduce differences in income levels</th>
<th>Employees need strong trade unions to protect work conditions-wages</th>
<th>Economic growth always ends up harming environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>.07**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>.07**</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>.18**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Our elaboration from European Social Survey, [www.europeansocialsurvey.org](http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org)
### Table 6A. Opinions on controls on globalisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t know/answer</th>
<th>Yes certainly</th>
<th>No, certainly not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td><strong>22%</strong></td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td><strong>31%</strong></td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td><strong>13%</strong></td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td><strong>11%</strong></td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td><strong>18%</strong></td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: our adaptation from “Flash Eurobarometer” on “Globalisation” (2003).

### Table 7A. Opinions on globalisation effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rather positive</th>
<th>Rather negative</th>
<th>No effect</th>
<th>Don’t know/answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: our adaptation from “Flash Eurobarometer” on “Globalisation” (2003).
Table 8A. Opinions on globalisation actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Do not trust</th>
<th>Don’t know/answer</th>
<th>Absolutely trust</th>
<th>Absolutely do not trust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: our adaptation from “Flash Eurobarometer” on “Globalisation” (2003).

Table 9A. Un/reliability of national institutions (% No)

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Source: Our elaboration based on Eurobarometer
Table 10A. European and World Value Surveys. Questions: Which, if any, do you belong to?

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<td>Third</td>
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<td>ity action</td>
<td>world/hu</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>man rights</td>
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* 1990-1993 data West Germany only.
** UK excluding Northern Ireland for 1990-1993 data.


Table 11A. European and World Value Surveys. Questions: a) Which, if any, are you currently doing unpaid work for?

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<td>world/hu</td>
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<td></td>
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* 1990-1993 data West Germany only.
** UK excluding Northern Ireland for 1990-1993 data.

Table 12A. Number of strikes and lockouts each 10,000 paid employers* country and * year

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* excluded agriculture and public administration
Source: our elaboration from International Labour Organization (ILO)’s data: [http://laborsta.ilo.org](http://laborsta.ilo.org)

Table 13A. Number of workers involved in strikes and lockouts each 1,000 paid employers* country and * year

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* excluded agriculture and public administration
Source: our elaboration from International Labour Organization (ILO)’s data: [http://laborsta.ilo.org](http://laborsta.ilo.org)

Table 14A. Number of days not worked for strikes and lockouts each 1,000 paid employers* country and * year

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* excluded agriculture and public administration
Source: our elaboration from International Labour Organization (ILO)’s data: [http://laborsta.ilo.org](http://laborsta.ilo.org)
Table 15A. Opinions on globalisation effects

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Source: our adaptation from “Flash Eurobarometer” on “Globalisation” (2003).

Table 16A. Opinions on globalisation effects

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Source: our adaptation from “Flash Eurobarometer” on “Globalisation” (2003).

Table 17A. Opinions on globalisation effects

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Source: our adaptation from “Flash Eurobarometer” on “Globalisation” (2003).
Table 18A. Opinions on globalisation effects

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Source: our adaptation from “Flash Eurobarometer” on “Globalisation” (2003).

Table 19A. Opinions on globalisation effects

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Source: our adaptation from “Flash Eurobarometer” on “Globalisation” (2003).

Table 20A. Opinions on globalisation effects

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
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<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: our adaptation from “Flash Eurobarometer” on “Globalisation” (2003).
Table 21A. Opinions on globalisation actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know/answer</th>
<th>Yes absolutely</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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</table>

Source: our adaptation from “Flash Eurobarometer” on “Globalisation” (2003).

Table 22A. Opinions on globalisation actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know/answer</th>
<th>Yes absolutely</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>ES</td>
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<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: our adaptation from “Flash Eurobarometer” on “Globalisation” (2003).

Table 23A. Opinions on globalisation actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Too much influence</th>
<th>Not enough</th>
<th>The right level</th>
<th>don’t know/answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: our adaptation from “Flash Eurobarometer” on “Globalisation” (2003).
Table 24A. Opinions on globalisation actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Do not trust</th>
<th>Don’t know/answer</th>
<th>Absolutely trust</th>
<th>Absolutely do not trust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: our adaptation from “Flash Eurobarometer” on “Globalisation” (2003).

Table 25A. Disproportionality in the election for the legislative (1945-1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Disproportionality</th>
<th>Electoral system</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>21.08</td>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>Proportional, then mixed</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>8.15</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>10.33</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 26A. Number and type of parliamentary chamber

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Asymmetrical bicameralism, heterogeneous</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Symmetrical bicameralism, homogeneous</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Symmetrical bicameralism, heterogeneous</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Asymmetrical bicameralism, heterogeneous</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Weak bicameralism</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Symmetrical bicameralism, heterogeneous</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Our elaboration based on Lijphart (1999, 231)
Table 27A. Number of effective parties (1945-1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Minimal</th>
<th>Maximal</th>
<th>n. of election</th>
<th>rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Our elaboration based on Lijphart (1999, 97).

Table 28A. Overlapping, similarity and differences between parties, per country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Overlapping</th>
<th>Similarity</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR (PCF/UDR)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT PCI/MSI</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCI/PLI</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE (SPD/CDU-CSU)</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES (PCE/CD)</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (Labourist/Conservatory)</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH (PS/PDC)</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Our elaboration based on Sani and Sartori (1983, 324).
Democracy and Transnational Networks
in Global Justice Movements

Mario Pianta, Raffaele Marchetti, Martin Köhler

University of Urbino

1. Introduction and summary

This paper aims to offer a conceptual contribution to the understanding of transnational networks that have developed within the global justice movements in relation to the issue of democracy. While other research in the Demos project concentrates on the national level, this paper focuses on the transnational and global dimension of the global justice movements. In particular, it analyses the specificity of transnational networks, as distinct from domestic mobilisations, in terms of political environment, strategic role, and actors’ characteristics. Networks are characterised as *global* in relation to the issues they tackle, the political centres of power they challenge, the way they are constituted and operate.

Central to this paper is the issue of democracy, intended both in the context of the global system - how transnational decision making on global issues takes place - and in the context of civil society - how transnational networks and social movement debate, deliberate and carry out their activities.

The paper investigates four main issues: concepts, characteristics, mechanisms, and outcomes of the activities of transnational networks in the global justice movements. In the next section, on concepts, transnational networks and the wider global justice movements are set in the context of the relationships, at the global scale, between the spheres of politics, economy and society. Definitions are provided of the emerging global civil society, of the global movements that operate within it, and of the transnational networks that have emerged as the backbone of movements. The principles and practice of democracy in the global system and in civil society are also discussed. The project of globalization from below that characterises a large part of global activism is introduced, and contrasted with the dominant project of neoliberal globalization and with other strategies for adapting to global processes. Within this context, the political meaning of transnational networks is defined as forces for change at the global level, demanding democracy to the state system and economic and social justice to the economic system.

In section 3, transnational networks are analysed in their fundamental characteristics. The examination of the values and identities of the networks, as shared principled ideas, leads to the analysis of their political visions embedded in a wider context of projects of social change that emerge in parallel to the development of global movement activism. Some of these characteristics are widely present in global movements and are a precondition for the rise of particular networks, while other aspects evolve and mature through the very process of network building, influencing in turn the wider context of global movements. Within this context, political challenges and key actors are discussed, highlighting the specificity of transnational networks vs. the traditional practice of domestic coalition building.
In section 4, the functioning mechanisms of transnational networks are studied in terms of the "internal" network dynamics and of the "proximate" relationship between networks and the broader global justice movements, addressing the issue of democracy within civil society. Why and how do networks emerge as a specific form of communication, organisation, activism and strategy for political change within the broader context of global movements? What are the activities that networks carry out within the world of civil society? What are the democratic processes of deliberation, discussion, consensus building, egalitarian participation and joint construction of political agendas and campaigns that shape (or may be missing) in transnational networks?

Networks are built when a set of preconditions exist, in terms of values, identities and political projects, and when a critical mass of organisations and individuals from a large number of countries agree on the general "frame" and on the specific focus of the network, as well as on the process shaping its development. Its "internal" dynamics is determined by the strategic decisions of national, social and political actors to enter, stay or leave a network.

Networks activities are directed, on the one hand, to the "proximate" world of civil society and to the global justice movements and, on the other hand to the "external" world of global political and economic powers, discussed below. In the former activities, networks build legitimacy through the involvement of key civil society organisations in different national contexts and present themselves as a legitimate advocate of voiceless and yet general interests, reclaiming a role in the public space.

The "external" activities of transnational networks are addressed in section 5, with the campaigns directed to economic and political centres of power, as well as to public opinion, demanding democracy in the global system. The focus of the analysis here is on the strategies that are developed - protest, pressure, proposals and alternative practices - and on the outcomes of networks activities. The way economic and political centres of global power have responded to the demands of social movements shows the impact they have had and the actual possibility of democratisation of the global system. The final task of this section is the consideration of a set of indicators for measuring the impact of transnational networks that could be used in the rest of the research to test in practice and through the web surveying the actual democratic outcome of the transnational networks under scrutiny.

In section 6, the concepts and frames developed in the previous sections are used in order to provide a historical overview of the emergence of transnational networks. It is shown that the origins of transnational social movements and networks of organisations active on international issues lie in the movements that have developed since the 1970s around the themes of peace, human rights, solidarity, development, ecology, and women’s issues. A wave of state summits began in the mid-1970s, spurred by far-reaching political change and by economic developments. As global issues and supranational decision-making power became increasingly important, attention and action by civil society also increased. Moving on from traditional efforts to put pressure on nation-states, attention started to focus on global problems and on the failure of states to address them in events such as summits. Different streams of cross-border activism, dating from the 1970s, are analysed here. They include the activities of international NGOs operating in several countries; the growth of parallel summits organised at meetings of international institutions; the emergence of international civil society meetings, and most recently, the appearance of global days of actions organised by the global justice movements.
The conclusions, in section 7, summarise the frame of operation, the challenge and the strategies of transnational networks in the global justice movements.

2. Concepts

2.1. Global politics, economy and society

Many studies of political mobilisations, economic conflicts and social movements developed around global issues have tried to understand them by extending in various directions the model of national social movements to a context of (limited) transnational actions. While there is no shortage of empirical cases that fall into the pattern of a limited transnationalisation of domestic activism, we believe that this approach is unable to capture the fundamental novelty of the global mobilisations on global issues of the last two decades, that have become mass social movements at least since 1999. In this section we outline the key concepts that are needed, in our view, to address and understand global movements.

Figure 1. Global politics, economy and society: the relationships between different spheres

The global activism of the last two decades has to be understood in the context of the evolving relationships between the spheres of politics, economy and society on global issues, resulting from the increasing international integration that has emerged since the 1980s. Figure 1 summarises the key concepts and relationships that we consider as useful starting points for the analysis.
At the global level, the sphere of politics is structured by the inter-state system, where national states, international and supranational institutions exercise their power. While at the national level the political relationships between state and citizens have been defined by constitutions, law and democratic processes, at the global level no universally coercive power of law has yet emerged, and no democratic processes of participation, deliberation and vote have developed for the world citizens. Leaving aside the problems resulting from the lack of global democracy, that will be addressed below, at the global level the operation of the politics has tried to develop new rules for economic and social activities, appropriate for the new context of globalization.

The sphere of the economy is structured, at the global level, by the operation of firms and markets, dominated by the search for profits and by a drive to turn into commodities an increasingly wide array of activities previously provided and regulated by states and society, from knowledge to education and health, from public services to global public goods such as water and environmental protection. The resulting privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation have characterised since the 1980s the model of neoliberal globalization that has asserted the power of markets and large industrial and financial firms over decisions made in the political sphere and over social behaviours.

At the global level, the web of social activities can be characterised as an emerging global civil society, defined as follows:

*the emerging global civil society can be defined as the sphere of cross-border relationships and activities carried out by collective actors - social movements, networks and civil society organisations - that are independent from governments and private firms, operating outside the international reach of states and markets*.\(^1\)

Demands that have emerged here vis-à-vis the political and economic spheres can be summarised as follows: a) demands by global civil society for global democracy, human rights and peace to the state system; b) demands by global civil society for global economic justice to the economic system; and c) demands by global civil society for global social justice and environmental sustainability to both systems. Conversely, both the state and the economic systems have put pressure on global civil society to adhere to their own values and norms.

At the national level, modern definitions of civil society have emphasised its separation and autonomy from both the state and the economy and have looked at it as the contested terrain where hegemonic projects are developed. Since the 1980s, a growing networking, activism and social mobilisation has addressed global issues, defended fundamental rights and advocated change in a transnational perspective. The demands and activities of civil society moved beyond their interaction with the national political and economic spheres, and challenged political and economic power across and above national

---

\(^1\) A growing literature has addressed the definition of civil society, from its origins in Ferguson, Hegel, Tocqueville, to the critique of Marx, and the modern meaning emerging with Gramsci (Bobbio 1976; Gramsci 1971). See (Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2001; Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2002; Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2003; Chandhoke 2003; Cohen and Arato 1992; Falk 1992; Falk 1999; Kaldor 2003; Lipschutz 1992; Pianta 2001, 171). According to the UNRISD definition, “Civil Society is a complex social arena, with individuals and groups organized in various forms of associations and networks in order to express their views and fulfil their interests. They could constitute anything from a global advocacy movement down to a village self-help group.” (UNRISD 2003, 1).
borders, questioning some fundamental aspects of the nature of the inter-state system and of the global economy. The increasing transnational nature, vision, scope and activities of civil society have made it possible to identify a growing field of activism with a distinctly global frame, identity and scale of operation. The autonomy from the territorially bound nature of sovereign states has made it possible for civil society (and, more precisely, for major actors within it) to define itself on the basis of values and identities that transcend national/state loyalties, to act on global issues and to co-ordinate action across boundaries.

2.2. Global social movements

The view of the emerging global civil society as a sphere of relationships among highly heterogeneous actors leaves the field open for a more focused definition of different types of mobilisations on the global challenges addressed by civil society. Global social movements are the key actors of protest within global civil society, and we can now propose a tentative definition, trying to integrate the different approaches discussed in the Demos project:

**global social movements are cross border, sustained, and collective social mobilisations on global issues, based on permanent and/or occasional organisations, networks and campaigns with a transnational coordination, moving from shared values and identities, challenging and protesting economic or political power, campaigning for change in global issues. They share a global frame of the problems, have a global scope of action and may target supranational or national targets.**

The focus of the analysis in the rest of the paper - and in the Demos project - is on the global social movements that have challenged the dominant model of relationship between global politics, economy and society, that can be defined as neoliberal globalization.

2.3. The global justice movements

While a great variety of different mobilisations can be identified in this area, we will refer to them with the general term of global justice movements, because all of them share values and identities opposed to neoliberal globalization, they have woven together and increasingly tight network of coalitions and campaigns and they have regularly met and planned initiatives in major global events, from a long series of parallel summits to the sequence of World (and regional) Social For a.

---

2 Della Porta and Diani (della Porta and Diani 1999) suggest that (national) social movements are defined by four key aspects: informal interaction networks, shared beliefs and solidarity, collective action focusing on conflicts, use of protest. The above definition focuses on global issues and movements as distinct from simply transnational ones. According to Sidney Tarrow (Tarrow 2001, 11), transnational social movements are “socially mobilized groups with constituents in at least two states, engaged in sustained contentious interactions with power-holders in at least one state other than their own, or against an international institution, or a multinational economic actor”.

3 The importance of social movements in the global system had been pointed out by (Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein 1989). The emergence of global social movements is examined, among a rapidly glowing literature, by (Amin and Houtart 2002; Andretta, della Porta, Mosca and Reiter 2002; Broad and Heckscher 2003; de Sousa Santos 2003; della Porta and Tarrow 2004; Grzybowski 2000; Houtart and Polet 1999; Klein
The strategies that can be identified within the global justice movements will be discussed in section 4, whereas a historical reconstruction of major developments and events of the global justice movements will be provided in section 6.

The emergence of the global justice movements can be traced in two processes: the move of activism from the national to the global scale, and its broadening from single issue mobilisations of individual organisations to a more comprehensive view and understanding of the challenges raised by neoliberal globalization. Its origins lie in the social movements developed around the themes of peace, human rights, solidarity, development, ecology, labour, and women’s issues. Starting with their own specific issues, they have developed an ability to address problems of a global nature, build information networks, stage actions, find self-organised solutions across national borders, interacting in original ways with the new sites of supranational power.

2.4. Transnational networks

A final, important definition concerns transnational networks. Within the global justice movements, a global network can be defined as follows:

_a global network is a permanent coordination among different civil society organisations (and sometimes individuals, such as experts), located in several countries, based on a shared frame for one specific global issue, developing joint campaigns and social mobilisations against common targets at national or supranational level._

Transnational networks are key actors with a major role in terms of aggregation of social forces, development of common identities, formulation of campaigning strategies, and implementation of political struggles. In the last two decades, cross border networks of civil society organisations have been the most typical actor promoting political and economic change on global issues. Transnational networks can thus be considered as the backbone of social movements engaged in the political struggle for global justice.

Transnational networks are usually characterised for their advocacy function toward the promotion of normative change in society, but they may also carry out alternative practices (such as fair trade) that are largely separated from the spheres of global politics and the global economy. While transnational networks' success in promoting change will be discussed in section 5 of this paper, for the moment suffices to hold that “when they succeed, advocacy networks are among the most important sources of new ideas, norms, and identities in the international system” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, X).
The main reason for focusing on transnational networks in this analysis of global social movements is that, differently from the national case, the actors drawn together by activism do not easily share the same issue frames, political cultures, repertoires of action, nor a language, in most cases, for that matter. Within a national civil society, the common language, culture and experience makes the rise of collective action easier, involving both organisations and individuals, with a highly informal pattern and fuzzy edges of the movement. At the global level, such common ground cannot be taken for granted and has to be slowly built by deliberate, long term efforts of organisations with substantial resources. In the case of the global justice movements, the complexity of global issues and the resources needed for acting on them are major barriers to entry in the field of global activism. Transnational networks, building on shared values, identities, mutual trust and common visions and strategies among organisations of different countries, have represented a major way for lowering such barriers and allowing a broader participation to global campaigns.

This is not to say that all global movements need transnational networks, nor that networks are a sufficient condition for the emergence of global social movements. Cross border mobilisations may develop on "backbones" different from organisation-based networks, assuming different forms, models and duration (an example may be Interned-based global campaigns). The experience of civil society organisations is also full of international coordinations that have never grasped the challenge of global issues, nor led to broader social mobilisations (an example may be the international trade union movement).

2.5. Democracy in the global system

Democracy is a crucial element in all the above discussion. The concepts and practices of democracy have assumed their more advanced formulation in the constitutions, laws and practices of democratic states, where equal citizens elect and control a sovereign, legitimate and accountable government, and participate to democratic processes, both deliberative and decisional, through a rich variety of social and political mechanisms, including political parties, trade unions and civil society organisations, the media and public opinion, etc.

At the global level very few traces of democracy resembling the national dynamics can be found. The inter-state system is made of unequal states whose external relations do not follow the democratic principles that may be present within them. Powerful states make decisions that affect the lives of citizens in other countries. Individuals have no status as citizens of the world, and their fundamental human rights are only now starting to be recognised as worth protecting beyond the boundaries of sovereign states. Supranational institutions and the United Nations system are designed as inter-state organisations, with narrow missions and limited resources. Citizens’ votes and individual voices can never reach the international decision makers, and on global issues there is no resort to transnational parties, world trade unions, or a global public opinion. Moreover, major decisions on global issues are made, outside the sphere of politics, by large industrial and financial corporations that wield economic power and control global markets; they have influenced national and supranational policies to follow the model of neoliberal globalization.
What all global decision-makers have in common is that they have not been elected and are not accountable to the people affected by their decisions. The absolute lack of democracy is a fundamental failure of the present global system and the deepest feature of neoliberal globalization.

The rise of global social movements in the past two decades has largely been about this lack of global democracy, as well as about calls for economic and social justice. Investigating the emergence, development and outcomes of the mobilisations for democracy by global social movements is at the centre of this paper, and of the Demos project.

The question of democracy in the global system can be examined from several perspectives. From the perspective of political theory, a growing gap can be identified between the socio-economic reality, that is transnational in its operation and effects, and the political system, which is still fundamentally anchored to a state-centred, model. Increasingly, decisions taken in one country affect people in other countries who do not have the possibility to express their voice because of their subaltern status as non-fellow, *ergo* disenfranchised, citizens. Production, investment, finance, trade, the environment, migration, health, and security are key examples of how the link between actions and consequences extends across borders. And yet those who bear the effects of decisions taken abroad are not typically entitled to have a political voice in the process (Archibugi, Held and Köhler 1998; Bello 2002; Cutler 2003; Falk 1995; Held 1995; McGrew 1997; Monbiot 2003; Stiglitz 2002, 18-22).

A state-based political system remains an unsatisfactory framework for addressing global issues and providing global public goods. Global politics is still largely the domain of inter-state relations, and in spite of the large production of international rules, treaties and agreements on a growing spectrum of global issues, the ability of the system to effectively address them has remained modest. In many cases, there is a lack of supranational institutions with a clear mandate to address specific problems; in other cases agreed upon rules and treaties are made ineffective by the failure to comply and act by states.

In this, the political participation of the public is very limited indeed. Both in cases where decisions taken in a given country have border-crossing consequences, and in those where decisions taken at the international level have correspondingly international effects, most often the grassroots political agent, who bears the consequences, does not have significant power to register his or her ‘trans-border consent’ (or, indeed, dissent). Assuming she or he has the power to register her or his consent at the domestic level (which is rarely the case), she or he nevertheless does not have a voice at all in the domestic decisions of other countries and has little voice in international fora, even when they are public. In public international organisations, the only political voice available to him or her is through the double representation offered by national parliaments, which (if entitled) subsequently elect international representatives with differing effective powers. Should one come from a poor country, in fact, he or she can expect to have an especially weak voice in the intergovernmental organisations. Using these observations as a starting point, one can

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6 A state-based system also fails to assure the self-determination of trans-border interests such as those embodied by non-national or trans-national political agents like migrants, minorities, etc. (Scholte 2004, 22).
argue that current international affairs are characterised by a high degree of exclusion and disenfranchisement (Marchetti 2005).

From the perspective of international political theory, the dichotomy of political exclusion vs. political engagement highlights a crucial element of political incompleteness in the current political arrangements at the international level. From a normative perspective, the inclusion of vulnerable agents into public and impartial decision-making processes at the international level represents a unique chance to improve the democratic legitimacy of the entire political system, both domestically and globally. The widely accepted creed of democracy remains in fact fundamentally flawed unless it is complemented with both a grassroots and an international dimension of democratic participation. No democratic regime can be truly democratic until a criterion is found that allows for the justifiable delimitation of the "membership" entitled to participation in decision making on cross border issues, according to constituencies that effectively reflect global public interests, rather than the national boundaries of states, or the private ones of corporations. In order to respond to the democratic deficit characterising the current political system, transnational networks represents central actors for ending the resulting unjust exclusion of a vast portion of the world population from transnational decision-making processes.

Global social movements can thus provide an important contribution to democratising the global system, but the reflection on the practical forms this may take, and on the ways global civil society may be part of this process, has just begun. For instance, it has yet to be debated whether global civil society should have a voice of protest, a voice of advice, a vote or a veto on decisions of global powers on global issues. A key question is how states and supranational institutions could formally recognise the role of civil society on global issues, granting its organisations the right to have a voice (outside or inside the rooms of power?) on global issues, as members, for example, of the delegations of national representatives to UN bodies, regional organizations (such as the EU) and international conferences; some very initial steps in this direction have already been taken in the case of the UN. One century ago the same route was taken by the labor unions when they obtained formal recognition for the representation of workers from governments and employers.

2.6. Democracy in global civil society

The principles and practices of democracy are relevant well beyond the global system. For social and political actors claiming to represent general interests and demanding a democratisation of global decision making, the democratic nature of the deliberative processes and decisions on collective actions within global civil society is equally essential. Democracy within civil society has a fundamentally different meaning than democracy in global politics. It has to do with participation more than with representation; it has to account for changing identities and evolving social actors rather than deal with well defined citizens; it has to accommodate diversity alongside the equality of individuals.

Democracy within global social movements and networks does not stop at the formal rules about membership of organisations, elections and accountability of leaders, representation in decision making bodies. It has to take up the challenge of favouring the participation of individuals and groups across the world, of including them in the
procedures for deliberation of networks, of developing a method of consensus building rather than majority voting on key decisions, of practicing mutual understanding and compromise among organisations representing different actors.

Within civil society, contrary to what happens in the political sphere, organisations and networks do not claim to have exclusive representation of fundamental values and interests and so far have no ‘vote’ in global decision-making. This means that they do not need to behave as representative and accountable democratic bodies in the way that is required for exclusive representation and decision-making power (such as in government policy-making). However, as the power of civil society to influence decisions grows, the question can be raised on how far can it go without coming to terms with the problem of representativeness and legitimacy. What are the boundaries, in other words, between public interest advocacy and a more systematic representation of interests?

More generally, a growing attention will have to be paid to the appropriate mechanisms assuring that the process of decision making within global civil society is legitimate, transparent and representative. For transnational networks this is a matter of survival, as they can retain and attract member organisations only insofar as they are perceived as legitimate, inclusive and indeed democratic, as well as effective in terms of their objectives.

2.7. Globalization from below

It can be argued that a vision of a globalization from below underpins the mobilisations of cross border social movements demanding global democracy and economic and social justice. As argued elsewhere (Pianta 2001; Pianta 2001; Pianta 2003), the dominant project of neoliberal globalization has been challenged by the project of globalization from below, based on the core values of peace, justice, democracy, protection of rights, advanced in the activities of civil society organisations and social movements advocating change, opposing current policies, and proposing alternative solutions to global issues.

The rise of global social movements is, at the same time, a practice of globalization from below and a manifestation of the importance of such a vision for addressing global problems. This perspective challenges the power of markets and states. It represents a hegemonic project aiming at restraining the rule of the market and the sovereignty of states, in the name of universal rights - human, political, social and economic ones. Globalization from below aims to empower civil society and provides spaces for self-organisation, but at the same time it is a challenge to the existing global order and its institutions.

According to Falk, who has introduced the concept, globalization from below has the potential to "conceptualise widely shared world order values: minimising violence, maximising economic well-being, realising social and political justice, and upholding environmental quality" (Falk 1999, 130). See also (Brecher and Costello 1993; Brecher, Costello and Smith 2000; Pianta 2001; Pianta 2001; Pianta and Silva 2003). A similar perspective, although with different concepts, is in (de Sousa Santos 2003; Sen, Anand, Escobar and Waterman 2004). A comparative perspective is in (Archibugi 2003; Held and McGrew 2002).

Between neoliberal globalization and globalization from below, a project of globalization of rights and responsibilities, had been advanced in the 1980s and 1990s, aiming at redefining the international rules of a more integrated world and supported by "enlightened" national governments and some UN agencies (Pianta 2001b; 2001a). The relevance of the vision of globalization from below among civil society organisations is documented in (Pianta and Silva 2003).
the same time calls for a different *quality* of global policies that may extend and generalise such an empowerment. Thus, it demands nothing less than a reconfiguration of the relationships between the spheres of the economy, politics and civil society. Globalization from below demands a new generation of policies by governments and international institutions putting at the centre not just the affirmation of rights, but their implementation in economic and social relations; not just the principle of democracy, but its introduction in international decision making and its development in a participatory perspective. Globalization from below calls for addressing the roots of global injustice and inequality in the market system.

The strength of such a vision will be considered again when discussing the strategies of global social movements.

3. Characteristics of transnational networks

3.1. Values and identities

Transnational networks within the global justice movements are characterised by a set of common believes and values which define their political identity. Network activists are usually motivated by shared principled ideas and interpret their role as a fully political, non-profit attitude. The normative aspects of global social movements, and of transnational networks in particular, are particularly illustrative of a double and reciprocal dynamics. In this, universal principles encounter values and norms fostered from below resulting in an unpredictable and creative normative combination.

Transnational networks foster a number of fundamental principles which, despite being originated in a specific cultural context, can be shared by culturally diverse actors. These principles typically include equality, justice, peace, human rights, environmental protection.

Alongside these fundamental principles, value pluralism is expressed by the differing norms emerging from below, from grassroots movements, which serve as sources of credibility for the project of normative persuasion pushed by transnational networks. While the matching of these two normative domains, global and local, can be an extremely progressive mechanism for modifying power positions and unjust situations, it can also hide a presumption of cultural imperialism. In order to avoid this risk, awareness of such danger is stimulated, together with a strengthening of the importance of the local component.

Accordingly, a common, normative strategy to disseminate fundamental principles and to enhance the encounter between universal and local values consists of the deployment

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9 Within the US literature, this marks a distinction from three differing types of networks, which transnational networks are keen to emphasize. Networks in the global justice movement are distinct from scientific (truth-seeking), private firms (money-seeking), and governments (power-seeking) networks, for they are not inspired by principled ideas (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 30; Ness and Brechin 1988). Despite being also indirectly motivated by the search for truth, money and power, social advocacy networks are primarily identified by their normative-political content. When this is confirmed, a prediction can be made on the likelihood that global social networks raise where there is an issue that is value-intense.

10 The values that are most likely to be adopted by transnational networks are then values whose legitimacy trans-borders distinct domains of normativity. See (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 76).
of the adjacency principle (Tilly 2001). According to the latter, an appeal is made to fundamental principles that are already accepted in other spheres and cases, and an extension to new circumstances is proposed through an appeal to an impartial analogy. Such value transportation provides the mechanism that allows for influencing other sphere of action, both domestically and transnationally. However, since each cultural context is modelled on different values, the result varies because the encounter generated by the norm’s transportation does not guarantee an unconditional acceptance in the receiving community. Moreover, even the "sending" cultural domain can be influenced in turn, thus changing those principles that are claimed to be universal. In both cases of change, the normative interaction between diverse cultural-political context produces a new identity, which is fundamental for the promotion of normative change in the political realm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

The coexistence of the appeal to common ideals and to specific, local norms and values, in fact, explains also the possibility of feeling of being involved in collective action without having to belong to a specific organisation or a unitary movement. While more on the specific features of this kind of organisational form will be provided in a later section, here imports to stress that pluralism within networks is allowed by the simultaneous presence of differing perspectives of action, informed by local motivational sources, and a shared appeal to ultimate values which is collective and public.

3.2. Politics and opportunities

The interaction between the set of values shared by social movements and the global political and economic realities leads to the emergence of different projects of political change, rooted in particular opportunity structures.

In national contexts, social movements are rooted in thick web of social relations and common identities, have access to important resources (human, financial, etc.), but operate in highly formalised political systems that constrain their mobilisation and impact. Conversely, at the global level social movements and transnational networks face major obstacles and costs in building up cross border relationships among civil society organisations with different cultures and languages, and have access to highly limited resources, but face a political system where the lack of democracy and the innumerable failures to address global problems represent as many opportunities for cross border mobilisations.

Moreover, the lack of a rigid, well defined institutional setting similar to the national one widens the options for political action. When there is a low degree of conflict and some institutional alliances are possible, "vertical coalitions" on selected global issues may emerge, with civil society organisations that may cooperate, or at least establish a dialogue, with particular supranational organisations (usually of the UN system), with some "progressive" governments or regional bodies, such as the European Union. When conflict is strong, on the other hand, it can be easily directed to the highest level, to core of the global decision making (as in the case of G8 protests), with a highly visible and effective challenge. In both cases, the results are greater opportunities for transnational networks to emerge as a legitimate and authoritative voice for global interests, extending their impact on public opinion and on civil society organisations interested in joining transnational networks and mobilisations.
Different opportunities are likely to be pursued by different organisations and networks within global movements. Again, it is important here to consider the heterogeneity of actors, of the fields of interest and of the political projects that may coexist within global civil society. The combination of "subjective" characteristics of social movements, such as values, identities, and political visions, and of "objective" political opportunities on global issues has led to identify a variety of streams within global social movements. On the basis of their attitude towards economic globalization, the following typology has been proposed (Pianta 2001; Pianta 2001):

a) reformists with the aim to 'civilise' globalization;
b) radical critics with a different project for global issues;
c) alternatives who self-organise activities outside the mainstream of the state and market systems.
d) resisters of neoliberal globalization, who strive for a return to local and national spheres of action, though with an open attitude of fair interchange.

This range of analytical perspectives is typical of social movements and, and we can find it also within the global justice movements, sometime with a certain degree of overlapping. Outside the movement, we can find in global civil society two additional perspectives:

e) supporters of the current neoliberal order, stressing the benefits brought by globalization;
f) rejectionist of global processes, favouring a return to a national dimension, often with a reactionary, nostalgic attitude.

Such a typology is centred on the political characterisation of social movements and is based on their interaction with the political sphere and political forces. It may be useful for understanding the interaction of values and opportunities in a comparative perspective in a given conjuncture, more than for charting the evolving identities within civil societies over time, that are bound to change their relationship to global and national politics. And the issue of change leads us now into the discussion of the mechanism of functioning of transnational networks.

4. Mechanisms of transnational networks

4.1. Change and challenges

At the core of the mechanisms leading to the emergence and operation of transnational networks there is the perception of the possibility of change in one specific global issue. The mainstream literature is divided along two alternative readings of social change concerning political issues: the positivist and constructivist approach. According to the positivistic approach, political issues pre-exist to political action for they occur in the social context as formed by historical power positions and individual preferences. Their existence, together with an antagonistic perception of one of the involved actors, explains the occurrence of political struggle. In opposition to this is the constructivist model, according to which political issues do not have an independent nature, but are the product of social struggle. This perspective maintains that political players looking for change aim
at re-shaping the terms of the conflict and indeed at generating the conflict itself though the
social formation of the issue at stake.

When the global issues addressed by the global justice movements are considered,
neither approach appears to be satisfactory. On the one hand, global issues have been
progressively identified, conceptualised and addressed as new political challenges in the
context of the UN world conferences and of several international initiatives since the 1970s
in which civil society has largely been involved and in fact has found an appropriate
environment to grow in its networking and activism (Pianta 2004). On the other hand, once
large social movements have developed within civil society on global issues, their
conceptualisation and their political meaning has indeed been reshaped by the ability of
movements to define the terms of their own agenda, world vision, and prospects for change.

A crucial challenge for any global network starting a specific campaign consists of
shaping the issue at stake in the public sphere, in such a way that it is perceived as
problematic, urgent, and soluble. The initial, key issue in this task is production and
internal exchange of information. ‘Overcoming the deliberative suppression of information
that sustain so many abuses of power, network can help reframe international and domestic
debates, changing their terms, their sites, and the configuration of participants’ (Keck and
Sikkink 1998, X). In particular, transnational networks often serve here as facilitators for
providing space to actors who are usually voiceless and excluded. Transnational networks
can project and amplify local voices globally, multiply the channel of access to the
international system, so that these voices can in turn return to the original local place
strengthened. In this regard, transnational networks are most likely to have a significant
impact in terms of enhancing local resources through making international resources
available to domestic actors, when the issue at stake is informationally-poor and needs to be
explained and disseminated widely. The production of information is a primary step in the
long process in which transnational networks argue, document, persuade, strategize,
protest, lobby or propose alternatives.

Following the production of information, the second step consists in the external
dissemination and strategic use of it. This is the crucial stage for it is here that the
information acquires a fully public dimension, thus a political significance. It is not enough
to generate information inside the circles of the transnational networks, for it needs to reach
the external public in order to make this producing, in turn, pressure on institutional actors
for normative change. Global public opinion thus needs to be attracted and its imagination
captured for framing the terms of the conflict in such a way that the issue at stake becomes
associated to a general interest which requires a public engagement.

This dynamics replicates a situation that social movements already face at the
domestic level. The struggle to occupy public space is a struggle about framing the conflict
and the terms of debate. Both in the domestic and the international case, activists seek to
develop a common frame of meaning which is antagonist to the present reading of the issue
at stake. “Each of these campaigns began with an idea that was almost unimaginable, even
by its early proponents. That they could abolish slavery, gain vote for women, or end
footbinding hardly seemed possible. One of the main tasks that social movements
undertake, however, is to make possible the previously unimaginable, by framing problems
in such a way that their solution comes to appear inevitable. The case of female
circumcision reminds us that such changes are neither obvious nor linear. They are the
contingent result of contestations over meaning and resources waged by specific actors in a
specific historical context” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 40-1). And yet producing and disseminating information in the public domain is not enough for the achievement of the political objective of the transnational networks. In order to promote norms change a third step is necessary.

The third step in the process of shaping the challenge is the projection of one’s self as a legitimate representative of the general interests involved in the issue at stake. The task consists here in the appropriation of a recognised role in the public space, as rightful advocate of general interest. To the question ‘in the name of whom you speak?’, transnational networks offer a response in term of reclaiming for themselves the representation of general interests. This is particularly significant in the international context, in which the representation of interest is stretched to such a point of risking to be lost in the several passages of delegation. The distance of the decision-bearer from the decision-makers is so wide and loose that the former does not have any concrete tool to influence the decisions that affect him or her (Held 1995; Marchetti 2005). Contrasting this exclusionary situation, transnational networks claim to be a more legitimate representative of the interests at stake in the international decision than the traditional/institutional actors. By producing, disseminating, and reclaiming the representation of general interests, transnational networks thus widen democratic participation in global politics.

Once organisations and social movements succeed in shaping a particular challenge associated to global issues where change is possible, the political opportunity for mobilising and network building arises.

4.2. Networking

Transnational networks are forms of organisation characterised by voluntary and horizontal patterns of co-ordination, which are reciprocal and asymmetrical (Anheier and Themudo 2002; Keck and Sikkink 1998; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Risse-Kappen 1994; Tarrow 1996). Flexibility and fluidity are two major features of the network organisational form. A flexible organisational structure enhances the capacity to adapting effectively to changing social circumstances and political situations. Fluid organisational structure, conversely, allows for porous organizational boundaries without enrollment ratified by formal membership.

A network among organisations from a large number of countries is formed when a set of preconditions exist, in terms of values, identities and political projects, and when a convergence develops on the importance of a specific global issue, on the agreement on a common issue frame and on the appropriate strategies to tackle it. Crucial in order to achieve convergence are the procedures according to which the consensus is affirmed and reproduced. In the network formation process the most used method of consensus confirmation is the production of a statute, that is then voted according to different procedures, both formal and informal. Voting procedures include simple majority rule; qualified majority rule; consensus; unanimity; and no objection base, depending on the circumstances. Additional key elements in this process include internal debate, entitlement to speak, and entitlement to vote.¹¹

¹¹ In a recent document of European Attac on the ESF process, the point was stressed on the need for the enhancement of the method of consensus finding. The WSF was taken as an example, and a call was made for
The "internal" dynamics of a global network are determined by the strategic decisions of national social and political actors to enter, stay or leave a network. Underpinning these decisions are a number of reasons which can be interpreted according to a model of acquisition of shares of "ownership" in the network, where the investment of political capital and resources by each participant is negotiated with the network coordinator and other key members, in order to obtain political gains both at the international and national level, in ways that may differ substantially across member organisations.

In transnational networks, the principled dimension we unfolded in the previous section on values is combined to a strategic or instrumental dimension, which can be roughly labelled *do ut des* conditionality. While it is undeniable that the normative content is of paramount important in the structuring of transnational networks, it is equally significant to reveal the instrumental side of the network relationships in terms of political drive, leadership, and interest pursuit.

The instrumental reading of the network organisational structure is nowhere more evident than in the mechanism of participation and ownership of the network. Members of the network coalesce on a clear equation of the type *do ut des*, which produces internal contingency and asymmetrical relations. Members are not part of the network until they decide to what extent take part, which is directly dependent on what the member receives back in change of its participation. This results in differing degrees of participation of each member, and thus in asymmetrical roles in the network.

This strategic aspect of the network organisational form should not be exaggerated, for it is moderated by both the discursive process within the network which keeps changing members' interests, and by the original background in reference to the common principles and values. In this regard, members should be simultaneously considered stake-holders and share-holders. They are stake-holders, insofar as they have in common - before entering a network or as a consequence of the internal discursive practice - a number of general principles and values that refer to concrete stakes in the struggle on global politics (the moral side of the network relationship). But they are share-holders, inasmuch as they bargain the degree of their engagement according to the degree of the satisfaction of their specific interest (the strategic side of the network relationship).

In the "internal" dynamics of the relationships between transnational networks and their member organisations, the above issues emerge as key aspects of internal democratic processes, where the deliberative dimension is increasingly important, with the forms and incentives to participation in activities and decision making, alongside the traditional problems of formal democratic organisation.

In the emergence of transnational networks, a number of specificities that set them apart from the widely studied national networks have to be pointed out.

1. At the global level the institutional system is less rigidly structured than within states, and this favours the emergence within global civil society of forms of a broader consultation toward the inclusion of those different movements and organisations who are currently not following the process, but nevertheless consider it most important. Broad consultations when defining themes and technical solutions for facilitating strategic inter-linkages and voluntary mergers of self-organised activities were to be found for the improvement of the ESF, in particular of its European Preparatory Assembly (EPA). In addition to openness and inclusiveness, transparency and accountability should also be strengthened, according to the Attac coalition (Attac 2004).
organisation and coordination that are equally flexible and fluid, networks being the most effective model.

2. At the global level a plurality of institutional actors coexists (including different states) and often no single or final authority can be identified for a given issue, creating opportunities for the "vertical coalitions" mentioned above, where civil society networks can play a crucial role. Nothing similar could develop in a national context.

3. Membership of transnational networks is also different in that it often excludes the participation of individuals. A number of costly barriers - including education, knowledge of foreign languages, travel costs, competence on complex global issues - prevent most individuals from taking part in the prolonged actions of the networks, except for the sporadic participation to global events of protest or pressure actions such as "mail bombing" or "net strikes".

4. A further specificity of transnational networks is the frequent lack of single, charismatic leaders. This is the result of three main factors; first, the horizontal structure of networks reduced the emergence of hierarchies and leaders. Second, the focus of transnational networks' work on the "proximity" of social movements means that leaders may be well known to activists, but have little exposure to the wider public. Third, there is a lack of symmetry between the cross border width of a network and the nation-based media system and public opinion that produce the "demand" for movement leaders.

Moving beyond the "internal" dynamics of the relationships between networks and their member organisations, we can identify two sets of relationships that matter for a global network. Networks activities are directed, on the one hand, to the "proximate" world of civil society and to the global justice movements and, on the other hand to the "external" world of global political and economic powers. In the former activities, networks build legitimacy through the involvement of key civil society organisations in different national contexts and present themselves as a legitimate advocate of voiceless and yet general interests, reclaiming a role in the public space. They grow on the identities and resources of civil society and provide global social movements with more focused issue frames, permanent transnational coordination and more effective campaigns, allowing for an evolution of their values, identities and strategies in the process.

Due to complexity of global issues and the difficulty of cross border activism, networks have generally played a crucial role in the growth of global mobilisations, linking major civil society organisations of different countries. They, in turn, have often developed sub-networks at the national and local level diffusing mobilisations on global issues. In such cases we can identify networks with a "central" role in global social movements. In other cases, transnational networks may play a more "peripheral" role, for instance when mass mobilisations are able to directly involve individuals and public opinion, or when transnational networks provide specific, limited support to national organisations in terms of experts' competences, resources, or access to international institutions. In the latter case we may find networks with a "bridging function" between global civil society and the sphere of global politics, as in the case of several UN-related networks among civil society organisations aiming at favouring their participation to UN activities or World Summits. In a few cases, a similar "bridging function" may be carried out in relation to the global economy by networks favouring consultation and dialogue with corporations and economic
decision makers, on issues such as environmental sustainability or corporate social responsibility. Networks with a "bridging function" are clearly peripheral to the dynamics of global social movements and may lose autonomy and legitimation as civil society actors as they move closer to cooperation with global economic or political centres of power.

4.3. Actions

The fluid and flexible nature of transnational networks means that their establishment does not guarantee by itself their permanence in time and the possibility to concentrate on the "outside" world alone. The actions carried out by a network have to be set in three different contexts, following the distinction made above: a) actions whose main meaning and effect concern the "internal" network dynamics, assuring the reproduction of the network; b) actions directed to the "proximate" world of global social movements; c) actions directed to the "external" world of economic and political power and public opinion.

The main activity of transnational networks is the development of global campaigns on global issues. In this context, the specific actions carried out, organised, coordinated or encouraged by transnational networks can develop at several levels, including:

a) truly global actions (that can be either "localised", such as the World Social Fora, or "diffused", such as the global days of action against the war in Iraq of February 15, 2003 and March 20, 2004);

b) transnational or regional actions (such as Continental Social Fora or actions on EU global trade policy in several EU countries);

c) actions in particular countries with a global significance (such as protests in countries whose policy is the target of global campaigns)

d) national/local actions by national/local network members for advancing global goals (such as lobbying national Parliaments on the Kyoto protocol on behalf of a global network for environmental sustainability).

Each type of action may have a differentiated impact on the "internal", "proximate" and "external" constituencies of a global network, and may respond to specific needs, challenges and opportunities emerging in different contexts.

The target of transnational networks' actions may include national, international, or supranational institutions whose decisions have a transnational scope affecting the issue each time at stake. As we have already argued, decisions on specific actions are determined by the combination of "internal", "proximate" and "external" factors. Within the latter, national, international and supranational aspects lead to a multilayered political opportunity structure in which transnational networks have to play (Kolb 2003; Tarrow 2001). While the issues that motivates the mobilisation can be ultimately global (though often mediated by the local dimension), the actual possibility of the take off of the mobilisation is entrenched in a net of political opportunities structures which combines both the national and the transnational domain of political action. In the link between globalization and the
raise of global social movements, there is always an important role played by national conditions (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996).

A major instrument of action available to transnational networks is the development of a campaign, defined as a “set of strategically linked activities in which members of a diffused principled network (what social movement theorists would call a ‘mobilisation potential’) develop explicit, visible ties and mutually recognised roles in pursuit of a common goal (and generally against a common target). In a campaign, core network actors mobilise others and initiate the task of structural integration and cultural negotiation among the groups in the network” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 6).

Transnational networks generally concentrate their activity on a particular campaign, that may entail however a great variety of specific actions, carried out either by the network itself, or by its member organisations, or by the wider global justice movements. A tentative classification of types of actions may be based on their intended "target":

a) "internal" and "proximate" activities within networks and social movements, such as spreading information and raising consciousness among activists;

b) public opinion-oriented actions, such as spreading information, political education and media-based initiatives;

c) institutions-oriented actions, where the target is the economic or political power centre (including private bodies, such as corporations) against which the campaign is developed. They may include protests, violent actions, civil disobedience, advocacy work, lobbying, representation of specific interests, development of alternative proposals, etc.

d) concrete alternative practices based on self-organised activities carried out outside the dominant economic and political processes, such as fair trade, ethical finance, supply of specific services, legal protection, self-help activities.

Behind the activities targeting institutions, there may be three different models of interaction with power: a) acceptance, integration and cooptation in existing power centres; b) dialogue and criticism, aiming at reform; c) rejection and conflict aiming at a radical change. They lead us to the analysis, in the next section, of the strategies and outcomes of networks in the global justice movements.

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12 The classical definition of political opportunities structure argues that “When institutional access opens, rifts appear within elites, allies become available, and state capacity for repression declines, challengers find opportunities to advance their claims. When combined with high levels of perceived costs for inaction, opportunities produce episodes of contentious politics” (Tarrow 1998, 71). To this reading, however, it is necessary to add the discursive content of social movement mobilisation (Koopmans and Statham 1999, 227), here included the role of mass media, in order to grasp properly the dynamics of mobilisation.
5. Strategies and impact

5.1. Strategies

The analysis of concepts and mechanisms presented in this paper leads to identify four main strategies for change, pursued by transnational networks and the global justice movements. While they are logically distinct, the practice of transnational networks has usually combined more than one strategy model at the time, in the interest of effectiveness. Moreover, the different strategies or combination of strategies adopted vary in times, for they seek to adapt to the context, while keeping the original political aim. Still, individual networks and social movements at a particular time can usually be associated to one dominant pattern within the following four models.

a) The protest model rejects present institutions and their policies, and demands radical change in both. Protest has been highly visible and effective in raising attention to global issues, but much less so in changing policies. An example is the Seattle 1999 protest against the WTO trade liberalisation agenda.

b) The pressure model has accepted present institutions and has lobbied for achieving minor changes in arrangements and policies. Lobbying has flourished around supranational institutions and UN activities in particular, but with modest results. An example is the effort to obtain a particular ruling of the WTO conflict resolution body concerning trade in goods whose production affects particular animal species.

c) The alternative policies model has questioned present institutions, demanded change in existing structures and developed policy alternatives. The focus here is on the possibility to develop, advocate and introduce change in current institutions, rules and policies pursued by national governments and international bodies, but the success has again been modest. An example is the demand that WTO rules be amended in order to make AIDS drugs accessible to patients in poor countries.

d) The alternative practices model has emphasised the ability of networks to self organise their cross-border activities outside the mainstream of the state and market systems. Increasing efforts are now directed to alternative practices within civil society, at the local level, but with strong global links. An example is the diffusion of fair trade between producers of the South and consumers of the North.

The first three models entail a "vertical" relation between social movements and politics; they are defined by transnational networks' attitude towards global political power. The change that is looked for is generalised, as it concerns all those sharing a given problem; the extent of change clearly differs in the three models. Change is expected to result from an evolution in the exercise of political power, from different policies and/or from different people deciding on them. The fourth model, conversely, is a "horizontal" perspective that tries to achieve localised change, for specific individuals and communities. The instruments for change are the direct activities and experiences of civil society; there is less "division of labour" between civil society and politics, as this strategy aims at the empowerment of civil society. Once successful, localised change can be replicated elsewhere if the new local conditions make it possible.
Each of the strategies pursued by transnational networks and movements will now be discussed in some detail, exploring the vision and the relationship to political and economic power.

The protest model. Resisting the decisions by global powers (often of dubious legitimacy) in the name of higher values or broader social interests is a major point of departure of social mobilization and political change. In the global justice movements of the last two decades, such politics of resistance has been effective thanks to an intense sequence of major protests that had a strong media-oriented, globally visible content, and dramatic cases of police repression. While highly successful in terms of mass mobilisations and impact on public opinion, the politics of resistance has been unable to achieve significant results on the international issues it challenged.

The pressure model. At the opposite of resistance there is the lobbying model. Networks and organisations may try to influence the decisions of global powers by a systematic work of documentation, contact with national decision-makers, and presence at international conferences. This work has led important results in recent years, including treaties banning land mines, creating the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto protocol on the reduction of carbon emissions, and many other accords on environmental issues. This path of change of the global order relies on small improvements from within the existing institutions, and it is possible only when there is a shared horizon of political action with existing supranational powers. It offers the opportunity to effectively implement necessary changes in global rules and issues, if only minor and partial ones. The risk is to keep civil society subordinate to the decisions of governments and supranational powers, removing the resources of protest and conflict. Recent cases of global decision making suggest that the space for a strategy of this kind are increasingly limited.

The alternative policies model. The third path of change is the capacity of global movements to produce alternative policies, autonomous from the actions of governments and traditional politics. Examples include the campaign for a Tobin Tax, and the rapid growth of Attac as a global movement demanding its introduction; the mobilisation around the Jubilee 2000 campaign to cancel the debt of Southern countries; the campaigns to reform the IMF and the World Bank; the request for access to drugs by poorer countries, in particular those for the AIDS epidemic, and the failure of the WTO conference in Cancun in autumn 2003 as key governments of countries of the South stood firm on negotiating

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13 The demonstrations in Seattle in November-December 1999 have shown the importance of the politics of resistance of global movements, a strategy which has culminated in the protests against the G8 summit in Genoa in July 2001 and the EU Council in Barcelona in March 2002. In between we had had dozens of large scale international demonstrations against the summits of the World Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in Washington in April 2000, Prague in September 2000, Washington again in April 2001; against the European Council meetings at Nice in December 2000 and at Gothenburg in June 2000; against the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in April 2001; against the WTO meeting in Qatar in November 2001 when major protests were held in more than 50 cities all over the world. After 2002, the protest nature of major global mobilisations on economic issues has increasingly been combined with other strategies, in particular the alternative policies model.

14 Measured not only by the growth from the 60,000 demonstrators at Seattle, to the 300,000 at Genoa and Barcelona. After Seattle, the next WTO summit was organised in Qatar, the location most protected from the requests of democratisation and changes in policies coming from global civil society. After Genoa, the G8 summits of the past can no longer be repeated in the same way, and the 2002 meeting his hidden in the Canadian mountains.
positions that echoed policy proposals of transnational networks. In all these cases networks have played a key role in the development of alternatives and in the campaigns to advance them, both within global movements and in the conflict with global powers. The search for alternatives has increasingly characterised the action of global movements since 2002, with global meetings such as the World Social Fora and the Assemblies of the People's United Nations in Perugia.\(^{15}\)

**The alternative practices model.** Disappointment with the modest results obtained by protest and pressure strategies, and diffidence with the closeness to the political system required by the search for alternative policies have led to growing efforts in global social movements to develop alternative practices, outside the mainstream of economic and political relations. Fair trade networks, ethical finance organisations, decentralised cooperation projects linking cities in the North and the South, all sorts of twinning initiatives between local communities are examples of networks and activism where the advocacy function is replaced by direct, concrete actions that address specific problems. Providing a practical solution to a particular case, of an exemplary value for the larger, global problems, is valued more in this approach, than demanding answers to global powers that are deemed to be neither accountable nor effective. The type of networks that have developed with such a perspective is radically different from the advocacy-based ones, and also their position and role within global social movements tends to be less central to the overall mobilisations, and more focused on specific subsets of global activism.

The differences in the nature and locus of the strategies pursued by transnational networks and social movements in addressing global issues reflect the variety of actors within social movements, their visions and attitudes, as well as the specific opportunities that they try to seize. Such differences are not necessarily a factor of weakness. Successful change in global issues requires a combination of capacity of resistance, radical visions, alternative practices, policy proposals, and instruments that introduce specific reforms. The question, then, becomes assessing the impact that global activism has on global powers.

5.2. Assessing the impact of transnational networks

The measurement of transnational networks effectiveness, as much as all other kind of social movements, is a particularly difficult task (Gamson 1975; Jenkins and Klandermans 1995). As argued above, the impact of transnational networks has to be assessed in all three relevant context, the "internal", the "proximate" and the "external" ones.

On the two former aspects, the number of organisations participating to a network, supporting its campaigns, and the participation of individuals to its initiatives are direct indicators of the network's relevance, impact and overall influence on broader social movements. Additional measures can be drawn from the information available and the visits to a network's internet website, from the number and type of actions carried out, from the communication flows generated by a network.

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\(^{15}\) The Assemblies were held in the fall of 1995 on the reform of the UN, in 1997 on a just economy, in 1999 on global civil society, in 2001 on globalization from below, in 2003 on alternatives for the global role for Europe (Lotti, Giandomenico and Lembo 1999).
On the "external" impact, Keck and Sikkink propose to evaluate the transnational networks’ impact according to the stage of influence that they manage to achieve in the following order: a) issue creation and agenda setting; b) influence on discursive positions of states and international organisations; c) influence on institutional procedures; d) influence on policy change in ‘target actors’; e) influence on state behaviour (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

In a similar vein, Sholte holds that in response to the democratic deficits of global governance (i.e., ignorance, institutional failings, and structural inequalities) three objectives can be achieved: awareness raising, institutional change, and structural transformation. In particular, six main types of contribution to democratic governance of the global economy, can be delivered by civil society: public education; public debate; public participation; public transparency of governing authorities; public accountability; redistribution of resources (Scholte 2004, § 2).

While the type of impact so far discussed mainly concerns civil society actors, public opinion and ultimately policy makers, networks pursuing a strategy where the development of alternative practices is paramount have to be assessed using different criteria. Effectiveness, in this case, has to do with the ability to address directly and "solve" - albeit in a limited, localised way - the specific problem identified. Appropriate measures of such efforts have to be developed on a case by case basis.

5.3. The effects on democracy

A more specific analysis has to address the impact transnational networks and social movements have on democracy, both within civil society and in the global system. Two distinct sets of impact indicators may be developed in this regard, both with an emphasis on democratisation processes, on progressive change, rather than on static pictures at a given time.

Democratisation within global civil society could be assessed considering the following issues:

a) the conception of democracy, the ideologies, value system and vision that may be expressed by transnational networks

b) the formal constitution of networks, with explicit rules on membership, participation and activities, the hierarchy in the decision-making process and the transparency and accountability of the procedures;

c) the encouragement to participation, lowering barriers to entry and activity, the openness to new members and the tendency to link with similarly-minded groups and networks;

16 Other significant indicators have then been provided by the Global Accountability Project that “works to ensure that the most powerful global organisations are answerable to the people they affect. It focuses on three main types of organisations that operate at the global level: intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), transnational corporations (TNCs) and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), developing a space for cross-sectorial learning. At the heart of the project is a unique framework which identifies four core dimensions crucial to fostering greater accountability: transparency, participation, complaints and redress, and evaluation” (Kovach, Neligan and Burall 2003).
d) the repertoires of actions envisaged and practiced, favouring participatory, nonviolent, inclusive, continuative forms of action;

e) the balance within a network's member organisations in terms of countries of origin and national income levels;

f) the procedures for representation of the network in other civil society or political bodies;

g) the autonomy from political and economic powers and the ability for self-funding.

The democratic impact transnational networks and movements may have on the global system mainly concerns political institutions and public opinion. The following variables could be considered as relevant to measure the democratisation of the global system:

a) the conception of democracy institutions with global decision making power may express and the formal constitution they have, making them legitimate and accountable to the world community, either through the United Nation system, or to global civil society;

b) increasing information and transparency on the decisions and procedures in global decision making, making access by civil society organisations easier;

c) increasing consultation and participation of weaker political and economic actors (such as poor states, trade unions) and civil society organisations in global decision making processes, making available the necessary resources;

d) increasing participation of weaker political and economic actors (such as poor states, trade unions) and civil society representatives in discussion, deliberation and decision making in global institutions, also as member of delegations of states;

e) increasing social movement mobilisations, raising public opinion awareness, putting pressure, opening conflicts, exercising control and monitoring over global decision makers, when democratisation of the institutions and mechanisms governing global decision making is impossible.

Efforts to assess these aspects of the activities of transnational networks will be developed in the next steps of the research by the Urbino team for the DEMOS project.

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17 On the spheres of institutional relationship, in particular, five main mechanisms of transnational networks’ influence can be identified. 1) Brokerage through the connection of different agents having different channels of access to the institution. 2) Certification through the recognition from international institutions in order to attain legitimacy. 3) Modelling, in which forms already in use somewhere else are duplicated. 4) Institutional appropriation in which transnational networks manage to use the institutional resources for their aims. And finally 5) Voice through membership in the national delegations (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; Tarrow 2001; Tilly 2001).

18 Steps towards more democratic decision-making include the practical ways through which the United Nations, international institutions and states could formally recognise the role of civil society on global issues. One possible way is through granting civil society organisations the right to have a voice on global issues, as members, for example, of the delegations of national representatives to UN bodies, regional organisations (such as the EU) and international conferences; some very initial steps in this direction have already been taken in the case of the UN. In the long term, the creation of a second UN assembly, as a space where representatives from civil society can meet and discuss, is very much a preferred option in the discussion on new models of world order.

6.1. Roots and context

The concepts and frames developed in the previous sections for the analysis of transnational networks and global social movements are used in this section to provide a historical overview of their emergence. The origins of transnational social movements and networks of organisations active on international issues lie in the movements that have developed since the 1970s around the themes of peace, human rights, solidarity, development, ecology, and women’s issues. Starting with their own specific issues, they have developed an ability to address problems of a global nature, build information networks, stage actions, find self-organised solutions across national borders, interacting also in original ways with the new sites of supranational power (Cohen and Rai 2000; della Porta, Kriesi and Rucht 1999; Florini 2000; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Lipschutz 1992; O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000; Waterman 1998).

However, the roots of such cross border activism and its historical antecedents can be traced back to the late nineteenth century. Charnovitz (Charnovitz 1997) has shown that in a previous wave of strong international integration, from the late nineteenth century to the 1920s, the establishment of supranational bodies such as the League of Nations and of scores of inter-governmental organisations was accompanied by equally flourishing international non-governmental organisations and civil society conferences. At several official summits and in the operation of the League of Nations, civil society groups were often able to articulate proposals on a wide range of themes including peace, national liberation, and economic, social, and women’s rights; in some cases they were even involved in official activities, opening the way for the formal recognition of NGOs in the Charter of the United Nations in 1945.

During most of the Cold War years the space for international civil society activities was constrained and shaped by state power and policies. The international mobilisation of civil society mainly took the form of trying to influence government policies on decolonisation, national self-determination, peace, human rights, development, and the environment. The political movements of the 1960s and 1970s challenged the political and economic order at the national and the international levels with a transformative perspective still focused on state power. A major exception was the rise of the women’s movement, which opened the way for new forms of politics, social practices, and culture based on identity (Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein 1989).

Within international institutions, NGOs had found since the 1970s a substantial opening in the UN system, in ECOSOC, and other activities; however, this official recognition of civil society work at the international level has led to very modest results in terms of visibility, relevance, and impact on the operation of the international system (Gordenker and Weiss 1995, and the contributions in the same special issue of Third World Quarterly; Lotti and Giandomenico 1996; Otto 1996). A wave of state summits began in the mid-1970s, spurred by far-reaching political change—East-West détente, the completion of decolonisation, and a new attention to human rights—and by economic developments—the end of the Bretton Woods international monetary system, the oil shocks, and the emergence

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19 This section draws from (Pianta 2001; Pianta 2003; Pianta, Silva and Zola 2004).
of the North-South divide. Existing inter-governmental organisations, starting with the UN, played a renewed and broader role, and other forums were established; the first G5 meeting was held in 1975. As global issues and supranational decision-making power became increasingly important, attention and action by civil society also increased. Moving on from traditional efforts to put pressure on nation-states, attention started to focus on global problems and on the failure of states to address them in events such as summits. Symbolic actions, at first small in scale and poorly organised, were followed by more systematic international work by civil society organisations, the creation of networks and mobilisations challenging international powers.

Different streams of cross-border activism, dating from the 1970s, are relevant here. They include the activities of international NGOs operating in several countries; the growth of parallel summits organised at meetings of international institutions; the emergence of international civil society meetings, and most recently, the appearance of global days of actions organised by the global justice movements.

**International NGOs.** Since the 1970s a few large civil society organisations - such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, WWF, Friends of the Earth, etc. - have established themselves as players on specific transnational issues - human rights, peace, environmental issues, etc. Moving from their base in Northern Europe or in the US, they have built membership and raised funds in dozens of countries and brought the attention of international public opinion to major issues of international concern, with a combination of protest events, lobbying efforts, and a patient work of documentation and information addressed to an event broader public.

**Parallel Summits.** Since the mid-1970, but more evidently from the mid-1980s onward, civil society organisations have started to meet during summits of states and inter-governmental organisations in order to challenge their growing role as locus of decision making on global issues. They have invented in this way the model of parallel summits, events that challenge the legitimacy of government summits, confront official delegates, make cross border networking among civil society organisations possible, give visibility to transnational social movements resisting neo-liberal policies and proposing alternatives to global problems.

**Global civil society events and global days of action.** Building on the experience of parallel summits, at the end of the 1990s transnational networks and the emerging global justice movements would take their initiatives one step further with the organisation of

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20 Parallel summits are defined here as follows (Pianta 2001; Pianta 2001):

- events organised by national and international civil society groups with international participation, independently of the activities of states and firms;
- events that may result from the autonomous initiative of civil society, or may coincide with, or be related to official summits of governments and international institutions;
- events that address global issues, or the same problems as official summits, with a critical perspective on government and business policies;
- events that use the means of public information and analysis, political mobilisation and protest, and alternative policy proposals; and
- events with or without formal contacts with the official summits (if there is one).
large scale global civil society events and global days of action independently from the agenda of states and international institutions.

6.2. The 1970s and 1980s: the streams of cross border activism

Several streams of activism have monitored and flanked UN meetings on the environment, development, women, and human rights since the 1970s. In 1972 the UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm saw the participation of a few hundreds NGOs active both inside and outside the official meeting (Conca 1995). In 1974 the World Food Conference in Rome saw an active presence of NGOs (Van Rooy 1997). In 1975 the First World Conference on Women held in Mexico City launched the UN Decade for Women, and was followed by one in 1980 in Copenhagen and another one 1985 in Nairobi; in all events large NGO forums were held (Chen 1995). Global summits of this type, with the UN system and states allowing some room for civil society voices, were possible because of the urgency of the issues, and because these themes did not challenge the Cold War ideologies of the time.

On the more controversial political and economic issues, civil society had to organise its international activities independently of the operation of states, the UN, and other international institutions. So the peace movement in 1981 started to organise the European Nuclear Disarmament Conventions (Kaldor 2003). Public opinion tribunals were regularly held on peace, human, economic, and social rights since the one on War Crimes in Vietnam organised by Bertrand Russell in 1967 (Fondazione Internazionale Lelio Basso 1998). The first gathering of The Other Economic Summit (TOES) to coincide with a G7 meeting was organised in 1984 by the New Economics Foundations of London, in association with the Right Livelihood Awards, a sort of ‘alternative Nobel Prize’ which has been awarded since 1980 (Ekins 1992). At first small conferences and media events, with a strong alternative development and environmental focus, TOES have been regularly organised in cooperation with different international networks and civil society coalitions of the country hosting the G7 summit. In recent years, alternative meetings to G8 summits have become large scale global civil society events, including protests and alternative conferences, organised by large coalitions of CSOs and global social movements.

These events made it possible for the first time the encounter of large numbers of NGOs and the development of direct relationships to decision makers on global issues - either UN officials or national government representatives. These novelties, according to several accounts, laid the ground for the of transnational activities of civil society networks, facilitated the emergence of a global civil society and led to its growing interaction with the UN on global issues.

An assessment of the 1974 World Food Conference in Rome argues that it has been "for many voluntary organisations, particularly in the North, a springboard into international advocacy work" and that "Rome drew the attention of a whole new set of NGO actors and propelled them onto the international stage. It was the same fledgling network that would bring about more substantial changes 18 years later in Rio" (Van Rooy 1997, 94, 98). In the case of women, it has been argued that "prior to the mid-1980s the world's women had not yet developed a collective identity, a collective sense of injustice, or common forms of organising. 1985 was, in many ways, a watershed year. The third United Nations world conference on women which took place in Nairobi, Kenya, and
consisted of both an intergovernmental conference and a forum of non-governmental organisations, brought together women from across the globe" (Moghadam 2004) leading to the emergence of transnational feminist networks and to the much larger mobilisation in Beijing ten years later.

6.3. The 1990s: the building of transnational networks

The large UN thematic conferences of the early 1990s, designed to chart the agenda for the twenty-first century on global issues were a major turning point for the emergence and participation of global civil society (UNRISD 2003).

The 1992 Rio Conference on the Environment and Development and the parallel summit taking the form of an NGOs' Forum were unprecedented in their size, media resonance, and long-term impact on ideas and policies, and for the emergence of a global civil society involved in building networks, developing joint strategies, and confronting states and international institutions (Conca 1995; Van Rooy 1997).

In 1993 the UN conference on human rights in Vienna saw the participation of thousands of civil society activists, and addressed a key issue, long neglected by states in the Cold War (Gaer 1995; Smith, Pagnucco and Lopez 1998). In 1994 the Cairo conference on population led civil society groups to forge new links on the conditions of women, families, and societies in the North and South.

Finally, 1995 was a crucial year for the emergence of global civil society. The Copenhagen Conference on Social Development and the Beijing conference on Women, both with very large NGO Fora integrated in the official programme, were points of no return for the visibility, relevance, and mobilisation of global civil society.

Several thousand NGOs participated to the events in Copenhagen and Beijing, gaining attention from official delegations, influencing the agenda and the final documents, and—equally important—becoming involved in large-scale civil society networks. The key issue of the Social Development conference was the need to combine economic growth with improvements in social conditions; its policy implications were clearly at odds with the neo-liberal prescriptions to contain social expenditure and public action.

The Conference on Women addressed many aspects of women’s conditions in North and South, including gender roles, family structures, reproductive rights, and social and economic activities; it called for a wide range of actions, from individual self-help to international commitments by states. 21

A large participation by NGOs (8,000 people from 2,400 organisations) marked also the NGO Forum parallel to the UN conference on human settlements held in Istanbul in 1996. In the same year, in Rome the FAO World Food summit was held, with a major involvement of NGOs both in the official activities, in the NGO Forum and in other parallel events. Again in Rome, in 1998, global civil society played a major role at the conference establishing the international Criminal Court (Glasius 2002).

21 On environmental, social, and women’s issues, see the case studies in (Chen 1995; Cohen and Rai 2000; Florini 2000; Keck and Sikkink 1998; O’Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000; Petchesky 2000; Rajagopal 2003; Uvin 1995).
A major global civil society event *without* an official UN summit was the Hague Appeal for Peace conference of 1999, held during NATO intervention in Kosovo, that gathered 10,000 participants from all over the world and involved several governments. A series of global civil society meetings held independently of UN summits, but with an explicit reference to the need for a more active and democratic UN are the Assemblies of the Peoples of the United Nations organised every other year since 1995 in Perugia, Italy, by a coalition of Italian and international civil society organisations. They have regularly brought together representatives of CSOs from more than 100 different countries to discuss issues such as the reform of the United Nations, economic justice, and a stronger role for global civil society; each event included a 15-mile peace march to Assisi with participation ranging from 50,000 to 200,000 people. The theme of the 1999 Assembly was "Another world is possible" (Lotti, Giandomenico and Lembo 1999; Pianta 1998; Pianta 2001; Pianta 2001).

In many ways, the first half of the 1990s was the heyday of the model of *globalization of rights and responsibilities*. Freed from the constraints of Cold War, the international community appeared ready to address global issues through a partnership of governments, international institutions and civil society, under the auspices of the United Nations system. A reformulation of rights and responsibilities at the global scale appeared possible in the context of new arrangements for global governance (Commission on Global Governance 1995). Great expectations were generated, and later turned sour as few of the proposals for reform and policy innovations generated in these years found their way through the decisions of national governments and international institutions.

The early 1990s were a period of sudden growth of global civil society. Participation to UN Summits by ever growing numbers of Transnational networks, increasingly also from countries of the South, and the consolidation of global links in the forms of networks, campaigns and transnational activities established global civil society as an emerging reality with a role to play in UN activities. But the rising role of transnational networks was never confined within the horizon of UN Summits alone. The strength of networking and sharing of values, visions and experiences - key ingredients of a perspective of *globalization from below* - developed rapidly and lead transnational networks to venture into an increasing range of issues and challenges.

Besides participating to UN World Summits, the emerging global civil society started to organise parallel summits to challenge G7-G8 meetings, IMF-World Bank meetings, European Union summits, conferences of North American and Pacific organisations, World Economic Forum meetings in Davos and other inter-state summits (Houtart and Polet 1999; Pettifor 1998; Pianta 2001). Such initiatives started from the need to confront the decisions of global powers on themes - such as debt, international investment rules, trade, development - that increasingly concerned economic issues and the consequences of the dominant model of *neo-liberal globalization*. Such challenges - often more confrontational than the relationships with UN Summits - helped to broaden the vision and actions of Transnational networks involved in global issues, and to set in motion waves of global social movements.

This became evident to all in Seattle in December 1999, when a broad coalition of (mainly US) transnational networks and trade unions, together with a variety of transnational networks, challenged the WTO summit and the Millenium Round of trade liberalisation talks. Seattle was the culmination of a long process, not a sudden outburst of
anti-globalization sentiment. It captured the attention of the media, the imagination of people, and—at last—the attention of policy-makers because it had both the arguments and the strength to disrupt the official summit. While the failure of the WTO conference was equally due to the divisions between the US, Europe, and countries of the South, in the perception of social activists, public opinion, and trade officials themselves, this was the first time global civil society had a major, direct impact on the conduct and outcome of an official summit.

6.4. 2000-2004: the rise of global justice movements

The example of Seattle led in 2000 to a dramatic proliferation of actions combining in the same way alternative proposals on global problems and street protests against international decision-makers, developing a radical challenge to the project of neo-liberal globalization.

The first major UN event that followed was a rather institutional one, the Millennium forum of NGOs held in New York in May 2000 with 1350 representatives of more than 1000 NGOs that produced not much in terms of social mobilisation, but an important and comprehensive document (NGO Millenium Forum 2000). This helped broaden the vision of transnational networks that had entered the global arena moving from initiatives on individual issues and had previously been reluctant to engage into a comprehensive perspective on world challenges. Themes such as peace, disarmament, globalization, equity, democracy that had not been included in the previous UN summits, nor in the agenda of major global civil society events, were put at the centre of the final document.

In parallel, the UN Millenium Summit of world governments adopted in 2000 the Millenium Declaration, from which the Millenium Development Goals have been developed, a policy agenda that in recent years has shown again converging efforts by UN institutions and Transnational networks (UNDP 2003).

Among the several UN events taking place since 2000, including many follow ups from previous conferences, it is important to point out in particular the following three ones.

The World Conference on racism and xenophobia held in Durban, South Africa, in 2001 saw the participation of 8000 people from 3000 Transnational networks to the NGO Forum, whose final documents were presented at the conference. The conference highlighted strong divisions - usually along North-South lines - both among governments and among Transnational networks on issues ranging from the implementation of equal rights to the reparations for the slave trade, to the Israeli-Palestinian question. In some ways, it showed that the well-tested process of UN Summits involving civil society could fail to produce a consensus on highly divisive global issues.

The UN-World Bank conference on Finance for Development in Monterey, Mexico, in 2002 was a rare opportunity to address global economic issues, a theme on which the gulf between the operation of markets and government policies on one side, and civil society alternatives on the other had grown particularly wide. In spite of a long preparatory process and important civil society events organised outside the official conference, no opening was obtained for the demands of Transnational networks on issues ranging from
debt, to development aid, to the proposal of a Tobin Tax on currency transactions. Monterey represented a unique encounter between *neo-liberal globalization*, driven by global finance, and the attempts at reforms called by a *global governance* perspective, with the actors of *globalization from below* on the sidelines. The lack of change in the operation of financial markets showed the inability of the model of *neo-liberal globalization* to accept a reform, even after the stock market crash of early 2001. A few months later, a major financial crisis hit Argentina, the showcase country of the policies of the "Washington consensus".

Ten years after the Rio conference, the World Summit on sustainable development was held in Johannesburg in August-September 2002, with 8000 participants and a wide range of alternative events and protests. The assessment by the conference of the failure to reach most environmental goals set a decade before, and the scaling down of several objectives represented a major disillusionment on the effectiveness of the UN World Summit process.

In different ways, all three events showed the boundaries that a perspective of *globalization of rights and responsibilities* could not trespass. The world economy, the environment and race relations could not be effectively addressed. The dominance of *neo-liberal globalization* and its pro-market policies could not be questioned. The door opened by involving civil society in debating global issues had been closed. Such an outcome was made starker - but not determined - but the arrival in January 2001 of the new US administration of George W. Bush, with its unilateral pursuit of national interests that after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 was turned into a strategy of global preventive war, leading to the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Facing such a rapidly evolving context, transnational networks and global movements stepped up their activism and developed an autonomous agenda for change. Since Seattle, international meetings of transnational networks have multiplied in a variety of forms. Protests and parallel summits have increasingly confronted the gatherings of international institutions. And global civil society meetings, convened by ever growing coalitions of transnational networks and social movements, have proliferated in all continents. These events have taken place on a monthly basis in every part of the world. They have been characterised by mass participation to street demonstrations, ranging from the tens to the hundreds of thousands, attracting very high media attention, as well as growing police repression. Thousands of transnational networks have become active on global issues, have built alliances, have radicalised their views and actions. The time for *globalization from below* had come, and with it a powerful wave of global social movements.

After Seattle, a number of major protests opened the way to the rise of global justice movements, with shared identities, repertoires of protests, agenda for change. They included, among many others, the Prague protest against the IMF-World Bank meeting in October 2000, the Goteborg protest at the EU summit in May 2001 and the Genoa protest at the G8 summit in July 2001, where hundreds of thousands demonstrators were met by unprecedented police repression. But the main process that has provided space, visibility

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22 For a documentation of the rise of global civil society events and global movements see (Amin and Houtart 2002; de Sousa Santos 2003; Pianta 2001; Pianta 2001; Pianta 2002; Pianta 2003; Pianta and Silva 2003; Sen, Anand, Escobar and Waterman 2004; Seoane and Taddei 2001).
and an inclusive organisation to such movements is the World Social Forum. In January-February 2001 the first World Social Forum was held in Porto Alegre, Brasil, followed every year by ever larger events, moved in January 2004 to Mumbai, India, and returned to Porto Alegre in January 2005. Dozens of regional Social Fora were held since then in all continents; the number of participants involved in all these initiatives may be in the order of a few million people. Through intensive discussion and exchange of experiences, such events have helped to build common values and identities, a widely shared critique of neoliberal globalization, while advancing a different hegemonic project and policy alternatives. Global civil society now does not meet anymore at events organised in parallel to official summits, in front of the locked doors of political and economic power. The global justice movements have emerged as a self-organised, autonomous actor on the global scene.

The ability of the global justice movements to assert itself is reflected in the shift in the nature of its actions, from the focus on parallel summits challenging international institutions and governments, to the organisation of global events based on the independent agenda set within global civil society. This shift is evident in the documentation of global events (Pianta, Silva and Zola 2004); since 2002 they split evenly between events independently organised by civil society networks with a global reach, and parallel summits organised in coincidence of official summits of international organisations or governments. While parallel summits have grown since the 1980s, the number of independent global civil society events has long been extremely limited, and its growth dates from the first World Social Forum held in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in early 2001 (that started itself as a parallel event to the World Economic Forum of Davos). Focusing on the January 2003-June 2004 period, 43 cases of global events were identified, with a continuing growth over the past years. Latin America concentrates one third of all events, Europe one quarter, Asia and Oceania one fifth, North America 12 per cent and Africa 7 per cent. The large importance of Latin American and Asian meetings is related to the World Social Fora held in Porto Alegre (Brasil) in 2003 and in Mumbai (India) in 2004, with a variety of associated regional events. Social Fora now account for 30 per cent of all global civil society events. Other meetings organised independently from official summits represent 21 per cent of events. The other half is made by a 9 per cent of parallel events to UN conferences, 7 per cent each to IMF, World Bank or WTO meetings and to G8 summits, and 26 per cent of parallel summits dealing with regional conferences (European Union, American, or Asian government meetings) (Pianta, Silva and Zola 2004).

The most important novelty of recent years is the organisation of global days of action with millions of participants to demonstrations and events in hundreds of cities all over the world. They took place, against the US war and occupation of Iraq, on February 15th, 2003, March 20th, 2004 and March 19th, 2005. The first of such dates was identified by the New York Times as the date of birth of global public opinion and civil society as a "second superpower". The values and politics of global justice movements were deeply challenged by the US government policy of unilateral, unrestrained global power engaged in systematic preparations for war. Opposition to war and the search for peaceful forms of conflict resolution - in the Middle East as everywhere - moved at the centre of global activism, and in 2003 and 2004 the first two global days of actions were an unprecedented, enormous success, bringing together people and civil society groups in all continents, with an extremely wide range of cultures, political orientation, class and ethnic backgrounds. The success of such global actions can be associated to their ability to give voice to the
consensus of a large majority of world public opinion, reflected also in public opinion polls. Global justice movements are now able to articulate a vision for global political and economic relations that is alternative to the model of neoliberal globalization and permanent, preventive war led by the US. They are also able to give a global voice to such a vision with unprecedented mass mobilisations, putting pressure for a change of course on national and global decision-makers.

The effects on political processes are starting to become visible in the election of progressive governments in several countries of the South - Argentina, Brasil, India and other countries - and in the increasing realignment of the electorate in both Europe and the US. The outlook is for an increasing ability of the global justice movements to become visible, vocal, articulated, and able to influence the debates on global issues and, in some cases, on national policies too.

7. Conclusions: the roads to global democracy

Global justice movements have emerged with the urge to search for effective solutions to common, global problems, the lack of democracy in the global system being one of them. But on global issues effectiveness has been elusive, due to distance of social mobilisations from power centres and from the mechanisms of decision making, and to the complexity of the challenges. What are then the roads that global activism has travelled in its search for change and global democracy? Three major ones can be identified, as we draw the conclusions of our conceptual investigation of democracy and transnational networks in the global justice movements.

a) Changing global institutions. Global social movements have confronted the institutions in charge of global issues and the policies they carry out. With a variety of strategies and actions they have tried to introduce change and democratisation. Much hope and effort has been directed to the possibility that international institutions will be capable to reform their own rules, procedures, and policies, meeting some requests of global movements, and integrating and co-opting some organisations. The response from global powers has been extremely modest, as demands from social movements have largely been dismissed and ignored. Still, there may be some room, in particular international institutions, to recognise the role played by global movements, to respond to their activities and demands, to integrate some civil society organisations in their decision making. A rethinking of the problems of global governance could give global civil society a greater role in redesigning the institutional tools for addressing global issues. This opportunity may emerge in fields where an institutional architecture at the global level is still emerging (as in the cases of the environment or the International Criminal Court), and where intergovernmental organisations and Transnational networks have long co-operated (UN agencies such as UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF, and UNEP rely on NGOs to carry out their mission). After a sequence of hopes and disillusionment, the future of such a course remains uncertain.

b) National politics. A recovery of national political processes remains a major way to affect global outcomes. Transnational networks and social movements have striven to reactivate the mechanisms of democracy in national politics; their proposals have influenced the positions of national governments, and in doing so, changed the balance of power in international bodies, as in the case of the WTO failure at the Cancun 2003
conference. This is a ground where national politics can meet civil society anew. Especially in some countries of the South, the opportunities to influence national politics and the policies of progressive governments have increasingly attracted civil society energies. In countries where the political system is more remote from society, as well as in non democratic countries, there is less hope in such a strategy.

c) Globally connected local actions. The model of alternative practices described in the previous section focuses on the local level, with the pursuit of independent solutions to global problems. Local, specific questions can be addressed with the resources and energies of global connections, developing activities outside the reach (or on the fringe) of the market and the state system. This model has developed as a reaction to frustration and disappointment with the two previous roads to global change, and is based on the strength associated to the ability to effectively introduce change, albeit in few, exemplary cases. Its spread is, to some extent, a measure of the failure of the political system to allow democratic change at the global level. There is some danger that a concentration of social movements' energies in this direction may mean "giving up" on the possibility to introduce democratic change in the global system, thus weakening democratic processes of participation and conflict. But a spread of such globally connected local actions may also be a concrete remainder that effective change is indeed possible, with direct initiatives of civil society when the political and economic systems fail.

In many ways, these three roads to global democracy may reinforce each other and revitalise democratic processes also at the local and national levels. They may all contribute to a globalization from below in which global social movements spread and co-ordinate, demanding and practising a more democratic order, more equal international relations, and a more just economy and society.
References


1. Left-wing social movement families in France

In the late 60’s, France, as many other western countries, was characterized by uproars on student campuses, proliferation and success of extreme left-wing party organizations together with the resurgence of corporate social conflicts. The particularity is the concentration of these events: the revolt of 68 that spread over only a few months and the worker’s rebellion that flopped at the beginning of the 70’s.

In 1972, the socialists, the parti des radicaux de gauche (small centre-left reformist party) and the communist party signed government’s Common Program. This, along with its rather radical tone could be perceived as a political and pacifist solution to expectations expressed since 1968. The prospect of parties, having the intention of breaking from capitalism, coming into power through elections most probably contributed to the decline of the extreme left, or more precisely to its inclination toward violence. At this time, groups reinvested militant activities into conventional structures—a process that was repeated when François Mitterrand became president in 1981. Since then however, left wing groups have either self-dissolved, as did the Proletarian Left (Gauche Prolétarienne) in 1973, or reoriented their strategy through seeking electoral partnerships, as was the case with the Revolutionary Communist League (Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire).

Another factor that led to the crisis of the extreme left wing was the weak response of the working class to their campaigning. Unlike the social movements in Italy, the French workers movement was, at that time, strongly tied to the orthodox communist movement and the PCF-CGT duo. These two groups would both display a strong hostility toward those often considered as “petit bourgeois”. In its attempt to compete with the most important union (the CGT) on its own territory, for example with metal or automobile factory workers, the extreme left grew tired and missed the opportunity of supporting conflicts happening at the same time in other sectors of the working class: workers without qualification (who were, for many of them, immigrants), workers in small companies, sometimes in the country (Lip conflict, 1973).

Through this very important conflict, a new kind of union culture was shaping with the CFDT. The French Democratic Confederation of Employment was originally rooted among Catholics but was secularized in 1964. It opened itself to a new generation of activists in the 1970’s and was influenced by the “autogestion” trend of the PSU (Parti socialiste unifié, 1960-89).

For many activists, taking a distance with extreme left groups happened through their involvement with counterculture movements. Also, NSMs would later strongly contribute to renew methods of action, providing a rallying point for the 68 generation and finally, ease a convergence of movements that would later lead to the Global Justice Movement. Two sexual liberation movements stemmed directly from the events of 1968.
1. The Feminist Movement led by the MLF (Women’s Liberation Movement, designation invented by journalists in 1970) and the fights in favour of contraception and above all in favour of abortion (Veil Law, 1975). The MLF presents itself as revolutionary and exclusively women, functioning in particular through “self-awareness groups”. Like its counterparts from other countries, it politicizes private issues like the use of the body and sexuality. It often uses spectacular actions to denounce patriarchal institutions (for instance the laying of a wreath dedicated to the widow of the unknown soldier in 1970, throwing veal organs to protest against a pro-life association meeting). It is divided into two groups: the “Psychépo” group around Antoinette Fouque and the feminist egalitarian group, inspired by Simone de Beauvoir and the radical left.

2. The Homosexual Movement led by the FHAR, The Homosexual Front for Revolutionary Action (Front homosexuel d'action révolutionnaire) founded one year later, in part by the feminist lesbians of the MLF, and the GLH, Groups for Homosexual Liberation (Groupes de libération homosexuelle) created in 1975. These main groups have two things in common: they choose voluntarily provocative methods of action and colourful demonstrations. Nonetheless, by the mid 70’s, their success weakened and they disappeared from the public scene of over a good 10 years.

The green movement starts being structured very slowly in a political party only at the beginning of the 80’s; during the 70’s they were influenced by a multitude of local groups strongly hostile to any form of institutionalization. Nevertheless, Friends of the Earth (les Amis de la Terre) supported the first Green candidate for the presidential elections in 1974, René Dumont. During the seventies, the ecological movement was mostly involved in the antinuclear struggle (Fessenheim 1971, Creys-Malville 1976-77, Plogoff 1978), mobilizing groups from various sensibilities. Marches, site occupations with festive “atmosphere”, not to mention acts of civil disobedience, all constitute the innovations in collective action repertories.

In terms of mobilization capacities France looks peculiar and ambivalent if compared to its European partners. The crisis of traditional activism seems stronger and deeper than elsewhere. In spite of – or maybe because of – this weakness of the classical interest groups, our country is periodically shaken by massive social conflicts, which keep surprising our neighbours or even nourish the stereotype of a permanent hexagonal fever.

The mass organizations, whether parties or unions, are structurally fragile. Furthermore, as in most western countries, they had to face, during the 1980’s, significant erosion together with a major crisis of confidence. For instance, political parties saw a drop in membership, from 875,500 in 1982 down to 628,000 ten years later. This decline, which is indeed not as spectacular as in other countries because of the structural weakness of mass organizations in France, has clearly affected more specifically the parties of the left, while those of the classical right as well as the radical right, in a growth phase, partly filled the gap. The penetration rate of political parties (number of party members in proportion to the number of registered voters) in French society is the weakest in Europe (2.6), compared for instance with United Kingdom (3.3), Italy (9.7), Belgium (9.2), Austria (21.8) (Ysmal 1994, 50).

The trend is particularly obvious as far as unions are concerned: according to estimations, they have lost half their membership between the mid 70’s and the mid 80’s.
With a union membership rate estimated to approximately 9% of the active population today, which hides a clear cleavage between private and public sector (8% in the private sector versus 26% in the public and semi-public sector) France is, here again, in the worst situation among the Western countries. The yearly number of work conflicts in the private sector has dropped, for example, from an average of more than 4000 at the beginning of the 70s to 3000 in 1982, and in 1992 it has reached the lowest level since the post World War II period with an average of 1500. The evolution of the number of strikers is the same, with an average of about 2 million in 1970 to 200 000 in 1990.

The year 1995 seems to be an exception in this context, considering the very strong mobilization of the state and public service employees against the Juppé reform plan of special retirement programs, with 3.7 million individual days on strike in the public sector and 2 million in the private sector. Eight years later, the Fillon plan for retirement reform – combined with the plan for decentralization of the management of part of the public education staff – provoked again massive strikes and demonstrations, especially in the public education sector – which was paralyzed in some locales for two months. The spring of 2003 took the unions by surprise, who did not carry the “responsibility” for the intensity of the mobilization. It deepened the fracturing of unions, which had started during the previous conflict over retirement reforms, but also the internal debate within each union. This mobilization surprised even the unions involved in the strike, because of the determination of the strikers, especially those in their thirties engaged in spectacular and unconventional actions. As on other occasions, radicalism “from below” is such that the unions have had difficulties keeping it under control.

1.1. Union renewal

1.1.1. Agricultural trade unionism

In the 70’s, farm workers unionism also went through deep transformations with the emergence of the Farm Worker’s Association (Paysans-travailleurs). This association shows hostility toward productivism that had been for years the base of the modernization of the agricultural sector. With the influence of the extreme left wing, the Paysans-travailleurs views the rural world in terms of class struggle and wants to get closer to other social movements: they support working class strikes, rallies, occupations of farms in order to fight against the threat of expulsion of farmers. The Paysans-travailleurs movement was inspired by Marxism, and was also open to New Social Movements (NSM) such as ecological and antimilitary movements that mobilized against the expansion of the Larzac Military Camp for over 10 years (1970-1981). In 1981, after the socialist-communist coalition’s electoral victory, the National Association of Farm Workers (Association nationale des travailleurs-paysans) went through several stages of evolution, and became the Confédération paysanne (Farmer Confederation) in 1987.

Starting in the 80’s, the dominant agricultural union, highly integrated in State apparatus, the FNSEA (Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d’exploitants agricoles) in favour of productivist agriculture, started being challenged. The Confédération paysanne focuses on finding an alternative method for agricultural production that respects ecological requirements (biological agriculture, contribution to rural development), with human size farms and a sense of solidarity with farmers from third world countries (Purseigle, 2005). The word “paysan” was used explicitly to underline its distinction from industrial
agriculture (Martin, 2005). The international opening was facilitated by the international links started during the Larzac struggle; the social Christian influence encouraged the links with other movements, particularly in Latin America where farmer’s organizations are strongly linked with the teología de la liberación. And finally, the European Union agricultural policy favours a transnational dimension to the farmer’s struggle.

The Confédération paysanne has shown ability in involving experts, such as the economist Alain Lipietz. Influenced by Marxism, the CP has attempted to build relations with other sectors, specially the working class sector, in order to avoid staying confined within narrow corporatist interests (Crettiez, Sommier, 138). The Confédération paysanne has also inherited its “action directe” approach from the 1970’ (destruction of the GMO fields). With José Bové, it shows a particular ability in capturing the media’s attention. Its spokesman has a great capacity to convey the problems of today’s society (cf. la malbouffe) and through his discourse and his physical appearance, he cultivates the image of the farmer, who is master of his traditions. However, both the over media coverage of José Bové and his strategic choices of action have led to internal tensions.

1.1.2. The coordinations

Together with the drop in the union’s membership, the union’s internal functioning faced heavy criticism. This phenomenon led to the emergence of coordinations (autonomous strikes decided and lead by the strikers’ assembly). The coordinations type first appeared with the high school student movement in 1971 and remained for quite some time specific to young students (Lapeyronnie, 1986). Later on it was taken up by other movements during the second half of the 80’s: railway workers in 1986, teachers in 1987, Air France Company’s employees and nurses in 1988, etc. These movements involve primarily young public sector workers who are critical of trade unions. These coordinations are characterized by the refusal to accept delegation; the concern for representativity’s spokesmen; the frequency of plenary reunions; and the encouragement of an active participation of the strikers. Unions regard these coordinations as a threat and as a symptom of the gap between them and their bases. It would be too schematic, however, to oppose coordinations and traditional unions. Many traditional union activists have played a leading role in the creation of the coordinations, and in particular Trotskyist activists. Furthermore, mobilizations through coordinations often end up being favourable to traditional unions: 1) through coordination’s leaders, who later re-invest their skills and their militant know-how within the union apparatus (for instance, student unions); 2) through union affiliations of coordinations members (road builders in transportation unions); 3) through the creation of new unions (SUD - Solidaires, Unitaires, Démocratiques - which emerged after the nurses movement in 1988).

1.1.3. The emergence of radical unions

Internal opposition in the CFDT came from members who joined the organization after 68 and who were strongly influenced by extreme left wing ideas. Its distance toward the CFDT increased when this organization changed its orientation starting in 1978 – its new objective being based on becoming a leader in “proposals” and “compromise” which was reinforced when Mitterrand came into power. Detractors, however, perceived this to be the beginning of “unionism of management of the crisis”. Starting in 1985, these
divergences led to exclusions and to the creation of several new structures: SUD-aérien (1985), SUD-PTT (1988), SUD-Rail (1996), SUD-éducation (1996), etc. SUD increased with the 1995 movement and the renewal of social conflicts caused by the Aubry Law about the reduction of working hours starting in 1999. This allowed SUD, which had originally taken roots mostly in the public sector, to start establishing itself in the private sector (Thomson-CSF, Renault, Aventis, Michelin, Fnac…).

Starting in 1992, SUD (and specifically SUD-PTT) offered a new dynamic to the Group of Ten (Groupe des 10), which connects together non-confederated unions. In 1998, a protest program denounced the injustices of the market economy and underlined the importance of ecological issues and the preservation of public services. Contrary to traditional confederate unions, each member of the Group of Ten preserves its autonomy and a right of veto.

Interactions between SUD and the State do not involve compromise or dialogue. A law passed in 1950 established criteria of representation which exclude SUD and new unions from negotiations with the State. The non-participation to the negotiation framework is additional factor which explains why SUD often used mobilization.

The success of the SUD organizations had to do with their capacity to respond and to “stick” to the new ideals of activism, which had already appeared within NSMs and the coordinations. SUD particularly appeals to 30-45 years old people, highly qualified (often overqualified for their positions) and who are concerned with the creeping privatization of public services. SUD is well recognized for its willingness to fight bureaucratization and for its position in favour of internal democracy: autonomy of local structures, quotas for women (1/3 for the federal bureau), and limits on the number of permanent staff, etc.

Similarly, the members of SUD are characterized by a commitment to a large number of social and civil rights issues. They also belong to many networks, such as Agir ensemble contre le chômage! (AC!, Acting together against Unemployment) or ATTAC. This is one of the characteristics of new structures: they increase the number of areas of action. Therefore, this modifies the classical typology for collective action. Furthermore, this new type of unionism got involved in societal issues and into building links between all types of social struggles conflicts for three reasons: the influence of radical leftism, the will of fighting against corporatism, the call for an extension of struggles (in the continuity of 68). The goal is to achieve a synthesis between unions and NSMs. SUD has become a central actor in national and transnational mobilizations, and is on the forefront of the global justice movement in France. This is an additional specificity of this new unionism; in comparison, traditional unions are much less involved in the global justice movement (Béroud, Ubbiali, 2005).

The Confédération Paysanne and the SUD have many points in common: they share the purpose of developing a unionism for social change (cf. the importance of societal issues), to keep supporting causes such as rights for the unemployed, immigrants without papers. They are often members of organizations such as ATTAC, and major actors of the global justice movement. The Confédération nationale du travail (National Confederation of Labor; CNT) is an even more radical group than SUD. It comes from the Anarcho-syndicalist movement. The CNT was reinforced within the coordinations (such as high school students, nurses). It was revitalized in the mid 90’s and participates in many mobilizations.
In addition to the renewal of workers and farmers unions, the 80’s and 90’s were also marked by the emergence of the “sans” movements. Pierre Bourdieu has considered the development of mobilizations of “low-income groups” as a “social miracle” (Bourdieu, 1998, 102-104).

1.2. The “sans” movements

The “Sans” (without) associations, in particular the unemployed, have managed to bring to the center of public debate the issues of exclusion and precarity. This has also shaken up traditional unionism, which has been blamed for insufficiently representing the most fragile elements of society. There is no doubt that these new associations are providing competition to the unions in terms of social questions, as is clear from the events organized by the alter movement. The associations will contribute to pushing the union confederations in joining the transformations in process, most notably that of the nascent anti-globalization movement. The CGT, for example, has been attentive to the criticisms leveled at it and has taken them into account by undertaking changes during the term of Louis Viannet (1992-98). The CGT has reactivated its committees of the unemployed and has joined, in parallel with the “Sans” associations, the occupation movement of ASSEDIC (organisms of distribution of unemployed insurances) during Christmas 1997.

1.2.1. The movement against unemployment

In 1982, the first union representing the unemployed was created with the support of religious associations. Its carried a very important action in terms of charity and reintegration, but did not lead to a mobilization. It has contributed to build the public problem of “new poor” that facilitate in 1989, under the socialist government, the creation of the Minimum Reintegration Wage (Revenu minimum d’insertion, RMI). Following up this first union for the unemployed, the National Movement of Unemployed and Insecure Workers (Mouvement national des chômeurs et des précaires, MNCP) was created. It is a network of local associations whose main purpose is to provide services (helping desk) and promote solidarity.

One year later, the Association pour l’emploi, l’information et la solidarité des chômeurs et des travailleurs précaires (APEIS, Association for Employment, Information and Solidarity for the Unemployed and Insecure Workers), was created by leaders of the PCF and the CGT with the help of associations such as Secours populaire or the Red Cross. This association generally takes a more offensive position. It considers that the capitalist system involved in globalization is responsible for unemployment and job instability. It criticizes political leaders for their inability to take action, and accuses the organisms of distribution of unemployed insurances of poorly managing government funds that are set aside for social services. From this point of view, the main repertory of action of the APEIS, is to sit down in the local agencies of these organisms. This method of action allowed to materialize the “battle for jobless people” and to get them involved in a more concrete action for the recognition of their rights.

The network AC! (Agir ensemble contre le chômage, Acting Together against Unemployment), created in 1993 by several unions, and principally SUD and CFDT, carries a quite similar purpose than APEIS. It is a very original type of network, having a
very loose structure, no legal status, no spoke person, and functions through the consensus of its members. It brings together several associations, such as the MNCP, the APEIS, the League of Human Rights (Ligue des droits de l’homme) and unions that are not recognized by the State. Following the reform of emergency aide funds in 1997, the unemployment movement sat down in the local agencies of the Assedic for 6 weeks. The importance of the mobilization can be explained by the common mobilization of the unions (CGT) and the associations of unemployed. They both launched a week of action for “social emergency” on December 16th.

1.2.2. The homeless movement

The homeless also emerged on the public scene, with the creation of the Committee of the Poorly Accommodated People (Comité des mal-logés) in 1987 (which disappears in 1993), the DAL, Right to Housing (Droit au logement) in 1990 and the Committee of the Homeless (Comité des sans-logis) in 1993.

In 1986, at a time when racism and the extreme right wing ideas were becoming increasingly present, several fires in poor and unhealthy apartments in Paris provoked the death of 17 persons. This prompted the reactivation of groups struggling for the right of decent housing. Associations criticized the State for having abandoned a policy for social housing and for not fighting the consequences of real estate speculation. The homeless movement uses highly spectacular methods that became quite present in the media: squats or camp sites in public places (Péchu, 2001), combined with law-suites that often turned out to be victorious. These actions are supported by a large range of charitable organizations, religious and secular: Secours catholique (Catholic Aide), Médecins du monde (Doctors of the World), groups against racism, unions such as CFDT, CNT; and political left wing parties (PC, les Verts, LCR and the Fédération anarchiste). The most symbolic and important occupation of a building was the one on rue du Dragon in Paris, in 1994: during the whole year, several dozen people were housed there. The homeless movement got closer to other struggles, and actively participated to the November 1995 movement. After 1997, the DAL decided to sit down in more symbolic places (political parties headquarters) so that the left in government would truly implement the law of requisition of housing.

1.2.3 The movement of “illegal” immigrants: Les “sans-papiers”

Since the 70’s, the movements for immigrants “sans papiers” have been recurrent (Siméant, 1998). It is partly connected with the homeless movement, and gets a large media coverage in 1995. This movement can be explained by the reform of the status of foreigners in France, that resulted in an unprecedented and inextricable juridical situation: some immigrants could neither be legalized nor expelled from the country (Pasqua Law of 1993). The illegal immigrants groups use two types of repertories of action: occupying public buildings (churches, gymnasiums, political organizations headquarters, theaters, etc.) and carrying out hunger strikes (Siméant, 1993). In 1996, the violent intervention of the police in the Saint-Bernard Church, occupied by immigrants without papers provoked a large media coverage and the mobilization of public opinion. In this context, conventional movements for the defense of human rights went through a radicalization process, for
example the League for Human Rights (Ligue des Droits de l’Homme) (Agrikoliansky, 2002).

The “sans” organizations started working together in 1994, and this led to the creation of the network Droits devan’t!! (Dd!!, Rights to the Fore!). Dd’s primary objective is to build a network that would federate the struggle against exclusion: unemployment, homelessness, unequal access to health care and culture.

1.3. The evolution of new social movements

Weaker than elsewhere, the French NMS declined rather rapidly due to its failure to find a political opening on the left and its inability to reposition itself in the period starting in 1978 with the impending accession to power of the left and the election of F. Mitterrand to the presidency in 1981. The subordination of the struggle to the electoral outcome (and thus to partisan strategies), as well as internal conflict around the issue of “reformism”, contributed to provoking and reinforcing divisions already present within each family of the movement.

The relationship to the left finally leads some environmental militants to split away the Green Party and to create in 1994 the MEI (Mouvement d’écologie indépendante – Movement of Independent Ecology) around Antoine Waechter. The anti-nuclear struggles that had helped to structure the French Ecologist movement, a movement crisscrossed by many local associations and branches of Anglo-Saxon associations, faded away during the 1980s, after having succeeded for Plogoff but failed against the nuclear plant Superphénix at Creys-Malville. Some of the former members of the anti-nuclear associations set up the new Green Party, others went on to give themselves expertise that was further developed with the creation of the CRII-RAD (Commission de recherche et d’information indépendante sur la radio-activité – Commission of Research and Independent Information on Radioactivity). The CRII-RAD dealt with the disinformation in France surrounding the explosion of the nuclear power plant at Chernobyl. But the French ecologist associations, rich in numbers but poor in members and finances, are thus in an inverse situation to their north European counterparts. They are also more sensitive to their political context full of tensions resulting from the alliances of the several Green parties and the plural left in France.

The laws and public policies undertaken by the left government during the first term of FM constituted responses to social movements, notably to feminism (reimbursement of abortions, improvement in the condition of independent women, professional equality, etc.). Feminism as a social movement receded and became oriented to interest group actions. New associations emerged, specialized on a specific cause (for example the Feminist Collective against Rape in 1985 or the Association Against Violence Against Women in the Workplace) or founded as an answer to the renewal of activism of moral crusades against abortion (creation of the CADAC, Coordination of Associations for the Right to Abortion and Contraception in 1990, and of Pro-Choice) A certain renewal was observed during the 1990s as part of the debate in France and the rest of Europe on the question of parity, a renewal that was facilitated by contacts established by historic feminists.

The same can be said of the homosexual movement, which achieved some success with the anti-discriminatory measures taken in the aftermath of 1981. The movement was
substantially transformed with the appearance of AIDS. The association Aides was created in 1984, Arcat-Sida in 1987, Act-up in 1989. Other than prevention and the fight against the disease, these associations played an essential role in the socialization of new generations of homosexuals. In view of the law on the PACS (Pacte civil de solidarité) they also committed themselves to equal rights.

While union membership decreased the number of associations (type bill 1901) increased and doubled. These associations vary in form and in nature. They are positively evaluated for their local community involvement, their pragmatic projects, their flexibility, their membership participation and their supply of services. The majority of these organizations are involved in environmental issues. Between 1980 and 1995, 40 000 associations specialized in these areas were created. Humanitarian associations that focus on third-world countries and human rights issues also grew in number, and in the 80’s, social solidarity associations emerged like the “Restos du Coeur” founded by the humorist Coluche. This same period of time is characterized by the rise of groups against racism which stand up for immigrants rights in a context of growing racism and radical right: SOS-racisme (founded in 1983), France-Plus (créé en 1985), Mouvement d’Immigration et des Banlieues (1995). These new organizations focus on “rebuilding social link instead of rebuilding political meaning” around specific concrete goals (Barthélemy, 2000, 121). These are the single-issue groups.

Nonetheless, not all associations can fit into the category of “protest renewal”. Many of them –very institutionalized– carry out social services that were formerly under the responsibility of the Welfare State. This paper will only focus on associations and groups which fit into the category of protest renewal.

1.4. The left and social movements

During the 1980’s and the 1990’s, the relationships of the social movements with the political parties of the left vary according to their positioning in the institutional sphere, due to the fact that they are, or not, in power.

In 1986, Mitterrand (Socialist) was the President of the Republic, and the right won the legislative elections. But France has a specific parliamentary regime with a President directly elected by the people, together with a government chosen according to the majority of the legislative body. This led to a Cohabitation. The President Mitterrand was in political opposition to the majority in the National Assembly. This type of cohabitation happened twice: 1986-1988, 1993-1995. During these two periods, one can observe a resurgence of protests fighting policies implemented by the right wing governments.

In 1986, Mitterrand offered public support to the student movement (Lapeyronnie, 1986), and this was a way to oppose his own Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac. When the right wing regained power in 1993, this led to a reactivation of social movements belonging to the family of NSMs, such as the Coordination for the Right to Abortion and Contraception (Coordination pour le droit à l’avortement et à la contraception, CADAC), and the creation of the Action Group for Women’s Rights (Collectif des droits des femmes). During that same period of time, the homosexual movement gained more visibility in the context of the fight against AIDS (Fillieule, Broqua, 2001).
1.4.1. Public recognition and political agenda

The “sans” associations have obtained high visibility and representativeness, they were consulted when laws dealing with their areas of protest were passed (laws against Exclusion, etc.) and were officially received by the government. This recognition became even stronger when the left wing returned to power in 1997 with the Jospin government, called the “gauche plurielle”, a union of several left wing parties (PS, PCF, Green Party. Numerous organizations obtained public recognition and were called upon by the government to consider issues or even laws regarding with their field of action.

Generally speaking, the coming of the left into government and the activism of the movements in the mid 90’s, have helped bringing many of these issues on the government’s agenda. Through the unemployment movement late 1997, the State officially recognized four associations and launched the preparation of the Law against Exclusion. Collaborations with the government created tensions within the movement between protest culture and strategies of political influence, involving moderation. AC!, for example, became divided on the issue of the reduction of working hours and held a rather complex position on the Aubry Law of 1998. The DAL attempted to influence the elaboration of the Law against Exclusion, but used its usual repertory of action, such as symbolic sit-down actions, demonstrations with the PCF and the Green Party (both members of the united left wing). The law has integrated several demands of the association (Crettiez, Sommier, 288) such as the establishment of a tax on vacant housing or preventing from being evicted.

1.4.2. The relationship with political representation

The issue of the relationship of these organizations with political parties is very complex. This is particularly the case of the Revolutionary Communist League, LCR (Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire). A good number of its members are involved in many of the groups: CADAC, SUD, AC!, DD!!, ATTAC, etc. With this central position, the LCR would like to build a radical left wing party, “gauche radicale”, and become its leader. In 2004, it chooses an electoral alliance with another Trotskyist party, Lutte Ouvrière, and combines both strategies of mobilization and electoral participation (Sommier, 2003, 295).

On another hand, at the beginning of the legislative campaign of 1997, a petition entitled “We are the left wing” (Nous sommes la gauche) pressed the institutional left to not forget about the left rooted in the social movements. In 1998, the petition “For the Autonomy of the Social Movement” (Pour l’autonomie du mouvement social) signed by “social movements activists, union members, intellectuals, citizens” was perceived as a warning to the PCF and to the LCR, suspected of willing to co-opt leaders of the “Social Movement” in order to be candidates on the list for the European elections.

Public disenchantment toward political parties has probably led to the creation, often successful of “civil society candidates” for the local (municipal) elections. These candidates were supported by local organizations. In March 2001, civil society lists (listes citoyennes: headed by the organization motivé-e-s) were over 10% in seven large cities in France, and particularly in Toulouse, with the music group Zebda.

From the radical left movement perspective, when Lionel Jospin was eliminated from the first round of presidential elections on March 21, 2002, it became even more urgent to rebuilt the left. Since then, there has been one petition after another. In late 2004,
journals and newspapers from different sensibilities (Politis, Témoignage Chrétien, Mouvements, Ecorev, Inrockuptibles, etc.), together with associations launched an initiative aimed at organizing « social forums for elections » in preparation for the 2007 elections, with the goal of building « electoral campaigns as social and cultural movements ». This new experience, consecutive to previous calls for « rebuilding the left » on the base of « actors of the social and cultural movement » is another illustration of the gap between parties and movements of the left, and of the « autonomization » of the associative space (Péchu, Mathieu) in relation to the partisan field of the left, that can be observed in France for the past fifteen years.

1.5. Social Movements in the 80’s and 90’s: Continuities and discontinuities

1.5.1. Direct democracy and multi-membership

Most often, all these groups function under the principle of direct democracy, a method boosted since the 70’s (by the NSMs and the coordinations). For example, within AC!, the members make decisions through consensus, as opposed to voting for a majority rule. Federalism is used within SUD-PTT, because their local unions have full power to make their own decisions, including to express, publicly, their disagreement with the position held by the national direction. Groups that represent illegal immigrants operate without formal juridical framework, their delegates work in rotation and are revocable at any time. These groups also operate with general assemblies, and seek to drastically limit the number of permanent staff, as is the case for ATTAC, that has 6 staff members per 35,000 members.

This “organized anarchy” must be, nonetheless, moderated through concrete observation of its functioning. Having no formalized structure opens up the opportunity to individuals who are very involved in the action and who are more charismatic to take over. The cases of José Bové from the Confédération Paysanne and Bernard Cassen from ATTAC illustrate this phenomenon quite well.

In this context of ideological decline, the multi-membership has expanded. Christophe Aguiton, for example, is a member of the LCR, AC!, SUD and ATTAC; and Annie Pourre is a member of the DD!, DAL, SUD-Aérien. These activists hold several positions and are professional protesters. They started their political activism during the 1970’s. Multi-membership breaks with former traditional political activism. In fact, up until the 70’s, groups were characterized by exclusive political activism, which compares to today’s idea of working in networks and for several causes at a time.

1.5.2. The utilization of "People Resources"

Movements have often sought the support of “people resources” for their causes, either personalities having a good media coverage or experts. They regularly mobilize external supports having social prestige or simply public visibility, enabling them to attract public opinion’s attention, such as singers like Jacques Higelin, or actresses like Emmanuelle Béart, standing beside immigrants without papers at the Saint-Bernard church in the summer of 1996. They also seek support from personalities known for their moral reputation, like well-known scientists, for instance Albert Jacquart and Léon Schwartzenberg.
Furthermore, all these organizations seek support from individuals with professional skills useful to defend their cause: lawyers, economists, etc. This recourse gives intellectuals a new position, which started being theorized by Foucault with the notion of “Specific Intellectual”. From this point of view, 1995 was a turning point. Pierre Bourdieu became the intellectual figure of critical thinking and makes many declarations in favour of these movements.

1.5.3. The late emergence of counter-expertise

In a world where information and, even more broadly, knowledge have become important power tools, getting an expert second opinion is a fundamental instrument for the forces of opposition. Even though the French ecological movement was the pioneer in using expert second opinion (Ollitrault, 1996), more generally speaking, France was relatively late in adopting it.

These reflection groups have developed after the strike movement of November-December 1995, and in the context of the « petitions battle » within the intellectual milieu, on the issue of the retirement system reform plan: petition in favour of it around the journal *Esprit* and petition « in support of the strikers » around Bourdieu - it should be noted that the petitioner form of action, which keeps going in 1997 with the calls for civil disobedience against the Debré law on the status of immigrants. In this context, a series of new groups were born: « Réseau Alerte Inégalités » (Inequalities Alert Network) in 1994 with the occupation of a building on rue du Dragon by the DAL, the « Appel des économistes pour sortir de la pensée unique » (Call from Economists to get away from the unique thought) and Acrimed (Action critique medias – Media Critique Action) in 1995, Raisons d’agir (Reasons for Action) around Bourdieu in 1996...

In 1998, through the newspaper *Politis* and the association Research, Society, Syndicalism (*Recherche, société, syndicalisme*) the idea to create a foundation of experts to compete with the Fondation Saint-Simon is developed. This foundation Saint Simon, a powerful think-tank of the Socialist Party, brings together intellectuals and entrepreneurs, and is accused of being an “auxiliary” of liberalism. In 1998, the Copernic foundation was created. It regularly publishes reports describing employers projects and will have some influence with the return to power of the left wing in 1997 (cf. the preparation of the Law on Exclusion in 1998).

In addition to the renewal of collective action, there was the development of new intellectual reviews trying to articulate knowledge and political activism, such as the following Journals: *Multitudes, Vacarme* (initiated by Act-Up), *Mouvement* and *Contre-temps* that has a Trotskyist sensibility.

1.5.4. Repertory of action

These movements use the methods of squats, requisitions of housing, breaking into pharmaceutical laboratories (*Act-Up*) and to sabotaging sites (McDonald’s and the destruction of the MGO fields). In order to “scandalize”, injustice has to be dramatized. *Act-Up* has proven to be the quite talented in this field, placing, for example, a giant condom on the obelisk at Concorde in Paris. Even the choice in the name of these organizations follows this logic, such as *AC!*, that, when pronounced in French, forms the
word “enough” and sounds like a shouted command. The purpose is to attract public opinion through the choice of memorable actions and targets that are symbolic of the denounced wrongdoings. Cécile Péchu qualifies this illegal action as sector-based because it is in direct relation with the demand carried on by the mobilization (Péchu, 1996, 123-124). According to Daniel Mouchard, using a strategy of disturbing public order is a means of surpassing State dependence (Mouchard, 2001, 395).

This repertory of action has been influence by three type of methods. 1) Sit-down actions are inherited from actions of some groups during the 1970’s, and particularly the anarchists. 2) Civil disobedience actions - for instance during the mobilization against the Debré Laws in 1997 or the Sarkozy Laws in 2003 - (Pedretti, 2001). Some Green Party's elected representatives have associated themselves to a type of civil disobedience action during the summer 2004, within the context of the struggle against MGO. 3) The festive style of the NSMs, that breaks from traditional actions, specially those of unions, is to be underlined, and goes through an aestheticism of revolts through the influence of Dadaism, of Surrealism and of Situationism. On this last note, one must notice the importance of the protest art in the mobilizations' entourage.

If today’s repertories of actions are quite similar in form to those of the 70's, on the other hand their meaning diverges profoundly. That is to say, recourse to illegal action is not the only method used. Other more traditional forms of action are used as well, such as petitions, demonstrations, direct contacts with political parties represented in the Parliament. There is even an ATTAC committee in the National Assembly and Senate in France, which includes 40 members. Lobbying and legal battles have considerably gained in importance. In this manner, organizations combine the two styles of action :AC!, for instance, carries out actions of protest and at the same time, asks the Constitutional Council (Conceal Constitutional) to ensure the respect of the Constitution with regard to social rights. SUD or the Confédération paysanne call this “democratic subversion”.

2. The Global Justice Movement in France

Seattle is presented as the birth date of the GJM. But, as many authors (Agrikoliansky, Blanchard, Bandler, Fillieule, Passy, Sommier ; 2004) have underlined, the GJM goes through very specific national trajectories, and did not have the same rhythm, kind of development and actors, according to different national contexts (Agrikoliansky, Fillieule and Mayer 2005, 13-42). In France, the reorganization of the protest movement’s characteristics starts by the end of the 80’s (Sommier 2003) and the 1995 protest movement against the retirement’s reform plan is a key moment. Several events are then fundamental in order to understand the gradual involvement of diverse organizations or tendencies in the mobilization, and the concomitant structuring of the GJM. Furthermore, it is fruitful to focus the study of GJM around specific events, in order to facilitate a better understanding of the movement.

2.1. The stages of the GJM
2.1.1. The 1989 Bicentenary

Parallel to the official celebrations of the bicentenary of the French Revolution and the G7 meeting in Paris, two initiatives that could be seen as pre-figuring the Global Justice
Movement, brought together unions, humanitarian associations, human rights associations and political parties of the left around the themes of debt, solidarity with the South, the policies of international institutions, and the environment. First a demonstration, followed by a concert, on July 8, and then on July 15 an “alternative summit” centred on the question of the cancellation of Third World debt. Both also marked the transformation of the space of militancy and solidarity that incited the initiatives. The change of name of the Cedetim (Centre d’études et d’initiatives de solidarité internationale, originally the Centre d’études anti-impérialistes), founded in 1966 by the “Pieds rouges” (left and extreme left government field workers doing their alternative military service while also engaged in the anti-colonial struggle), reveals the rapprochement vis-à-vis third-worldist organizations of Christian origins and the emergence of a re-composition of international solidarity of a humanitarian nature.

2.1.2. 1995

The year 1995 is a key moment in the reorganization of the protest movement spectrum and was seen by some as the “first revolt against economic globalization”. First of all because it appears as an exception in the context of significant decline of strikes. It publicly formalizes the shift within traditional unionism, symbolized by the struggle for petitions about the retirement system reform: on one side, the CFDT against the strikers, and one the other side their supporters, around classical unions, CGT and FO, and also around radical or radicalized unions like the FSU and the CNT, and new unions federated in the Group of 10. It has also favoured establishing a connection between the unions and the “sans” (without) movement (Sommier 2003, 104-107; Mouchard 2002). The shift increases in 2003 with the mobilization against the Fillon project to reform the State employee’s retirement system, and also against the reform of unemployment benefits of the “intermittents du spectacle”(temporary workers in the cultural and artistic sector), in June 2003: 68% of the French who participated in the ESF in November 2003 had participated in the strike movement during spring 2003, and 36% had participated in the “intermittents” movement.

The experience of 1995 created a dynamic of selective alliances: involvement of the CGT next to the immigrants without documents in 1996; squat of the ASSEDIC (c.f. WP1a report) by unemployed people with the support of unions (CGT, SUD, CNT); mobilization against the “Pare” (Plan for access and help to find a job), which brings together the CGT, FSU, Group of 10, DAL, AC!, in May 2000; sporadic strikes, since autumn 2001, of the temporary workers in the fast food sector (Mac Donald’s and Pizza Hut) bringing together Dd!!, the CNT, SUD, but also the CGT. In any case, they represent a break in the recent history of collective action by re-mobilizing militants and building bridges between the unions and new associations. There was also a dynamic which made possible the organization of European marches against unemployment associating, in the spring of 1997, different groups of the countries of the Union. Starting from Sarajevo, Tangiers, Lapland and Ireland, the corteges crossed French, Spanish, Italian, German, British and Swiss towns and finished by bringing together 50,000 participants in Amsterdam on June 14, 1997. The experience was renewed two years later, with the convergence of 30,000 persons demonstrating “against unemployment, precariousness, and exclusion in Cologne where, at the moment, there was being held a summit of the European Union and the G8.
The year 1995 is also important for the renewal of feminist struggles with the organization, at the initiative of the CADAC, of a demonstration bringing together around 100 associations representing about 40,000 persons on November 25 to denounce the “return of a moral order” favoured by the policies of the government of the right. Afterwards, the Collectif national des droits des femmes (National collective of Women’s Rights) was created and held in March 1997 a National Meeting for the Rights of Women, which employed demonstrations and lobbying (participation in discussions on abortion and the 35-hour work week).

2.1.3. The struggle against Multilateral Investment Agreement

The French organizations played a driving role in the first failure, before Seattle, of an international negotiation conducted under the aegis of the OECD : the AMI (Accord Multilatéral sur l’Investissement, Multilateral Investment Agreement), during the course of the winter 1997-98. It was after the discovery on the Internet of the texts of the agreement that the mobilization was begun by bringing together the coordination of diverse organizations, unions (like SUD and the CGT finance branch), associations (like DAL and AC!), think tanks (Global citizens, Observatoire de la mondialisation, etc), but also individuals, notably film makers, who circulated several petitions.

2.1.4. The birth of ATTAC

ATTAC - Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Benefit of Citizens - was created in June 1998 by Bernard Cassen, a professor at the University of Paris VIII, (former University of Vincennes and well-known place for post-68 critical thinking), and chairman of Le Monde Diplomatique, following an editorial by Ignacio Ramonet, entitled “Disarm Financial markets”. Success was immediate. The association has 35,000 members and 150 local committees (Denis 2005). Several well-known personalities from different backgrounds are members of ATTAC (Manu Chao, René Dumont, Viviane Forrester, etc.) as well as organizational entities (Confédération paysanne, the Group of Ten, SUD-PTT, AC!, DAL, DD!, etc.). The ATTAC project is to fight for the implementation of the Tobin tax (name taken from the Nobel Prize winner in Economics in 1981) on financial transactions, which corresponds to a deduction of 0.05%. ATTAC is managed in a very original way. Beyond the conventional board of directors and a national office, ATTAC is managed by a scientific council composed of researchers, university professors and union activists. The monthly journal (Lignes d’ATTAC) and a collection of publications aim at providing arguments for “second opinion expert advice” –a form of action that is little developed in France– and at promoting a “Movement of Popular Education oriented toward Action”.

As with the preceding organizations, the strength of ATTAC is due in large part to its key position at the crossroads of several struggles and, consequently, to its readiness to “globalize the struggles” not only to the economic and financial spheres, but also to the social and environmental ones. Based on its platform, its founding members, and its project (building a “movement of popular education oriented toward action”), it is the French organization the most massively oriented toward the production of counter-analyses. France was behind many other countries in the building of expert militancy, in particular behind the North American continent and its “dossier militancy”: organization of conferences,
production of counter-reports challenging official reports, decoding texts, etc. Attac is the French organization with the largest international ramifications.

2.1.5. From dismantling a MacDonald to struggling against GMO

On August 12, 1999, between 200 and 300 sheep breeders gathered around José Bové, the spokesman of the *Confédération Paysanne*, and started dismantling the McDonald’s in Millau, in order to protest against the heavy taxing of Roquefort cheese by the United States (Martin 2005). A few days later, four activists were arrested and José Bové put under arrest. His image has become a symbol of the struggle against “malbouffe” (bad food, fast food of large corporations) (Bové and Lunea 2002).

At the beginning of July, during the trial of José Bové and nine other activists, more than 50 000 activists met for two days, in order to « put globalization under trial ». The verdict was dissuasive: ten months in jail, but with nine suspended. At the same time, José Bové was sued for having destroyed a GMO field of the National Institute of Agronomic Research (INRA, *Institut National de Recherches Agronomiques*) in Montpellier. He got a sentence of three months in jail for these acts. A vast solidarity movement was organized in order to demand his liberation, with a petition to the President of the Republic because there is in France a presidential pardon. This sentence provoked a large outrage for several reasons. The penalization of activist actions in France is more and more frequent. Furthermore, the difference of attitude of the State toward farmers mobilizations is obvious: actions of the FNSEA are not sued (Duclos 1998) whereas actions of the *Confédération paysanne* not only are a reason for a very important police presence but are also sued by penal justice. The penal actions contribute to the media coverage of the anti-GMO movement and more generally of the movement against “malbouffe” (bad food). In July 2003, for the 30th anniversary of the struggle of the Larzac farmers against a military camp and in the perspective of the WTO summit in Cancun (Mexico), a large meeting was organized under the slogan “The World is not a merchandise”. More than 150 000 people came to the meeting (Collectif 2004). 23% of the French participants in the ESF (November 2003) participated in the Larzac meeting 4 months earlier.

From 2003 on, José Bové takes a certain distance toward the CP and gets involved in a new group: the Collective of Voluntary Reapers This collective, mostly active in Southwest France, aims at destroying the tests of transgenic plants in open fields. This collective advocates civil disobedience. Elected officials, specially from the Green party, participate in the action with their tricolour scarves. Besides dismantling the MacDonald and the Larzac meeting, the summits scheduled in France are other important moments for the structuration of the GJM.

2.1.6. GJM events in France

From May 30 to June 6, 2003, on the occasion of the G8 summit in Evian, a series of demonstrations aiming at denouncing neo-liberal globalization took place on both sides of the Franco-Swiss border in Annemasse, Geneva and Lausanne. Among the French groups participating in the mobilization, (38% of the participants were French), the unions (Sud, G10 but also FSU and CGT) still played a central role (Fillieule, Blanchard, Agrikoliansky, Bandler, Passy, Sommier; 2004). The very large involvement of small
organizations belonging to the third wordlist current, of NGO-type like CEDETIM (Agrikoliansky 2005), must be underlined. This mobilization is thus characterized, in the French case, by a clearer involvement of NGOs working on issues of development, some of them being marked with a Christian heritage.

The idea of holding the first counter-summit in Porto Alegre, in parallel with the one of Davos, was a joint initiative of the Brazilians and the French, lead by ATTAC with Bernard Cassen and the Peasant International created in 1992 as part of the Brazilian Mouvement Sans-terre, Via Campesina, where the Peasant Confederation played a leading role. The French delegation was the largest European delegation; it included around 500 militants. During the second counter-summit, held in January 2001, it was decided mostly at the influential behest of the Italians and the French to import the forum format to the European continent. The first was held in Florence in 2002 and the second in the Ile-de-France (the suburbs of Paris) the following year.

The organization of the ESF in Paris in November 2003 is another important moment in the French GJM (Agrikoliansky and Sommier 2005). 51 000 participants attended 55 plenary conferences, 271 seminars or 280 workshops. According to the figures of the ESF, 80 000 persons participated in the closing. The organization of the ESF helped to attach certain organizations in the GJM: for example the MIB (Movement of Immigration and Suburbs), the Léo Lagrange Federation (organization of popular education created in 1950), or Friends of the Earth. It contributed also to clearly showing which groups, contrary to what is believed, did not participate in the French GJM, like SOS-Racism (and its recent creation of a new organization involving the issues of women in the suburbs “Neither Whores nor Dominated”) or Doctors without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF). The organization of the ESF allowed very different organizations that had not traditionally worked together to meet and favored links between competing organizations (Agrikoliansky, Sommier 2005, 292). However, the differences were also clear. Certain groups, such as “Intergalactics” (Réseau intergalactique 2003), criticize the institutionalization of the ESF. Each of the different events described in this section have contributed in the structuring of the GJM in France. Let’s now analyze the networks of the GJM.

2.2. The organizational networks of the « Movement for a globalization from Below ».

2.2.1 The GJM : A Cooperative Space Of Movement Families

The GJM may be seen as a cooperative space associating to diverse degrees and variable manners, depending on the stakes and the episode (demonstrations, campaigns, forums, counter-summits and alternative spaces) several families of movements that have undergone for a number of years a revival of activities and/or a symbolic radicalization marked by a refounding event.

1) The movements of the defense of human rights associating themselves now and then with the GJM (essentially in forums), above all as expert groups, are of two types: of a transnational scale such as the Human Rights League (Ligue Française pour la défense des droits de l'homme et du citoyen founded in 1898 in the context of the Dreyfus Affair) or Amnesty International (whose French branch was founded in 1971, tens years after the founding of AI). Or on a strictly French scale like Cimade (1939), the GISTI (Groupe d'information et de soutien des immigrés – Groupe of Information and Support of
Immigrants, created en 1972) and the recently created associations like SOS Racisme and the MIB (the only one really active in the GJM among recent associations of this type). Today they have in common the struggle against racism and violations of the rights of foreigners, notably police violence. From this point of view one may add MdM and MSF whose actions in France focus on the rights of foreigners.

2) The older humanitarian organizations have a confessional origin, like the Secours catholique and the CCFD (Comité catholique contre la faim et pour le développement, Catholic Committee against Hunger and for Development, 1961), or an anti-colonial mission like Terre des hommes (1963), the Cedetim (1966) or Ritimo who has associated, since 1985, 45 documentation centers on the Third World constituted since the 1970s. Others are more recent, such as coordinations of local associations : Artisans du monde (1974) and Max Havelaar (1988) dedicated to fair trade, Peuples populaires (1984) and 4D (Dossiers et débats pour le développement durable, 1993) dedicated to sustainable development, Survie (1984), against hunger, Agir ici (1988), etc. These associations have federated themselves around the CRID (Centre de recherche et d’information pour le développement, Research and Information Center for Development, created in 1976), which today brings together 47 international solidarity associations (like the Cimade, the CCFD, Frères des Hommes or Solagral). The CRID is oriented toward expertise and lobbying, and is involved in forums and counter summits, like the Summit for Another World (Sommet pour un autre monde, SPAM), organized with the Cedetim.

3) The feminist movement in France mobilized on the occasion of the preparation for the demonstration of 1995 and, starting in 1998, for the “World March of Women against Violence and Poverty” which took place at the headquarters of the UN on October 17, 2000.

4) The pacifist movement is rather weak in France and linked to political parties, in particular the PCF, who started the Peace Movement, Mouvement de la Paix, in 1948. One may also add the MAN (Mouvement pour une alternative non violente, Movement for a Non-violent Alternative, founded in 1974 by Jean Marie Muller) and ACG (Agir contre la guerre, Act against War) created in January 2002. Thus, in spite of the appeal signed by about a hundred organizations, the global demonstration for peace of February 15, 2003, has been weaker than elsewhere (around 250,000 people in Paris).

5) The parties on the left are still present, but discreetly either because their presence is officially prohibited (during social forums) or problematic (in particular for the PS). The LCR plays a central role because of the great commitment of its militants in several families of the movement and because of its strategy of building, beginning with the activism of movements, a “left-left pole.”

6) Movements for the protection of the environment.

7) Union organizations of employees and peasants.

8) The “sans” organizations.

2.2.2. Organizational networks

The data presented in this paper come from the survey realized by the CRPS team during the European Social Forum in November 2003 (Paris-Saint-Denis), and have been
analyzed in the collective book « Radiographie du mouvement altermondialiste » (Agrikoliansky, Sommier 2005) and in particular chapters IV (Gobille and Uysal 2005), V (Coulouarn and Jossin 2005), VI (Fillieule and Blanchard 2005). In order to analyze the French global justice movement, the activists living in France have been put together in a separated data bank.

In their large majority, the French participants to the ESF declare to identify very much (39%) or quite (38%) to the global justice movement in its whole or to one specific section. The multiple affiliations of the activists is fundamental in order to understand the French global justice movement network. They can this way claim to belong to a specific organization, while having the feeling to be part of a homogeneous ensemble. The activists have several affiliations within the movement: an activist declares to be affiliated to an average of 2.4 organizations, including 1.5 in an active way. The movement “for a globalization from below” brings together, with a federative slogan people who are sympathetic to very diverse causes. Of course, the largest organizations in the ESF are the specific global justice ones, like Attac. 40% of the activists are affiliated to one of them (Fig. 1). 35% to the unions: this reflects their predominant position within the French Global Justice Movement (GJM). Then come humanitarian (26%) and environmentalist associations (19%), political parties (17%), pacifist (23%) and human rights organizations (26%), organizations against racism (16%), solidarity organizations (16%), etc. (See fig.1). Two thirds of those belonging to these organizations declare having an active role.

For the young participants, the hierarchy of the organizations changes drastically: unions, which come to the 2ᵉ place for the total amount of the participants, drop to the 15ᵉ place. Logically, the youth and student movements tend to be predominant among the young population of our sample, together with the pacifist and « autonomous ». As Blanchard and Fillieule (2005, 161-162) note, on the contrary, the young people are less involved in the organizations against racism, solidarity, neighbourhood and religious organizations, and political parties.
**Fig. 1: In the following list, do you belong to any of the following movements?**

N = 1413

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Yes, I am currently affiliated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alter or no-global</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian organization</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmentalist organization</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacifist organization</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights organization</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization against racism</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminist organization</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity organization</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gay and lesbian groups</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antagonist area</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against AIDS</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious organization</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer’s Organization</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Media Network</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers organization</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Sans” Movements</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other organization</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: CRPS survey

Let’s now analyze the links between the organizations. In order to do this, we can draw some « aggregates » which bring together organizations strongly connected with each other (through their activists affiliated to several organizations).
Organization’s Network according to their attractiveness among the ESF activists (Blanchard and Fillieule 2005; 164).
The first aggregate is the largest because it brings together three out of the six most attractive types of organizations: the no-global *stricto sensu*, the green movements and the pacifists: Attac and a large number of small organizations like the Friends of *Le Monde Diplomatique*, the *Forum de la gauche citoyenne*, the Copernic Foundation, Greenpeace France, *Ingénieurs sans Frontières*, the network *Sortir du Nucléaire*, etc. It is a young aggregate (the activists are an average of 37 years old), cosmopolitan (they speak a foreign language and/or have lived in a foreign country), very few believe in God. This aggregate is composed of people who are in majority working full time, and often holding manager positions in the public sector. The people of this aggregate don’t vote very often, and when they do, it is rather for the Greens and the *Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire* (Trotskyist Party). They are very involved in the Global Justice Movement—although without having organized any. They have a collective militant involvement: their family and friends are also involved in the GJM (Blanchard and Fillieule 2005, 165-166).

The second aggregate is the closest to the first one and connected with it through activists who belong to several organizations. It includes the Research and Information Center for Development (CRID), the Catholic Committee for Food and Development (CCFD), the CIMADE, the Craftsmen of the World’s Federation, the League for Human Rights, Amnesty International. Women, people under 30 years old and retired people are over-represented. More than two thirds have had an education for more than three years after high school. They are cosmopolites and often hold a middle or high level position mostly in the public sector. Many of them are professionals. Less on the left than the average, these activists often went to the ESF on their own, do not believe as much in the effectiveness of the GJM and are not the most active. They are close to the Green Party and have sometimes been candidates for a political election. This second aggregate emphasizes an involvement of activists with a strong educational and economic capital, strongly interested in the question of helping the countries of the South (Blanchard and Fillieule 2005, 166).

The third aggregate is dominated by unions and political parties activists, with, additionally—but very marginally—the unemployment movement. They belong to the CGT, the FSU, the *Union syndicale G10 solidaires*, the PCF, the LCR, but also AC ! *Agir contre le chômage*, or also the Euromarches against unemployment. This aggregate is socially very homogeneous. Its members are between 30 and 60 years old, most of them work full time, are less educated than those from the two first aggregates, and belong to the public sector. This aggregate is the most experienced politically: strong political know-how, mastering of political debates, participation in conventional political activities (regular voting, party affiliation, political candidacy), maximum protest, politically positioned on the radical left. In this group, 13% are PCF members, 7% LCR members, but more than half of the group is close to the LCR. They also often declare to be affiliated to SUD, the CGT, but also the FSU and the CFDT. They are very well integrated into activist networks: their close family and friends are also involved in the GJM, they came with the organization they belong to. They fully identify with the GJM network, they believe in its effectiveness and have been part of the organizers of the ESF (Blanchard and Fillieule 2005, 167).

The fourth aggregate brings together the solidarity, religious and neighborhood organizations. It is connected with the second aggregate essentially through the humanitarian organizations and in the logic of connecting problems of poverty in the South and in the North. The *Secours Catholique* or the League for Human Rights also belong to
this aggregate. Its members also come from alternative radio stations. They are older, more educated, and are, in the same proportions, retired, unemployed, salaried employees and students. Among those who have a job, there is a majority of workers in the associative sector, rather than the public and private sector. In their majority, they believe in God and are Catholic. Their political involvement is conventional and limited: they talk less about politics, don’t often vote or belong to a union or political party, they also do not protest much, and don’t position themselves as much on the left. They prefer the PS, the *Verts*, even UDF and UMP rather than the LCR. They are the less experienced in terms of GJM protest, they don’t identify very much with it. They are less involved and will not stay very long at Saint-Denis. This aggregate, with a clear religious connotation, stays in fact on the margins of the movement – which are actually quite important (more than ¼ of the activists questioned). This aggregate has nonetheless a ideological coherence (Blanchard and Fillieule 2005, 167).

The fifth and the sixth aggregates are a minority. The aggregate 5 includes the feminists and gays - lesbians: *Femmes solidaire*, *les Panthères roses*, *le Réseau féministe*. Its most representative members are rather women, who most exclusively hold mid-management jobs, in the public or associative sector. Precarity (unemployment, part time, « intermittence » -temporary-) is quite strong. Their close family or friends are little involved in the GJM. All these observations confirm the difficult relationships between the GJM and these groups. The controversy turns around the male domination and capitalism, and about the internal functioning (male domination provoking a lack of female representation). This is a group which votes and protests occasionally, but which talks less than the others about politics, and does not belong to any union or political party. It is focused on gender equality. The aggregate 6 brings together heterogeneous groups: groups of the antagonist area on one hand, organizations mobilized against aids on the other hand. This aggregate is dominated by people who hold mid-management jobs. Its members work in the associative sector, specially Sida info service, or AIDES. One third believes in God. Protestants and Muslims are also represented. They are politically active, declare to be close to the PS and believe in the effectiveness of protest. They have a good experience of mobilization in the GJM, including as organizers, and they live in an environment which shares this involvement (Blanchard and Fillieule 2005, 168). The other types of organizations are out of the aggregates, because the profiles of the activists are too different.

2.2.3. Social networks

It is important to look at the impact of social networks in the GJM activism. 17% of the participants have very activist friends and 45 % rather activists. Only 35% of the participants came alone. The number of individuals who came with friends (24%), family, (10%) or work colleagues (7%) is more important than the number of individuals who came with an organization (23%).

Family, friends and professional background (environment) of the participants in the ESF seems to play an important role in their involvement. For instance, the more they talk about politics with their family or friends, the higher is the probability of identification to the movement or to a specific sector/organization. Similarly, when the people of the sample declare that their friends are very, or quite involved, there is a higher probability for them to declare a strong identification to the movement. Therefore, social environment
constitutes not only one of the key factors of the tendency to participate in a collective action, but also to recognize oneself subjectively as fully involved in it (Coulouarn and Jossin 2005, 165).

There is a statistically significant correlation between the age of the people of the sample and their answers about identification. The older the participants in the ESF are, higher is their tendency to identify with the movement. In their majority, young activists don’t identify with the movement as much as the older category of the sample. As Coulouarn and Jossin (2005, 166) note it is interesting to emphasize this trend, which is quite contrary to the image promoted by the media.

2.3. Protest repertories

2.3.1 Types of Repertories

First of all, the French participants in the ESF are very active and experienced in terms of protest action: 97% have signed a petition, 96% have participated in a demonstration, 72% went on strike. 75% declare to have leafleted. This is a more important proportion than for the whole sample (including the French) (92% petition, 90% demonstration, 63% strike, 66% leafleted): the French seem to use protest action on a larger scale than the average of other European activists in the ESF. This shows that their activism in the past was not limited to simply being part of the audience. This population is experienced, at least in terms of non-violent activism. This probably contributes to creating a feeling of belonging to a coherent movement.

Then, referring to a classification of repertories of action proposed by Hans-Martin Uehlinger (1988) and Dieter Fuchs (1991), Coulouarn and Jossin have classified the actions in three categories: demonstrative repertory of action (legal and non-violent), civil disobedience (illegal and non-violent) and category of political violence (illegal and violent) (Coulouarn and Jossin 2005, 140). The legal and non-violent actions in the demonstrative repertory include signing petitions, participating in groups of reflection and discussions, demonstrations, symbolic actions, leafleting, boycott of some products or stores or countries, strike, hunger strike, fast and prayers.

2.3.2. Violence versus non-violence

Illegal actions of civil disobedience repertory are occupying buildings (factory, school, etc.), resistance to the forces of order and blocking traffic (sit-in, etc.). The repertory of political violence includes damaging properties and physical pressures (constraints) on a person. The criteria of respecting/or not the law and of using or refusing violence seem relevant here, since these themes are frequently associated with the GJM. The media easily present the GJM during the counter-summits as potentially violent. They are described in terms of « rioters » (« casseurs »), « social war », even « Intifada » (Coulouarn and Jossin 2005, 141). But illegalism and its types of action (non-violent blockings, affinity groups, etc.) give at the same time a young and innovating style to these mobilizations.

Internal debates, within the GJM about the use, or not, of violence, reflect this ambiguity. Some GJM activists include, in their strategy, the goals of breaking the law and
using violence (crossing the red zone of supra-national summits, building occupations, blocking traffic in Annemasse and Geneva at the Evian counter-summit in 2003, etc.), but they face a lot of criticisms within the organizations. The cleavage about violence is not simple: it is a important stake, also because it allows subtle tactics of positioning and differentiation within the movement. It is thus important to study the attitude of the activists toward this issue. Only one third of the ample would agree to use violence. But the acceptance of such or such type of action is rather a matter of effectiveness than of ethics. The types of action of the demonstrative repertory are thus considered « quite » or « rather » effective by more than 60% of the participants, those of the confrontational repertory by 38% to 62% of them (according to the types of action), those of political violence by less than 16% of the people in the sample. Actions in the repertory of political violence are considered ineffective by more than half the participants; this is probably linked with the concern of losing support from part of the population that would weaken the impact of the GJM (Coulouarn and Jossin 2005, 143). If activist violence brings some media coverage to this protest movement, it is rather in negative terms.

In order to go further in the study, it is possible, if we refer to three types of repertories, to elaborate three categories of activists: the demonstrative group brings together activists who refuse to use the actions of the confrontational and political violence repertories; the confrontational group includes those who only refuse the use of actions of the political violence repertory; the group of political violence includes those who claim having used or declare themselves ready to use at least one out of two actions of the political violence repertory.

A large majority of the participants have used legal and non-violent actions (demonstrative repertory); more than one third have used illegal and non-violent actions (confrontational repertory) and almost half declare themselves ready to do so; more than two thirds of the activists refuse political violence (Coulouarn and Jossin 2005, 149-155).

On the other hand, the attitudes of the participants toward the types of action raise the question of their social characteristics (age, level of education, social and professional background, etc.), together with their political and activist roots. If we refer to Charles Tilly and his studies of collective action repertories, it is quite possible that both parameters play a role. The choice of one type of action rather than another often depends on the context, the activist experience and the sociographic characteristics of the person.

Thus, the members of the three groups can be classified upon the level of education and the occupation. Those belonging to the group of political violence are characterized with a somewhat lower level of education: 50% hold a degree equal or above the bachelor’s (versus 55.5% for the two other groups), 8.5% did not finish high school (versus about 6% for the two other groups). In the same way, there is a larger number of workers (3.6%) and employees (11%) than among the demonstrative (7% employees, and no workers) and the activists in favour of civil disobedience. There is also a difference according to the professional situation: unemployed are over-represented in the group of political violence; retired people and university/high school students are over-represented among the demonstrative (Coulouarn and Jossin 2005, 146-147).

This cleavage in the repertory of action is connected with a larger one within the movement. During the ESF seminars, one could hear some activists refer to the modalities needed to change society. As Coulouarn and Jossin (2005, 148) note this opposition between radical change and more reformist methods (reforms through new laws, gradual
changes in the lifestyle, etc.), was visible for instance though the apparent antinomy between “the alternatives” and “the Alternative”. Demonstrative and confrontational groups are more in favour or reformist methods: “reform international economical and financial institutions”, “reinforce international law”.

3. Conclusion

The French case presents several specificities. Before all, one must remember the impact in France of the coming into power of the left in 1981, with the election of F. Mitterrand to the presidency which puts on the governmental agenda a certain number of demands of the social movements of the seventies. It has provoked a decline of mobilization of the New social movements, by orienting their action towards logics of lobbying and direct collaboration with the socialist government. Now, if we focus on the 80's and 90's, one can observe two parallel evolutions. First of all, there is a substantial decline of the membership of traditional organizations (traditional unions and political parties). Secondly and in parallel, new forms of collective action emerge (new styles of unions and “without movements”).

Several events are then fundamental in order to understand the gradual involvement of diverse organizations or tendencies in the mobilization, and the concomitant structuring of the GJM. 1) The year 1995 is a key moment in the reorganization of the protest movement spectrum because it has favoured establishing a connection between some traditional unions (like the CGT), the new unions of the public sector (S.U.D.), and the “sans” (without) movement. 2) The creation of ATTAC in June 1998 is the real beginning for the elaboration of the problems of the GJM in France. 3) The actions of the Confédération Paysanne, around José Bové, with the destruction of a Mac Donald and the denunciation of bad food (“malbouffe”), provoke a mediatization of the demands of the GJM, and a large meeting at the Larzac in 2003. 4) The GJM meetings in France (Evian and FSE) are characterized by an involvement of actors which were not very active previously in the movement: for instance NGOs working on issues of development (some of them being marked with a Christian heritage) on issues of popular education or immigration.

The French GJM’s activists have several affiliations within the movement. The specifically “no global movement associations” are in minority whereas unions are in a predominant position. Then come humanitarian and environmentalist associations, political parties. The multiple involvement and affiliation to several networks is a new aspect that must be underlined. The movement “for a globalization from below” brings together, with a federative slogan, people who are sympathetic to very diverse causes.

The French GJM must now face two challenges: its relationships with government and within the left. The movement is facing a paradoxical situation toward the government and president Chirac. On the international stage, president Chirac advocates for the implementation of a international tax deduction on financial transactions and appears as the spokesman of a human globalization. However, as far as internal policy is concerned his government is actually the most « neo-liberal » in France since the beginning of the Fifth Republic. This government seems to break with the tradition of social Gaullism.

Within the left, the emergence and consolidation of the GJM have developed links between competing organizations. Two main tendencies can be drawn: the first one is in
favor of an institutionalization, or at least an inscription in the political field, of the movement, whereas the second one wants to keep the principle of “politique autrement” and only stay a protest movement. The goal of insertion of the GJM in the political game seems to be related to the old project of re-foundation of a radical pole on the left, in the context of the membership decline of the PCF and the PS. It is for example the case with the large number of petitions (cf. WP1a) and the participation of 100% GJM electoral lists for the regional elections in 2004. GJM is thus not only a distant international stake, but must be analyzed within national political dynamics (Agrikoliansky, Sommier 2005, 302-303).
References


The Global Justice Movement in Germany
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1. The heritage of left-wing social movement families

Compared to the first half of the 20th century, political culture in Germany underwent basic changes partly resulting from the activity of social movements. While in West Germany the era of the students’ movement in the late 1960s and the following decade was characterised by harsh confrontation between governmental and movement actors, bargaining and collaboration became common practice since the early 1980s, though confrontation continued at least in some issue areas and some points of time. In East Germany, actions of dissenting groups were closely monitored and oppressed until the authoritarian regime finally collapsed after hundreds of thousands of protesters urged for democracy in 1989. For the challenger groups in this part of Germany, unification of the two Germanies was accompanied by an adaptation to the Western status quo. Today, social movements are widely perceived as legitimate political actors. They have acquired a broad and stable basis and a profound impact on policy-making in some policy domains (e.g., environmental protection) while hardly being influential in other domains (e.g., defence policy, industrial policy). Overall, new social movements are stronger in the West than in the East, while social issues play a greater role in the East.

1.1. Context

Social movements that are part of the global justice movement today can be traced back to the antecedent students’ uprising in the 1960s and even to earlier movements. The peace movement, for instance, is rooted in a long tradition that goes back to the early 20th century. After the Nazi rule, a corporatist regime was established in Western Germany that was dominated by major political parties. Particularly in the West, the split of Germany into two political systems resulted in a strong and effective adherence to the political and economic system. Both significant organisations of the Old Left and remnants of the labour movement, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the trade unions, were supportive of the economic system called “rhine-ish capitalism” that included an elaborated welfare component. Criticism from the residual Left was perceived as a threat to freedom and, more generally, the existing system, and was largely denounced as communist activity.

The so-called extra-parliamentary opposition of the 1960s was the first significant force to openly challenge this constellation. As a compound of peace activists, students’ groups and adherents of an emerging counterculture, the movement was opposing the concealment of the national-socialist past, the war in Vietnam, the hierarchical and outdated educational system, and the repressive and hypocritical bourgeois culture. Yet the majority of the population, and perhaps more so the political and economic elites, were not ready to make any concessions. The authorities’ overreaction to demonstrations and disruptive practice in combination with the anti-communist agitation of a mainly conservative press led to the notion of a sealed “fascistoide system”. Therefore, hard-core
leftists haunted a revolutionary overthrow to the given system. The socialist movement disintegrated at the turn of the 1960s, splitting into many hierarchical small parties founded in reminiscence of the Leninist, Maoist or Trotskyist organisational model, militant groups, and an anti-authoritarian residual, the so-called *Spontis* (Koenen 2001). A significant share of activists was integrated in the SPD’s youth organisation after the party’s promise to reform the exclusive political system (Chancellor Brandt, in 1969, promoted the slogan “Daring to establish more democracy“). Moreover, a thematic shift became visible. Groups dealing with feminist issues, international solidarity, ecology, and urban development mushroomed (della Porta and Rucht 1995). Still, the antagonistic constellation prevailed and led to serious clashes with the authorities taking shape in the conflict over squatted houses, nuclear power stations, and other large industrial projects. Violence peaked in the “German Autumn” in 1977, when the *Rote Armee Fraktion* killed three representatives of the economic and judiciary system. As a consequence, not only the terrorists but also their sympathisers were vehemently prosecuted by the authorities. By virtue of these experiences and due to the lack of a supportive working class, the revolutionary scheme waned while countercultural concepts simultaneously gained importance. Unlike the utopia of democratic socialism – that prevailed until the breakdown of the Eastern bloc – and the “borrowed reality” of revolutions in the developing countries, issues of the emerging new social movements were related to everyday life and more specific aims.

Movement structures, without doubt, developed differently in the East (Haufe and Bruckmeier 1993, Pollack 1994). With a regime denying basic rights of political expression, citizens had to act secretly or subversively, usually in small and informal groups. Mobilisation was difficult to organise and represented a high-risk enterprise. Experiencing unsteady terms that alternately brought additional oppression and temporal relief, the only independent, non-clandestine organisations were sheltered by the church. Since the mid-1980s, opposition was no longer limited to small, mostly intellectual groups. Citizens called attention to the ecologic disaster resulting from industrial pollution as well as to the hazard of the military arms race. Facing oppressive policing and thus low mobilisation, the groups resorted to more subtle and more creative forms of resistance. Collective walks and bike tours turned into implicit protest. Yet confrontation with the authorities was not perceived as a tactical alternative. Because there neither were forums enabling open discussion nor resonance to these groups in state-run media, political information had to be circulated secretly in the form of more or less improvised newsletters and journals (samiszdat).

In the following section, the development of four social movements that participated in the global justice movement is described to highlight the fundamental changes they were subject to, depending on time-specific political opportunities and alliance structures. Note that the description is valid only for the majority of groups and networks. Relevant fractions have been opposing the mainstream development by maintaining their initial values and organisational structures.

**1.2. Social Movement Traditions**

**1.2.1. Labour Movement**

Descending from an utterly confrontational and battle-ridden field of conflict, labour movement organisations, namely trade unions, played an eminent role in the
stabilisation of German post-war society (Pirker 1960). Both trade unions and the SPD endorsed capitalism in exchange for a welfare state model. They accomplished important reforms that enforced workers’ rights and participation during the 1970s. With a large proportion of organised employees and a unitary organisational principle (Einheitsgewerkschaft), trade unions had acquired a powerful position in German politics, representing one pole – besides the state and the capital – in the tripartite neo-corporatist arrangement. The trade unionists’ self-conception of capital and labour as “social partners” highlights the fate of the class cleavage in Germany. As both a prerequisite and result of their pacification, the trade unions became an important pillar of the economically prosperous Modell Deutschland. With conflicts being mediated institutionally, trade unions tended to shy away from confrontation and strike activities, even more so if these were not protected by law during periods of existing contracts negotiated between labour and capital. Few European countries experienced less industrial action in the second half of the 20th century as Germany did. Activities beyond the dominant trade unions, for instance wildcat-strikes, remained singular and locally isolated incidents. No successful attempt was made to organise labour interests beyond the powerful unitary trade unions. Christian trade unions, for example, remained insignificant.

Up to now, the emphasis of the mainstream unionist actors on economic growth breeds conflicts with new social movements. With the exception of the leftist wing within the unions that was ideologically close to left-libertarian movements, environmentalism and movements for disarmament, at least in a first period, were perceived as a threat to employment. Later on, joint campaigns of (parts of the) unions and new social movements were organised. Especially unions of metal workers and public sector employees were open to movements’ claims. Nevertheless, these movements were kept at arm’s length from the hierarchically organised labour organisations. With the decline of ideological fever and a shift towards pragmatic tactics in the 1980s, however, the gap narrowed between organised labour and new social movements. A similar process took place in the relations between left-libertarian movements and the SPD.

Declining membership as a consequence of a shrinking working class identity, neo-liberal policies, and the rise of unemployment contributed to an erosion of the trade unions’ power that today, from the perspective of the elites, is perceived as an obstacle to economic progress. With the dismantling of some welfare guarantees and the reduction of former achievements of the labour movement, the distance between unions and the SPD in power is growing. Reformulating their position in the political process, trade unions have tried to broaden their thematic scope (e.g., including issues of global justice movements) and maintain independence from the SDP. More recently, readiness to combat in addition to an increasing dedication to transnational issues can be witnessed. Today, many intersections of unionist and left-wing movements can be perceived and alliances are frequent, particularly in respect to defending the welfare state and to maintaining public services.

1.2.2. Environmental Movement

German authorities’ attempt to enforce the construction of a nuclear power plant near the town of Wyhl in 1972 spurred the already emerging environmental movement. Later, nuclear energy proved to be the most important field for ecological mobilisation. Socialist groups in the wake of the student movement framed the existing power structure and the reactions of the authorities as evidence of a “nuclear state” (Robert Jungk). They
joined the struggle of local citizens’ committees who seemed to provide the mass base that the socialist groups were longing for (Linse 1986). The grassroots initiatives addressing local problems were the most important factor in the ensuing campaigns and mobilisations. Their umbrella organisation *Bundesverband Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz*, founded in 1972, managed nation-wide activities effectively but faded away after the peak mobilisations in the mid-1980s as well as after a series of internal problems. From then on, more conventional national public interest groups, which can partly be traced back to the early 20th century, gained importance. Today, they are the most influential part of the movement. The prevalence of these formalised, hierarchical organisations reveals the process of institutionalisation within both individual organisations and within the movement as a whole (Rucht 1991, Rucht and Roose 2001b).

The environmental movement united a broad array of citizens ranging from conservatives to radical socialists, thus causing ideological cleavages between protective approaches (“conservationism”) and left or “deep” political ecology. This cleavage was obvious during the process that led to the founding process of the Green Party in 1980, bundling and representing many of the radical leftist activists (Raschke 1993). The participation of the Greens in governmental politics has affected the persisting split between radical conviction (so-called fundamentalism) and *Realpolitik* in favour of the latter. Nevertheless, the party has been reaching consistently significant shares in local, national, and European elections, with the exception of the Eastern territory.

The action repertoire deployed in the environmental movement changed significantly over the years. Protest, often confrontational and partially militant, was common in the 1970s and 1980s. At the same time, an alternative culture arose out of numerous attempts to realise a conscious, simple, and sustainable way of life: ecological farming, alternative production, biking, waste separation, etc. A convergence of governmental and movement actors became obvious in the following decade (Rucht and Roose 2001a). Environmental groups started bargaining and even cooperating with the authorities on delimited issues. As in other policy-fields, cooperation was facilitated by the committed and effective means in which groups had begun to deal with local problems. This trend triggered serious discussions in terms of whether or not it was legitimate to accept money from the government to further the groups’ cause (*Staatsknete-Debatte*), ending in the acceptance of or even straight demand for state money. The majority of protests taking place today are rather of symbolic than of confrontational character, taking into account the role of mass media as a mediator of environmental claims.

As engagement in environmental politics has become a highly differentiated and issue-specific matter with a lowering ideological component, cooperation with governmental actors has become frequent and often successful, ranging from the local to the transnational level (for the European level, see Roose 2003). On the local level, the Agenda 21 process fostered by the EU allowed activists’ participation in shaping local environmental policy with the emergence of limited deliberative practices (Müller-Christ 1998). This experiment to increase citizens’ participation provided ample funding on the part of the authorities and was evaluated ambivalently by activists (Bergstedt 1999, Oels 2002). The concessions made by institutional politics are visible in the institutional and procedural consideration of environmentalists’ concerns. Correspondingly, environmental groups have moderated their claims and forms of action to make them more acceptable to governmental and economic actors.
1.2.3. Peace movement

In Germany, the experience of the past war nourished a tradition of a widespread emphasis on peacefulness. The largest mass mobilisations in the federal republic were triggered by the issue of war and peace. Research has shown that approximately one third of all protesters in West Germany took action to promote peace in the years 1950-1994 (Neidhardt and Rucht 2001, 39). In the 1980s, when the NATO planned to deploy nuclear weapons in central Europe, the new peace movement took to the streets, and hundreds of thousands opposed the plan (Cooper 1996). Citizens with diverse backgrounds were united by fear of a nuclear war. Media attention was fostered with the involvement of celebrities such as Nobel laureate Heinrich Böll and green party icon Petra Kelly in a blockade of the U.S. Army base in Mutlangen, helping in generating broad support among the population. The movement also broadened when organisations from other social movements, internationalist, feminist, environmentalist and alike, participated in peace activities. Left-wing politicians, trade unions, and Christian as well as radical leftist groups played an important role in mobilising protesters. Particularly in the first protest wave in the 1980s, the Green party was another important ally of the movement. With its dependence on contingent political decisions, however, the organisational structure of the peace movement was reticular and volatile, concentrating on distinct and highly visible campaigns in some periods and falling into latency in others. While the war in former Yugoslavia was met by relatively few protests, the wars against Iraq in 1991 and much more so in 2003 sparked a wave of protest.

Peace activists have used disruptive, though strictly non-violent means to achieve their goals: Mass demonstrations, blockades, and public appeals. Despite the tremendous impact on people’s minds, the movement could not achieve crucial gains. Even the large peace campaign in the 1980s virtually had no policy impact. Moreover, an immense fluctuation can be observed over the years. Mobilisation against the war in Yugoslavia in 1999, a war that was ideologically supported by the German government, lacked wide participation and was mainly promoted by radical leftist groups. With the war in Yugoslavia and the Western intervention, the pacifistic mood waned. Due to their support for military action as a ruling party, the Greens, a former ally of the peace movement, became an outsider, if not even an opponent to the peace movement. Several prominent proponents within the Greens became a target of hatred and aggression.

1.2.4. The Women’s Movement

The beginning of the new women’s movement has often been identified with the throwing of tomatoes against male delegates at the conference of the German SDS, Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund in 1969. By means of deeds and words, women reminded their male comrades of the close link between patriarchal and capitalist structures (Gerhard 1990). This double impact of class and gender as well as the revolutionary alternative did not persevere in the feminist framing of problems. Instead, everyday experiences of systematic discrimination shed light on the microstructures of power. Thus, tangible and achievable goals moved to the foreground in order to find straight solutions to help discontinue the unequal treatment of women.

This pragmatic shift also shaped the repertoire of action. Feminist groups began to provide services to women in various fields: shelter, education, health care, and so on.
Large and highly visible protests were scarcely been carried out since the 1970s (Rucht 2003, 160). Solely one of the first important issue areas, the controversy over abortion, resulted in a significant protest wave, triggered by the “self-accusation” of prominent women who publicly declared to have performed an abortion in the Stern magazine 1971. To open a field for public debate on women’s issues, feminist media evolved, playing an important role in the identification process of both movement’s activists as well as of a broad range of non-activists. As with their own media, self-organised structures were particularly important to the movement. Women stressed the autonomy and importance of the subject, rejecting any form of representation and hierarchy. A double autonomy was proclaimed vis-à-vis male dominated organisations and, more specifically, the state as a patriarchal institution. Based on its great symbolic meaning, this autonomy was widely and rigidly practiced among many feminists throughout the 1970s and early 1980s.

Whereas the initial non-hierarchical organisational model is still present in the autonomous wing of the women’s movement, the majority of projects underwent profound changes since the 1980s. The supply of services spurred differentiation and hierarchical decision-making. This trend was strengthened by an approximation to the authorities very similar to the environmentalist movement. Thanks to the enduring activities of the new women’s movement, the call for equal rights has become widely acknowledged in German society. Alliance partners were found in many segments of German politics. The fairly conventional umbrella organisation Deutscher Frauenrat for instance, rooted in an association founded in 1894, unites women from parties, religious, and economic interest groups. The broad resonance to the issues of gender and equality fostered the authorities’ readiness to consult feminist groups and finance institutions both within and outside the movement to serve women’s needs. The outsourcing of public services and the private engagement particularly matched conservative governments’ polity-concepts. Thus, state money allowed a consolidation and professionalisation in this pragmatic branch of the movement. Additionally, institutional regard for gender issues became visible: a governmental branch was created, and women’s representatives started to work in local executive branches and public institutions. Through the introduction of a quota for women in representative and executive functions, the Green Party initiated advancement for the proportion of women in politics, thereby gaining some support from open-minded conservatives.

1.2.5. Internationalist and Third World Movement

The international perspective of the global justice movements is far from being a new occurrence: it was mainly Christian and socialist groups that played an important role in the perception of the “Third World” since the late 1960s (Olejniczak 1998). Ever since the anti-colonial struggle in Algeria in the early 1960s, more or less subversive groups played an important role in influencing the revolutionary concept and identity of socialists in Germany. Perceived as part of an international revolutionary process, guerrilla groups were supported ideologically and materially. The Sandinistas’ fight in Nicaragua, in particular, turned out to be a focal point for the German left. Later on, the emphasis on international solidarity was supplemented by the concept of development. Yet when the overcoming of the capitalist system had proved to be impossible in the capitalist core countries, hope concentrated on the anti-capitalist struggle in the periphery. Besides leftist groups, also Christian engagement in favour of the “Third World” was, and still remains, important. It is
mainly rooted in charity initiatives in the late 1950s. Over the years, an explicitly political discourse evolved in this arena, scandalising poverty and global economic inequalities. Today, Christian groups represent the largest charity organisations, playing an important role in fair trade, international projects, and domestic consciousness-raising. In East Germany as well, Christian belief provided a strong impulse for a comparable movement (INKOTA-Netzwerk e.V., 1990).

Regarding organisational structures, an enormous plethora of groups has emerged. On the one hand, there are few influential and well-organised interest groups with some impact on governmental development politics. Just recently, most interest groups bundled their forces in a national umbrella group, the Verband Entwicklungspolitik deutscher Nichtregierungsorganisationen (VENRO). On the other hand, numerous small groups with a great thematic variety exist, however, often only focussed on one project or one southern region. Some grass-roots initiatives united as early as 1977 in the umbrella network Bundeskongress entwicklungspolitischer Aktionsgruppen (BUKO), taking an explicit though not revolutionary, anti-capitalist stance. Both organisational types have been cooperating in campaigns in favour of fair trade and human rights. An important field of action for Third World groups in Germany are public relation campaigns aiming at raising consciousness regarding injustice in the international perspective. At the same time, most domestic initiatives support local projects in Third World countries. Significant differences, and sometimes tensions, exist between smaller groups on the one hand and the big and more established players engaged in lobbying and efforts of global governance on the other hand.

Regarding certain thematic areas, there were close links between antagonist groups organising international solidarity and trade unions (e.g., campaigns against dictatorships in Latin America) and churches. Germans tend to be generous with financial contributions and individual commitment. Thus, the more established groups that are mainly engaged in charity work dispose of considerable resources. Yet the impact on policy-making is very modest. For many years, the German government has by far been failing its aim to devote 0.7 percent of its gross national product to development aid (the current proportion is 0.28 percent). Moreover, no fundamental shift in the governmental concept of development politics is in sight, though occasional declarations of intent by some politicians can be heard.

1.3. Adaptations in Eastern Germany

Mass mobilisation demanding reforms in the wake of promises of perestroika in the Soviet Union opened the window of opportunity for civic engagement in Eastern Germany. The “Wende” (change, shift) period rapidly facilitated this development, breeding hundreds of groups involved in human rights, environmentalism, women’s issues, urban development, etc. At the same time, oppositional socialist groups lost coherence and adherents. Nevertheless, until the adaptation of western Germany’s economic and political system was decided upon, a socialist frame and the search for a “third way” were prevalent in the movements’ discourses. In contrast to this socialist stance, a pragmatic attitude subsequently accompanied the process of re-unification.

In the brief period of transgression between the collapse of the regime and the decision of unification, a round table model was established, bringing authorities, church
representatives and civic movements together. This deliberative practice existed on a national as well as on the local level, generating single-issue committees dealing with environmental problems, urban problems, media, and alike. Though lacking official legitimation in many cases, these forums served to make pragmatic decisions and had a strong influence on the government (Thaysen 1990). The recent discussion on citizen participation partially has referred to this model. For example, joint attempts have been made at the local level to reduce the output of carbon dioxide.

It was the disappearance of the second German state that finally accelerated a rapid process of adaptation, leading to a profound change in movement structures in the East (Rucht, Blattert and Rink 1997). Western organisations quickly expanded to the new federal states, partly by merging with existing local groups, partly in replacing them. Processes of professionalisation and differentiation that took decades in the west changed the eastern movements within a few years only. An enormous surge of governmental funding and public employment programmes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen) helped to consolidate, and sometimes even create, groups and networks that were meant to contribute to the public good.

The transformation of the economic system soon led to the shutdown of many workplaces in the eastern federal states. Rising unemployment changed the agenda by bringing bread-and-butter issues to the surface, thereby weakening new social movements’ claims. The situation worsened when federal funding was radically cut and new social movements became weaker. Contrary to the East, movement structures in western Germany did not experience a significant change in reaction to the unification process, with the exception of a temporary decline in mobilisation in the early 1990s. Overall, however, the movements, at least at the aggregate level, were able to maintain their organisational strength and, in some areas such as environmentalism, even experienced a growth in members and other resources.

A phenomenon quite different that unfolded since re-unification was a tremendous rise of nationalist and racist violence that was accompanied by a xenophobic discussion in parliaments and mass media. Several immigrants were hurt or killed in attacks by right-wing activists, most of these loosely organised and concentrated more in the East than in the West. Negligible in the West since the early 1970s, the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) managed to collect these energies and establish a local infrastructure. This is particularly interesting in regard to debates on globalisation, since the NPD began to raise criticism against globalisation within a nationalist and racist framework at the turn of the millennium.

1.4. General Tendencies

Left-wing movements have altered German politics while they themselves have been altered by their context. These social movements have contributed to the democratisation of a country with an outstanding continuity of authoritarianism by teaching democratic attitudes and practices, whereas German authorities have opened up the political system to non-institutional actors (Koopmans 1995). Radical ideologies as a constituting factor in the establishment of the movements in the 1960s and 1970s have lost their prominent position. Today, the mobilisation of street protest is mainly a matter of informal groups and networks. The latter, however, also may include more formal, large interest
organisations such as trade unions and environmental groups. Protest, rather than being a confrontational and divisive matter, tends to be seen as a symbolic action to attract media attention. In general, media strategies of social movements have shifted from the paradigm of creating a counter public or attacking the media to influencing these by more conventional means. In contrast to their conflict-ridden descent, the majority of movement organisations is engaged in the supply of services or lobbying and bargaining with authorities. As non-confrontational partners, the more conventional movement organisations have reinvented their role and contributed to the privatisation of public services. Movements engaged in policy fields that are more suited to negotiations have had remarkable impact. For example, feminist and environmentalist groups were successful in both altering citizens’ attitudes and in contributing to institutional and procedural changes. By contrast, movements related to pass-or-fail issues such as the peace movement did have little policy impact. More generally, the federal system with strong checks and balances is not supportive to rapid and fundamental change as requested by social movements. In the long term, however, left-libertarian movements have contributed to a shift in political culture – a shift from a corporative system that did not encourage civic participation to active citizenship, though not of the population as a whole. Large formal and hierarchical structures are predominantly met with suspicion. Citizens engaged in politics prefer loose and egalitarian forms of organisation, typically to be found in social movements.

The above-provided evidence on social movement traditions in Germany helps us to understand the array of several movements that tackle the problems of globalisation on the basis of anti-neoliberalism as the smallest common (negative) denominator. The following chapter will deal with the emergence of this leitmotif that connects diverse actors across thematic, ideological and territorial borders.

2. Characteristics of the German “Movements for a Globalisation from Below”

2.1. Antiglobals – The Making of a Movement

Although the German academic discourse tended to present the problem of globalisation with reference to political economy (Altvate and Mahnkopf 1999, 2002) and to the restructuring of political power (Beck 1997, 1998a, b), thus having aroused people’s awareness of the issue, the public recognition of a global justice movement was rather late. It was the violent conflict of Genoa in the summer of 2001 that triggered a temporary interest on the part of mass media and led to the “discovery” of a new actor (Rucht 2002) that was widely labelled the anti-global movement. Media actively shaped the perception of this actor and particularly its alleged core, the German Attac branch that attracted the attention of many journalists (Kolb 2004). To this day, little research has been done on the actual emergence and development of the movement, with the exception of Attac. In most scholarly publications, the structures and changes in the German movement sector are neglected. Many authors who portray the global justice movements take a sympathising perspective or actually play an active part in the movement, rather than undertake systematic research (Mies 2001, Leggewie 2003a). A great share of the literature has been produced by journalists (Grefe et al. 2002) or activists who discuss the strategic problems, the limitations, and the future of a pluralistic project that connects ideologically and organisationally diverse actors (e.g., Habermann 2002, Buchholz et al. 2002, BUKO 2003,
Wahl 2004). Adding to this literature, some periodicals of the socialist and Third World spectrum have produced special issues on the movements and their campaigns (e.g., iz3w 2001, iz3w 2002, INKOTA-Brief 2003). Thus, the most valuable knowledge seems to be located in those parts of the movements that theoretically or strategically reflect on the movement. Publications that combine strategic debate from the activists’ view and social scientists’ expertise mirror the ongoing exchange between both sides and a high level of reflection within the movement (Walk and Boehme 2002).

After the incidents in Seattle and, much more so in Genoa, public interest in the global justice movement increased in Germany. In search of a representative voice, journalists favoured the German branch of Attac (Kolb and Kreutzfeldt 2005) that was involved, though only as a minor actor, in the events in Gothenburg and Genoa. Other movement organisations, though actually playing a relevant role, were more or less neglected by the media. Due to its high profile in the media, Attac attracted many supporters who were willing to engage in the global justice movement. Inspired by Todd Gitlin’s inquiry in the “making of a movement” (1980), Felix Kolb traces back the rising Attac membership to media coverage (Kolb 2004). Thus, the “anti-global” phenomenon, to a large extent, was a media product. The media focus on Attac has concealed the actual heterogeneity of the movements that deal with transnational problems.

2.2. Times of Re-Orientation

In Germany, the development of a movement critical to neo-liberal globalisation has obviously been influenced by the repercussions of German re-unification. After the Berlin wall had fallen in 1989, leftist activists in Germany underwent a profound process of re-orientation. The omnipresent division into two politically opposed camps waned with the collapse of the German Democratic Republic and so did the liaison between parts of the left in West Germany and oligarchy in the East – a liaison that tended to be exaggerated by the conservatives in the West. While for decades left protesters were confronted with the slogan “Geh’ doch nach drüben” (If you don’t like it here, go to the other side), the conflict de-territorialised within a few months. In the situation of ideological reconfiguration, the split into reformist and radical currents among the Left became even more obvious. After a period of latency during the course of re-unification, the focus of either current shifted from the East/West divide to the disparities between north and south. This new international perspective became apparent in two opposite forms and fields of action: on the one side, public interest groups intensified their collaboration with the authorities as indicated by their participation in the official delegations at the UN World Conferences on climate (in Rio, 1992) and poverty (Copenhagen, 1995). On the other side, radical groups were confronted with raising nationalism in Germany that included violent attacks against non-Germans, but also a more subtle xenophobia among non-radical segments of the population. In reaction, left-wing activism promoted advocacy politics in favour of refugees as well as the fight against the “fortress Europe”. Contrary to this point of departure, the obvious cleavage between radical and reformist politics seemed to weaken when the left began to focus on neo-liberal globalisation. A great share of the movements treated in the first part of this chapter started to focus on the global scope of the problems that they were addressing. The common cause for the problems at the global level was perceived to be the neo-liberal hegemony. The emergence of this common reference point links movements with thematically and ideologically diverse backgrounds. When considering the value basis
of these movements, we believe that the idea of justice is best suited to serve as a master frame. Yet because of their heterogeneity, we will refer to these movements hereafter as global justice movements in the plural form.

2.3. The Legacy of Internationalist Engagement and Third World Movement

The notion of the “anti-globalist movement” as a new actor was corrected by Dieter Rucht in pointing to transnational mobilisations in the 1980s (2001). Instead, he provides evidence for a “moderate transnationalisation of political protest” (2001, 92) as a process that evolved over decades. The issue of global inequality had been voiced early by Third World initiatives and took shape in several campaigns promoting fair trade and human rights. It was part of the internationalist heritage, in which Hierlmeier identifies three periods (2002, 9f.): In the course of the students’ movement, a proletarian internationalism was revived, projecting revolutionary hope to the countries of the south, in particular Vietnam and Cambodia. The second period was marked by the spreading doctrine of neoliberalism and the desperate defence of free spaces such as in Nicaragua. The embargo against this Central American country was the main concern of a counter-summit against a G-7 meeting in Bonn in May of 1985 (Holzapfel and König 2001, 25). Three years later, mobilisation against a meeting of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in Berlin proved to be important for a shared framing of global problems, when some 150 ideologically diverse groups signed a declaration reflecting a common perception of the international institutions (Gerhards and Rucht 1992). At the end of a “week of action”, some 80,000 protesters took to the streets to oppose the policy of free trade, partly ending in severe confrontation with the police. However, hope for a “new internationalism” uttered at this counter-summit soon dwindled. The decade after re-unification was dominated by interest groups that co-operated closely with the authorities and participated jointly in UN World Conferences, whereas grass-roots organisations lost importance (Hierlmeier 2002, 112). Lobbying was the dominant form of action in transnational movements, and protest was largely neglected. But Nevertheless, there was some contention and street protest. Aiming at a joint summit of G7 and EU, 17,000 demonstrators gathered peacefully in Munich in July 1992. Several hundreds of them were encircled and finally detained by massive police force (Holzapfel and König 2001, 27). The prevailing state of movement latency changed when a red-green national government came into power. By the late 1990s, moderate movement organisations previously engaged in the co-option process euphemistically labelled “global governance” had to face the disillusioning fact that the initially supported government of Social Democrats and Greens failed to implement a polity change. Transnational institutions did also not seem to move in another direction (Eberlei 2002). As a consequence, the distance between movements and their former alliance partners grew within the social democratic and green parties, and protest was revived as part of the repertoire of action. At the same time, the indígena uprising in Chiapas served as a guiding star for the post-socialist left. It brought them to the fore with both free trade as a target of international mobilisation and autonomous structures as a viable alternative to conventional interest groups (Brand 2002).
2.4. The Next Generation

Observing the age of activists engaged in events organised in the context of global justice movements, we find – relative to the previous new social movements – cohorts in the middle range as underrepresented. Whereas the new social movements were strongly supported by activists aged 30 through 40, the dominance of younger and – to a lesser degree – older age groups in the activities of the global justice movements is remarkable. Especially high school and university students seem to be strongly represented. This underlines the general findings on the high mobilisation of younger people for political protest (Rucht and Roth 1999). A series of youth studies regularly sponsored by the Shell Corporation shows a decrease in interest for political issues compared to the 1980s and at the same time a shift in the political engagement. The majority of Germans aged 15 to 25 are distrustful of the institutionalised political process and tend to engage “selectively” with high regard for global problems (Shell 2002, 48). Focussing on the group of youth “oriented to participation” (with regard to their attitudes towards politics and democracy), the proportion of students is considerably high. Compared to the average figures, this group shows a high interest in politics (68 %, overall population 30 %), high content with democracy as a form of government (76 %, Ø 58 %) and tends to self-anchorage on the left (42 %, Ø 29 %; Shell 2002, 118). This group seems to form the basis for political participation beyond traditional forms of organisation. Still, there are few groups that succeed in attracting youth and channelling their political energies. Several events in the last years have shown that there is indeed a high potential for youth mobilisation, albeit without lasting visible engagement. In mass demonstrations, university students have shown their discontent with the plans for tuition fees and cuts in the welfare system. Activities in the years 2002 and 2003 were covered comprehensively by the mass media, but the protesters did not succeed in preventing the envisaged cuts. Youth engagement was particularly visible during the protests against the war in Iraq in 2003. Student representatives organised a strike and demonstrations on the first day of the attack. Consistently, the antiwar Demonstration on February 15th showed a high proportion of participants younger than 25 years. On this occasion, a significant share of students expressed radical convictions while at the same time showing a high identification with the global justice movement (Rucht 2003b).

2.5. Movement of Movements – Different Fields of Actors

When investigating the actual configuration of movements critical to globalisation, mainly two fields of fairly distinct actors can be identified. These fields are separated by their respective distance vis-à-vis the political and economic system, their action repertoire, relation to mass media, and the respective level of criticism. In addition, a plethora of intermediate groups that do not match the opposing fields, form part of the global justice movements. The networks promoting the movements’ claims in a global perspective have interconnected actors in all of these fields. Part of this interlinkage is Attac and the newly emerging social forum structure (the first national social forum will be organised in Erfurt on July 21-24, 2005).
2.5.1. Interest Groups

The first field of actors is mainly composed of interest groups featuring a high degree of formalisation and hierarchy. Most are rich in resources, based on a major – mainly passive – membership and a strong apparatus with paid staff. The field is a compound of organisations of manifold backgrounds: established charity organisations committed to development aid exist such as Misereor, Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst, and Brot für die Welt with a Christian background. Furthermore, there are groups engaged in human rights (amnesty international), development (Terre des hommes), environmentalism (BUND as part of Friends of the Earth) and alike evolving from the new social movements. In an exceptional position and only more recently, trade unions like ver.di in the public sector or the metal workers IG Metall can be added to this field. Playing an important role in the corporatist Modell Deutschland in the 1960s and 1970s, trade unions had a strong standing in an institutionalised process aiming at balancing the interests of capital and labour. Moreover, the unions’ engagement was explicitly non-universal, but centered around their membership. Nevertheless, with their growing distance vis-à-vis the social democratic party and state institutions more generally, the most powerful trade unions and the unionist youth organisation have become close to, if not having become part of, the global justice movement. In broadening the scope of their activities, unionists hoped to find new and attractive alliance partners by joining the Attac network. To them, bundling forces was a means to compensate for their loss of influence in the political process.

Organisational structures of interest groups are very much alike. Typical is a central executive committee determining decisions on issues and strategies on the one side and, on the other, a membership supporting the organisation passively by donations and/or actively by local engagement, but without influence on the national level. Most of the interest groups have been working internationally to a certain extent in solidarity campaigns, human rights monitoring, and development assistance projects. Trade unions, for instance, have promoted the improvement of global labour legislation and the support of oppressed unionists in authoritarian countries. Germany’s most important charity organisation, Catholic Misereor, has financed development and charity projects in Africa, Asia, and Latin America since 1958 with the aim to fight starvation and counteract lack of education.

A common feature of these groups is their ongoing cooperation with authorities and the affirmative relationship toward the economic and political system. Emerging from the critical impetus of new social movements, organisations with a high degree of formalisation like Greenpeace and Amnesty International have developed in a similar way. They express moderate criticism and occasionally make use of protest, flanked by a highly professionalised PR. Referring to Rucht’s definition of movements’ reaction to media by the quadruple A: adaptation, attack, alternative or apathy (2004), the preference of the adaptation approach can be clearly seen with these groups. Due to financial resources and their respected standing in terms of critical expertise, interest groups are broadly represented in the media, thus capable to promote their cause. Adding to this profile, direct action is not an option for these organisations. In particular, charity organisations hardly mobilise for street demonstrations, yet they may join networks and campaigns. Confrontational demonstrations are highly unlikely to be organised by the established interest groups or by unionists. Instead, lobbying is probably the most relevant form of action used by this type of organisation. Interest groups have established close contact to national and supra-national authorities. In part, they have attained a consulting status in
official settings. Having access to some decisive meetings and influence on global policy, interest groups have been ascribed a democratising role in global politics (Beisheim 2004). Given this important role in the political process, they triggered a considerable amount of NGO research. Yet particularly in Germany, interest groups had to learn that a qualitative policy change was impossible, and claims for altering basic structures were not heard. Facing this situation, strategic reorientation became inevitable. In terms of organisation, the participation of interest groups in UN World Conferences led to another process that facilitated the co-operation of different kinds of actors: the construction of transnational as well as intra-issue and trans-issue networks. In the development sector, a national umbrella group, the Verband Entwicklungspolitik deutscher Nichtregierungsorganisationen (VENRO) was established more recently. On the transnational level, German groups joined and partly contributed to the limited success of several campaigns, most notably the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Jubilee 2000 Campaign (in Germany represented by Erlassjahr.de). While the effect of isolated lobbying strategies tended to be limited or near to nil, the partial success of these two international campaigns can be traced back to a comprehensive usage of several means: a professional PR, measures of education, mobilisation, and lobbying. By virtue of these developments, there is a general opening towards other actors in the broader framework of transnational movements.

2.5.2. Antagonist Groups

The common denominator in the second field is a radical rejection of capitalist exploitation, racism, sexism and ecological devastation. From the antagonist perspective, these issues cannot be seen as single phenomena to be repaired step by step. Antagonist groups interpret the current situation of intensified economic globalisation as the direct expression of an overall ill-constructed society. According to this view, there is no alternative to a fundamental critic of dominance (Herrschaftskritik) and the struggle (Kampf) against political actors who explicitly or implicitly maintain the current situation.

Antagonistic groups within the global justice movement are difficult to grasp. This is mainly because they tend to resist integration in umbrella organisations. In addition, currently no joint national forums and campaigns exist that can claim to be representing the majority of these groups. These groups rather prefer to be part of loose, segmented networks or organise in local and independent grass-roots initiatives. In order to obtain an overview of the spectrum of antagonist groups within the global justice movements in Germany, we will briefly describe three groups. They are the Hamburg-based national organisation Bundeskoordination Internationalismus (BUKO, the former Bundeskongress entwicklungspolitischer Aktionsgruppen), the German activists of the transnational network People’s Global Action, and the local initiative Schöner leben (better life) Göttingen. BUKO, one of the oldest German solidarity alliances, was founded in 1977. The roots of People’s Global Action’s can be traced back to discussions of activists who demonstrated against a WTO-meeting in Geneva in 1998 and who sympathised with the struggle of the Zapatistas in Mexico. Schöner leben Göttingen was a product of a mobilisation of activists in the Lower Saxonian town of Göttingen against the IMF and World Bank summit in Prague in 2000. In comparing these groups, we will be able to illustrate the diversity of antagonist groups.

BUKO stands for classical internationalism of the German left. As an apparent signal, namely the renaming in 2002, with the abandonment of the word “development
assistance” from its label, symbolised BUKO’s adaptation to the global justice movement, combining international solidarity with a national form of organisation. The position of BUKO is far less anti-institutional than that voiced in the two other groups described below. Ironically, BUKO was founded on the initiative of the Ministry for development that was in search for easy contact to the diversified field of local Third World initiatives. However, the governmental funding of the leftist merger ceased when BUKO launched a campaign to support Salvadorian guerrillas with arms in 1981. As a network of organisations and formal members, BUKO mainly unites local One World shops, development assistance groups, and students associations. At the moment, it consists of more than 150 member organisations. Still, its organisational model emphasises the value of self-organisation and bottom up-politics. Since its founding in 1977, the best known project of BUKO has been the organisation of the annual conference Bundeskongress, where a wide spectrum of leftist internationalists is invited to discuss current topics. The conference is managed by a coordinating committee which also organises the website, seminars, and publishing activities. At least once a year – on occasion of the conference – BUKO holds conferences of its members to discuss the network’s policies. An elected steering committee speaks for BUKO between the conferences. Even though the organisational structure of BUKO seems quite formal, issue-specific working groups and campaigns carrying out most of the political field work have the political mandate of BUKO independent of the two national committees. The participating groups rather see themselves engaged in a political fight than in charity work. After all, BUKO was created to provide a platform to promote emancipatory politics. Cooperation with political institutions is rejected by most of the members or met with suspicion. For the most part, BUKO is not engaged directly in protest activities. Joint campaigns aim at public awareness-raising via publications, collection of signatures, and seminars. However, BUKO is connected to activists who also tend to use more confrontational forms of protest. The Protestant Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst, for instance, having funded BUKO over the last decades, freeze its support for the entire group by referring to a “Yomango” incident, when a few protesters combined shop-lifting with the political message of social justice.

Besides the fact that all groups have an antagonistic profile, BUKO on the one side and PGA and Schöner leben Göttingen on the other side exhibit some significant differences. The latter two groups have consistently mobilised protest activities against international summits, but also engaged against racism or the war in Iraq. PGA, as mentioned above, was founded in 1998 as a loose protest network inspired by the “intergalactical meeting” of the Zapatistas largely identifying with the global protest in the following years. The German activists of PGA are difficult to identify. This is due to the fact that PGA is strictly an anti-institutionalist network. There are no speakers, representatives, or coordinators. Joint meetings are organised by so-called “convenors”. The goal is to attain a maximum of autonomy for the participating groups. Therefore, hardly any visible structures can be found. Solely email-newsletters, websites, and offline “infopoints” serve as places where information is circulated. The grass-roots initiative Schöner leben Göttingen unites a handful of active members, mainly university students. Their organisational principles emphasise autonomy, the absence of hierarchy, and the open character of the group. Meeting at least once a week in a plenum and having strong local ties, the members of Schöner leben Göttingen discuss their political positions. The group is an offspring of a rich local tradition of “autonomous” unrest. After several thematic shifts
from the anti-nuclear struggle via squatting to anti-fascism, this current is engaged on the radical fringe of anti-neoliberal protest. Stressing the unconditional self-determination of the subject, autonomous groups have been an important part of the German left. In the sub-culture of squatted houses and plenary assemblies, an intransigent opposition to the economic and political system could be experienced and fortified at the same time. In this arena, both radical democracy and militant resistance were closely linked (Geronimo 2000, Schwarzmeier 2001). Unlike other groups in the antagonist field, Schöner leben Göttingen engage in the local Social Forum, supposedly playing an important role in this local framework. Despite its local roots, the group was a significant actor in the mobilisation for the no global protests in Genoa. During this process Schöner leben Göttingen as a component of the radical left was a counterpart to WEED, a lobbying organisation dealing with development and ecology. In search for a compromise aiming at joint mobilisation of diverse groupings, both Schöner leben Göttingen and WEED managed to come to an agreement. Schöner leben Göttingen and PGA prefer confrontational forms of action without generally rejecting violence and not allowing for lobbying efforts and public relations. Like for all groups in this field, a difficult relation to mass media can be observed. From the group’s perspective, collaboration with the established media is senseless, given the media’s focus on violent clashes with the police at the neglect of substantial information on the movements’ points of view. Thus apathy or alternative forms of dissemination are chosen as media strategies (cf. Rucht 2004). Groups prefer direct forms of communication (for instance BUKO does not have a press officer despite its’ formalised status) or they use, or even create, independent media, newsgroups and websites. Not surprisingly, besides broader information platforms such as Nadir also a German branch of Indymedia has been established. It continues to play a vibrant role in the communication of leftist activists.

2.5.3. Intermediate Forms of Organisations

Defining two conflicting fields of organisation does not mean that groups active in the global justice movement are completely split into these counterparts. In fact, there are several smaller groups and networks which do not exactly belong to either field. The strong tradition of locally scattered organisations is due to the federal structure of the German state. Given this tradition, many groups resist attempts to organise at the national level. Most of the groups active in the global justice movements are descendants of the new social movements, sticking to local organisation emphasising democratic participation. Most of these groups have undergone an ideological moderation. Although less visible in the political discourse, most intermediate groups engage in protest activities such as demonstrations or conscience raising. Peace groups, for example, coordinated via the umbrella Netzwerk Friedenskooperative, had triggered mass protests in the 1980s. Today, they have diminished in number but continue to play a significant role on the meso-mobilisation level, as the protests against the war in Iraq have shown. Another field of action is the promotion of alternatives to the neo-liberal economic and social model. An example of this, developed in the Christian and solidarity sector of the global justice movements, are shops selling products that have been produced under socially and environmentally friendly as well as economically fair conditions. In regard to collaborating with authorities, the patterns of intermediary groups vary. While some groups engage in
service projects that are mainly or exclusively funded by governmental money, others keep their distance to state institutions.

2.5.4. The Attac Case

Initiated by NGOs of the peace and third world sector in 1999, Attac continues to be perceived as the organisation to represent the plurality of the movement. In this role Attac is widely covered by media but heard to much minor extent in institutional politics (but see the tentative pledge for a Tobin tax voiced by chancellor Schröder at the World Economic Forum in 2005). Attac Germany defines itself as a platform where actors from all three fields sketched above are supposed to meet and engage in a dialogue. As a mixture of organisation and network, Attac was founded to provide a space for all kinds of actors that are critical to neo-liberal globalisation regardless of their ideological point of view – with the notable exception of far-rightist and racist groups. Attac has both individual and collective members who are invited to take part in a council and to be represented in a coordination committee that speaks for Attac vis-à-vis the public and organises national campaigns. Additionally, there is an office of paid staff and volunteers that deals with logistic problems and offers expertise to both local groups and external information seekers. Almost 250 local groups are proof of a fairly wide- spread network in Germany. While first having been ignored, Attac experienced a media hype with and after the Genoa events, but then underwent a “crisis of growth” according to Attac-spokesperson Sven Giegold (Leggewie 2001, 19). The small group of activists in the Attac office was troubled with multiple organisational tasks while some local groups were afraid of infiltration by Trotskyist groups like Linksruck or Sozialistische Alternative. These groups have constantly collaborated in network attempts to promote their cause within the left community. Albeit their small group size (Linksruck – the German branch of International Socialist Tendency – is reported to have several hundred members), a few committed activists have a strong presence in demonstrations and in network meetings.

Attac is known to the public as a group mobilising for transnational protest events and has indeed generated a wide range of action. Many of the national protests were striking as colourful and effective events. Due to improved media strategies and a strict adaptation to the needs of mass media, Attac has consolidated its central role in the public perception of the global justice movement in Germany. For instance, the organisation developed an “embedded” coverage model by offering journalists to join Attac-coaches for transnational protests and supplying them with information by email and a SMS-pager service. The professionalised offerings helped to increase presence in mass media but triggered criticism on the part of radical groups. In a discussion at the 25th BUKO conference, leading Attac activist Peter Wahl stated: „We allow for the growing role of television. In the media-staged social drama of ‘pro’ and ‘contra’ Attac has chosen the ‘contra’ role.“ (die tageszeitung, 13.5.2002) But the limits of media interest became obvious when Attac started to link the issue of neo-liberal globalisation to domestic politics. Campaigns on the privatisation of pensions and health service did not echo in the media because the organisation was not ascribed a legitimate status in the domestic debate (Kolb 2002). The prominent role in the media and an ongoing tendency in the wider public to discriminate more radical forms of action led Attac to firmly reject militant forms of protest after the Genoa incidents. With violence as the issue media covered during the mobilisations, Attac spokespersons were obliged to commit themselves to non-violent
protest regardless of the actual amount of police repression. Noticeably, the centrally organised public relations approach does not exclude the usage of independent media like Indymedia or the production of videos. Especially regional groups are actively spreading information about their actions via the internet. Mailing-lists and forums are common means of internal communication. Emanating from the Attac entourage, an Internet-based mobilisation-site, campact.de, has been established in 2004 by following the example of US-based moveon.org. To transcend the idea that there are no alternatives, Attac tries also to mobilise scholarly knowledge through a body of some 80 academics in the scientific council. As Raising awareness for the risks and consequences of international trade is a central aim to the Attac community, education is another means to strengthen and broaden the movement. To this aim, a pool of lecturers and various forms of online and offline information are created, and a Summer School is held on an annual basis.

Because of the forum character of Attac and its ideological openness, the organisation hosts a broad array of perspectives. Two years before the creation of Attac in Germany, Daniel Janett has pointed out the advantages of a pluralistic organisation reflecting the multiple social contexts in which it has to act when compared to homogenous single-issue organisations (1997). The pluralist concept allows Christians to get in contact with anarchists, trade unionists with feminists, and anti-capitalists with immigrants. Initially, many hopes were attached to this open concept. The Attac congress in October 2001 was euphorically attended by some 2,500 visitors. But criticism towards the realisation of the pluralistic concept has been voiced early. Especially radical leftists observed tendencies to exclude their approach. Bergstedt has argued that an oligarchic clique in the federal office and the coordination committee sacrificed the rank and file-concept in favour of a “NGOisation” focused on lobbying and campaigning from above. He encourages local groups to re-appropriate the network idea (Bergstedt 2004).

The predominant appeal to national authorities and tendencies to make use of protectionist arguments triggered criticism by both insiders, e.g. individual BUKO-representatives critically engaged in the Attac-network, and outsiders sticking to an antagonistic stance. Critics stressed the crucial role of state actors in the promotion of neoliberal politics, referring particularly to the repressive police activity during protests in Genoa (Brand and Wissen 2002). To avoid state-centred approaches and a narrow critique of financial transactions that may foster anti-Semitic tendencies, critics of Attac argued not to target neo-liberalism but capitalism as a determining structure. Against the background of an irreconcilable conflict between antideutsch and anti-imperialist currents about the prevalence of anti-Semitism in the radical left, the debate about a supposedly anti-Semitic position in the Attac-network had a profound impact on the image of Attac within the left community. As a reaction, many groups withdrew from the forum idea. Indeed, rightwing politics has incorporated criticism of globalisation in a nationalistic and anti-Semitic

\footnote{The phenomenon of Antideutsche visibly developed as a reaction to pro-Palestinian and partly anti-Semitic positions in the radical left since the turn of the century. The members of this current insist on reminding the left of an anti-Semitic tradition within the radical leftist current and denounce German guilt in general, symbolically stressing the legitimacy of the Israeli state (Hanloser 2004). This vigorous controversy leading to regular clashes in leftist discussions is a testimonial for the fragmentation of the radical left in Germany. Antideutsche have adopted rather unexpected positions in radical left discourse, supporting the war on Iraq against an anti-Semitic regime. During the peace demonstrations in Berlin on February, 15th for instance there was an antideutsche counter-demonstration, waving the Israeli flag and addressing peace demonstrators with the strong denunciation: “Your pacifism is fascism!”}
framework. The neo-national-socialist NPD has raised the issue in a number of demonstrations like the one on Mayday 2002. On this occasion globalisation was opposed from a nationalistic perspective: “National and social solidarity has to oppose the erosion of everyone’s vital rights by globalisation and multi-culture.“ (NPD press release, 29.4.2002). Without unfolding an elaborated critique of globalisation, this issue was adopted to exploit public unease with the repercussions of globalisation (Leggewie 2003b). Participation of right-wing activists is also reported in the mobilisation against the war in Iraq and the Hartz package of laws that entail serious cutbacks for unemployed people.

Like the Attac-network, the social forum idea, spreading from Porto Alegre to countries all over the world, is inspired by the same idea to connect people from various social movements with different experiences and ideologies. To date, the forum initiatives in Germany are restricted to a few big cities. There seems to be neither a strong effort to institutionalise this organisational form nor broaden participation in it. Forum activists partly rely on experiences in Agenda 21 groups, promoted and financed by local and other authorities after the World Conference on Climate in Rio 1992. One reason for the sluggish progress of social forums in Germany is certainly the objections of radical leftists reconstructed above.

2.6. A Reconfiguration of the Global Justice Movements

After the demonstrations in Genoa a rearrangement in the field of actors became visible. Groups that used to have a predominant status in the discussion about globalisation lost visibility, others – mainly those associated with Attac – gained importance. While PGA activists in Germany have become less visible and organisational nuclei such as Schöner leben Göttingen virtually left the stage, annual BUKO-congresses are met with increased interest and the small think thank of WEED appears to gain significance. The salient position of Attac in the German global justice movement is one reason for the waning radicalism. Another reason is an ongoing dissociation of antagonist groups from movements’ forums, criticising the dominance of the traditional and bureaucratic left in the movement. For most antagonistic groups the position toward the Social Forum process is highly ambivalent. As in the case of PGA there is a strong critique of this type of political action because of its lack of strategy, its avoidance of harsh confrontation with the established forces, and its ideological vagueness. There is a strong opposition to cooperate with actors presenting a reduced critique of globalisation or even promoting nationalism and anti-Semitism. However, other radical groups such as Schöner leben Göttingen engage strongly in local Social Forums.

Visible shifts have taken place in the agenda of the global justice movement. In order to document these changes, BUKO might serve as an example as an important actor that participated in the movement from its beginnings in the late 1990s. As a mixture of think tank and discussion forum, BUKO has stimulated important debates within the movement over the last years. The main themes of the BUKO conferences are a good indicator for themes and issues discussed within the movement as a whole. Between 2000 and 2002 the main theme at annual BUKO conferences was the transnational protest against neo-liberal globalisation manifest in counter summits and mass demonstration against international organisations. September 11th meant a crucial turn in the way how the public perceived the movement by shifting attention from global inequalities to terrorism and war. War in general and peace protests clearly dominated the agenda of the 26th BUKO
conference in 2003. At the same time, Attac was the most important organisation within the global justice movement that was mobilising against the war on Iraq. Among other tactics, activists organised civil disobedience, for example blockades of US military bases in Germany similar to peace activities in the 1980s. A survey among peace demonstrators rallying in Berlin on February 15th has shown significant overlap with the movement against neo-liberal globalisation (Rucht 2003c). 70 percent of the demonstrators showed sympathy for the global justice movements. More than a third identified themselves with it or defined their antiwar activity as part of the no-global protests. Limited to a strict criterion such as prior participation in protests of the global justice movement, some 19 percent of activists from the global justice movements participated in the stop-the-war-demonstration. With the war on terror, the protests against transnational institutions and summits lost some importance within the movement. At the same time, the trend towards global, regional and local social forums was not embraced by the BUKO conferences. Still, criticism of neo-liberal globalisation is one of their most important themes. The positions taken at the last conference in 2004 can be seen as the result of a long discussion process how to proceed strategically after the ritualisation of protests against international summits. Today, many activists seem to opt for themes such as European social policies, cutbacks of the German social welfare systems and the undermining of certain civil rights. These issues dominated the activities of Attac as well. Campaigns against the governmental “Agenda 2010” triggered the most important mobilisation in 2004. As a future strategy, activities against the neo-liberal economisation of everyday life were discussed at the last BUKO-conference. The motto of the conference “The end of modesty – appropriation” can be interpreted as a call for more confrontational direct action at the local level within Germany. The Spanish “Yomango” protests were chosen as a positive example of appropriation activities. Likewise, several antagonist groups claimed a “Berlin for free” or “Hamburg for free” to demand free public transportation, education, and cultural events in summer 2004. Thus the call for appropriative forms of protest can be seen as a sign of revitalisation of radical internationalist politics.

2.7. Conclusion: The Constitution of the Global Justice Movement in Germany

When considering the constitution of the global justice movement in Germany, an ambivalent image arises. On the one side, the interconnection of actors from different social movements, organised in diverse forms and representing a great variety of ideologies has facilitated powerful mobilisations and an enduring presence in the mass media. After the “rehabilitation of protest” (Uli Brand) by the more established groups within the movement, the opportunities for joint action were present. Transnational mobilisation was flanked by public relations offered by organisations rich in resources. Still, the joint action of interest groups and the more radical branch of the global justice movement was lagging behind the development in other countries where interest groups, especially trade unions, joined the struggle in the early 1990s, broadening their scope of issues and addressees. Based on a common framing of global problems, a mobilising structure has been created to bring together traditionally affirmative and bureaucratic organisations like trade unions and groups akin to, or stemming from, the new social movements. Resources provided by the former will strengthen joint campaigns, protests, public relations, awareness raising, and lobbying. The general openness towards networking practices, no matter whether cross-national or cross-issue, has improved the impact of even tiny groups. Despite its small size,
the environmentalist group *Urgewald*, for example, has become widely known due to its cooperation with organisations in many parts of the world. *Urgewald’s* lobbying efforts have had considerable success (Wahl 1997, 310). *Attac* representing the merger of currents as described above, has become an important part of the landscape of protest in Germany. Above all, it is acknowledged by left and liberal mass media as a competent pole in the controversy about economic globalisation. As shown above, some media, predominantly *die tageszeitung* as a newspaper emerging from debates on counter public in the late 1970s, have contributed to the growth and legitimacy of the global justice movement. After many years of neo-liberal hegemony, the global justice movement has achieved a “reversal of the burden of proof” (Leggewie 2001, 18). Today, Margret Thatcher’s “There is no alternative”-principle is challenged by the motto: “Another world is possible”. Those who promote neo-liberal globalisation have to prove that their policy provides a better life for the peoples of the globe. Support for this paradigm shift came from parts of the liberal left. Political foundations associated to the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), Greens and Social Democrats have organised several discussions on World and European Social Forums. Whereas these foundations prove to be important alliance partners for movement actors, political parties have lost this connectivity. Compared to the 1980s and 1990s, when green and social democratic parties were part of or closely connected to new social movements, an ongoing process of alienation can be observed on the side of social movements since the former partners became members of the government. Hope for a substantial political change was frustrated within short time when the government promoted missions of the armed forces, cuts in the welfare system, and neo-liberal policies that neglected development aid and human rights. Notwithstanding, the post-communist PDS as the only remaining party in the left spectre, does not meet the needs of movement actors to become a lasting alliance partner. Its members, being mainly retired adherents of the faded socialist system, tend to authoritarian and xenophobic attitudes, while the leadership is definitely more progressive. The party’s interest for neo-liberal globalisation is inspired by a traditional Marxist framework. Thus, the PDS shows an obvious discrepancy to the constituency of the global justice movements in terms of political and ideological culture. In fact, the issue of globalisation was taken up hastily by the PDS at the stage of counter-demonstrations at the turn of the millennium, then superseded by anti-war activity and domestic themes of social policy that were not predominantly framed as repercussions of neo-liberal globalisation. Recent developments show the limits of the PDS in attracting west-German leftists. Instead of strengthening the left alternative represented by the PDS, the dissatisfaction with governmental politics led to the foundation of a new party. Composed mainly by left social democrats and trade unionists, the *Wahl-alternative Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit* opts for an etatist renaissance but to date does not play an important role in the global justice movements.

On the other side, the fragility of support has become visible. In federal Germany few non-formalised organisations are active at the national level and the dominance of professionalised activists is likely. In general, local initiatives rarely engage on higher levels. As a consequence of severe economic problems, the global justice issues play a minor role in the eastern part of Germany where bread and butter issues dominate. Additionally, ideological fragmentation is obvious in the left spectre of the movement. A significant proportion of the radical left refuses to join coalitions with groups that do not share their basic criticism. Even more so, they complain about the pacification of radical
thought and a lack of delineation vis-à-vis right-wing currents. These arguments have led to scepticism and overt dissociation from the forum concept.

Considering the described situation, there seems to be a rather strong view within the global justice movement of linking neo-liberal globalisation to a decline of state power. This framing brings together trade unionists and leftists in defence of nation state. Christian organisations, more formal ones and grassroots groups, support this view. But still the movement lacks a broad and lasting base. Radical leftist groups do partly tamper with this coalition but most of them keep at arm-length. The events following September 11th, i.e. the war in Iraq, the rise of unemployment rates, and the social reforms undertaken by the German government, have at least temporarily weakened mobilisation against neo-liberal globalisation. Unlike in other countries, potential allies such as charismatic intellectuals or farmers are far from playing a role in the conflict. Thus, there is no strong support for social forums that play an important role in other countries. In general, we expect the continuation and probably even further growth of the global justice movements in Germany. However, they are likely to face more internal and external problems, cannot expect to grow as rapidly as in the past, and will have more difficulties in gaining further terrain.
References


Social Movements and the Rise of the
Global Justice Movement in Britain
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1. Social Movements in Britain since the 1960s

The development of social movements in Britain has sometimes been treated as that of a succession of essentially discrete movements (see, e.g., Byrne 1997), but it can also be told as the history of an unfolding sequence of interlinked mobilisations and campaigns (see, e.g., Lent 2001). It is not merely viewed through the prism of present relationships that the latter appears to us to be more felicitous. The development of the ‘new’ social movements can be seen as a single syndrome (Rootes 1997), a long wave of protest which is both conditional upon and has contributed to the development of a less deferential and more participatory form of society in which the boundaries of legitimate political expression have been progressively pushed beyond the strictly conventional (Rootes 2003a). It is, however, difficult so to tell the story concisely whilst at the same time saying enough to facilitate comparative analysis. For that reason, in this paper the four movements considered important for cross-nationally comparative purposes – the peace, women’s, environmental and labour movements – are presented sequentially before an attempt is made briefly to analyse their changing relationships one to another, and to other important strands of recent social movement mobilization.

1.1. The political context

British political history since the 1960s can, for present purposes, be divided into three periods. The first, the 1970s, was a decade dominated by industrial disputes, economic crisis and chronic inflation. The second, the period of Conservative government from 1979 to 1997, was dominated by the premiership of Margaret Thatcher (1979–90) whose government and that of John Major (1990–7) were strongly committed to economic redevelopment by means of a neo-liberal programme of deregulation, privatization, tax cuts, and reduction of trade union power. The third, the period since 1997, began with the election of a Labour government committed to continuing Britain’s economic recovery but also pledged to ‘put the environment at the heart of policy-making’ and to redress the social inequalities that had increased during the previous 15 years.

The periodization of social movement development is more complicated. As elsewhere, the radical student and anti-war movements of the late 1960s stimulated the rise of women’s and other personal liberation movements, but were, during the 1970s, overshadowed by the rise of trade union militancy and competing trotskyist groups. After Labour lost office in 1979, forces that elsewhere achieved autonomous development as ‘new social movements’ were, with the exception of environmentalism, largely brought within the orbit of the Labour left, which for much of the 1980s was in the ascendant within

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1 We are indebted to Brian Doherty for his very helpful comments on an earlier draft.
the Labour Party even as the party itself was in electoral outer darkness (Rootes 1992). The allure of Labour dimmed from the late 1980s as the party set about renovating itself in pursuit of electoral success, and as environmental issues, long disparaged by the left, assumed centre stage. The years of Labour government since 1997 are more difficult to characterize. Environmental protest became relatively subdued as the new government appeared relatively responsive. Few new provocations were offered to social movement activists until the Blair government committed itself to supporting the Bush administration’s ‘war on terror’ and the invasion of Iraq. This, however, has been the period during which, in response to the increasing impact of economic globalization, the agenda of global justice has emerged pre-eminent. Although the global justice agenda has not, in Britain, been resisted by government, it has, because of the circumstances and consequences of the ‘war on terror’, become the master frame of social movement activism in the present decade.

1.2. The Peace Movement

The long wave of protest that has come to be identified as the ‘new social movements’ began early in Britain. The symbolic marker was the birth of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in 1958, but in fact CND was simply the well publicised, elite-directed successor to a number of more grassroots groups concerned to mobilise against Britain’s role in the nuclear arms race, and indeed, against the arms race itself (cf. Taylor 1988).

CND, the principal organization of the British peace movement, was established to campaign for Britain’s unilateral abandonment of nuclear weapons. Initially conceived as an elite campaign (rather than a grassroots social movement) to change public policy by first changing that of the Labour Party, then in opposition, it attracted unanticipated levels of public support and by 1963 had over 900 local groups. A democratic constitution was adopted only after the movement had grown, and only in 1966, when support for CND was clearly declining, did it become a national membership organization. Nevertheless, at its first peak in 1962, some 150,000 people rallied in Hyde Park at the culmination of CND’s annual march from the nuclear weapons research facility at Aldermaston.

CND enjoyed early success when the Labour Party annual conference in 1960 endorsed unilateral British nuclear disarmament, but this was soon reversed when the Labour leader campaigned against it. Public support peaked at the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Its subsequent decline was exacerbated by conflicts over strategy, and in particular whether to broaden the campaign to embrace opposition to US prosecution of the Vietnam war. But the seeds of internal conflict were present in CND from the beginning. Partly they were conflicts of personalities, but more profoundly they were disagreements over strategy and tactics. The original CND elite was committed to changing public policy by strictly conventional and constitutional means, but others in the movement, especially a younger generation associated with the Committee of 100, and the Direct Action Committee (which pre-dated CND and pioneered tactics later popularised by Greenpeace [Lent 2001, 41]), were more anarchistic and/or committed to direct action.

2 An element of this conflict was nervousness about association with trotskyists, who were prominent among organisers of the protests against the Vietnam war.
Although the latter remained in a minority, they established non-violent disobedience as a political tactic in Britain.

Opposition to the US prosecution of the Vietnam war was the principal preoccupation of peace activists during the latter part of the 1960s. The Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, launched in 1967, was loosely structured and its main activities were organizing demonstrations and providing speakers for meetings and media discussions (Lent 2001, 51). Events, particularly in 1968, stimulated massive participation in VSC-organized demonstrations, but Britain was not directly involved in the Vietnam war and so momentum proved difficult to maintain. Nevertheless, the VSC provided a focus for rising student protest, and it served as a bridge between the years of CND mobilization and the development of domestic marxism and new social movements during the ensuing decade, but it ‘had little or no impact upon the political conditions or popular consciousness of Britain’ and it left no organizational legacy (Lent 2001, 55).

CND, by contrast, survived the decline in public support, kept alive mainly by the commitment of Quakers and Communists (Byrne 1998, 118). By 1971 it had just 50 local groups and a membership of barely 2,000. CND was, however, a beneficiary of the revival of cold war tensions and the anxieties surrounding the US decision to develop and deploy a new generation of nuclear weapons – the neutron bomb, and Cruise and Pershing missiles. By 1979 it had some 150 groups, rising to 1,100 in 1983 (Byrd 1985, 66). National membership reached 100,000 in 1983-4 (with perhaps another 250,000 members of local groups). Paid employees increased from three in 1979 to 25 in 1983 (Minnion and Bolsover 1983, 150). In 1983, two months prior to the deployment of Cruise and Pershing, 400,000 people rallied in protest.

By 1985, however, CND had passed its peak, and it adopted a renewed focus upon the ‘basic case’ of unilateral British nuclear disarmament (Byrne 1988, 146-51). Events in 1986 prompted renewed public interest. First, the US bombing of Tripoli, using planes based at British airfields without the knowledge or consent of the British government, exposed the sham of the ‘dual key’ arrangement that supposedly controlled the use of American missiles deployed at bases in Britain. Then, when a catastrophic explosion occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in Ukraine, CND was inundated by callers seeking advice, and CND’s national membership again rose. Thereafter it subsided as Gorbachev’s reforms, nuclear détente and the dismantling of the iron curtain swiftly reduced the fear of nuclear war.

Nevertheless, CND survived as an organization, abandoned unilateralism in favour of a focus upon multilateral force reduction, and was prominent, alongside the Stop the War Coalition and the Muslim Association of Britain, among the organizers of the massive public protests against the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.3

CND has been credited with central importance in creating the ‘culture of protest’ that ‘grew and flourished from the late 1960s onwards’ (Taylor 1988, 340). Certainly, CND

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3 ‘CND is not a member of the Stop the War Coalition. We work together with them on specific events around the illegal war on Iraq and the subsequent occupation. Normally with these events we also work jointly with the Muslim Association of Britain. We view it as a triple alliance of equal partners. When we are working together, for example on a demo, we have joint meetings between the three organisations. CND is also invited to send an observer to the STWC steering committee, which is made up of representatives of many organisations.’ (Kate Hudson, Chair, CND, email to the authors, 7.2.2005.)
was the single thread of continuity running through the British peace movement during the past four decades. But each iteration of the British peace movement has introduced important innovations, innovations that have partly reflected but that have also contributed to the development of other strands of social movement activism. Thus in 1958-61, the peace movement, which was at first as overwhelmingly conventional in its tactics and strategy as it was informal and elite-directed, popularised tactics of mass demonstrations, direct action and civil disobedience.

The revived movement of the 1980s continued the tradition of mass demonstrations and lobbying, but its focus upon the Labour Party was now rather less exclusive. It was also tactically innovative, the most salient of these innovations being the peace camps, most famously at Greenham Common, and, more enduringly at Faslane.\(^4\) The peace movement of the 1980s had a complicated relationship with the women’s movement (Roseneil 1995, Mitchell 1987); besides the women’s peace camps at Greenham, and a variety of autonomous women’s peace and Greenham support groups, there were a number of women-only CND local groups.\(^5\) Nevertheless, CND, which had by then become a formal, mass membership organization, remained at the heart of the peace movement. CND was not, however, a monolithic or exclusive organization; there were a variety of autonomous affiliated groups and ‘specialist sections’, including Christian CND, Trade Union CND, Parliamentary Labour CND, Green CND and Liberal CND, and the leadership worried that some prioritised their other political commitments over those to CND. But CND was committed to maintaining the unity of the peace movement and reacted to challenges from groups demanding more radical action by accommodation (Byrne 1988, ch. 7). Moreover, as the declining salience of the nuclear issue raised doubts about the wisdom of continuing with high profile mass demonstrations, CND sought allies, and in 1987 mounted ‘a joint demonstration with Friends of the Earth on a general anti-nuclear theme’ (Byrne 1988, 153).

It was not only CND’s relationship with other social movements that underwent fundamental changes during the 1980s. So too did its relationships with the trade unions and the Labour Party. The Transport and General Workers Union, the largest British trade union, was, in 1959, the first to endorse CND’s calls for unilateral nuclear disarmament, and the most consistent supporter of the peace movement thereafter (Byrd 1985, 77). It secured support for unilateralist motions at the Labour Party conferences of 1960, 1972 and 1973, but not until 1982 did it secure the party’s unequivocal commitment to unilateral nuclear disarmament. The Labour leadership consistently opposed unilateralism until the election as leader of lifelong disarmer, Michael Foot, in 1980. This period in which the peace movement appeared to have achieved its interim goal – the persuasion of the Labour party – coincided, however, with the nadir of the party’s electoral fortunes; the party was reduced to its lowest post-war vote in the 1983 general election. Indeed, it was the triumph of unilateralism, the badge of the left in the Labour Party, that was in large part responsible

\(^4\) ‘Peace camps – even short term in town centres – became a regular feature of the NVDA and local peace/CND group repertoire. And while numbers at camps were small, a lot of people visited and did other support work – for mixed camps as well as Greenham.’ (Brian Doherty, email to the authors, January 2005).

\(^5\) The CND leadership was critical of the exclusion of men from the Greenham camp, but delegates to CND conferences were vociferous in their praise of the Greenham women. Nevertheless, the Greenham rejected CND’s proposals of joint protests, and this CND accepted (Byrne 1998). Other peace camps, such as those outside the US base at Molesworth and at Fairford and Upper Heyford were not women-only.
for this calamitous performance, for it crystallized the resolve of several prominent Atlanticists to leave the party and to found a new Social Democratic Party. Public opinion had never favoured the deployment of Cruise missiles, but nor had a majority ever supported unilateral nuclear disarmament. The substantial minority who did support unilateral nuclear disarmament shrank dramatically in the course of the election campaign. Although Foot’s successor as Labour leader, Neil Kinnock, was also a unilateralist, by 1989 he had jettisoned the policy in the interests of making Labour electable, and so CND’s long embrace of Labour finally loosened.

The peace movement of the present decade is strikingly different from those of the recent past, both because the central issue is no longer nuclear disarmament, and because the peace campaign is no longer dominated by a single organisation nor so focused upon the Labour party. It is, moreover, interlocked with a range of other social movements and diverse political actors to a greater degree even than in the 1980s. After a brief upsurge during the Gulf crisis in 1990-1, during the 1990s the peace movement was eclipsed by the rise of radical environmentalism, but anti-militarist and anti-weapons campaigners persisted and mounted occasional forays into direct action. Especially notable were actions by Ploughshares, including in 1996 damaging an aircraft allegedly destined for use by the Indonesian military in its brutal actions against separatists. The peace camp continued outside the Trident nuclear submarine base at Faslane (since 1988 the site of the only nuclear weapons in Britain). CND itself still had 40,000 (mostly passive and ageing) members (Byrne 1998, 124). Trident Ploughshares, launched in 1998, has mounted a persistent and increasingly international campaign of non-violent direct action (ranging from blockades and fence-cutting to the ‘disarming’ [sabotage] of weapons-related equipment) against various facilities associated with British nuclear weapons, but has also been involved in more conventional lobbying of policy-makers. The stepped-up Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT) from 2001 has employed a variety of tactics to protest against the biennial London arms fair, including, in 2001, a march and vigil, with speakers from the peace movement including CND. A ‘Fiesta for Life Against Death’ direct action protest was supported by Reclaim the Streets and the Wombles. Globalise Resistance, Amnesty International and other groups have also been involved.

The major focus of renewed peace movement activity in recent years has, of course, been opposition to the prosecution of the war in Iraq by the US and its allies. On 15 February 2003, the Stop the War Coalition coordinated the largest political demonstration ever seen in Britain, with estimates of between one and two million participants drawn from an unprecedentedly wide variety of backgrounds and groups (prominently including Greenpeace and the Green Party as well as a plethora of left and humanitarian organizations) taking to the streets of London. Smaller demonstrations were mounted in Glasgow (Rüdig and Eschle 2003) and, in subsequent weeks, in other British towns and cities as well as again in London and Glasgow.

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6 This protest became especially famous when a jury refused to convict the self-confessed perpetrators of ‘criminal damage’.

7 NB that Trident constitutes Britain’s ‘independent nuclear deterrent’ and so does not inspire the anti-US sentiment that complicated protests against the siting of US missiles at bases in England, but since Faslane is in Scotland protests there are compounded by Scottish nationalism.
Both in advance of the mass demonstrations, and in their aftermath, several groups took direct action. Over 150 activists took part in ‘Operation Official Look’, which involved spying on RAF Northwood, Britain’s military headquarters. In January and February 2003, Greenpeace volunteers boarded a military supply ship, occupied tanks awaiting shipment, and chained themselves to gates at Marchwood Military Port, near Southampton, while the Greenpeace flagship, Rainbow Warrior, and small inflatables blockaded the port on several days until seized by the authorities. Greenpeace activists also blockaded Esso’s UK headquarters and sabotaged some 80 filling stations in protest against Esso’s alleged support for the war (Guardian 24.2.2003). In a series of direct actions in March 2003, during the build-up to the invasion of Iraq, Trident Ploughshares activists severely damaged a Tornado at Leuchars, sabotaged 30 support vehicles at the B52 bomber base at Fairford, and blockaded other military airbases, cut or scaled their perimeter fences, and carried out community ‘weapons inspections’.

The outbreak of war triggered protests in most British cities, an estimated 10,000 school children taking time off school on 19 March 2003 in order to participate (Schnews 2003a). On 22 March, 200,000 protesters marched through the streets of London. Over 1,000 people attempted to ‘Foil the base’ at Menwith Hill, by visiting the spy base dressed in foil costumes, wearing glitter wigs, carrying helium-filled balloons, and decorating the perimeter fence and police vans with tin foil, with the intention of interfering with the reception of the satellite receivers. A peaceful 4,000-strong march took place in the vicinity of the Fairford airbase. Voices in the Wilderness activists carried out a number of direct action stunts, including splashing fake blood over the Foreign Office, blockading roads, and breaking into the RAF base at Welford. (Voices in the Wilderness UK 2005).

However, despite continued public skepticism about British involvement in the invasion and occupation of Iraq, a mass peace movement comparable to those of previous decades has not developed. Consistent with the familiar pattern of peace movement mobilisations, mass protests subsided once hostilities commenced, although in 2005 various local peace groups continue to hold regular meetings and vigils, and the Stop the War Coalition holds meetings and rallies and organized a mass demonstration in London in March 2005 to mark the second anniversary of the invasion. Perhaps the chief beneficiary of the protests against the invasion of Iraq has been ‘Respect - the Unity Coalition’, a new party built around the dissident former Labour MP, George Galloway, a longstanding critic of international sanctions against pre-war Iraq. Respect has so far contested European and local elections, the latter with modest success, and appears to have become the new focus for left activists terminally disillusioned with the Labour Party.

There is as yet almost no scholarly literature on this latest stage in the development of the peace movement, and, in the absence of systematic primary research, our observations are necessarily impressionistic, but the peace movement today, such as it is, appears to be an integrated part of an emerging multi-stranded movement for global justice. The European Social Forum in London in October 2004 concluded with an anti-war demonstration whose British participants prominently included the Muslim Association, trade unions and a wide variety of left groups (most conspicuously the Socialist Workers Party and Respect), as well as smaller contingents from CND, the Green Party and Friends of the Earth.
1.3. The women’s movement

1.3.1. What is the women’s movement?

There is some debate about whether a women’s movement exists, or has ever existed in Britain. Largely, the debate is a result of a failure to establish a coherent theoretical argument about the characteristics that feminist and women’s campaigning should have in order to be called a movement (Nash 2002). The most commonly told story is one of a strong mass movement building steadily from the 1960s and dissolving by the end of the 1970s (Segal 1999, 9). Bashevkin’s (1996, 542) interviews with 43 feminists representing all sectors of the movement in the early 1990s revealed that one quarter of them ‘insisted there was no British Women’s Movement, just a multitude of separate fragments working on individual issue campaigns’. However, others strongly argue that ‘something that looks like a women’s movement does still exist’, and although it cannot any longer be called a ‘mass movement’, there is a ‘large collection of single-issue organisations that press for feminist aims in many different accents’ (Walter 1998, 44).

Using the definition provided by Lovenduski and Randall (1993, 3), the women’s movement consists of ‘all those individuals, networks, organisations, ideas and practices that espouse feminist values and goals’. Although this is not a theoretically robust definition of a movement, it is useful because it is more or less consistent with common conceptions of the movement. It is clear that organisations pursuing feminist values – such as non-hierarchy, participation and openness – have existed since the 1960s and still exist in today’s social movement industry. Campaigning groups and autonomous social centres working on feminist issues such as equality, lesbian rights, health, abortion, and protection from male violence have also existed since the 1960s. On this basis we can quite sensibly argue that there is a women’s movement in Britain today, and proceed to chart the changes that have occurred since the 1960s.

1.3.2. The 1960s

Like most so-called ‘new’ social movements, the British women’s movement was kick-started in the 1960s by politicisation of women via the student movement, campaigns against the Vietnam war, and the general interest of left-wing women in revolutionary socialism (Gelb 1986, 107). CND was also an important recruiting ground, as many of its early activists were women (Pugh 2000, 318). Women’s movement activists were also frequently active in the Labour Party, trade unions and revolutionary left groups, although these were not generally receptive to women’s issues (Byrne 1996, 58).

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8 Most literature on the ‘British’ women’s movement deals almost exclusively with activism in England, and tends to focus mostly on actions and debates that occurred in major conurbations at the expense of small towns and rural areas. Breitenbach et al (1998) draw attention to this and note how the Scottish movement emerged in the late 1970s rather than the 1960s, and remained strongly active into the 1990s, alongside the Scottish left. Consequently, the Scottish movement attracted a greater proportion of working class women than its counterpart in England. In Wales the movement has been even less significant. It developed slowly and campaigns tended to be restricted to the cities (Bouchier 1983, 178).

9 Writing from a socialist feminist perspective, Weir & Wilson (1986, 76) suggest that the women’s movement emerged as much through ‘old movement’ networks as ‘new movement’ ones. For example, the 1968 strike actions by women machinists at Ford in Dagenham were closely related to the Labour movement. Trade union support was sought for this action as part of a broader objective to exert feminist influence on the
1.3.2. The 1970s

The women’s movement of the 1970s was concerned with women’s liberation. Its initial four demands, as agreed at the first Women’s Liberation Movement Conference in 1970, were: 24-hour childcare provision; equal pay and education; free contraception, and; abortion on demand. It was always a loosely knit network that, unlike its US or Australian counterparts, devoted virtually all its energy to its own internal development rather than influencing external institutions (Byrne 1996, 55). Steeped in principles of consensual decision-making, informal horizontal networking, participatory democracy and non-hierarchy, women activists in the 1970s appear to have been preoccupied with maintaining social spaces where feminist consciousness could be nurtured. The decade witnessed the rise of single-issue groups, centres and refuges whose central concerns were domestic violence, rape, abortion and women’s health. By 1976, there were approximately 90 battered women’s centres in Britain (Pugh 2000, 324). In the 1970s, the dynamism of these types of campaigns seemed to be enough to keep friction between radical and socialist, and black and white feminists, at bay, despite the quiet disappointment that some socialist women felt over the inclusion, at the insistence of radical feminists, of a fifth priority for the movement at the 1976 Women’s Liberation Conference. This called for the right to define one’s own sexuality and to prevent discrimination against lesbians, and had the effect of drawing more newly politicised lesbians into the movement (Pugh 2000, 327).

Although national conferences took place (until they were discontinued in the late 1970s), and campaigns like the National Abortion Campaign (NAC) had narrow and limited national co-ordinating structures (including support from the TUC), most women’s movement activity occurred and continues to occur at a local level (Byrne 1996, 58, Gelb 1986, 109). Despite the movement’s national demands, local groups were free to dictate their own priorities, and in practice, campaigned on the five key themes to varying degrees.

Although developing female-only social and political spaces was paramount to the 1970s movement, its activists also engaged in debates, marches, development of alternative media and some direct action. The marches against anti-abortion bills of the 1970s appear to have been the major mobilizers of that decade, attracting thousands of women and the support of trade unions. The 1975 National Abortion Campaign demonstration, for example, was 20,000-strong (Lovenduski & Randall 1993, 220). During the 1970s, most of the movement’s direct action was limited to strikes by women workers, although there was a limited amount of militancy that included an attempt to sabotage a Miss World contest. Unlike the generation of feminists that followed, 1970s women activists were inclined to bypass the political system, regarding it with scepticism because of its formal structures and embodiment of male power (Pugh 2000, 319).\(^{10}\)

\(^{10}\) Cf. arguments about the ‘public realm, private sphere’ (Stacey and Price 1980, Siltanen and Stanworth 1984, Showstack Sassoon 1987).
1.3.3. The 1980s

At the start of the 1980s, an estimated 10,000 committed feminist activists were frequently involved in mobilizations, with a further 20,000 intermittent supporters (Byrne 1996, 60). In contrast, the years that followed (1980-1990) are conventionally regarded as a period of disintegration, fragmentation and deradicalization as the movement began to seek institutional change mostly via local authorities, trade unions and political parties, and to suffer from factionalism (Byrne 1996, 55). Indeed, by the 1980s radical and socialist feminists were at loggerheads with one another. Radicals argued that their socialist counterparts were failing to grapple with patriarchy, which they viewed as the belly of the capitalist beast, and socialists felt that the priority radicals accorded to lesbianism and their increasing intolerance of heterosexuality would alienate the movement from the majority of women and the wider public. This was heatedly debated at the final Women’s Liberation Movement Conference in 1978, at which, to the dismay of many attending, anti-men and pro-lesbian clauses were added to the movement’s demands. This ultimately resulted in recognition that the differences between heterosexual and lesbian women’s politics were irreconcilable. Whilst political separatism was widely accepted by the movement, sexual separatism sowed the seeds for its downfall. This was very soon thereafter followed by divisions in the peace movement – in CND and at Greenham.

The flurry of women’s committees that emerged in local councils (sometimes referred to as ‘municipal feminism’) in the 1980s is usually taken as evidence of the movement’s institutionalisation and departure from the public eye (cf. Halford 1992). These committees sought to influence the internal practices of local authorities on issues such as childcare, conditions of employment and women’s health care, and often involved liaison with the police regarding cases of violence against women (Byrne 1996, 63). The Greater London Council (GLC) during Ken Livingstone’s leadership (1981-86) was a particularly hospitable political ground for women’s committees, which flourished in Labour-controlled London boroughs (Gelb 1986, 117). Women also became increasingly involved in the labour movement, especially via the TUC Women’s Conference and the Women’s Labour Action Committee. The Women’s Labour Action Committee demanded that the five guiding principles of the Women’s Liberation Movement be discussed at the Labour Party conference, for seats to be reserved for women on Labour’s National Executive Council, and for the mandatory inclusion of women on short-lists for parliamentary candidacy (Perrigo 1996, 121). Increasingly, women’s groups accepted state funds and became service providers, departing from the original woman-centred, collective and non-hierarchical origins of the movement. This Griffen (1995, 8) skeptically regards as ‘a means of containing women whilst side-stepping the underlying conditions that made the service necessary’. The 300 Group, formed to train women for parliamentary candidacy with a view to their filling half the seats in the House of Commons, is another key institutionally focussed initiative of the 1980s.\footnote{The 300 Group was all-party and was \textit{not} a creature of the left. In Scotland, the women’s movement took up issues of gender balance and fair representation in the early 1990s via a similar umbrella group called the Women’s Coordination Group (Brown 1996, 34-37). Rather than signalling the downfall of the Scottish movement, Brown attributes the very institutionally-oriented campaigns for constitutional reform (establishing a new Scottish Parliament and ensuring equal gender representation) as a key reason for the \textit{resurgence} of the Scottish women’s movement from 1987 onwards (p.38).}
However, this is not to suggest that all women’s movement activity deradicalized in the 1980s. During this decade, some of the most radical mobilizations of women since the nineteenth century occurred. Between 1981 and 2000 women were involved in sustained peace camps and various forms of direct action at Greenham Common to protest against deployment of US Cruise missiles in Britain (Harford 1984, Roseneil 1995). Support groups were established throughout the country, actively involved in raising awareness, fundraising, visiting the site, and delivering donated items. Greenham activists were closely networked with Women Against Pit Closures, a group of women who supported their husbands during the 1984-5 miners strike, using direct action and community kitchens to build solidarity. Pit camps, modelled on those at Greenham, were established at six of the ten pits listed for closure (Beckwith 1997, 21). Anti-pornography campaigners of the 1980s also engaged in direct action, including actions at cinemas showing pornography, and the picketing and firebombing of empty sex shops (Pugh 2000, 319).

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, black women, disenchanted with the white and middle class character of previous women’s organisations, began to create their own social centres and even engaged in direct action at Heathrow airport to protest against immigration laws and particularly against virginity testing of female immigrants (Lovenduski & Randall 1993, 103). One particular difference between white and black feminism was their polarised conceptions of the virtues of the family. Whereas radical feminists saw nuclear families as pillars of patriarchy and therefore ripe for abolition, black feminists regarded the nuclear family and domestic household as an important refuge from racism in a white-dominated society (Byrne 1997, 117). In the aftermath of the 1981 ‘race’ riots in London and Liverpool, a number of black women’s self-help groups and police monitoring committees were established (Lovenduski & Randall 1993, 104), mirroring the autonomous nature of the white women’s liberation movement. By the early 1980s, some ethnic minority and white women had partly reconciled their differences, and joined together to form campaigning organisations such as Women Against Racism and Fascism, and Women Against Imperialism (Bouchier 1983, 193).

1.3.4. The 1990s to the present

Some commentators see the 1990s as the final stab in the chest for the dying women’s movement. According to a protest event analysis of reports in The Times, women’s movement protest peaked in 1984 when the Greenham peace camp was at its most active, but had practically disappeared by the late 1980s (Bagguley 2002, 175). Certainly Thatcherism played a role in destabilising and marginalizing it. Many local women’s committees folded in the 1990s allegedly because of Tory homophobia, confirming socialist feminists’ worst fears that public and political marginalization would result from radicals’ emphasis on lesbianism. Clause 28 of the 1988 Local Government Act explicitly prohibited the ‘promotion’ of homosexual activities by local authorities (Lovenduski & Randall 1993, 98). A coterminous high profile media debate swayed public opinion against homosexual groups and consequently many local authorities withdrew their funding from local women’s committees despite the fact that a clear majority of women

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12 NB. It is hazardous to generalize from the existence of groups (which may be small or include only a small section/faction / key individuals) to statements about the whole movement.

13 As in other texts, the word ‘black’ is used as a generic term covering all non-white ethnic minority groups.
involved in the committees were heterosexual (Byrne 1996, 63). Moreover, the GLC, which had hitherto provided financial support for both the Greenham women and women’s multi-action centres, was abolished by the Thatcher government in 1986. By the late 1980s, most women’s centres had closed, although there remained some active hubs, notably in Leeds and in Scotland (Lovenduski & Randall 1993, 96). Also in the early 1990s, the Home Office began co-operating with women’s refuge workers, taking the issue out of the hands of feminists and into state control, and serving further to dismantle the movement.

Bashevkin (1996) relates the trend towards institutionalisation in the British women’s movement specifically to the Thatcher government. Thatcherism was at odds with the women’s movement’s emphasis on social welfare provision, decentralization and autonomy, and most especially they clashed with Thatcher’s insistence that ‘there is no such thing as society’. Treading institutional channels post-1979 could be interpreted as a means of seeking to influence a government hostile to traditional feminist organizing. The centralized structures of Tory governance ‘made feminists appreciate the power of the state against outsiders and work to be in it’ (Nash 2002, 317). Institutionalisation was also the result of more equal opportunities producing a new generation of independent, well-resourced and professional or well-educated women willing and able to pursue reform politics. Although there was some disagreement over the merits of ‘selling out’ versus aligning with the ‘loony left’, the debates were much less protracted than those of the 1970s.

By the 1990s British feminism appears to have lost its appeal, and few young women associate with it ideologically or practically, but that is not to say that women have given up campaigning. Byrne (1996, 66) suggests that women have shifted their campaigning to other issues, citing for example their prominence in campaigning networks such as Earth First!, animal rights, and those opposing the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act. Although not practising political or sexual separatism, or even dealing with feminist issues, these campaign networks of the 1990s have drawn on feminist values such as open participation and non-hierarchy that were trialed within the women’s movement.¹⁴

Some women-only campaign organisations have sustained themselves into the 21st century, including Women’s Aid, which was established in 1975 and continues to provide a service for battered women, promote favourable policies for them, offer self-help woman-centred refuges, and provide a feminist understanding of the social structure. Despite funding difficulties, there are still over 40 active rape crisis centres in the UK. In 2003 the National Abortion Campaign merged with the Abortion Law Reform Association to form a new organisation, Abortion Rights, that continues to work in the interests of accessible and woman-friendly abortion. The Women’s Environmental Network was established in 1988, and claims to have over 100 local groups throughout the country (WEN website 2005). It focuses on environmental issues that other EMOs do not cover, especially those concerned with women’s health. Women on the Waterfront provided a support and direct action role for their male friends and family in the 1995-8 Liverpool Dockers Strike similar to that played by Women Against Pit Closures in the mid-1980s. Taking a case study approach to feminist activism, Griffen and her collaborators showed that feminist activism in the 1990s

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¹⁴ ‘There is some political separatism or at least ‘autonomous space’ in EF! There have been a few “Women Speak Out” conferences and EF! Gatherings do have “women only” spaces.’ (Brian Doherty, email to the authors, January 2005)
was still ‘alive and well’ (1995, 1) and that there was still a wide range of active campaigning groups. However, the movement is diverse, lacks a master-frame, and is fragmented by issues and ethnicity.

1.3.5. Continuities and discontinuities

The 1970s was the decade of what has been called the Women’s Liberation Movement, a movement that supposedly declined and fragmented in the course of that decade. However, the 1970s movement is commonly credited with more coherence than it actually displayed, so much so that it has even been referred to as ‘a myth’ (Griffen 1995, 4). In practice, the ‘movement’ consisted of a broad range of issues and ideological approaches that were only loosely held together by a national conference that struggled to make consensus decisions, and a commitment to non-hierarchical and autonomous organising. Nor were all organizations of the 1970s movement averse to taking institutional forms of actions. Throughout the decade, women’s organizations were involved in political lobbying and campaigns for legal rights (Barrett 1980, 245-6).

The 1980s saw the rise and fall of both radical and socialist feminists as movement leaders. The influence of these factions diminished as a result of homophobia, and the collapse of European state-socialism respectively. Between 1968 and the mid-1970s, as in the 1990s, single issue campaigns were more important vents for feminist frustration than infighting between factions. On some issues, the current movement displays remarkable continuities with its past. Health issues, abortion, and refuges from violence and rape have remained high on women’s agenda and clear parallels can be drawn between Women on the Waterfront and Women Against Pit Closures (Cf. Beckwith 2003, 175-7).

However, there is a clear trend towards institutionalisation of some aspects of the movement, most evident in the willingness of parts of it, in the 1980s, to accept state funding, train women for political candidacy, and to use insider political campaign tactics – things it had initially abhorred. Women are also increasingly involved in women’s professional associations, and women’s studies have become acceptable in academia. This trend has been coterminous with a decline in autonomous women’s organising.

Although the decline of the women’s movement has probably been overstated, it is clear that the movement has attracted fewer women since the 1980s, that an increasing number of women’s centres have closed and not been replaced, campaigning networks have fragmented and newsletters have folded (Lovenduski & Randall 1993, 358-9). One thing is clear: feminist issues have less appeal to a younger generation who tend to view the movement as ‘extreme, man-hating and separatist’ (Byrne 1997, 123). However, Nash (2002, 225) points out that many women remain concerned to protest and promote women’s rights, as evidenced by frequent utterances of ‘I’m not a feminist, but …’ followed by the articulation of some demand that would have been unthinkable before the 1970s. Clearly the ‘issues and questions raised by feminist analysis and prescriptions have entered into virtually all aspects of political, economic and social life’ (Byrne 1997, 111). Radical feminist ideas of the 1970s and 1980s are no longer supported by public feminist activism. What remains is a mixture of liberal equal opportunities feminism and cultural analysis in the academy and media. The entrenchment of feminist ideas in society, partial institutionalization of feminist initiatives, and the increasing attention women activists give to other issues have helped the movement slip out of sight and out of mind. Furthermore,
the demand for political separatism may have diminished as a result of the diffusion of the principles of feminist organizing such as consensus decision-making, participation and non-hierarchy into a broader range of mixed gender movement networks, some of which seem to have more urgent and demanding goals.

1.4. The environmental movement

It has been claimed that Britain is home to ‘the oldest, strongest, best-organized and most widely supported environmental lobby in the world’ (McCormick 1991, 34). Environmental activism certainly has a long history in Britain. The first great wave of formation of organizations campaigning for environmental protection began with the Commons, Open Spaces and Footpaths Preservation Society in 1865. Others followed, including the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) (1889) and the National Trust (NT) (1895), and further waves of organizational innovation occurred following the first and second world wars. The 1970s saw both renewed organizational innovation and the beginnings of a dramatic surge in membership. Between 1971 and 1981, the membership of several of the longest established environmental movement organizations (EMOs), including the NT and the RSPB grew fourfold, and between 1981 and 1991, it doubled again. The movement continued to grow, albeit more slowly, into the 1990s. By 2000 the NT had 2.5 million members and the RSPB over one million. In 1998 some 20 per cent of Britons claimed to be members of one or more environmental organizations (Johnston and Jowell 1999, 183), a figure consistent with the aggregate membership of over 5 million claimed by the ten largest EMOs. Most EMOs have experienced a spurt of growth in numbers of members/supporters and income during the present decade, and their total aggregate membership in 2005 stands at well over 5.5 million.

At the turn of the millennium, the British environmental movement was, at national level, a network of over 100 organizations of varying degrees of formality, embracing large, well-institutionalized conservation organizations, newer campaigning organizations such as Friends of the Earth (FoE) and Greenpeace, umbrella organizations that were themselves nodes of networks, and, rather more loosely, a variety of still newer radical ‘disorganizations’ and campaign networks around such issues as biotechnology (Rootes and Miller 2000). Despite its relatively small size, FoE was at the core of the movement, the breadth of its concerns, its openness to alliances and collaborative campaigns, its encouragement of local groups, its campaigning style, and its international links making it both an exemplar and a resource for many more narrowly focused organizations.

The collective action of the movement has been overwhelmingly non-violent and mostly rather conventional. Although there were instances of environmental direct action in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the most celebrated involved mass trespass, mainly by working class people, in the assertion of customary rights of access to land. Otherwise, environmentalism in Britain was thoroughly moderate, respectable and

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15 This section draws in part on Rootes 2003b.

16 It should be noted that the World and European Values surveys, asking different questions, have found very much smaller proportions of British respondents claiming to be members of environmental organizations. It is likely that many members of the National Trust, in particular, do not think of it as an ‘environmental’ organization since the main benefit they derive from membership is free or reduced price access to the many national monuments that the NT administers.
reformist, and enjoyed relatively open access to a political establishment itself ambivalent about the impact of industrialization. Local protests against unwanted development that might be seen as harbingers of later protests began to appear in numbers only in the mid-1960s (Rüdig 1995, 222–5).

The development of the modern British environmental movement began in the 1970s, marked by the formation of new, more activist environmental organizations – notably FoE (established in 1971) and Greenpeace (1977) – that broke with past practice by eschewing charitable status in order to be free to take unambiguously political stances critical of government and industry. They were also distinguished by the breadth of their conception of environmental issues, their unabashed use of mass media to mobilize public opinion in order to exert pressure on government and corporations, and, especially in the case of Greenpeace, their employment of non-violent direct action.

FoE launched in Britain with a highly publicized ‘bottle drop’ of non-returnable bottles on the doorstep of the drinks supplier, Schweppes. Such publicity stunts were useful in attracting supporters, but FoE was committed to influencing policy by engaging government and industry in debate, and to winning arguments by ‘getting the science right’. Accordingly, FoE committed itself to arguing the case against the proposed nuclear reprocessing facility at Windscale at the 1976 public inquiry. Some activists saw this as a diversion of energies and, partly as a result, a UK branch of Greenpeace was established and distinguished itself by spectacular acts of protest to draw attention to Windscale’s pollution of the Irish Sea.

Nevertheless, by comparison with its European counterparts, the anti-nuclear campaign confirmed the moderate character of environmental protest in Britain. Anti-nuclear protest was amplified when in 1979 the Thatcher government envisaged the construction of ten pressurized water reactors. Yet, although the campaign did, at various points during 1978-81, employ the forms of non-violent direct action familiar in Britain since the rise in 1958-63 of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, by comparison with events in France or Germany, protests in Britain were small and resolutely non-violent. Indeed, the violence of confrontations in France and Germany inhibited British campaigners from enlarging the campaign of direct action (Welsh 2000, 163). The most confrontational actions were locally intense protests designed to obstruct evaluation of / construction at possible reactor / waste repository sites. These were protests mounted by some of the ‘350 mixed membership groups actively campaigning on the issue throughout the UK’ (Welsh 2000, 185) and at best loosely linked to campaigning organizations such as FoE.

The anti-nuclear issue was subsequently starved of salience when the Thatcher government adopted a deliberately low profile approach as it sought to avoid distracting confrontations with environmentalists whilst it concentrated its fire power on the trade unions. The need for additional nuclear capacity evaporated with the arrival of cheap and plentiful North Sea gas, the nuclear power programme was quietly shelved, and so the British environmental movement was deprived of the issue that in continental Europe was the chief stimulus to radical environmentalism.

The revival of the peace movement during the early 1980s largely eclipsed the environmental movement and, despite its lack of direct interest in the environment, probably attracted many who might otherwise have been drawn to environmental protest. By the late 1980s, when the peace movement was in decline, environmental issues had
become matters of widespread public concern internationally. Moreover, they began to enter the political mainstream, and so environmental organizations were encouraged to concentrate their energies on participation in newly receptive national and international arena. Both FoE and Greenpeace were by now committed not only to high-profile critical campaigning but also to carrying out or funding research on environmental issues and, increasingly, to ‘solutions campaigning’ designed to promote better environmental practice. In this climate, calls for direct action were rare (Rüdig 1995, 230).

If EMOs in general prospered, the growth of the newer campaigning organizations was spectacular. Between 1981 and 1991, the numbers of members of FoE grew six-fold and those of supporting donors of Greenpeace ten-fold. Both became substantial operations: in 1995, Greenpeace, with over 200,000 donor supporters, had a staff of 106 and an income of over seven million pounds, and FoE, with over 100,000 members, had a staff of 110 and an income of nearly four million pounds (Rawcliffe 1998, 78–80). FoE and Greenpeace had captured the public mood at a critical moment, and yet, in the mid-1990s, the growth of both organizations stalled and the numbers of their members and / or supporting donors stagnated or declined.

1.4.1. The institutionalization of environmentalism and the resurgence of radicalism

Environmental movement organizations in Britain may often have felt marginal to the political process, but even FoE and Greenpeace, generally regarded up to that point as the radical, activist end of the environmental movement, were by the 1990s frequently consulted by policy-makers and invited to comment upon draft policies. Indeed, the extent of the involvement of EMOs in partnerships with government and / or industry appeared to be restricted more by their strategic preferences and the limitations of their own resources than by any closure of access to the policy-making process.

Such developments created tensions within EMOs, and it is sometimes claimed that the increasing influence of the environmental movement and the considerable increase in the size of its ‘conscience constituency’ has been accompanied by a decline in the proportion of active members and a corresponding decline of mass participation in environmental activism since its peak in the late 1980s (Jordan and Maloney 1997).

Even before the ink was dry on that observation, events conspired to prove it wrong. Increasing concerns about the environment were given special force by the effects of development pressures accelerated by the late 1980s economic boom. Discontent with Conservative government policies was widespread by the beginning of the 1990s, but it was the government’s road-building programme – ‘Roads for Prosperity’ – that provided the focus for the sharpest conflicts.

Because of their vulnerability to litigation, both Greenpeace and FoE became more cautious about the actions they undertook. Indeed, FoE’s withdrawal, in the face of threats of legal sanctions, from the anti-roads protest at Twyford Down in 1991 was a defining moment in its relationship with the radical, direct action wing of the environmental moment. Nevertheless, both FoE and Greenpeace thereafter provided material support and advice to smaller and more directly activist groups, but both found it difficult to continue to do so when the demands of their own campaigns were increasing as, during the 1990s, their revenues were stagnating or declining. Their failure to continue support once it had been
given was a source of resentment among activists allied to smaller groups, and was claimed by some to have pushed them into the arms of more radical direct action groups.

Partly in reaction against the apparent pacification of once radical but latterly increasingly successfully institutionalized EMOs such as Greenpeace and FoE, less formally organized, even deliberately anarchistic, environmental protest has been conducted in the names of networks, quasi-organizations or ‘disorganizations’ such as Earth First!, Road Alert!, and Reclaim the Streets (RTS). However, ‘nomenclature does not necessarily help to distinguish these groups’ (Plows et al 2004, 199). Earth First!, RTS and others overlap, as do the affinity groups within them, and they are perhaps better characterised as networks of networks, or even as projects.

The rise of new kinds of environmental protest conducted by new kinds of actors, especially in the course of protests against roads and other transport infrastructure projects, made headlines, but at least as remarkable was the frequency with which the new direct action groups and networks made common cause with local environmental protest campaigns that appeared to have little if any connection with established organizations and that were often, at least initially, motivated by ‘NIMBY’ concerns. The emergence of dreadlocked anti-roads protesters as folk heroes in the tabloid press was perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of the changed status of environmental protest in 1990s Britain (Cf. Seel, Paterson and Doherty 2000). By the mid-1990s, the road-building programme had effectively ground to a halt in the face of public opposition and spectacularly innovative protests, but not before hugely controversial highways had been driven through several areas of recognized scenic and scientific value.

### 1.4.2. Explaining the pattern of environmental protest

Environmental protest in Britain has had two peaks, the first in 1989, and the second, more spectacularly in 1995. The wave of environmental protest that crested in 1989 began to rise soon after the re-election in 1987 of the Thatcher government. Renewed economic growth had brought substantially increased road traffic and, especially in southern England, a development boom that markedly increased pressure upon the environment. Development projects such as the high-speed rail link from London to the Channel Tunnel provoked well-publicized protests (Rootes and Saunders 2001, Rootes, Adams and Saunders 2001), and in towns and villages throughout the south there were conflicts between residents concerned to protect the quality of their environment on the one hand, and the proponents of housing, office, and road developments on the other. Moreover, from August 1988, the popular press highlighted the suspected role of pollution in the deaths of seals on North Sea coasts.

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17 Reclaim the Streets began in 1992 as a campaign of Earth First! It became famous, especially after the M11 protests in London, for its employment of street parties as a form of disruptive protest. However, neither the name nor the tactic was new, Reclaim the Streets protests having been mounted in London by Young Liberals as early as 1971 (Wall 1999a, 63); a Reclaim the Roads cycle protest was organised by FoE in 1979 (Lamb 1996, 95).

18 This impression may, however, be exaggerated by the fact that FoE local groups (of which numbers have fluctuated between 100 and 200 for over 20 years) often employ campaign-specific names.
Margaret Thatcher helped to legitimize environmental concerns when, late in 1988, she made two speeches declaring her government’s commitment to preserving the balance of nature. Whatever the motive for these speeches, their effect was dramatically to heighten the prominence of environmental concerns and to give unprecedented respectability to their articulation. In their wake, media reporting of environmental issues reached a crescendo. The more activist EMOs were immediate beneficiaries. In 1988–9 FoE grew from 31,000 to 125,000 paid-up members, and Greenpeace’s supporters increased from 150,000 to 281,000 (Frankland 1990, 13). In the 1989 elections to the European Parliament, the Green Party scored almost 15 per cent of the vote. If protest rose only modestly at this time, it is because there was widespread optimism about prospects of progress by other, more conventional means.

The second and more sustained wave of environmental protest began its rise soon after the 1992 general election. Environmental issues did not figure prominently in that election, the Green Party failed dismally, and the most closely fought election since the 1970s resulted in the re-election of the Conservative government, no less committed than before to economic development projects, especially road-building. With the government apparently deaf to criticism of the environmental effects of its policies, and no immediate likelihood of a change of government, the absence of any prospect that conventional politics and reasoned argument might change policy encouraged the adoption of less conventional tactics. A particular stimulus to the adoption of direct action was the vigour of the campaign against the poll tax introduced in Scotland in 1989 and in England in 1990. Although the anti-poll tax campaign was principally coordinated by left-wing activists and had no close connection with the environmental movement, it, the political demise of Mrs Thatcher, and the government’s subsequent abandonment of the tax, were represented as evidence of what could be achieved by direct action. The example appealed especially to younger people impressed by the urgency of environmental concerns but dismayed by the apparent quiescence of established environmental groups (Wall 1999a, b). Thus the closure of political opportunities represented by the re-election of an unresponsive government was conjoined with a proximate example of an apparently successful campaign of direct action (Rootes 2003a).

As in the case of the poll tax, the rise of direct action against roads was paralleled by a significant shift of public opinion against government policy and by increasing conventional opposition from government MPs and local party branches in the constituencies most affected (Robinson 2000). It is probable that outbursts of direct action were more the symptom than the cause of widespread public discontent with the government and its policies. Nevertheless, the reporting of direct action served to dramatize and to amplify shifts in public opinion by keeping the roads issue more generally in the news than it would have been had it depended upon the pronouncements of MPs or the more conventional and localized protests of affected residents. The novelty of the alliances forged between local campaigners and eco-activists and the evident public sympathy for anti-roads protesters encouraged media coverage that accorded unprecedented legitimacy to direct action and probably contributed to its spread.

The greater radicalism of environmental protest after 1992 compared with that of the 1980s is explicable in terms of the changed political conjuncture. In 1988, Margaret Thatcher’s speeches had raised expectations that the policies of her government failed to meet. In 1989 the political calendar provided the opportunity to large numbers of people to
protest by the simple act of voting for a Green candidate in the elections for the European Parliament. In 1992–3 no such opportunity arose, and the environment had in any case slipped from the top of the public agenda. As a result, local campaigners whose concerns were as urgent as ever were pushed into the arms of the direct activists, resulting in the extraordinary sights of middle class housewives and pensioners carrying tea and biscuits to dreadlocked tree-sitters, tunnellers, and protest campers. Likewise, the wide-ranging campaign against the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (1994), a piece of portmanteau legislation that, amongst other things, criminalized trespass, extended the networks of direct activists at the very time that Shell and the French government were providing new reasons to protest, and when animal welfare campaigners were stepping up their action (Cf. Chesters 1999). The Major government’s retreat from road-building and its proclaimed commitment to the introduction of more effective measures to protect the environment, and to the tightening of regulations to protect the welfare of transported livestock, contributed to the decline of protest from 1996.

The decline of reported environmental protest in 1997 may be in part a product of its declining news value in the wake of the 1995 peak, but it may also reflect the changed priorities of editors in an election year. Certainly, by 1998 reported protest had returned to the levels of 1996 and a ‘summer of discontent’ witnessed protests on a broad range of issues (Coxall 2001, 119–20). Analysis of reports in the Guardian for 1998 reveals that the revival was mainly attributable to protests concerning nature conservation and pollution, urban, and industrial issues, the best publicized of which was a spate of direct action to disrupt field trials of genetically modified crops; transport and animal rights protests remained at 1997 levels.

To the extent that the decline of environmental protest in 1997 was real rather than an artefact of media attention, the anticipation of the general election and the change of government are likely to have been at least partly responsible. The Labour Party did not have a history of sympathy for environmentalists but, in its last years in opposition, it is said to have been influenced by personal links between its leading figures and environmentalists (Rawcliffe 1998, 222). Its 1997 election manifesto marked a revolution in Labour rhetoric about the environment. Moreover, manifesto promises to put ‘concern for the environment at the heart of policy-making so that it is not an add-on extra but informs the whole of government’ were repeated by the new Labour ministers. The Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, John Prescott, presiding over a newly formed department that was claimed to be the most powerful environment ministry in the world, proved to be surprisingly environmentally aware, globally as well as nationally, while the Minister for the Environment, Michael Meacher, won wide respect within the environmental movement.

However, the Blair government was by no means regarded as a panacea by environmental activists; the protests of summer 1998 were interpreted as an expression of disillusionment with Labour’s failure to put its promises into practice. Nevertheless, although the government’s priorities lay elsewhere, it did enough to give few pretexts for sustained large-scale environmental mobilization. Indeed, it showed itself to be adept at defusing environmental issues just as they seemed about to erupt (as they did with hunting, with housing developments on greenfield sites at the beginning of 1998, and with the ‘right to roam’ and the licensing of genetically modified crops in 1999). It is probably this responsiveness that accounts for the more moderate repertoire of reported protests in and
since 1998; even by comparison with 1997, there was a notable rise in conventional and
demonstrative protests while the decline of confrontational protests was sustained.
Although, in the absence of any systematic investigation for more recent years, a health
warning should be attached to our impressions, reported environmental protest appears to
have declined since 1998 and to have become less confrontational.

The pattern of environmental protest in Britain during the 1990s was quite
distinctive. Not only was there was a dramatic surge of environmental protest, but, in a
striking departure from the longstanding tactical moderation of British environmentalism,
there was a clear shift toward more confrontational forms of protest, even, on occasions,
‘ecotage’ (Plows, Wall and Doherty 2004). It appears too that environmental protest in
Britain was especially tactically innovative during this period. The tactics of ‘manufactured
vulnerability’ (Doherty 1999b) –  tripods, lock-ons, tunnelling –  may have borrowed rather
liberally from the experience of environmental protest in Australia and North America, but
the scale of its use and the level of risk taken by the participants does appear to have been
qualitatively different from anything previously seen in environmental protests in Britain.
The pattern of protest is best explained in terms of the pattern of opportunities presented by
the electoral cycle and the policies and attitudes of governments. Nowhere else in the
European Union was a government so determinedly committed to a controversial, large-
scale programme of road-building, so resistant to hostile public opinion, or so
imaginatively confronted by so heterogeneous an environmental movement.

If the peak of environmental protest mobilization may thus be represented as a
distinctive achievement of an obdurate Conservative government as much as of the activists
who opposed it, the movement did not simply lapse into repose with the election of a
Labour government more sensitive to public opinion. The continued ability of
environmental groups to mount campaigns, notably over housing on greenfield sites and
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), and the high levels of public support they have
attracted, suggest that, even if protest has declined from its peak, the environmental
movement has not been entirely demobilized. The speed with which the Blair government
reacted to a succession of threatened environmental protests suggests that the fear of
exciting a new protest wave acts as a constraint upon ministers and officials considering
new transport infrastructure projects, as well as the introduction of GMOs. In that respect,
the unprecedented protest wave of the 1990s lives on.  

That is not, however, to suggest that renewed road-building will simply provoke a
revival of the spectacular anti-roads protests that were so characteristic of the radical
environmentalism of the 1990s. It was not merely the prevailing pattern of political
opportunities and constraints that produced those protests. They also need to be seen in
their historical context as outcomes of a particular sequence of development, a process of
‘path dependency’, in which the legacy of the campaign against the poll tax was especially
important. That legacy is, however, progressively diminished as the events recede into
history; the battle over the poll tax is already a ‘guerre de papa’ for most people of
mobilizable age, and anti-roads protests themselves may have lost their iconic status,
especially as new, less parochial icons have emerged. Environmental conflicts have, since

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19 It lives on, too, in the expanded range of tactics available to later generations of environmental activists. The ‘culture’ of environmentalism has a much larger place now for direct action than it did before the 1990s.
the mid-1990s, appeared to move out of the backyard and onto the global stage. Nowhere is this more evident than in the changing agenda of some of the largest and most influential EMOs in Britain (Rootes 2005).

1.4.3. The changing agenda of British environmentalism

The dramatic rise during the 1980s of the new campaigning EMOs – FoE and Greenpeace – and the emergence of informal networks and ad hoc campaign alliances were major stimuli to new thinking in established conservation organizations. This was not entirely new: from the very beginnings of environmentalism in Britain, there has been a large measure of cooperation among EMOs, as well as recognition of a specialized division of labour (Lowe and Goyder, 1983). Nevertheless, interorganizational influences increased in the 1980s and 1990s due to increased networking and the formation of national and international umbrella groups. This networking appears to have diffused among quite different groups a new shared concern, grounded in a more systemic analysis of the sources of environmental ills. All now speak the language of sustainability and biodiversity. FoE, Greenpeace, WWF and Earth First! all recognize, albeit in differing ways, the contributions of transnational capital and markets to ecological degradation, and RSPB is increasingly prepared to examine the social forces that affect wildlife habitats. EMOs increasingly recognize that just as the preservation of a particular species requires a more holistic ecological perspective, so the environment as an issue domain cannot be isolated from a wider range of human concerns.

Thus although WWF-UK describes the conservation of species as ‘still the core of our business’, in 2000-1 and 2001-2 it spent more than twice as much (about one-third of its total budget) on ‘levers for long-term change’, a portfolio including education and information for schools and businesses, an International Development Policy program in conjunction with the humanitarian NGO, CARE International, and preparations for the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WWF-UK Financial Report, 2001-2). WWF sees its move toward increasing concern with sustainable development as a logical development from its initial objectives and its analysis of the promotion of those objectives, although its concern with the environment remains fundamental. FoE has always been more anthropocentric in its concerns, and latterly it has brought issues of environmental justice, both nationally and globally, to the centre of its agenda.

The British environmental movement today is a more convincingly transnational movement than it was thirty years ago. There is an increasing sense of EMOs as part of a global movement dealing with global issues. But this is not, for EMO elites themselves, a radical departure so much as an incremental development of already existing perspectives and aspirations. The main driver toward the transnationalization of the British environmental movement has been EMOs’ broader and more sophisticated understanding of the complex and interrelated issues entailed by effective action on issues of central concern. Another is the changing pattern of opportunities as national governments have

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20 This judgement may, however, be premature. There are suggestions that activists are ‘bored with summit-hopping’ and relish the prospect of a revival of anti-roads protests (Alex Plows, personal communication 17.1.2005). In response to renewed road-building (some 50 new roads or expansions of existing roads are now approved and another 150 proposed or planned), a new umbrella organization to coordinate anti-roads campaigns, Road Block (www.roadblock.org.uk), was launched in January 2005.
yielded sovereignty on environmental issues to transnational organizations, most notably the EU. Such changed circumstances represent a new pattern of constraints rather than simply the lure of opportunity; British EMOs have to address transnational institutions because that, on many issues, is where critical decisions are now made. But action at the transnational level generally remains secondary to their national activities because the arenas and the actors in them are less familiar and less accessible, because the costs of sustained action at the transnational level are daunting even for relatively well-resourced EMOs, and because the most efficacious route to Europe is still often via national governments.

There is, nevertheless, evidence of increased transnationalization in the coordination of EMOs in transnational networks of various kinds. Greenpeace, FoE and WWF were, of course, transnational from the beginning, and their British branches have in each case played a leading role (and still do in the cases of FoE and WWF), but even such a national institution as RSPB has developed a transnational role though its initiation and sponsorship of Birdlife International. Even such a relatively small and nationally-focused organization as the Campaign (formerly ‘Council’) for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE) has at least intermittently played a transnational role and sought to make links with similar organizations elsewhere in the EU.

In 2005, the environmental movement in Britain is dominated by a number of large, well-institutionalized EMOs that more often make the news by their pronouncements or partnerships than by their protests. Greenpeace continues to mount spectacular protests on a variety of issues, but the radical ‘disorganizations’ that still exist (RTS having disbanded and Earth First! having become less visible) are increasingly difficult to distinguish from the non-sectarian anti-capitalist left. It may be that environmentalism is currently a movement ‘in abeyance’, but it has the organizational bases for rapid revival should circumstances require. In the meantime, increasingly close links with the global justice movement provide new challenges, and FoE in particular has been quick to embrace them, not least through its very active role in FoE International.

1.5. The Labour Party, Trade Unions, and the Left

1.5.1. General trends in the Labour movement

The British labour movement increased in militancy and numbers through the 1960s and 1970s until 1979, whereafter it became increasingly subdued as a result of the Labour Party’s attempts to distance itself from the unions, and the impact of the ‘Thatcher effect’ (Kavanagh & Seldon 1989). The core of the British labour movement has never had grand ideas of creating a socialist society, but has instead been preoccupied with securing better working conditions and pay for working people. The left of the labour movement – left-wing activists, communist and socialist organisations (notably in the past Communist Party, and more recently the Socialist Workers’ Party [SWP], Scottish Socialist Party, and the Socialist Party) – has attempted to pull the party and the unions to the left, and to varying degrees has sought to incite a workers’ revolution with the ultimate aim of overthrowing capitalism. However, the left has had a minimal impact on workers’ consciousness and trade unions (Saville 1998, 135), and there has been ‘a striking absence of a labour-socialist culture’ (Saville 1998, 140).
Despite the failure of Labour, the labour movement and the left to develop a united alliance, left-wing activists have been and continue to be active within trade unions, and have often been at the forefront of the militant trade unionism that has occurred despite Tory anti-union legislation and Labour’s pleas for a moderate partnership approach. Although rank-and-file trade unions do not exist in Britain, shop stewards’ committees have played a similar role. It was through a shop stewards’ committee that the recent and significant Liverpool dockers dispute of 1995-8 was organised. Although militancy had been successful in achieving settlements in the past, especially under Labour governments, the examples of the 1980s miners strike (under a Tory government), and the Liverpool dockers (under Tory, then Labour governments) – both illegal strikes that failed to reach a satisfactory settlement for workers – indicated to trade union members that taking a confrontational approach was futile. Increasingly, unions have cooperated with legislation restricting the right to strike (Fraser 1999, 245).

However, even though they occur considerably less frequently, are effectively outlawed, and generate less national solidarity than before, militant labour outbreaks are not things of the past. Neither should we assume that the Labour movement is in a state of terminal decline. Trade union membership is increasing, the number of legitimate strikes in sectors such as the railway industry and postal service has risen, and increasing numbers of industrial and white-collar workers are choosing to be represented by a union. Kelly (1998) sees these as evidence of the revival of the movement. Internationalism of workers’ struggles and left-wing involvement in a range of equality- and justice-based campaigns are also offered as reasons for optimism.

1.5.2. The 1960s: Labour in power 1964-1970

The Labour government of 1964 had a bare majority in parliament. Although the election was won on the issue of trade unions, this was the very issue that saw the party’s loss of power in 1970. Labour’s promises of social reform were not delivered and attempts to impose a wage curb were disastrous (Saville 1988, 132). Unfulfilled claims for wage increases resulted in a peak of strikes (3,906 in 1970), and militant tactics, such as occupations and sit-ins by Clydeside shipbuilders, and flying pickets of miners, spread around the country. A loss of confidence in the party resulted in the unions moving significantly to the left by the 1970s, and right-wing elements in the party for the first time questioned the desirability of being so closely linked with the unions (Coates et al 2000, 4-5). The war against the unions had begun, marked by the Labour-sponsored Donavan Report, designed to explore the ‘industrial relations problem’ and concluding that workplace negotiations should be formalised so as to reduce the control of shop-stewards who were regarded as the cause of disorder and conflict (Goodman et al 1988, 50).

Shop stewards were not the only scapegoats of industrial action. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, government ministers, employers and some trade union officials blamed the Communist Party’s industrial militants for the outbreak of unofficial strikes (Darlington 2000, 103). Although Communist leaders were not the sole cause of militancy, the British Communist Party did have 25,000-30,000 members in the 1960s, and a number of shop steward activists in a variety of workplaces and unions. Although the Party had low electoral capacity, hundreds of thousands of workers who would never have voted for the Party in a general election were willing to accept its activists as shop stewards and union
officials as part of their campaign for better wages and conditions. The Communist Party was a major activist force in some of the most well known militant workplaces of the 1960s and 1970s including the engineering industries of Sheffield and Manchester, shipbuilding on the Clyde, and the Ford plant at Dagenham (Darlington 2000, 112). According to Bert Ramelson, the Communist Party’s industrial organizer in 1972, ‘…there has not been a single mass industrial movement of any size in this country in the last decade where you don’t find Communists at the centre’ (cited in Ferris 1972, 77).

The International Socialists (IS), later renamed the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), emerged as the key organisation in the neo-trotskyist revival of the 1960s (Meiksins Wood 1995, 33), finding a fertile field of industrial discontent on which it attempted to build a rank-and-file socialist movement (Darlington 2000, 115). The emergence of IS was also the result of perceptions that the Communist Party was becoming increasingly ineffective due to its preoccupation with electoral politics and attempts to replace right wing trade union officials with those sharing communist sympathies (Darlington 2000, 115). However, as we have already seen, individual Communist Party activists played a key role in industrial disputes, including some yet to come. Beyond the Community Party, IS, and the labour movement, the ‘Left’ found itself overshadowed by a range of single issue politics including women, peace, environment, animal rights and gay rights and took a significant side-step away from class politics (Jones 1996, 511).

1.5.3. The 1970s: Conservative government 1970-1974

Although not so repressive as the Thatcher government that followed, the Conservative government of 1970-4 hardened attitudes towards trade unions. In 1971, the Industrial Relations Act introduced an Industrial Relations Court and a Code of Industrial Relations Practice. The Court was designed to make employment contracts enforceable, flexible working hours acceptable, shift work tolerable, and to give managers control with regard to overtime. The Code of Practice banned unofficial and unconstitutional strikes including some types of sympathy strikes, closed shops and the blacking of goods. The Act also made unions responsible for the actions of their members, and unions could only be registered if they agreed to these principles. Registering was encouraged by imposition of a heavy tax burden on defaulting unions. Effectively, this outlawed the main tactics that shop stewards had used to defend their members’ wages, and made official trade unions responsible for the unofficial acts of their members (Coates 1989, 55-6).

The Act failed to stifle industrial militancy. The immediate response from the labour movement was greater resilience and well-organised campaigning. Most unions decided to not comply with the Act (Ferris 1972, 41). Communist Party activists dominated the Liaison Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions that was formed to bring together militants across the unions and called half day strikes involving half a million workers.

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21 Although the press at the time implied that the involvement of Communists in the labour movement was part of a planned conspiracy by the Communist Party. Communist activists or sympathisers would not have been able to lead workers if it their ideas did not resonate with pre-existing discontents amongst workers (Ferris 1971, 78-9).

22 A ‘closed shop’ is a workplace in which only members of a particular trade union may be employed. Closed shops were preferred by trade unions because they increased their bargaining power and made collective action easier to organize.
protesting against the Industrial Relations Bill (Darlington 2000, 112). In 1960 there were 10 million trade unionists. By 1976, there were 12 million, and unionism was advancing into new territories including local government, insurance and the National Health Service (Coates 1989, 60-61). 1972-4 saw miners striking, and Liverpool dockers blacked goods when the International Relations Court fined workers and sequestered union funds. There were mass walkouts at the London docks and an out-break of sympathy strikes among workers in traditional industries (dock workers, miners, car manufacturers, ship builders). Militancy even spread to usually reserved and quiet sectors such as health and education. The 1972 miners’ dispute saw the strongest manifestations of workers’ solidarity in Britain since the 1920s, as ‘10,000 engineering workers marched out of Birmingham to help flying pickets from Yorkshire coal fields to close the Saltley Coke works’ (Coates 1989, 128).

Communist Party activists and the International Socialists were key driving forces behind this wave of militancy. Communist Party activists held national executive posts and full time employment in a number of unions, and the International Socialists produced a range of rank-and-file newspapers for several industries as part of a campaign against the high levels of bureaucracy that appeared to have hampered official trade union action. The radical ethos soon diffused into the broader labour movement. By 1973, the Trade Union Confederation (TUC) was involved in a sustained campaign for repeal of the 1971 Industrial Relations Act. Union officials who have since acquired reputations for moderation went so far as to accept a policy of ‘controlled militancy’.

1.5.4. Labour government 1974-1979

The Labour government of 1974-9 sought a close relationship with the unions as part its objective to reduce militancy, and it promised legislation to bring about industrial democracy. Despite meeting many of the labour movement’s demands, including settling with the miners, extending trade union privileges, and passing ten major statutes on a range of issues including health and safety, equal pay and maternity leave, the Labour government managed to alienate its own constituency by its poor handling of the economy and ill-received attempts to impose wage discipline. Early in its term of office, Labour conceded wage rises of 35% for the miners and 32% for civil servants. However, high inflation meant that it was becoming financially unviable to continue meeting workers’ demands for increased wages. To remedy the situation, the unions and the government agreed on a ‘social contract’ in which unions were given a larger say in social and economic policy to compensate for lower wage increments (Fraser 1999, 230). Although this was successful for a while, the TUC voted in 1977 for the abolition of all wage restraints. The government responded by attempting to impose a maximum wage increase of 5%. The trade unions’ unhappiness at this outcome led to a burst of strike activity which culminated in the ‘winter of discontent’ of January 1979, during which 1.5 million workers took part in a 24-hour coordinated strike action that left the country in chaos. In 1979 nearly 29.5 million working days were lost to strikes (Coates 1989, 78). This spoiled the image of a ‘special relationship’ with the unions that the Labour Party had been seeking to cultivate in order to impress the electorate. Unsurprisingly, and to the dismay of the labour movement, the Tories won the majority of seats in the 1979 general election. ‘Out of control’ unions were blamed.
1.5.5. The 1980s: Thatcherism

After just two years of Conservative government, the marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm published *The Forward March of Labour Halted*, and argued that ‘nobody can seriously deny that the labour movement of today is in a considerable mess’ (Hobsbawm 1981, 167). The labour movement became divided between the majority who were willing to toe the line and align with the rhetoric of ‘new realism’, and militants such as the coal miners. Trade unions had failed to broaden out the socialist agenda or address the wider social needs of working people, and the Communist Party remained electorally marginal. The Thatcher agenda contributed to the crisis of the movement. Its agenda of individualism, free markets and removal of state control over labour markets led to a huge increase in unemployment, while its series of Employment Acts (1980, 1982, 1984, 1988) further restricted unions’ influence, power and potential for militancy, and took the sting out of the tail of the SWP, preventing it from building an effective rank-and-file movement. The decade 1980-90 saw ‘the most sustained assault on trade unionism among advanced capitalist countries in the post war period’ (Howell 1999, 33).

The 1980 Employment Act was an attempt to extend the anti-union legislation of the previous Conservative government. It outlawed secondary picketing, and allowed employers to fine sympathy strikers for damages, provided funds to finance union ballots and elections, and to change union rules (so as to make militancy less likely), gave the Secretary of State for Employment power to draw up rules on Fair Industrial Relations Practice for use by judges and industrial tribunals, and reduced the number of pickets permitted to enforce a strike to six, thereby discouraging mass pickets. The six-month period of continuous service previously required for claiming unfair dismissal was extended to two years, and a union could only win a closed shop if at least 80% of workers had voted on it (Coates 1989, 121).

The 1982 Act restricted the unions further, requiring periodic ballots on closed shops, narrowing the remit of what could be termed a ‘trade dispute’, preventing unions from claiming damages, outlawing solidarity actions and political strikes, making it possible to threaten unions with injunctions if they engaged in illegal action, and overriding unfair dismissal legislation for striking workers.

In 1984, a further Act focused on the internal practices of unions, insisting on secret ballots before strikes, re-election of union executives by secret ballot, and balloting members on whether union political funds, where they existed, should be retained. This Act also meant that an individual worker could choose not to strike even when a majority voted in favour of strike action. The government also reduced the welfare benefits payable to the dependents of strikers, abolished the Fair Wages Resolution, and contracted public service work out to private firms, resulting in lower wages and increased use of casual labour. Pre-entry closed shops were forbidden by the 1988 Employment Act, and in 1993 wages councils were abolished, greater notice for strike ballots was required, and postal voting was made mandatory for industrial ballots (Goodman et al 1998).

Despite the legal restrictions placed on union activity, the miners’ dispute of 1984-5 was the largest post-war industrial dispute to that date. The closure of Cortonwood colliery in March 1984 was rapidly followed by a national strike of miners that, at the insistence of the National Union of Mineworkers’ General Secretary Arthur Scargill, went
ahead without a national ballot, thus contravening recently imposed legislation.\textsuperscript{23} The Conservative government used this to question the legitimacy of the strike, which escalated to high levels of violence in a riot in Orgreave. Although retrospective analysis has shown that the violence was orchestrated by the police following government orders, media and government exploited this and other violent incidents to convince the electorate that the miners, and trade unionists generally, were violent thugs who needed to be suppressed (Saville 1998, 149). In 1984, over 9,000 pickets were arrested, charged with serious offences, and given bail on the condition that they not return to the picket. By the time the strike ended, union leaders had spent ten days in jail and had been fined for contempt, and the union had had its assets sequestered and placed under the control of a North Derbyshire Conservative councillor (Coates 1989, 130). Whereas the miners’ strike of 1972-4 was successful because Labour eventually supported miners’ claims for a pay rise, the 1980s strike was a political and industrial relations disaster. Politically, the trade unions were out of favour; industrially, miners failed to get support from other unions and returned to work without a settlement (Sheldrake 1991, 92).

Thatcherism also encouraged a ‘managerial renaissance’, one result of which was to give employers more courage and muscle with which to challenge trade unions. This effectively gave employers the power to phase out industry-wide bargaining and replace it with decentralised bargaining. Through the 1980s, many industry-level agreements broke down, to be replaced by single-employer bargaining. The process of shifting from industry- to company-level bargaining is now almost complete. Between 1986 and 1999, fourteen major industry-wide agreements collapsed, and very few newly established firms have since signed up to industry-wide agreements (Howell 1999, 38). This effectively makes it more difficult for trade unionists to raise solidarity within single industries and this has a fragmenting effect on the labour movement.

Manufacturing output fell by 14% between 1979 and 1983 and over a million jobs were lost. Unemployment peaked at 3.3 million in 1985 (Coates 1989, 125-5). Although the power of the unions was severely constrained by the Thatcher government’s anti-union legislation, a great deal of the decline in union membership can be explained by the loss of jobs in traditionally unionised industries. Union membership had peaked at 13.4 million in 1979, but by 1985 was down to eight million. The early 1980s saw the rise and defeat of the miners, the slandering of trade unions by the press, restraint of trade unions by the government, and mass unemployment in many working class communities. Unsurprisingly, the mid-1980s had the lowest level of industrial disputes since 1938 as unemployed and low-paid workers became absorbed in ‘the daily struggle to cope’, leaving them little time or energy for resistance (Coates 1989, 153). In the late 1980s, however, public sector strike action rose, with teachers, nurses and other white-collar workers showing a greater propensity for industrial action.

At the end of the 1980s, the Soviet bloc collapsed, followed by the British Communist Party (1991) (Wainwright 1995, 79).\textsuperscript{24} The decade had, however, seen the

\textsuperscript{23} It should perhaps be explained that the British coal industry was effectively a public sector monopoly, with a single employer, the National Coal Board. The closure of Cortonwood was seen as a test of strength between the union and a management under government pressure to close uneconomic pits.

\textsuperscript{24} In 1998, the British Communist Party re-established itself. However, it is now considerably more marginal to the labour movement than was its predecessor.
development of relationships between the labour movement, New Left activists, and gay, black, feminist and lesbian groups, among them links between peace activists and unionists working in the arms trade (Wainwright 1995, 85).

1.5.6. The 1990s

Restrictive legislation on trade unions was tightened further in the 1990s. In 1990, an Employment Act was introduced with the aim of confining industrial action to the immediate contractual employer, meaning that separate ballots were required for each employer. Other legislation included the 1992 Trade Unions and Labour Relations (consolidation) Act that tightened the procedure for registering unions, and the 1993 Trade Union Reform and Employment Relations Act (1993) that created measures allowing for trade unions to be investigated, to disclose all their financial affairs on demand, and to employ an independent scrutiniser to check membership details and count votes for union elections and ballots. Union membership continued to decline, and the number of days lost to industrial action reached an all time low.

At least some militants regarded the new subdued trade unionism as ineffective, arguing that the unions had become moderate business organisations ‘more concerned with maintaining what they term “the fabric of their own organisation” and the laws of the land rather than aiding ordinary members who may be in struggle with their bosses’ (Terry Teague, Merseyside Shop Stewards Committee, cited in Kennedy 1998, 211). Mike Carden, a Merseyside shop steward, claimed that the TUC ‘… in reality no longer represent(s) anyone but itself’ (Kennedy 1998, 219).

The Liverpool dockers dispute is important because it was a radical response to disillusionment with the increasingly staid mainstream trade unionism, and because of the international networks that the Shop Stewards Committee built. As secondary picketing and sympathy striking had been outlawed in Britain, the Liverpool dockers received minimal support, financial donations apart, from other British dock workers and trade unionists. Instead, they turned their attention to building solidarity with dock workers in other countries, and with the developing radical direct action movement.

The tale of the dockers dispute begins in 1989, when the Conservative government abolished the National Dock Labour Scheme that had previously protected the rights of dockside workers. Its abolition meant that anti-trade union laws could be applied to the industry, resulting in a reduction in union significance, wage cuts and an increase in part-time, casual and temporary employment contracts. Workers were increasingly threatened by mass disciplining, falling safety standards, and threats of dismissal. In 1991, 80 dockers’ sons took up employment with Torside Ltd, a subsidiary of Merseyside Docks and Harbour Company (MDHC). Four years later, they were offered redundancy as the company sought to employ part-time workers and employment agency temps. This resulted in a unanimous strike ballot and picketing by Torside workers. In solidarity, 329 dock workers employed by MDHC, concerned to protect the jobs of the young, refused to cross the picket line. They were immediately sacked for illegal industrial activity, and locked out. Later, 200 of the less troublesome ex-MDHC employees were offered their jobs back, but with new conditions including no union representation, lower wages and part-time or casual employment status. The workers resisted, drew up the Dockers’ Charter asking for ‘no return to casual labour, real jobs, no victimisation, reinstatement of sacked workers, and
trade union recognition and elected shop stewards’, and started a local and international campaign of direct action. Women on the Waterfront, rapidly established by women whose male friends and relatives had been sacked, carried out press work and conducted candle-lit vigils outside the homes of MDHC’s directors, helped with picketing, and even took part in occupations (Pilger 1996).

Within weeks of their lockout, the Liverpool dockers began networking with dock workers in other countries with the aim of holding up ships and their cargoes headed for Liverpool to damage the financial viability of MDHC. In February 1996, Merseyside Port Shop Stewards Committee organised an international conference attended by dock workers from 18 countries. The conference delegates resolved to take direct and indirect action against vessels doing business with MDHC, provide aid for the Liverpool Dockers, establish an international steering committee to co-ordinate conferences and international actors, to take solidarity actions and support one another (Labournet 1996). Dockers in the US and Sweden instigated 12-hour stoppages against all Atlantic Container Lines (ACL) cargoes, one of Liverpool port’s largest trading partners.

On 28 September 1996, to mark the first anniversary of their lockout, the dock workers held a demonstration in collaboration with Reclaim the Future, an alliance of direct action protesters including anti-roads protesters, Kurdish groups, Reclaim the Streets (RTS) activists, animal rights protesters and trade unionists. The next day was filled with workshops and the following Monday was a day of direct action including occupations of ACL offices and the docks. Police violence escalated towards the end of the demonstrations, and in total over 40 people were arrested and many injured. Both the dock workers and the direct action movement activists were pleased to be working in alliance, despite the union asking dock workers to distance themselves from anarchists (RTS website). In April 1997, RTS held a Social Justice march in support of the dock workers, estimates of numbers of participants varying between 3,000 and 20,000. Links were made between labour issues and others such as the plight of the homeless, asylum seekers and pensioners. Despite the high and persistent levels of militancy and solidarity with radical direct action protests and dock workers in other countries, the dispute ended in January 1998 when four-fifths of the dock workers voted to accept settlement payments of GBP 28,000. Rallies and community pickets continued for a while afterwards, but fizzled out by the end of the decade.

The solidarity between Liverpool dockers and other activists of various persuasions represents the nature of modern autonomous left coalitions that exist ‘in most towns and cities … [and] come together across party and organisational boundaries around major issues of the day’ (Wainwright 1995, 93). Other issues that have brought broad sections of the left together have been resistance to the poll tax, hospital closures, the Criminal Justice Act (1994), and war. The SWP has also attempted to engage with contemporary struggles through the front organisations for which it is famous. SWP has been at the helm of Unite Against Fascism and the anti-globalisation organisation, Globalise Resistance, and took part in the Stop the War Coalition and the Respect- Unity Coalition. Although these may appear to be single-issue campaigns, they can all be viewed as strands of a broader movement for equality, justice and sustainability.

Although the SWP grew to 6,000 members by the early 1990s, recently merged with the Scottish Socialist Party, and is Britain’s most important revolutionary socialist organisation (Darlington 2000, 117), few regard it as a successful political organisation.
Wainwright (1995, 99) argued that although it had been ‘persistent’ and ‘energetic’, it had not managed to grow much beyond student campuses and a few workplaces and unions. Even within unions, it has not been able to influence the labour movement through a network of shop stewards as the Communist Party did. Whilst the left of Labour has had no electoral success or mass following, many left-wing activists have organised independently of formal socialist parties and organisations to create fruitful and colourful coalitions fighting for social and economic justice and against neo-liberalism (Waterman 1998).

1.5.7. The new millennium: New Labour

New Labour has retreated from close links with the unions, organisationally, programmatically and personally (Coates et al 2000). Under Blair’s leadership, union sponsorship of MPs has ended (although many MPs retain associations with unions), and the union share of party funding has been reduced to 30%. Blair has sought to further deradicalize the unions by attempting to shift their emphasis towards the individual rather than collective needs of employees, by supporting skills and training initiatives, and helping the unemployed. Blair’s speech to the TUC on 17 September 1998 called for no return to ‘the days of industrial warfare, to strikes without ballots, mass and fly pickets, secondary action and all the rest’ (quoted, Coates et al 2000, 11). The TUC, it appeared, dutifully followed its master (Ludlam et al 2000, 14). In June 1998, the TUC General Secretary reported that the TUC is ‘an important interest group that cannot be shut out of national life, but we’re not the only one and we can’t always expect to get our own way’ (Barber 1998). This is reflective of the New Unionism/realism agenda that New Labour has been cultivating, making unions no longer the senior partners in the Labour coalition, shifting their interests towards partnership, nurturing commitment to the success of enterprise, improving the quality of working life, and emphasising training and skills, and individualism, over collectivism (Undy 2001).

Although labour movement activity has recently been subdued with the exception of some short-lived legal strike actions in the fire services, universities, and Post Office, one effect of the dockers dispute has been to widen the politics of the direct action movement. In January 1999, RTS occupied the offices of London Underground Ltd to protest against its privatisation. This act was carried out in solidarity with Underground workers, whose strike action had been called off by their union (RMT) after London Underground Ltd threatened it with a court order. Alongside privatisation, other labour-related issues that the direct action movement has become increasingly concerned with are labour flexibilization and casualization. ‘Precarity’ was a major theme of the Wombles-organized radical autonomous alternative to the European Social Forum in London, October 2004.

Waterman (2001) suggests that the labour movement should transform itself into an international force. As with other players in the ‘global justice movement/s’, there is slow

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25 A campaign highlighting the health and safety implications of casualization was stimulated by the death of Simon Jones, who was part of the activist scene in Brighton, on his first day working short-term as a docker at Shoreham in 1998. This incident was important in deepening direct action groups’ commitment to campaigning on the issue (see www.simonjones.org.uk).

26 As the word ‘precarity’ is new to the English language, its adoption by groups organized around the ESF might be taken as unusually clear evidence of the cross-national diffusion of movement discourse.
but growing realisation that wage labour and capital are misappropriated across the globe. Waterman suggests that, whereas in the past, Labour and Social Democratic Parties and trade unions have been ‘subordinated to national or imperial capital and to chauvinistic, militaristic and imperialist states’ (p.16), there is now an ‘intimate relationship between, on the one hand, proletarian states, working class struggle, the labour movement and socialist ideology and, on the other, internationalist identity, organization and action’ (p.17). Yet despite the forging of international links in the dockers dispute, the trade union movement has not yet caught up with the peace, human rights and environmental movements, which all have well-developed international networks. Most trade unions are slow to take up multilateral and IT-based communication (Waterman 2001, 215).

1.5.8. Continuity and change in the labour movement

There has been a marked change in the structure of employment between the 1960s and the present. In particular, the massive decline in employment in manufacturing led to a reduction in trade union density. More recently, union membership has increased among white-collar workers, the public sector union, Unison, being a conspicuous beneficiary. Howell (1999, 28) suggests that the strength of 1970s trade unionism was the result of its ‘reliance upon the particular economic and political conjuncture of the 1970s’. Full employment, fordist firms, and an open and favourable state made trade unions complacent and ill equipped for the repressive post-fordist agenda that followed. The result of repression was a marked reduction in industrial militancy, which, to the delight of Conservative and Labour governments alike, has almost disappeared from the labour movement’s repertoire. The initial response to the repressive Industrial Relations Act in 1972 was a broad alliance between communists/radicals and moderates. No similar alliance has come together since. In fact, it appears that radical and moderate organisations are becoming increasingly distant. Whereas the TUC of the 1970s was complacent, in the 1990s the TUC asked Merseyside shop stewards to distance themselves from the emerging radical direct action movement. The relationship between the Conservative government and the labour movement of the 1970s was one in which repression led to militancy. From the 1990s, by contrast, the partnership agenda of New Labour has led mostly to acquiescence. Another significant change is that the agenda of the labour movement, or at least that of certain parts of it, has become more internationalised than was true in the recent past.

There are, however, also some continuities with the past. Although not all unions are happy with the New Labour / New Realism reframing of the role of unions, and are only partially satisfied with industrial relations under New Labour, a similar story can be told of the unions under previous Labour governments (Undy 2001). The left has never fully engaged actively with the labour movement and the SWP has remained marginal. Militant trade unionists have made and maintained links with other ‘new social movements’ including the womens, peace, and environmental movements in the 1960s and 1970s, and with the direct action movement focusing on similar issues into the new millennium. Nevertheless, in general it is the weakness of the links between trade unions and the new social movements that is most striking. Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s many environmental and feminist socialist activists emphasised the importance of building an effective alliance with the labour movement, few now give the relationship such a high strategic priority. While some still see unions as positive forces, discussion of their role seems largely to have dropped out of strategic debates. New alliances between the
unofficial labour movement and the direct action movement might promise a change in direction for both, but to some informed observers it appears that only the SWP and the Socialist Party still take union activism seriously as a route to wider political change.27

One possibly significant development is the involvement of several unions – notably Unison and the Transport and General Workers Union – in the European Social Forum (ESF) in London in October 2004. Clearly some in the labour movement see advantages in making common cause with other movement activists in a transnational campaign for social justice.28 It remains to be seen whether, beyond the exceptional circumstances of the ESF, the distinct discourses of the new social movements and the labour movement can be brought into a common conversation.

1.6. Comparisons and conclusions

The purpose of this paper has been briefly to describe – and to account for – the development of four key social movements in Britain from the 1960s to the present day. As will already be apparent, the presentation of these as sequential accounts of discrete movements is less than wholly satisfactory because, whilst each movement has a distinguishable trajectory, its interactions with other movements and its responses to the wider political environment and the climate of the times are also consequential. In this concluding section, we attempt to set the distinct strands of social movement development in comparative context.

We suggested at the outset that the development of the ‘new’ social movements can be seen as a single syndrome. To what extent, then, does it make sense to consider thematic social movements in Britain as distinct entities other than for reasons of expository convenience? There is no simple answer. The answer depends on which period one considers, and upon which level – local or national – one focuses.

In the ferment of the mid to late 1960s, interactions among and overlap between the thematic concerns of activists were considerable. This was, to put it simply, the period of early mobilization in which radical activism was relatively undifferentiated thematically, even though it was often intensely divided by the competing claims of various left groups. To the extent that the traditional left was involved, it was mostly as the tired and compromised ‘old Left’ stigmatized and caricatured by a self-confident New Left comprised largely of students and recent graduates. The labour movement itself had an ambiguous relationship to these developments. On the one hand, it was the target of a new generation of self-styled revolutionaries who sought to rediscover and mobilize the proletariat, while on the other it was becoming the battleground between rank-and-file unionists and union bureaucrats, with the former increasingly gaining influence through the shop stewards’ movement and unofficial strike action.

The 1970s was a decade mostly remembered for industrial militancy, but it was also the decade in which the thematic differentiation of libertarian and radically reformist

27 We are grateful to Brian Doherty for the comments that inform these remarks.

28 See, for example, the remarks of Frances O’Grady, deputy general secretary of the TUC, published during the London ESF: ‘Increasingly, unions are recognising that reaching a new generation of workers…means trying out new ways to organise not just at work but in society too’ (The Guardian, 16 October, 2004, p. 22).
movements became apparent, and in which new themes scarcely addressed by the activists of the 1960s came to prominence. 1970 was the year in which the first national women’s liberation conference was held, the Gay Liberation Front was founded, and the formation of a British branch of Friends of the Earth was begun (Lent 2001, 4). The women’s and personal liberation movements set the tone for the 1970s, the environmental movement only beginning its long rise, and the peace movement re-emerging only towards the end of the decade.

Missing from our story so far, but important to understanding some of the peculiarities of British social movement politics and its relationship with the extreme left, is an account of the anti-racist movement. It emerged principally as a counter-movement in reaction to the rise of political racism in the form of the National Front (NF) which in the early 1970s enjoyed some highly publicized but exceedingly modest and very localized electoral success. Rock Against Racism, in 1974, and the Anti-Nazi League (ANL), in 1977, were formed on the initiative of SWP members but, although the extent of SWP control remains a matter of dispute, the ANL grew too large simply to be an SWP front (Brittan 1988). If the SWP deserves credit for the fact that the ANL was able to mobilize much larger numbers than the local anti-racist/ anti-fascist committees that predated it (Lent 2001, 116), it can also be blamed for the ANL’s failure to leave a legacy of a broad ethnic minority solidarity movement (Gilroy 1987). The SWP was more focused upon the NF’s neo-fascism than upon solidarity with embattled members of ethnic minorities, and when its immediate political objective – the neutralization of the NF as an electoral force – was achieved, the ANL was dissolved. Continued mobilization against racism was largely left to ethnic minorities themselves.

**Figure 1.**
*Interconnections and overlaps among social movements in Britain during the 1980s*
The 1980s began with the peace movement, CND at its core, clearly on the rise. It ended, the peace movement all but forgotten, with an extraordinary surge of support for environmentalism. Put so baldly, a great deal that is interesting and important is obscured. Figure 1 is an attempt to represent the interconnections and overlaps among social movement mobilizations during the decade. During the 1970s, a decade in which the Labour Party was either in government or a government-in-waiting, social movements had mostly kept their distance from the Labour Party and, indeed, been kept at a distance by the Labour Party. As a result, there was free space in the political landscape in which social movements could develop autonomously and play out their sometimes complicated relationships with the micro-parties of the extreme left. For most of the 1980s, by contrast, the Labour Party, out of office and led by left-wingers, became a pole of attraction for people who actually were, or otherwise might have been, social movement activists. As a result, there were during the decade significant overlaps between the Labour Party and other social movements, in addition to the traditional one with the trade union movement (cf. Doherty 2002, 165-6). The conspicuous exceptions were the environmental movement and the soon-to-be moribund anti-nuclear movement, itself increasingly subsumed by the environmental movement. By the end of the 1980s, however, the Labour Party had, in the interests of again making itself a contender for government, largely turned its back on the social movements with which it had flirted.

**Figure 2.**
Interconnections and overlaps among social movements in Britain during the 1990s
During the 1990s, the patterns changed (see Figure 2). The anti-racist / anti-fascist movement was revived, again in response to a feared rise of extreme right parties, but this time it was bitterly divided between an Anti-Racist Alliance, started in 1991 by activists formerly involved in the black sections of the Labour Party, and the ANL, revived in 1992 (Brittan 1996). This time the overlap with the Labour Party was more extensive, but by mid-decade the movement had largely disappeared. On the other hand, the overlap between the Labour Party and a shrunken trade union movement was less apparent, and, by mid-decade, there were at least points of contact at elite level between a massively expanded environmental movement and a reinvigorated, if substantially de-radicalized Labour Party. The women’s movement, insofar as it still existed, was represented by stronger strands within other, more obviously active movements. What is not apparent from this representation of movement overlaps is the very significant change that occurred within the environmental movement during the first half of the decade. Partly as a legacy of earlier campaigns of direct action and civil disobedience (notably that against the poll tax), there was a remarkable rise of confrontational protest. This marked the emergence of a radical green movement (Doherty 2002) through which environmentalism emerged as the master frame of social movement activity in Britain (Lent 2001, 215-33). If the larger, more reformist and more institutionalized part of the environmental movement was developing fruitful contacts with leading figures within the Labour Party, radical green activists remained deeply suspicious or openly contemptuous of a Labour Party apparently more interested in office than in fundamental social change. Radical green activists, however, undoubtedly produced a ‘radical flank effect’ from which environmental reformers profited.

Figure 3.
Interconnections and overlaps among social movements in Britain in c. 2003
By 2003, a still large, if less conspicuously activist, environmental movement overlapped with both the Labour Party and trade unions to an unprecedented, if still modest, extent. The overlap between the trade union movement and the Labour Party was substantially diminished, if not quite eliminated. The revived peace movement overlapped with sections of all three (see Figure 3). To the extent that one can yet speak of a global justice movement in Britain, it would, in 2005, largely subsume the peace movement and overlap more extensively with the environmental movement and the labour movement.\(^{29}\) Especially prominent within it are the remnants and successors of the radical green movement, but they are almost certainly less numerous than the more conflict-averse folk who have come to the movement from the churches, and aid, development and humanitarian charities.

The ghost at the feast here is the SWP, the largest of Britain’s far left organizations. The SWP has consistently followed a strategy of building broad campaign coalitions which, it is widely alleged, it seeks to dominate, a charge which SWP denies, arguing that so to do would be counter-productive. Nevertheless, SWP and other trotskyist activists have played prominent roles in a whole series of protests from the Anti-Nazi League and Rock Against Racism, through those against the Criminal Justice Act, to Globalize Resistance, the Stop the War Coalition, and the organizing committee for the European Social Forum in London in 2004. According to its supporters and sympathizers, such is the SWP’s centrality to the organization of campaigns that little would have happened without it. According to its critics, however, it is more an irritant than an inspiration, its centralized, hierarchical organization an anathema, and its mere presence a deterrent to the participation of many who disagree with its politics.\(^{30}\)

The decade-by-decade comparison outlined above is, of course, pretty broad-brush stuff. It is essentially an impressionistic account based on evidence of links between organizations engaged in joint campaigns, and of the involvement of prominent individuals associated with one organization or another. It is based on a high level of aggregation and abstraction over whole decades and over the whole territory of England if not always of Britain. England being the highly centralized country it is – culturally as well as politically – this account certainly has a metropolitan bias; a great deal that happens outside London is neglected. This means that the separate identities of the several movements described may well be exaggerated; the distinctive views of ideologues of movements are more likely to be reflected in national media, and in London there is a critical mass for almost any

\(^{29}\) Placing the Labour Party in relationship to the movement is problematic. Despite the undoubted commitment of the Labour government to the relief of poverty and debt in developing countries, especially in Africa, ‘one of the big changes now is the absence of Labour members and councillors in social movement activism. You met them regularly in the 1980s, never now.’ (Brian Doherty, email to the authors, January 2005). It is probable that the responsibilities and opportunities of office have served to maintain a degree of distance between the Labour Party and the movement that would not have existed had Labour been in opposition rather than in government.

\(^{30}\) See Kingsnorth (2004) for a discussion of the London ESF and the SWP’s role in it.
specialized, sectional social movement activity, and consequently less need or opportunity for an individual activist to be active on several issues.

If, however, social movement activism is viewed from a local, non-metropolitan perspective, or, perhaps especially, with an optic focused upon radical activists, the overlaps and continuities between various strands of social movement activity are often more impressive than the differences and discontinuities. Recent work by Brian Doherty, Alexandra Plows and Derek Wall on radical environmental networks in Manchester, North Wales and Oxford demonstrates how

Local activist communities can cut across the boundaries between movements such as the women’s, gay and lesbian, peace and green movements. Activists are well used to the idea that there is a kind of social movement family, linking what they call ‘progressive’, or ‘alternative’ movements, at local levels. … The concept of a local activist community provides a qualification to approaches to social movements as based on particular issues such as environmentalism or pacifism or identity politics as in the case of feminism or gay and lesbian movements. While the latter groups can legitimately be analysed as social movements, when placed in the context of local activism, they also need to be understood as set within a local activist scene, in which cross-movement activism is the norm …

two … features … were most significant about the groups studied in Manchester, Oxford and North Wales. The first was the local inter-dependence and overlap between what, in larger-scale national or comparative international studies, are viewed as discrete social movements. The second was the importance of the evolution of local social movement networks over time.

… it is the nature of the core issue for each movement that shapes local activist alliances, but the framing of issues is variable by context and time. At different periods in our study, it was clear that both gay and lesbian (in the 1970s) and environmentalist groups (in the 1990s) had extensive ties with other local social movement groups, and were pursuing radical projects and working on issues such as state repression and racism that exceeded their supposed core issue. This suggests that it is not the core issue itself that determines the extent of cross-movement ties for particular local movement groups, rather it is how groups articulate their core issue in relation to cross-movement frames at particular points in time. (Doherty 2004)

Diani, exploring the networks among a large range of political, civic and community groups in Glasgow, found a dense network of left-wing parties, peace campaigners, greens, women’s movement and other social movement groups who had worked together on campaigns, been at the same demonstrations, and regarded themselves as sharing a common project. They saw themselves as engaged in social conflicts with opponents, protested frequently, used a wide repertoire of confrontational and less confrontational forms of action, and shared a collective identity and a solidarity generated by regular interaction (Diani and Bison 2004). Interestingly, however, in Bristol, one of the reputed centres of the ‘DiY culture’ that some (e.g., McKay 1998) see as especially

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31 ‘DIY culture’ = ‘Do It Yourself culture’. The term refers to the allegedly ‘post-modern’ practice of cultural innovation and eclectic cultural borrowing.
characteristic of new social movement activity in modern Britain, Diani found only a much looser and less active network.\footnote{This is perhaps an artefact of his focus upon inter-organizational rather than inter-personal linkages.} Clearly locality and local political traditions shape the pattern of present social movement activity.\footnote{Cf. Rootes, Adams, and Saunders (2001) who compared local environmental politics in south-east London and Kent, and Saunders (2004), who compared north-west and south-east London. Doherty (2002, ch. 7) discusses local environmental campaigns in comparative perspective.}

Nevertheless the existence of cross-issue social movement networks even in some localities suggests the limitations of seeing social movements as each having their own logic, and narrative, and it is much more consistent with some obvious features of current examples of activism, particularly those around issues of global injustice ... A further relevant feature of the informal alternative activist networks that we studied, and which play an important role in anti-globalization politics, is the rapid biodegradability of their ‘organizations’, such that the same people might be present over a decade or more but in different organizational guises. This makes inter-organizational surveys less useful in assessing the nature of long-term local activism. (Doherty 2004).

This biodegradability of organizations is, of course, more characteristic of the local and the radical strands of social movements than of the national and the reformist. A plausible case can be made for considering radical activism as something generic rather than thematically specialized, with activists moving from one hot issue to another as circumstances change. Thus the same sorts of people – sometimes even the same people – campaigned against the poll tax in 1990, against roads, the Criminal Justice Act and neo-fascism/racism in the early to mid-1990s, and participated in anti-globalization protests in the present decade. There is, in other words, a left-anarchist underworld of (nearly always non-violent) direct activists that surfaces in one social movement after another and whose identity is defined by its resistance to capitalism, the state and the US-dominated global system of economic, political and cultural relationships rather than by allegiance to any one thematically specialized social movement.

However, it is not only at the grassroots that networking among social movement activists is apparent. At elite level, too, the interactions have become more frequent and systematic. A process that was apparent within the environmental movement from the late 1980s onwards, and that probably pre-dated it among humanitarian, aid and development NGOs, has become more general, especially as the agenda of the environmental movement has developed to embrace issues of global justice. Not only has the inter-organizational coalition become the normal mode of public campaigning and mass mobilization, but the personal networks among the increasing band of NGO professionals have expanded as people who acquire expertise in one thematic area move, as they often do, to other organizations focused upon other issues.

There is, of course, more to social movements than inter-organizational networks, but the collective action that is an indispensable part of social movements takes many forms, some of them rather more spectacular, confrontational and newsworthy than others.
Britain has, since the 1960s, experienced a long wave of protest that is both conditional upon and has contributed to the development of a less deferential and more participatory form of society in which the boundaries of legitimate political expression have been progressively pushed beyond the strictly conventional. Lent (2001, 232) considers the late 1980s to mark the end of the ‘long explosion’ that began in 1958, but we think this is to underestimate the continuities of social movement mobilization through the 1990s and since. The actual level of social movement mobilization may vary from issue to issue and time to time, but Britain has an incomparably more participatory political culture now than it did in 1960. In survey after survey, the British have professed a continually rising approval of non-violent forms of protest and willingness themselves to participate. As the massive marches organised by the Countryside Alliance in 2002 and 2004, and the extraordinary anti-war demonstrations of 2003 confirm, it is not only in responses to surveys that the British testify to their willingness to take direct action to protest what they perceive to be injustices. It is only if we make a shibboleth of confrontational protest that social movement activity in Britain appears subdued.

It is against this background that what is increasingly referred to as the ‘global justice movement’ has emerged. As we shall see, this putative movement is a complex and often contradictory phenomenon. Indeed, its very identity as a movement is uncertain.

2. The Global Justice Movement in Britain

2.1. What is the Global Justice Movement?

Because it consists of a wide range of types of organisations, groups and networks, working on a broad range of issues, the British global justice movement is exceedingly difficult to define and to describe. These issues – from labour and immigrant rights through to anti-debt, trade, peace and environmental concerns – are linked by an emerging consensus amongst activists that their root cause is the dominant neo-liberal agenda, or ‘Washington consensus’ (George 2003). The action repertoire of the movement is equally broad, ranging from the direct and sometimes illegal actions of autonomous ‘affinity groups’, to the organised lobbying of conventional non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Following Diani’s (1992) ‘consensual’ definition of a movement, we conceive of the British global justice movement as a network of formal and informally organised organisations and individuals who have a common concern to campaign or protest, in one way or another, against the global neo-liberal agenda.

This definition allows us to cast the net fairly wide, and whilst our conception of the global justice movement may differ from direct activists’ views of the ‘direct action’ or

34 The proportion saying they would go on a demonstration in response to an unjust law rose from 8 per cent in 1983 to 17 per cent in 1994 and 20.5 per cent in 1998 (Jowell et al. 1999, 320). Indeed, in 1994, 8.9 per cent said they had gone on a demonstration in such circumstances (Curtice and Jowell 1995, 154), and by 2000 this had risen to 10 per cent (Bromley, Curtice and Seyd 2001, 202). In response to a differently worded question in 1996, 31 per cent said they ‘definitely’ or ‘probably’ would go on a protest march or demonstration, and 5.5 per cent said they had actually done so in the previous five years (Jowell et al. 1997, 320).

35 The character of the Countryside Alliance is disputed, but as well as drawing attention to a plethora of rural grievances ill-understood in urban Britain, its principal mobilising issue was the proposed ban on hunting with dogs which finally became law in England in 2005.
’anti-capitalist’ movement, it allows us to chart important changes in NGOs as they have become increasingly aware of the non-democratic nature of international finance institutions that relentlessly pursue the neo-liberal agenda, and its effects upon the issues with which they are particularly concerned. NGOs working on trade, development, aid, racism/immigration, environmental and peace issues are increasingly networking amongst themselves, and increasingly challenging the institutions of global capitalism. These trends are discussed, whilst not over-looking the characteristics of the direct action wing of the movement.

According to Ekins (1992, 1), the global justice movement is a response to four crises: nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and military superfluity; hunger and poverty in the South; pollution and extinction of species; and human repression / lack of fundamental human rights. The conjunction of movements focused upon these issues in a struggle against the common enemy – neoliberalism – results in a trend toward the convergence of movements and a quest for democracy. Kriesberg (1997, 4) identifies four major trends that characterise the movement: growing democratisation; increasing global integration and communication (e.g. using ITCs); converging and diffusing values; and a proliferation of powerful transnational organisations.

Although 1970s activists borrowed ideas from their foreign contemporaries, they never went so far as to build a transnational/global movement. Cheaper flights and internet networks make it easier now easier to participate in transnational protests, and local instances of activism are more easily and quickly diffused. For example, tactics of direct action, sabotage, street blockades and carnivals employed by activist networks in Manchester have since become characteristic of the radical part of the global justice movement (Doherty 2000). The current movement appears to merge strands of previously existing movements, including anarcho-punks whose style was prevalent in the 1980s, radical environmentalists, trade unionists and the traditional left, aid and development and debt relief organisations, and (perhaps more marginally) environmental NGOs. The British movement has also been influenced by events in other parts of the world, especially by the Zapatistas, and there has been a diffusion of tactics across countries. The British white-overalled Wombles, for example, were inspired by the Italian Tute Bianche (‘white overalls’), although, as is often the case in instances of transnational diffusion, the Wombles’ tactical repertoire has developed differently from that of the resolutely non-violent Tute Bianche. Although Broad and Heckscher (2003, 726) draw on examples of movements from more remote history (particularly the anti-slavery movement and resistance to Reconstruction in the aftermath of the US civil war), they note the important fact that whilst

The events in Seattle [commonly believed to be the birth of a novel global justice movement] were, indeed momentous … they need to be understood as a new stage in a concatenation of historical processes and events, some of which are linked by direct threads, others of which are stitched together through more circuitous and longer historical trajectories.

36 In another neat demonstration that cultural diffusion rarely results in the simple replication of the original model on new territory, the Wombles refer to the source of their inspiration as ‘Tutti Bianche’ (= ‘all white’) rather than Tute Bianche (= ‘white overalls’).
Thus, this paper discusses the emergence of anti-capitalist and anti-globalist activist networks and organisations as a set of movements that have come together to form the British global justice movement, or as Tom Mertes (2004) calls it, ‘A Movement of Movements’. It is impossible to chart the action repertoire, organisational forms, ideology, alliance structure and conflict structure of this movement without detailing each of the movement’s tributaries. As one activist claims:

Our movement is like a river. A fractal network of converging … channels, defying straightforward analysis, and rising from a thousand distant sources (Tyler 2003, 195).

Whilst this summary may not give due credit to each of the channels, it attempts to focus on some of the key tributaries: anarcho-punk (1980s), radical environmentalism and DiY culture\(^{37}\) (1990s), trade union and employment issues (mid-1990s onwards), socialists, trade/aid and development NGOs (mid-1990s onwards), environmental NGOs, UK activist networks’ involvement in anti-capitalist/-globalisation protests, campaigns for immigrant rights, the recent resurgence of the anti-war/peace movement, and the evolving social centre and social forum movements.

At this stage of the development of the movement, with so many actors involved but few that are exclusively organisations of the movement, a felicitous outsider account must inevitably focus much attention on the campaigns and protest events by means of which the network that comprises the movement is made manifest. For that reason, the discussion that follows will offer accounts of those campaigns and protests, focussing especially upon those which have acquired iconic status for movement activists themselves.\(^{38}\)

### 2.2. 1983-1984: Anarcho punk

The British 1980s anarchist and punk movement developed ideas that emerged from the peace movement. Anarchists and punks were ‘lifestyle romantics’, proclaiming the virtues of squats and farming as achievable utopian lifestyle initiatives. However, British punks were most especially characterised by their disdain for authority: ‘Don’t give in to authority, make them give in to you’ (agit prop cited in Fox 1982). Their propaganda recommended sabotage such as jamming the locks of banks with superglue, and they achieved highest visibility during the Stop the City (STC) spectacles of 1983-4. These STC demonstrations were very similar to, and important precursors of, the J18 protest that

\(^{37}\) ‘DIY culture’ = ‘Do It Yourself culture’. The term refers to the allegedly ‘post-modern’ practice of cultural innovation and eclectic cultural borrowing. (See, e.g., McKay 1998).

\(^{38}\) There is as yet only a small scholarly literature on the global justice movement, and little systematic coverage in the mainstream press. Accordingly, and particularly in order to assemble a detailed account, it has been necessary to rely heavily upon activist sources. Although these are probably at least as reliable as other public sources for information about events, their interpretations of the significance of events, and especially of the motivations and actions of other actors are often inflected by particular allegiances and / or philosophies. This is perhaps most evident – and transparent – in the accounts of the policing of protest, which characteristically emphasise its repressive character whilst omitting to mention, or downplaying, the actions that provoked repressive policing. It is not necessary to suggest that policing measures were always proportionate to the actions of protesters in order to believe that activist accounts of such contentious and contested matters should be treated cautiously as the testimony of partisan observers rather than as unvarnished truth.
radical environmental activists instigated in 1999 (see below). Plows (2004, 97) observes that the literature written by STC could be easily mistaken for the communiqués issued by People’s Global Action (PGA) in the latter half of the 1990s:

The world we live in, the oppressions we suffer and perpetuate, are phenomenally complex. Class, feminist, race, anarchist and third-world experience and analyses of oppression are all valuable. The oppressions they name and seek to overturn interconnect and mutually reinforce … The struggle is at least as complex as the oppressions themselves. One potentially creative and constructive antidote is to form coalitions with those groups whose aims and methods we roughly share … (Editorial from Peace News, 1985, cited in Plows 2004, 97).

Moreover, some of the literature suggests that the same personnel may have been involved in STC as in the J18 action. London Greenpeace (an autonomous organisation, unrelated to Greenpeace International) claims to have been the initiator of the 1983-4 STC demonstrations. In that year, four separate street blockades of the City of London were organised, with one drawing at least 4,000 participants, causing 100 million pounds worth of damage, and resulting in 1,000 arrests (London Greenpeace 2004). These four demonstrations saw ‘thousands of anarchists, anti-militarists, peace punks, rebels and refuseniks lay siege to the City of London in a series of militant and angry demonstrations that demanded an end to war, profit, capitalism and oppression’ (RC No Sir 2001). The aim of the actions was to close down the City of London’s financial centre on the day quarterly profits were calculated, and to expose the economy of war and exploitation, using ‘disruptive, creative and destructive actions’ (No Sir 2001). At the time, much financial information was physically moved around the city by couriers, and so its carriage was easily disrupted. Like J18 fifteen years later, the STC actions involved a carnival atmosphere, processions and percussion, leaving in their wake smoke plumes from burning financial papers and piles of broken glass from the windows of city banks. Increasingly effective – and repressive – policing prompted the decision to make the fourth STC the last. Thereafter, attempts were made to carry out smaller decentralised actions with the aim of Stopping Business as Usual, although these were patchy, usually isolated stunts, and soon faded away.

London Greenpeace claims to have been one of the first groups to expose international financial institutions, and from the late 1980s began targeting the IMF and the World Bank (London Greenpeace, 2001). Opposition to international financial institutions was preceded by campaigns in the 1980s against privatisation of public services that escalated under GATT (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, precursor to the World Trade Organization) (Plows 2004, 98). The view of many activists, and the official line from most of the British media, was that nothing like the J18 protests had occurred

39 STC1 took place in September 1983, attracting between 1,000-3,000 participants. In March 1984, STC attracted up to 4,000. This was followed by STC3 in May, which was a much smaller operation involving just 500 activists who tried to keep the action secret so as to outsmart the police. The September 1984 protest attracted numbers in the low thousands and a massive and repressive police response. The police response to STC1 involved mass arrests, but overall policing was ineffective because they were caught off guard. By contrast, STC2 was greeted by a violent police response. By the time of ST4, only those activists who dressed up in smart city attire were able to break through the police cordon, and hundreds of people who looked like stereotypical protesters were arrested on sight.
previously. The Stop the City demonstrations indicate that, on the contrary, large number of anarchists were mobilised in the 1980s for riotous direct action of a similar kind, and also that targeting international financial institutions has been, at least for some, a longstanding project whose roots stretch way back before the ‘Battle of Seattle’. Punk’s anarchistic rejection of authoritarian structures continues to penetrate the direct action component of the British global justice movement. According to Graeber (2002, 62), ‘anarchism is the heart of the movement, its soul, the source of what’s new and hopeful about it’. Although it may not be ‘new’, the principles of anarchist organisation such as autonomy, disregard for authority, and bottom-up democracy have remained key to the movement.

2.3. 1992-1999: Radical environmentalism and ‘DiY culture’

Radical environmentalism has made a significant shift toward addressing capitalism as the root cause of ecological problems, and has increasingly recognised links between environmental and social concerns:

Increasing fusion of environmental (green) and social justice (economic concerns) within the anti-globalisation movement represents a radical transformation of green activism. Green politics can no longer be adequately addressed through specifically environmental concerns relating to the organic realm but has increasingly included human impacts. (Welsh 2004, 331. Cf. Rootes 2005)

Britain’s radical environmentalist ‘movement’ is a loosely knit network of activists, some of whom are affiliated to ‘organisations of sorts’, but ‘nomenclature does not necessarily help to distinguish these groups’ (Plows et al 2004, 199). Earth First!, Reclaim the Streets (RTS) and others overlap as do the affinity groups within them, and they are perhaps better characterised as ‘disorganisations’, ‘networks of networks’, or even as ‘projects’.

The radical environmental movement emerged in the early 1990s and took off in response to the British government’s road-building plans, first attracting significant attention at Twyford Down near Winchester where direct action camps were set up in an attempt to prevent the extension of the M3 motorway. Ecotage was carried out on several sites, and included trashing machinery, pouring sugar into petrol tanks and stabbing the tyres of security vehicles. Blockade techniques such as tree houses, ropeways, lock-ons and, later, tunnelling were also widely used. There was much tactical innovation in the direct action movement of the 1990s including modifying direct action repertoires to suit urban environments, resulting in roof top demonstrations, office occupations, disrupting Annual General Meetings of environmental villains and upsetting routine business at the outlets of pariah companies (Plows et al 2004). From 1998 onwards, there was a shift towards direct action at GM crop field trial sites that included symbolically or purposefully destroying these crops. ‘Environmental’ direct activists have also taken action against companies that produce arms, exploit the third world or are racist, branching out to address some of the broader issues of the global justice movement/s. Earth First! especially has become increasingly involved in ‘anti-globalisation’ and anti-war protests, and by no means limits its issue focus to ecology narrowly defined (Plows et al. 2004).

Reclaim the Streets (RTS), an important player in the British global justice movement in its early days, began as an Earth First! campaign in 1992 (Wall 1999, 63), later hosting street parties as part of the M11 roads protest in east London, and painting
cycle lanes on roads. The protest tactic of street reclaiming popularised by RTS in London has been widely emulated throughout the world and has become a feature of many summit protests and counter-summit events.\textsuperscript{40} After the M11 campaign, RTS shifted towards street parties as a form of protest against car culture and capitalism. Often this involved staging a car crash or erecting tripods to block roads, and reclaiming public space for parties that included free food, makeshift ‘beaches’ for children to play on, jugglers, fire spinners and a sound system or two. The advent of RTS represents a shift in the ideology of radical environmentalists to a more direct attack upon capitalism:

\begin{quote}
We are basically about taking back public space from the enclosed arena. At its simplest, it is an attack on cars as a principal agent of enclosure. It’s about reclaiming the streets as public inclusive space from the private exclusive use of the car. But we believe in this as a broader principle, taking back those things which have been enclosed within capitalist circulation and returning them to collective use as commons (RTS Agit prop, cited in Chesters 1998).
\end{quote}

Chesters (1999) notes how the radical environmental movement has ‘increasingly displayed an “antagonistic” or “intemperate” approach towards the normative system of production, distribution, exchange and consumption’. An RTS activist in 1999, for example, reminded his/her fellow activists that ‘we have to remember to go for the heart of the beast, which is capitalism itself’. The J18 action identified capitalism as ‘the root of our social and ecological problems’ (Notes from Nowhere 2004, 184).

The radical environmental movement can be viewed of as part of a DiY culture (Purdue et al 1997, 1999; McKay 1998) that grew with resistance to the Criminal Justice Bill and formed the backbone of the street-party-carnival protest culture that was eventually to evolve into the British direct action contingent of the global justice movement (Donson et al 2004). Chesters (1999) argues that the Criminal Justice Bill was the catalyst for interaction between groups which otherwise might have taken far longer to identify a common interest, or indeed might never have done so. In 1994, \textit{SchNEWS} \textsuperscript{41} went so far as to write a thank you letter to Michael Howard, the Home Secretary responsible for the Bill, for providing activists with an issue about which to build a diverse grassroots movement.

Effectively, the Bill brought together networks of travellers, hunt saboteurs, squatters, environmental protesters and ravers, all of whose activities it curtailed. Section 60 (1) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act gives police officers the right to stop and search people if a superintendent judges that serious violence is likely to break out. Section 68 forbids trespass and interfering with land or property for illegal activity, travellers’ sites were restricted to a maximum of six vehicles, and unlicensed parties playing music with ‘a repetitive beat’ were outlawed. The criminalization of many strands of youth culture created a pool of frustrated and alienated young people. Chesters (1999) believes that this resulted in ‘the dynamic, proactive and diverse synergy of groups,

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{40} Even in Britain, there is nothing particularly original about RTS’s tactics. RTS has precedents at least as early as the action by Young Liberals in central London in 1971 (Wall 1999, 29). ‘In 1979, friends of the Earth marshalled a coalition of cycling and transport campaign groups to mount a 6,000-strong bike rally in Trafalgar Square that went on to “Reclaim the Roads” by filling Whitehall with cyclists…” (Lamb 1996, 95). Other local pedestrian demonstrations under ‘Reclaim the Streets’ banners followed in a number of towns and cities.

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{SchNEWS} is a direct action newsletter that was founded to report on resistance to the Criminal Justice Bill.
\end{footnotesize}
organisations and individuals which manifested itself on June 18th [J18’]. RTS can therefore be regarded as the product of a synergy of youth cultures.\(^{42}\)

2.4. Post 1995

2.4.1. Trade Unions and employment issues\(^{43}\)

Since 1995, the direct action movement and workers have linked their struggles, with both defining them as a side effect of corporate globalisation. RTS has supported the striking dockworkers of Merseyside and striking tube workers (see Rootes and Saunders 2005). For anti-roads protesters, linking with social issues was a corollary of a more general shift towards blaming capitalism for the ills giving rise to various types of struggles:

the power that attacks workers through union legislation and casualisation, is the same power that attacks the planet with over-production and consumption of resources; the power that produces 4 million cars a year is the same power that attacks workers through the disempowerment of the unions. This power is capital.’ (SchNEWS 2004a, 95)

As secondary picketing and sympathy striking had been outlawed in Britain, the Liverpool dockers’ strike that began in 1995 received minimal support (other than financial donations) from other British dockworkers and trade unionists. Instead, they turned their attention to building solidarity with dockworkers in other countries, and with the radical direct action movement. According to SchNEWS, the dispute ‘… brought together several issues at once from working class communities to globalisation and labour casualisation’ (Schnews 2004a).\(^{44}\)

In September 1996, the dockworkers demonstrated and held workshops to mark the first anniversary of their lockout in collaboration with Reclaim the Future, an alliance of direct action protesters including anti-roads protesters, Kurdish groups, RTS and animal rights activists, and trade unionists. Although the union asked dockworkers to distance themselves from anarchists, both dockworkers and direct action movement activists declared themselves pleased to be working in alliance (Tash 1996). In April 1997, an RTS Social Justice march in support of the Liverpool dockworkers and other strikers attracted several thousand protesters, and ended with a street party in Trafalgar Square (Jordan 1998). At these marches and workshops, links were made between labour issues and others such as the plight of the homeless, asylum seekers, pensioners and the environment. The solidarity between Liverpool dockers and other activists of various persuasions reflects the nature of modern autonomous left coalitions, that exist ‘in most towns and cities … [and] come together across party and organisational boundaries around major issues of the day’ (Wainwright 1995, 93).

\(^{42}\) Lancaster RTS, for example, consisted of local green activists, free party organisers, the marginalized/excluded, travellers, free party goers and others (Chesters and Clarke 1998).

\(^{43}\) Recent developments in the British labour movement are discussed in some detail in Rootes and Saunders (2005). In order to minimize duplication, the discussion here is limited to those aspects essential to understanding the complexities of the GJM in Britain.

\(^{44}\) For a more detailed account of this dispute, see Rootes and Saunders 2005.
One effect of the dockers dispute has been to widen the politics of the direct action movement. In January 1999, RTS occupied the offices of London Underground Ltd to protest against its privatisation and in solidarity with Underground workers. As well as privatisation, the direct action movement has become increasingly concerned with labour flexibilization and casualization, and ‘precarity’ was a major theme of the Wombles-organized radical autonomous alternative to the European Social Forum in London, October 2004. Corporate abuse and flexible work regimes are claimed by some to have brought unity between new social movements and the working class (Dale 2001, 369).

The issues were brought even closer to home for the direct action movement when, in 1998, Schnews volunteer journalist Simon Jones died in a work-related accident on his first day of casual employment. His friends and family immediately launched a campaign against casual labour (The Simon Jones Memorial Campaign), claiming his death was not an accident, but was instead a side effect of casualization, a process that forces workers to accept skilled jobs at low wages without adequate training. Jones’ death has been followed up with legal challenges against the company he worked for and the employment agency that recruited him. The failure of the trade unions and the left to mobilize around the issue has stimulated direct action, including the scaling of a crane at the docks, occupying offices of the Department of Trade and Industry and the employment agency, and protesting outside the Health and Safety Executive headquarters.

Although viewed by most commentators as a part of the global justice movement (Dale 2001, RTS Agit-prop etc.), socialist and trade union organisations remain distinct because of their limited internal democracy and their hierarchical structures as well as their industrial focus. There is, in particular, a conflict between the hierarchical decision-making structure of trade unions and the SWP, with their preference for centrally organised mass marches, on the one hand, and the direct action movement that prefers autonomous direct actions, on the other. In particular, the direct action movement is hostile towards the SWP, which it regards as an ineffective, reformist organisation that has attempted to hijack the grassroots anti-capitalist movement in the interests of promoting itself. Having created ‘fronts’ to capitalise on apparently growing contemporary concerns and to keep the Party alive, the SWP is notorious in activist circles for jumping on new movements, using them as platforms from which to recruit, dominating and weakening them, and then moving on to another issue or movement to repeat the process. Its front organisations include No Sweat, the Stop the War Coalition, and Globalise Resistance, nicknamed ‘monopolise resistance’ by critics in the direct action movement (Schnews 2001). Despite its ill repute amongst direct activists, Globalise Resistance claims, at least, to have brought together two overlapping constituencies: those who sympathise with anti-globalisation but who are not already part of a direct action network, or who find direct action networks inaccessible/unwelcoming; and those from the old Labour constituency who are disillusioned with the rhetoric and practice of New Labour (Callinicos 2001).

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45 A Liverpool dockers activist observed that ‘a few years ago it would have been workers coming out that shut the dock, not protesters going in’ (Schnews 2004b).
2.4.2. Trade, aid and development organisations

Raghu and Skanthakumar (2001, 16) point out that campaigns against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services, and the Jubilee 2000 coalition were amongst the important precursors to the British wing of the global justice movement. These were preceded by an international campaign against the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations under GATT in which British organisations including Christian Aid, Oxfam, Action Aid, the Catholic Institute for International Relations and the World Development Movement (WDM) played a role (Wilkinson 1996, 254).

In 1997, the implications of the MAI came to the attention of British NGOs, who were concerned that it would give disproportionate power to transnational corporations (Bray 1998). The MAI’s aims were to create uniform rules on market access and legal security, to remove barriers to investment flows, increase employment, and improve living standards. It would have given corporations the power to prosecute states in international courts for limiting investments or capital flows without good reason. Trade NGOs were especially concerned that protection of local markets, and peoples’ health and their environment would not be considered sufficient reasons to restrict trade agreements that threatened them (Farnsworth 2004, 60). The campaign involved WDM, Oxfam, WWF, Northeast England Greens, FoE, Corporate Watch, UNISON, Christian Aid and others, bringing together a broad range of religious, environmental, trade union and development/aid organisations, mirroring the range of interests that the global justice movement was developing. Corporate Watch pondered presciently: ‘could the MAI-campaign be the start of a deeper inquiry into the global economy?’ (Corporate Watch 1998). It can, indeed, be viewed as a springboard from which wider and deeper critiques of the workings of the global economy were launched. The campaign involved conventional lobbying, with WDM kick-starting an extensive letter writing campaign, through to direct action by Corporate Watch, which occupied the offices of the International Chamber of Commerce in London, a lobbying group that was actively supporting the MAI. The organisations involved in this network moved on, as part of a network of NGOs dotted around the globe, to critiquing the WTO and GATS.

Jubilee 2000 grew out of the British Debt Crisis Network that was led by the New Economics Foundation, Christian Aid and WDM. By lobbying, these organisations managed to secure some improvements in the World Bank and IMF debt policies through Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiatives (1996), yet this resulted in only small trickles of aid that hardly touched the debt burdens of the poorest countries, and which were difficult to implement due to resistance by creditor countries. The lack of progress persuaded NGOs concerned with trade that the issues needed a higher public profile. In April 1996, the Trade Crisis Network began taking the coalition forward, with some tentative support from CAFOD and Tearfund. In October 1997, the formal coalition was launched with over 70 supporting NGOs including trade unions, many international aid organisations, women’s organisations and the Green Party. According to Peters (2000), the main players in Britain have been Christian Aid, CAFOD, the Methodist Church Division of Social Responsibility, the United Society for the Propagation of Gospel, the Church Missionary Society, Oxfam,

46 Corporate Watch keeps a watchful eye on the workings of corporations, especially where they have vested interests or negative effects (Plows 2004, 99).
WDM, Save the Children, the International Labour Organisation and the New Economics Foundation. The initial priority of Jubilee 2000 was to ensure that unpayable debts were written off by 31st December 1999 and that all other debts were reduced to levels that would allow sustainable human, environmental and economic development (Pettifor 1998, 121). The campaign has been guided by religious principles and human rights concerns, the need to remove imbalances, and opposition to usury (Pettifor 2001, 48). It is the coalition’s critique of the G8, IMF and World Bank as contributors to the debt problem that assimilates the anti-debt movement to a broader movement that critiques international financial institutions, the agenda of neoliberalism and lack of democracy within international financial institutions. Indeed, in 1998, the participants in Jubilee 2000’s symbolic human chain action, timed to coincide with a G8 meeting in Birmingham, came from a range of NGOs and radical activist networks that are part of the broader movement. Jubilee (in 2001 it dropped the suffix ‘2000’ and became the Jubilee Debt Campaign) continues to campaign for the removal of debts, and to attend protests at G8 summits, including at Prague in 2000, where it raised its concerns about the IMF’s relaxed conditions on its debt scheme (Ford & Poolos 2000).

The Trade Justice Movement (http://tjm.org.uk/) was established in 2002 by a small steering group drawn from some 40 British aid NGOs large and small to campaign ‘for fundamental change to unjust rules and institutions governing international trade, so that trade is made to work for all’. Consciously emulating the form of the Jubilee 2000 campaign, the TJM was formed as a result of inter-organisational discussions about how best to influence the UK government’s stance during and after the Doha round of trade negotiations. Thus the TJM campaigned to persuade the government not to sign the free trade agreement on foreign investment proposed at the WTO meeting in Cancún. It again came to prominence when 25,000 people participated in its all-night vigil outside Parliament on 15 April 2005 in the lead-up to World Poverty Action Day. Describing itself as a ‘fast growing group of organisations’, it was in April 2005 a coalition of 66 organisations including trade, aid and development charities, churches, trade unions, and student and environmental organisations.

The Make Poverty History (MPH) coalition is more prominent and more inclusive. Bringing together nearly 400 British NGOs including the Jubilee Debt Campaign, the TJM, and a host of other charities, campaigns, trade unions, faith groups, student unions and celebrities, MPH campaigns for, ‘in nine words: trade justice, drop the debt, more and better aid’. Like the TJM, which includes a prominent link to MPH on its website, the organisers of MPH believe that, because the UK will be hosting the G8 summit (at which poverty in Africa is a key theme), and holding the chair of the EU Presidency, 2005 provides an unprecedented opportunity to tackle trade, aid and debt issues. MPH seeks to emulate Jubilee 2000’s 1998 action, but on a much larger scale, by rallying at least 200,000 people in Edinburgh immediately prior to the July 2005 G8 meeting (Make Poverty History Coalition 2005). Although there is considerable overlap between MPH, TJM and Jubilee, the sheer scale of MPH by comparison with Jubilee is testimony to the growth and breadth of the movement.

47 For example, the IMF expected to receive at least $600 million more from Africa in 1998 than it gave it in 1997.

48 The high number of organisational affiliates to MPH is not simply an artefact of its having less rigorous collective membership criteria than the other two coalitions. To the contrary, the collective membership
2.4.3. Attac in Britain

ATTAC was launched in Britain in November 2001 following a public meeting in London’s Conway Hall convened by Friends of Le Monde diplomatique and the London School of Economics ATTAC Society. Approximately 200 people attended, and reached consensus that the most effective means of launching ATTAC in Britain would be to create a network of autonomous local ATTAC groups supported by a central website to which all local ATTAC groups would contribute. As a result, ATTAC Britain is not an organisation but is a website that provides information and an internet forum for local ATTAC groups and interested members of the public. According to ATTAC Britain (2005):

You can think of it as a large house, with many bedrooms for local groups, as well as a kitchen, a library, and so on, which are meant to be shared. It has been created by volunteers, in the hope that it will be useful to local groups both individually and collectively.

Here's the rationale: by working on an online library together, we can build a broader, more coherent library than each group could provide individually; the result can be a more useful resource for self-education. By sharing a calendar and a newswire, we can make it easy for the public to find out what all of us are doing. There are publicly-archived mailing lists (and we can create more as needed); these can help us coordinate our efforts on campaigns, even if we're widely geographically dispersed, and provide a permanent record of our discussions, making us more transparent as organisations. Of course, we can share online resources even if each group also chooses to have its own web site.

ATTAC Britain is, unlike its French and German counterparts, a marginal player in the global justice movement. Although the website lists active groups in Jersey, London, the London School of Economics, Oxford, and University College London, only those in Jersey and London have websites that are reachable through the ATTAC Britain hub. Jersey is a well-known tax haven, which according to Jersey ATTAC has ‘had a hugely detrimental effect on local culture, economics and politics, and the natural environment.’ Jersey ATTAC campaigns actively for the abolition of tax havens, and claims that the GBP 85 million lost to tax havens each year in Britain should be spent instead on improving public services and infrastructure. London ATTAC too campaigns against tax havens, but also against privatisation of public services and the downgrading of state pensions, and for curtailment of the power of financial markets.

criteria for MPH are actually more stringent than those for TJM and JDC: JDC requires merely commitment to its aims and principles, and willingness to support the campaign; TJM insists that affiliated organisations must agree with its principles, not be a political party, and not have its membership opposed by any of its own organisation’s members; and MPH asks that affiliates agree to promote MPH, agree with the principles, respect the coordination team’s decisions, not engage in any illegal activity under the banner of MPH, not be a political party or profit-making body, have no members opposing the affiliation, not be involved directly or indirectly in violence, and not be intolerant to people on the basis of ethnicity, gender, disability, sexual orientation or religion. Interestingly, TJM is listed among the 387 affiliates of MPH (as at 17/05/05).
2.4.4. Environmental NGOs

Increasingly, British environmental movement organisations (EMOs) see themselves as part of a global movement dealing with global issues. This is not, for EMO elites themselves, a radical departure so much as an incremental development of already existing perspectives and aspirations. The main driver toward the transnationalization of the British environmental movement has been EMOs’ broader and more sophisticated understanding of the complex and interrelated issues entailed by effective action on issues of central concern. Another is the changing pattern of opportunities as national governments have yielded sovereignty on environmental issues to transnational organizations, most notably the EU. Such changed circumstances represent a new pattern of constraints rather than simply the lure of opportunity; British EMOs have to address transnational institutions because that, on many issues, is where critical decisions are now made. But action at the transnational level generally remains secondary to their national activities because the transnational arenas and the actors in them are less familiar and less accessible, because the costs of sustained action at transnational level are daunting even for relatively well-resourced EMOs, and because the most efficacious route to transnational arenas is still often via national governments (Rootes 2004).

Since the early 1990s, there has, nevertheless, been increased transnationalization in the coordination of EMOs in transnational networks of various kinds. Greenpeace, FoE and WWF were, of course, transnational from the beginning, and their British branches have in each case played a leading role (and still do in the cases of FoE and WWF), but even such a national institution as RSPB has developed a transnational role though its initiation and sponsorship of Birdlife International (Rootes 2005).

As well as becoming increasingly international in scope and having greater need to challenge international decision-making structures, most major British EMOs recognise that transnational capital and markets contribute significantly to environmental degradation. FoE in particular has made a significant shift towards embracing issues of social inequity and global trade, and its main campaign themes for 2003-2008 are environmental justice, sustainable economies, environmental limits and accountability/participation. The environmental justice theme aims to make considerations of social equity central to the way the public and decision-makers view environmental issues. It incorporates a campaign for ‘climate justice’, seeking an equitable climate change treaty, and ‘action for justice’, working with community groups suffering from injustices. The aim of the sustainable economies theme is to develop a sustainable economic agenda at both technical and public levels. This incorporates an attempt to ‘curb the power of the supermarkets’, by ensuring they are made accountable for their social and environmental impacts, and by promoting local alternatives, and, most significantly in the present context, to ‘derail the WTO’ by challenging its legitimacy, preventing its expansion, and halting the liberalisation of its services. Other aspects of new economics include ‘corporate accountability’, which involves highlighting socially and environmentally damaging corporate practices and seeking to introduce a new regulatory framework, and ‘reducing resource use’, which will expose the impacts of UK resource consumption on the environment, oppose unsustainable waste disposal, and promote zero waste policies. Accountability/participation seeks to improve the quality and quantity of grassroots campaigning in and outside FoE (FoE 2002a, Saunders 2005). FoE claims to be concerned about global trade because of its abuse
of democracy, threats to human rights, disregard for the environment, and encouragement of a growing gap between the rich and the poor.

FoE has also been actively campaigning alongside those NGOs in the trade/aid/development lobby over GATS, which it was concerned would override nation states’ abilities to enforce their own environmental legislation. FoE asked its members to write letters to their MPs to complain about the lack of democracy in the GATS negotiations, and petitioned Members of the European Parliament (FoE 2002b). In September 2003, FoE campaigners visited Prime Minister Blair, asking him to restrict the agenda of the WTO meeting in Cancún, Mexico, and accusing him of being ‘in the pocket’ of big businesses (FoE 2003). FoE was also centrally involved in the coordination of a ‘trade justice march’ timed to coincide with the Geneva WTO meeting in June 2002, which attracted 5,000 people, most of them supporters of NGOs such as FoE and Oxfam. FoE was also, for a while, locked in battle with the WTO over its claim that the EU’s restrictions on the import of genetically modified food were an illegal constraint on trade.

Representatives from FoE EWNI (England, Wales and Northern Ireland) and Greenpeace UK have for some time participated in international environmental and economic conferences, joining in the ‘summit hopping’ seen in the direct action global justice movement. At the COP conference (Conference to the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) at the Hague in 1997, campaigners from FoE ENWI helped to build a huge sand bag dyke to raise awareness of the effects of climate change. Greenpeace campaigners were there too, and allegedly branded the eco-activist networks that were campaigning against the Kyoto Treaty as ‘anarchists who should not be listened to’ (Saunders 2005). Whilst both reformist EMOs such as FoE and Greenpeace, and radicals like Rising Tide, which was formed at the Hague summit, are all part of a broader movement, there is more than a little ambivalence in relations between them.49 Whilst Tony Juniper (currently director of FoE ENWI) was apparently impressed with the scale of the demonstration in Seattle against the WTO, and the broad range of interests it mobilized, FoE is careful, like Jubilee, not to get involved in the ruckus that is often the outcome of large-scale international demonstrations. According to Sheila Freeman (post and volunteers coordinator at FoE ENWI) FoE has become:

Very interested in the anti-capitalist/globalisation … issue. In fact that has been the basis of some of our big campaigns … [But] Friends of the Earth are of course very wary of throwing rocks at windows and getting lots of police out and any of that sort of thing, and as a big organisation, I think they have to be. (Freeman, interview with Clare Saunders, February 2004)

2.4.5. Zapatistas trigger consciousness and shape movement discourse

The Zapatista rebellion has been a source of inspiration for many British activists. Subcomandante Marcos struck a chord when he declared that the movement did not want to seize the power of the state, but rather wanted its communities to control their own lives, and to encourage others to do the same:

49 Nevertheless, some Rising Tide (RT) activists have been directly involved in Greenpeace local groups, one RT activist works for FoE, and there has been fairly extensive cooperation between FoE and RT in their establishment of the No New Oil coalition.
We want a world in which there are many worlds, a world in which our world, and the worlds of others will fit: a world in which we are heard, but as one of many voices (quoted in Roddick 2001, 118).

[the movement’s] result will not be the victory of a party, an organisation or an alliance of triumphant organisations with their own specific social proposal, but rather a democratic space for resolving the confrontation of various political proposals (Zapatista communiqué 20/1/94, quoted in Chesters 2004, 8).

Awareness of the Zapatista rebellion spread to Britain from 1994 onwards, and became an entrenched part of the discourse of some British radical activists as a result of their attendance at Intercontinental Encuentros Against Neoliberalism and for Humanity conferences held in Chiapas, Mexico in 1996 and Spain in 1997. These conferences were gatherings of movements from across the globe, including the Brazilian landless, Italian autonomists and British direct action protesters. The overall theme of these was opposition to neo-liberalism, and the sub-themes of culture, education, information, land rights, ecology and labour were discussed. British EF! and RTS activists were also amongst the tens of thousands of Zapatista supporters who attended the 16-day tour with the Zapatistas from Chiapas to Mexico City in spring 2001 (Chesters 2002).

In Britain, as elsewhere, most of the movement does not seek to seize state power, but instead seeks direct democracy through horizontality, exercising power from below ‘and rights like those of access to social resources beyond the market and of people’s mobility in a world without barriers’ (De Angelis 2001). The experiences and energies generated by anarchists, punks, eco-activists, RTS protesters, trade unionists, trade justice and environmental NGOs, and the sharing of concerns with indigenous movements across the globe, laid the foundations for the ‘summit hopping’ spectacles that were to follow, and for which the movement has become (in)famous.

### 2.4.6. Prisons and no borders

Although there have been campaigns for the rights of immigrants for a number of years in Britain, in the late 1990s direct action activists took up the issue and, for the first time, attributed the problem to the global capitalist system. At the EF! Summer Gathering in Suffolk in August 1999, a new network called CAGE was formed to build a network of resistance against what was called ‘the prison state’. This network was motivated by activists’ awareness of the enforcement of increasingly repressive legislation against protesters and petty criminals, resulting in expanding numbers of prison sentences. Most of CAGE’s actions have focussed upon ‘UK arms fairs [involvement in the Disarm DSEi network, see below] … mental health detention … resistance to prison building and fighting immigration detention’. It has held direct action protest camps at prison building sites (including occupation of cranes and machinery), and on land set aside for prison development. One protester sees direct links between ‘confronting the prison system’ and ecological direct action:

50 This is not an acronym, but was devised as a working title for the network that was never changed.
... action against the prison system is not very different from action against roads – it’s about stopping the same processes, in similar ways. We’re even up against some of the same [construction] corporations. (VER 2000f)

Although many organisations have been working on prison-based issues for many years, including the Anarchist Black Cross, Campaign Against Racism and Fascism, and hundreds of prisoner support groups, CAGE claims to be one of the first to view the issue of prisons in the context of resistance to economic globalization, informed by an analysis of prisons as part of a ‘prison-industrial-complex’ because of their role in extracting cheap labour, and because they are, increasingly, run as privatised capitalist ventures.

CAGE has also become part of an international network of groups protesting about the politics of and conditions within immigration reception centres. It regularly joins the Close Campsfield Campaign’s monthly demonstrations. Activists sympathise with refugees and regard them as yet another symptom of the capitalist system. A 2002 edition of *Schnews*, the direct action movement’s most popular weekly newsletter, opened with the quote:

Wars, environmental exploitation, poverty, economic conditions, dictatorships, all of these situations create refugees. The cause of refugees … is capitalism. (Osaren, The Voice Refugee Forum, Germany).

In addition to attributing the cause of refugees to capitalism, no borders activists also blame capitalism for the apparent ill-treatment of immigrants, many of whom are forced to leave home just to survive. On arrival here instead of help they get interned in prisons such as Campsfield House, run for profit by private security business … [such as Group 4]. (W@ 2001).

Other local No Borders groups, such as Brighton No Borders have protested outside local refugee detention centres, or even illegally breeched barbed wire fences in order to meet with refugees and offer their sympathies. In Brighton, activists have carried out direct action to prevent the departure of flights carrying deported immigrants, and have set up a Migrant English Project at their Cowley social centre that offers support, advice, English lessons and voluntary work for immigrants (*Schnews* 2004c).

London’s No Borders Network also supports actions at detention centres, but campaigns too against the voucher system, and against racist corporate media (*Daily Mail*) campaigns against asylum seekers. London activists were amongst those involved in the international No Border camp at Strasbourg in 2002 and have joined other demonstrations outside refugee camps across the Channel. This group sees itself as part of a broader anti-racism campaign.

The theme of ‘no borders’ and sympathy for refugees is growing in the direct action movement, so much so that it became one of six themes at the London Wombles-organised Beyond ESF in October 2004. The Wombles have been involved in the campaigns to close down Campsfield detention centre, and chose to remain in the UK to engage with campaigns for immigrants’ rights rather than join protests at the G8 summit in Genoa in 2001.

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51 Campsfield is an immigration centre notorious for alleged human rights abuses and profiteering.
2.5. The new Millennium

2.5.1. Days of actions, and protests at summits and counter-summits

Although the ‘movement’ includes formal NGOs, the summits and days of action that have come to characterise it are organised on a decentralised basis, and are mostly dominated by radical or autonomous organisations/networks. NGOs from the environmental and trade/aid/development movements have taken a more staid role involving formal participation in summits or the holding of separate actions and stunts. For example, although Jubilee 2000 took part in the protests against the IMF and World Bank in Prague, 2000, because it was concerned about violence it was careful to remove its supporters before the main demonstration began (Ford & Poolos, 2000, 215). Unlike formal coalitions of NGOs, the protest events are organised in an unstructured manner by radical activists, and are coordinated largely through email lists, web postings and meetings. Internet sites like Indymedia and Urban75 and email discussion lists allow the activist community to come together in virtual space to discuss propositions, coordinate actions, and share experiences (Atton 2003). Convergence centres near the protest site are designed to allow protesters to meet and to hone their ideas for action.

With the exception of May Day actions, it is difficult to untangle many academic and activist accounts of these high profile days of actions to reveal the actions and ideas of purely British activists. This account may therefore reproduce the tendency to conflate British and foreign actions. This is partly justified because the international days of actions are important for shaping British activists’ local and national political projects. They provide opportunities for them to reflect on tactics and strategies, to share and learn skills, and to express solidarity with activists from other countries (Chesters 2004, 3). The other problem faced when relaying events based on secondary literature (or even others’ first-hand observations) is that the narratives often reflect the events as seen through the participants’ or observers’ eyes, are to varying and indeterminate degrees idiosyncratic, and can never present the full picture. To keep the story relatively concise, this section focuses only on a sample of the global justice movement’s days of action. There have been many more parallel summits and ‘riots’ across the globe than those outlined below, but the focus here is upon those summits abroad which appear to have attracted a significant number of British activists, or which represent solidarity actions within Britain.

Protests at international summits of multi-lateral economic institutions (notably the World Bank, IMF, NATO, G7/G8, WTO, United Nations and EU) and parallel summits have become increasingly frequent. The protests raise issues regarding the undemocratic nature of these institutions and the social and environmental implications of the neo-liberal policies that they promote (Pianta 2001). They attract protesters from across the globe, including British contingents. However, British participants are likely to participate in higher numbers the closer the summit is to home. We shall therefore focus on the Birmingham G8 protests of May 1998, the J18 ‘Carnival of Resistance’ (June 18th 1999), solidarity actions in London on November 30th (to coincide with the ‘Battle of Seattle’), S26 in Prague (26 September 2000), and the London May Day protests in 2001, 2002 and 2003.
2.5.1.1. The G8 meeting, Birmingham, May 1998

In May 1998 70,000 people, including bishops, middle class individuals and radical environmental protesters, formed a human chain around the city of Birmingham in an action called by Jubilee 2000 to raise the profile of the issue of debt in the G8 discussions that were hosted there (Anheier et al. 2001, 331). In preceding weeks, the New Economics Foundation organised several days of meetings and workshops called the Peoples Summit to spread awareness of debt issues and the role of the G8. Christian Aid brought together activists from indebted nations to join in the protest to represent the Poor Eight – Jamaica, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Bangladesh, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique and Ethiopia. Jubilee 2000 used a church with a capacity of 800, but the participants spilled out into surrounding gardens and car parks to hear speakers who included UNISON’s General Secretary, keynotes from a range of organisations including the African Liberation Support Campaign, Tear Fund, Christian Aid, WDM, New Economics Foundation, and a handful of politicians including Clare Short (at the time Secretary of State for International Development) (Pettifor 1998, 116). A street party followed, organised, with some help from London RTS, by a small group of radical activists. To the dismay of most of those attending, several partygoers helped themselves to fruit and vegetables from a market stall and began throwing it at the police, who were provoked into shutting down the party, bringing it to a much less happy, and much earlier, end than planned (Trapese 2005).

Some of the organisers of the Jubilee 2000 human chain action were bitter about the apparent lack of cooperation from the street party organisers, regarding them as direct competitors for support, and expressing concern that the street party would ruin the integrity of their action. According to the street party organisers, Jubilee 2000 had pressured at least one of the bands that was due to play to pull out. Although a minority of Jubilee 2000 staff realised the street party organisers shared the same politics (some even attended the party), most believed the police warning that the party would be a public safety crisis intended to sabotage the Jubilee 2000 action, and attempts to publicise the street party during the Jubilee 2000 action were banned. This was despite a conscious effort made by street party organisers to choose a time and location that would not disrupt the Jubilee 2000 action, and to encourage people to attend it before going to the party (Trapese 2005).

2.5.1.2. J18 Carnival of Resistance, June 18th 1999

On June 18th 1999, 10,000 people converged in the heart of the City of London to attend London’s contribution to the ‘global’ J18 ‘Carnival of Resistance and International Day of Action’. The key organisations involved in both the London protest, and in spreading the message globally via internet networks, were RTS, EF! and London Greenpeace (Notes from Nowhere, 2004, 184). The day began with a blockade of London Bridge, and a critical mass demonstration that significantly slowed down the progress of City workers on their way to work, pickets by animal rights activists at McDonalds outlets, and a Campaign Against the Arms Trade action where activists covered in fake-blood staged a ‘die-in’ outside a branch of Lloyds Bank (Lancaster J18 Collective 1999, Tyler 2004, 191). The main action involved a partially successful colour coded march, followed by a convergence in the centre of the City. The march split into four ‘blocs’ all headed for the London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) building, the largest international finance centre in the world. Whilst most in the crowd were enjoying the
impromptu street party and dancing to the samba band, sound systems and punk bands, a minority of protesters sought to occupy and close down the LIFFE building. The building was physically damaged, many windows were smashed and the lower entrance was bricked up. The LIFFE stopped trading after a ‘sustained physical and cyber attack’ (Chesters 1999) the aftermath of which was reminiscent of the 1980s STC actions. The ground floor of the building was flooded when protesters disrupted a water hydrant to the delight of those revellers who danced under its cool fountain (Tyler 2003, 118). The policing was less than restrained. One activist recalls how:

… the police rioted … Wails of distant sirens merged with cries of distress and anger. A slow motion choreography of rising and falling batons, cracked heads, and dripping red faces, played out around me (Tyler 2003, 194).

Seventy-six people were arrested for the part they had played in the J18 protests, and 46 were injured in scuffles with the police.

2.5.1.3. N30 Solidarity actions in London, November 30th 1999
N30, the 30th November 1999 protest which has become (in)famous as the date of the ‘battle of Seattle’, called for a global day of action, resistance and carnival ‘in recognition that the capitalist system, based on exploitation of people, societies and the environment for the profit of a few, is the prime cause of present social and ecological troubles’ (VER 2000e). In Britain, activists occupied Lloyds Bank and a Nestlé factory, and organised a rally and street party at Euston tube station against the privatisation of public transport. Approximately 2,000 protesters attended and were met yet again with what activist sources describe as heavy-handed policing.52

2.5.1.4. S26, IMF and World Bank meeting, Prague, September 26th 2000
The action in Prague against the IMF and the World Bank (26-28 September 2000) has been described as ‘the biggest self-generated mobilisation of British people to a political situation in another country since the Spanish War’ (Schnews 2004d, 197). It took place before the SWP and its front organisation Globalise Resistance had jumped on the bandwagon, and this helps to explain why more British direct activists, most of whom disdain Globalise Resistance, attended this action than any subsequent summit protest (Schnews 2004d, 197). The action was planned by INPEG (Initiative Against Globalization), a coalition consisting mostly of American and British activists, with a sprinkling of Czechs (Voices from Ecological Resistance [VER] 2000a). The plan was to devise three marches taking different routes to the conference centre. British activists, mostly Earth First!ers and RTS activists, designed themselves a fourth route. Socialists and trotskyites dressed in pink, Ya Basta in yellow, the anarchist/autonomist / black bloc in blue, and the 500 British activists wore pink and silver (VER 2000a).

52 As in most of these cases, what activists describe as heavy-handed policing, others have described as firm but restrained policing proportionate to the challenge or threat as assessed from intelligence reports. Since there are no neutral sources, it is impossible to judge, but it does seem very likely that at least some activists went to such protests prepared to offer violence or provocation to the police. In the N30 protests, for example, a police van was incinerated.
The British bloc called itself ‘Tactical Frivolity’, an idea originating with women activists from Lancashire, Yorkshire and the southwest of England. The aim of the action was to be purposefully non-violent, wearing pink and silver clothing that provided no protection. It was not just a passive blockade, but ‘active non-violence’ that included polishing police officer’s boots with luminous pink feather dusters. This bloc symbolised resistance to ‘machismo and violence’ as much as to neo-liberalism (Farnsworth 2004, 68).

Pink and silver march agit prop explained:

We are a colourful party in the street, a carnival with theatre, pink fairies and radical cheer leaders, clowns and music, a creative, magical and confrontational dance that takes decisions in a horizontal nature through affinity groups. We want to reduce aggressivity to the minimum with imagination, samba, art. Playing with space and the police, to create a relaxed atmosphere with good vibes. While we dance, we denounce the brutality of capitalism, patriarchy, racism and all the forms of oppression and domination, denying any legitimacy to those eight men who meet as if the world belonged to them and they could exploit and destroy at their will … Our strategy: Tactical Frivolity, Our identification: Pink and silver. (cited in Chesters and Welsh 2004, 331)

The march was organised by consensus decision-making. When the marchers were unsure of the route, a flag with a picture of a confused fish was hoisted, and affinity group delegates had to find out what decision needed making, head back to their groups, discuss it, and then reach a decision (VER 2000c).

The playful strategies of Tactical Frivolity are part of a general trend towards greater use of harmlessly mischievous and comical tactics in direct action networks (Chesters 2000). The recently established Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army (CIRCA) rebels against state surveillance, believes in improvised forms of action, seeks to transform the lives of participants, dresses up as clowns, and fights for life and the environment in what it views as a ‘war against capital’ (CIRCA 2004). This has included playfully disruptive actions at army recruiting centres where soldiers have had their boots polished by insurgent clowns, and at McDonalds, where Ronald McDonald has been given a run for his money. Another recent comical protest in the British global justice movement/s is the Capitalism Represents Acceptable Policy (CRAP) project. By attending marches dressed as middle class money-lovers, CRAP protesters seek to expose some of the contradictions of capitalism by wielding banners displaying slogans like ‘less trees, more bombs’ and ‘FCUK the third world’, and worshipping multi-national chain stores. The Space Hijackers have been responsible for organising Circle Line Parties on the London Underground, and organising the Corporate Games during the London ESF (October 2004). This included re-jigged versions of children’s games such as musical chairs in Starbucks cafes, Bingo (based on what other customers order) in McDonalds, hide-and-seek in GAP, and a version of British Bulldog in a Nike store. Participants were disqualified from the games if they purchased anything from the stores in which they were taking place (Space Hijackers 2004).

A small affinity group of British activists were inspired after their participation in the Yellow Bloc in Prague and resolved to establish in Britain something similar to the Italian Tute Bianche. Thus, the Wombles emerged in 2001, attending demonstrations fully prepared for self-defence by wearing helmets and padded overalls. In a demonstration later
in 2001, the Wombles directly challenged a police cordon, and managed to allow people to escape. Seven Wombles were duly arrested and taken to court. At their hearing, five were released, and it was found that the police had acted heavy-handedly and unlawfully (Donson et al 2002, 19).

2.5.1.5. The EU Summit June 2003 and the Thessaloniki Seven

In June 2003, British protesters were amongst those protesting at the EU summit at Thessaloniki in Greece. This case is important because it increased activists’ sense of the injustice of police action, and resulted in a deal of solidarity with prisoners. Prisoner solidarity was, however, nothing new as EF!ers had been supporting arrested comrades years previously. Simon Chapman, a 30-year-old Briton, was amongst 29 protesters detained and among seven held on remand on charges of rioting, possession of explosives, and resisting authorities. All seven denied the charges (Thessaloniki Prisoner Support 2003). Chapman became unconscious after being teargassed, and was arrested and physically beaten when a black rucksack allegedly in his possession was found to contain Molotov cocktails, a hammer and a pickaxe (Chapman 2003). Video footage taken by protesters later proved that Simon’s blue rucksack was swapped by police for the black rucksack containing the anarchist’s tool-kit with which he was ‘found’. Days of protest in solidarity with prisoners like Chapman were held in London and other European cities and the Wombles encouraged sympathisers to write to Simon in prison, and to complain to the Greek Embassy. After between 49 and 66 days of hunger striking, the Thessaloniki Seven were released on bail on 26th November 2003. This case has been well publicised and even the conventional NGOs involved have rallied round to support the prisoners, and Amnesty International conducted an independent inquiry into the maltreatment of these protesters (Amnesty International 2003).

2.5.1.6. May Days

This account of May Day demonstrations focuses upon actions in London. Although similar actions have taken place in other cities (notably Manchester and Bristol), the accounts of London protests are more easily accessible, and are broadly representative of the types of actions that happened elsewhere. May Day 2000 coincided with the launch of Indymedia UK (although similar provision for the uploading of reports onto the web was developed for the J18 protests in 1999). Outside London, ‘impressive actions’ took place in several towns and cities including Manchester, Sheffield and Glasgow (VER 2000e), but it was the London protest that attracted most controversy.

In the run up to May Day 2000, anarchist veterans of the 1980s tried to force their politics into the organisation and practice of the London protest, and to use the developing anti-capitalist movement as a vehicle to put their plans into action (VER 2000d). Activists from Anarchist Black Cross and London Greenpeace were part of the May Day 2000 ‘action faction’ which, according to one protester, consisted of ‘a bunch of people who were a hell of a lot better at producing leaflets than they were at actually organising anything’ (VER 2000, 73). The result was a logistical nightmare. The ‘action faction’ had

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53 Bristol activists for example also carried out a guerrilla gardening exercise on 1st May 2000.
produced leaflets advertising four days of action, but had not gone beyond this. The onus fell on RTS to organise a mass action at short notice, and in the aftermath of the J18 ‘riot’. The action began with a critical mass bicycle ride around central London and, in an attempt to discourage violence, ‘guerrilla gardening’ was chosen as the focus of the main action, with the aim of turning Parliament Square into a useful community resource. Concerned that forks and spades might be used violently by a drunken minority, the organisers provided only plastic hand trowels. Although the protest was chaotic, it was mostly peaceful, there was some limited violence and property damage, and Winston Churchill’s memorial statue was decorated with a turf punk-style mohican and graffiti (Donson et al 2002, 11). RTS attempted in vain to draw protesters away from possible confrontation with police, but large numbers filled Whitehall in a march to Trafalgar Square. The police observed without intervening the guerrilla gardening event, the march, and even the painting of graffiti on the national war memorial, the Cenotaph, until a small group ransacked a McDonalds restaurant which was at the time full of customers. The day resulted in 95 arrests, and nine injured police officers. Whilst protesters viewed the police as heavy-handed, the press and many of the public criticised them for being overly lenient, even the guerrilla gardening event being represented in the press as disorder tantamount to riot. In the days preceding the protest, the tabloid press had cranked up expectations with reports from undercover reporters and rumours of police intelligence, the Daily Mail predicting that guerrilla gardeners would use their gardening tools as weapons in a full-scale riot (Tempest 2002). After the event, Prime Minister Blair claimed that:

The people responsible for the damage caused in London today are an absolute disgrace. Their actions have got nothing to do with convictions or beliefs and everything to do with mindless thuggery. (interview, The Guardian 2.05.2000; quoted Woodward et al. 2000)

In the run up to May Day 2001, the media again printed lurid predictions of another riot and claimed that hard core activists trained by the IRA and American activists would be inciting violence. This instilled fear among potential protesters and may, alongside the harsh policing strategies used, have contributed to the decline of numbers attending May Day demonstrations. The organisers of May Day 2001 called for affinity groups to engage in their own autonomous actions, with a planned critical mass in the morning, and a convergence at Oxford Square in the afternoon (Jeffrey 2001). Particularly after the debacle of May Day 2000, the police have responded to ‘anti-capitalist’ protests with increasingly precautionary, firm, or heavy-handed tactics, and on May 1st 2001, police penned protesters into Oxford Street for up to eight hours, and did not allow anyone, peaceful protesters and innocent bystanders included, to leave unless they gave their name and address and consented to being photographed. Police are increasingly photographing protesters at demonstrations and making use of powers to stop and search.54 The public, it is alleged, have helped to justify these police tactics by believing the media’s demonisation of protesters as ‘folk devils’ (Donson et al 2002).

May Day 2002 was focused around Mayfair and organisers recommended that embassies be used as targets for self-organised affinity groups. A mass ‘village football’ game, jesters and jugglers lightened up the protest. The police response was considerably

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54 The filming or photographing of protesters is often preliminary to later arrest, as it is often considered tactically better to avoid immediate intervention that might provoke wider reaction.
more relaxed, culminating only in non-violent skirmishes. The theme for 2003 was Weapons of Mass Construction and involved a series of actions against potential beneficiaries of the Iraq War (oil companies and arms traders) (Morland and Carter 2004, 90-1). In 2004, partly due to a poor turn out at coordination meetings, the London May Day Collective decided not to co-ordinate a day of action, but instead to hold a picnic at which the future of the movement could be discussed (Some Members of the London May Day Collective 2004). However, actions by other organisations included the Trades Union Congress’s annual march, some actions by animal rights activists, and visits to some of those companies targeted in 2003. The youth division of the Socialist Party (International Socialist Resistance) held a protest outside Shell UK’s offices, making links between large corporations, human rights abuses and the occupation of Iraq (James 2004).

2.5.1.7. The Dissent! Network

A network of British activists called Dissent! has been developing since December 2003 in preparation for the meeting of the G8 on 8 July 2005 at the Gleneagles Hotel near St Andrews, Scotland. The network is based on the principle of rejecting power structures, and as such is non-hierarchical, participatory and uses consensus decision-making. Dissent! does not have an office, spokespeople, members or staff. Instead, it is a loose network that is open to anyone interested and organises through small-scale meetings, occasional gatherings and an email discussion list. Activists meet bi-monthly to discuss ideas and means of mobilizing support. It is a self-educating network that believes in the value of sharing skills.

Whilst other social movement organizations have proposed actions to coincide with the meeting of the G8, they have left a space for radical resistance, direct action, disruption and the creation of alternatives. SWP and CND, for example, are organizing a joint conference /alternative festival in Perth. They are allegedly funding this event through the official security budget of the G8, and for this reason radical activists aligned with Dissent! regard it as a sell out, and a poorly constructed security measure. The trade unions and trade, aid, development and debt relief organisations will be involved in a Make Poverty History event in Edinburgh, 40 miles from the site of the G8 meeting. Make Poverty History, like the SWP/CND proposals, is regarded by radicals as too reformist and its rally is considered to be too distant from the actual G8 meeting to have any real impact.

Dissent is supported by the Trapese (Take Radical Action through Popular Education and Sustainable Everything) educational road show which has been travelling around social centres and towns informing people about the network, and encouraging them to form their own local Dissent! groups. In Spring 2005 there was a major gathering of Dissent! at which activists will formulate proposals for action. Currently there are only a few concrete ideas regarding the shape and form of actions. The PGA (this time standing for Peoples’ Golfing Association) will be holding an open golfing tournament, and children will be taking part in a roller skating party. There has been discussion about a potential blockade on 4th July, and there is some enthusiasm for positive community building actions inspired by the alternative villages at the Evian G8.
2.5.2. Anti-war movement consolidates groups working on diverse issues

However, the story does not end with general protests against undemocratic financial institutions. The global justice movement has adapted to respond to new issues as they emerge. One of the biggest and most recent issues has, of course, been resistance to the Iraq war. The ‘anti-war movement’ can be framed as part of the broader movement for global justice, as its participants have included many of the types of groups mentioned in preceding sections of this paper. Direct activists, climate change campaigners, environmental movement organisations (including Greenpeace and FoE), the Green Party, muslim and ethnic minority groups, socialists and no borders activists have all rallied around the cause. Besides attempts directly to disrupt the war effort, direct activists have been involved since 2001 in attempting close down the biennial Defence Systems and Equipment International (DSEi) exhibition where almost 1,000 companies involved in the arms trade gather to display their products.

A network of British organisations joined together to organise Disarm DSEi, days of direct action aiming to close down the arms fair. In September 2001, this included a Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT) march and vigil, with speakers from the peace movement including CND, and a ‘Fiesta for Life Against Death’ direct action protest, supported by Reclaim the Streets and the Wombles, which drew on the pink and silver theme developed for the Prague protests and included a street party, samba band and cycle-powered sound system. Police mounted pre-demonstration raids of squats where pink and silver costumes were being made, and later were involved in violent clashes with protesters. Because the protest was planned as one big action, it was easy for police to cordon off the area and move the protest away from the conference centre.

The larger September 2003 action was deliberately multi-headed to make it more difficult to suppress. It began with occupations of the offices of British Aerospace, action to disrupt the voyages of warships on the way to the conference, and a blockade of the entrance to the conference centre to prevent the arrival of tanks and military hardware. A march on 6th September (2003) in central London was organised by the Campaign Against the Arms Trade, and supported by Sheffield samba band. At Trafalgar Square, the fountains were dyed blood red to symbolise the violence and death that result from the arms trade. On 9 September, 2,000 protesters listened to speeches by representatives of Globalise Resistance, Amnesty International and others before marching on the fair. Police intercepted the march, declared it an illegal gathering under Section 14 of the Public Order Act, gave the crowd thirty minutes to disperse, and arrested protesters who attempted to get closer to the fair. Space Hijackers dressed as arms traders mounted a CRAP-style protest shouting ‘kill, kill, kill’ and claiming to be interested in purchasing bombs and land-mines (Bristly Pioneer 2003). Seven activists who managed to enter the fair mounted a tank to display a banner demanding ‘Stop DSEI, Stop Death’ (Evening Standard 2003). On opening day, arms dealers were paint bombed, and a street party caused gridlock in East London. Docklands Light Railway trains carrying arms dealers to the conference were cancelled after activists D-locked themselves to the railway and locked trains together. On the second day, further blockades, a critical mass and a RTS party complicated delegates’ journeys to the conference centre. Mounted riot police forced protesters into a small park, and released them in small groups only after they agreed to be photographed. Nevertheless, about 100 protesters managed to get close to the conference centre where they obstructed delegates until dispersed by police baton charges (Voluntary Slave 2004).
The final day of the 2003 arms fair ended with a Gala Banquet, which was disrupted by a noisy street party. Activists estimated that they and bystanders were penned in by 1,000 police officers and 50 police vans. Police used Section 44 of the Terrorism Act to justify the random searching of protesters, the local tube station was closed to the public but open to arms traders, and, by the end of the action, police had arrested 144 activists. Video clips were collected, proving that the police were unnecessarily violent towards protesters, and police tactics were condemned by the respected civil liberties organisation, Liberty (This is London 2003). Members of the May Day collective attribute the poor activist response to DSEI 2004 to the over-bearing police presence at the 2003 protests.

Of concern to us all should be the effect on our movement of intensive state scrutiny and the shutting down of debate that has any kind of perceived oppositional politics. There has been a palpable retreat of activity generally this may have some consequences for how some of us might then choose to organise and act … It is quite clear that nobody wants to be herded around, stopped and searched by the police any longer. (Some members of the London May Day Collective, 2004)

September 11th 2001 had come amidst a broader swathe of mobilizations against neo-liberalism. The protests against the bombing of Afghanistan served to further heighten the links between immigrant and refugee control, environmental concerns and capitalism. Afghanistan’s location astride the possible route of an oil pipeline to the Caspian sea raised issues of imperialism, environment, human rights, war for oil, and alternative energy (Bakkan 2001), and provided a strong foundation upon which the diverse interests that were to become the anti-Iraq war movement was built. Said (2005, 76) notes that the issue of oil ‘brings together concerns as diverse as human rights, development and environmental sustainability, governance and corporate responsibility’ and thus that campaigns against oil-related developments, as do campaigns against war, ‘involve the building of cross-border and cross-disciplinary activist networks and alliances’.

Direct actions against the prospect of the Iraq war were well underway by the beginning of January 2003. A global day of action was called for 18 January, the twelfth anniversary of the first Gulf War. Over 150 activists took part in ‘Operation Official Look’, which involved spying on RAF Northwood, Britain’s military headquarters, where activists locked themselves together to blockade the main entrance gates. The Greenpeace flagship, Rainbow Warrior, blocked the departure of military supply vessels for Iraq. On 15 February 2003, the Stop the War Coalition coordinated Britain’s largest ever political demonstration, with estimates of up to two million marchers. Organised by the Stop the War coalition, CND and the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), the march helped to forge links between religions and peace movement activists (Stop the War Coalition 2005).

The outbreak of war triggered a series of unlicensed protests in most British cities, billed as ‘Stop the City, Stop the War’. Typically, these involved some street reclaiming/blockading, and school children taking time off school to take part in their own autonomously planned actions (Schnews 2003a). On Saturday 22 March, 200,000 protesters marched through the streets of London, protest actions were mounted at a number of airbases, and in London a short-lived peace camp was established in the grounds of the Imperial War Museum (Schnews 2003a, Schnews 2004e, 251, Rootes and Saunders 2005). A number of local stop the war initiatives continue to hold local vigils and marches (Justice Not Vengeance 2004), and the Stop the War coalition, CND and MAB organized a major
demonstration in London in March 2005 to mark the second anniversary of the invasion and to demand the withdrawal of British troops.\footnote{For more on the anti-Iraq war protests and the peace movement, see Rootes and Saunders (2005).}

2.5.3. The Social Forum Movement and Social Centres

As we have so far indicated, the movement for global justice incorporates a range of types of organisations, and embraces a number of different issues. As a movement of movements, we could claim that its ingredients are the peace movement, the anarchist / direct action movement, the environmental movement, the labour movement and anti-racist campaigns. What makes it a movement is the shared participation in events such as the global days of actions mentioned in the preceding section, its belief in ‘democracy from below’, and networking among organisations and activists. Although there are many formal alliances between organisations, and even greater numbers of informal alliances between individual activists, the movements’ most significant networking (beyond organising collaborative events via the internet, or meeting at convergence centres) is facilitated by social forums, and for the direct action wing of the movement, through social centres.

Local social forums in Britain are microcosms of the World Social Forum (WSF), an initiative of ATTAC (which itself scarcely exists in Britain), designed to give the global justice movement/s the opportunity freely to discuss what it is for, as much as what it is against, with a diverse range of organisations rallying under the banner ‘Another World is Possible’ (Klein 2001). These increasingly large conferences have taken place annually since 2001. The WSF Charter of Principles declares that it is not an organisation, nor a united front platform, but:

an open meeting place for reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences and inter-linking for effective action, by groups and movements of civil society that are opposed to neo-liberalism and to domination of the world by capital and any form of imperialism, and are committed to building a society centred on the human person.

Before commenting on the activity of local social forums in Britain, it is important to contextualise them by briefly discussing the organising process of the London European Social Forum (ESF). Similar to the World Social Forum, but at European level, ESFs have taken place in Florence in 2002, Paris in 2003 and London in 2004. Several local British social forums were formed, in part, as a response to the organising process of the 2004 ESF, which many regarded as undemocratic.

A small group of British activists, dominated by SWP (as Globalise Resistance) and Socialist Action members, worked in isolation to write a bid to host the 2004 ESF. London Social Forum, a newly emerged network of community activists, was concerned that:

There is a substantial prospect of turning the UK participation into a façade for something else – just a delegation from several separate organisations, reciting general principles and broad political lines about world affairs. This would contradict the spirit of the ‘social forum’ idea. And this outcome could happen because in the UK there is no organisational effort to promote social
fora, i.e. political spaces which facilitate solidarity, inclusion, horizontality, participation, and conviviality. (London Social Forum 2005)

Salusbury (2004, 18-19) noted how this played out in practice. At one of the planning meetings, the chairs had been arranged in a circle to facilitate consensus decision-making, but participants returned from a coffee break to find that the chairs had been rearranged into rows facing the chairing panel seated at the front on a stage. Later (January 2004), the forum’s organising committee was restricted to conventional organisations, excluding individuals and networks.

As well as serving as a stimulus for the creation of local social fora, this served to exaggerate the hostility that already existed between hierarchical socialist organisations and grassroots direct action protesters. Manchester and London local social forums launched petitions criticising the bid, which was nevertheless accepted by the ESF European Assembly. This was followed by an attempt to ‘Democratise the ESF!’ by asking that all activists be allowed to participate. Although the European Assemblies supported demands for democracy, it was difficult to implement in practice. According to Levidow (2004):

The main organisers often demanded acceptance of specific proposals – saying that otherwise the GLA and the trade unions would not contribute funds. Thus control of resources, along with a claim to speak for others, operated as political blackmail. Such manoeuvres precluded discussion on the content and process, much less on how the ESF could help create ‘another world’.

By spring 2004 (the ESF being scheduled for in October), numerous activist networks began to create self-organised alternatives to run alongside the main conference. These included a LETS (Local Exchange Trading Systems) conference, debates on deliberative democracy, and a Wombles-organised forum focusing on issues ranging from ‘precarity’ to climate change and ‘no borders’. The Wombles’ forum, ‘Beyond ESF’, also provided the opportunity for planning direct actions that drew inspiration from the semi-formal presentations. Presentations by a Spanish network, Yo Mango, which ‘liberates’ (steals) products from multi-national companies, and by Berlin for Free! inspired a mass shoplifting exercise and attempts to travel on the tube for free. These actions were forerunners of the much better publicised ‘storming of the Palace’, breaking into Alexandra Palace, the principal venue of the official ESF, to protest against its non-democratic nature. Seizing a microphone from an official ESF speaker, one female palace ‘stormer’ told a baffled audience: ‘never again must a social forum be organised like this. It has been a travesty of democracy’ (Kingsnorth 2004, 11). The CIRCA and CRAP actions mentioned earlier were products of the Laboratory of Insurrectionary Imagination, held at the RampART Social Centre during the ESF.

The official ESF, attended by 25,000 people, was organised around the themes of democracy and fundamental rights, war and peace, anti-racism, discrimination and the far right, equality and diversity, corporate globalisation and global justice, social justice and solidarity, anti-privatisation, and social, workers’ and women’s rights, the environment, and sustainable societies. The spaces were dotted with the stalls of environmental organizations, ‘lived alternative’ eco-groups, left parties, publishers, single-issue campaigners, and counter-culturalists (Smith et al 2005). At both the autonomous and

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56 This means ‘I steal’ in Spanish street argot, but Mango is also a Spanish product brand.
official events, there were fewer British supporters than expected, but this may have been an expression of activists’ aversion to the SWP, trade unions and the Greater London Assembly (GLA) which allegedly dominated the organisation of the forum.

Of the local social forums that emerged during the run-up to the London ESF, some were short-term, merely seeking to raise awareness and mobilise for the ESF, whilst others have aimed to be more enduring fora for discussing how the neo-liberal agenda affects the day to day life of local communities. Leeds Social Forum appears to have been of the former type; its website has not been updated since October 2004 and refers only to details of the London ESF and means of mobilising for it (Leeds Social Forum 2004). Sheffield Social Forum runs under the principle of ‘people before profit’, and aims to link different campaigns with a view to organising and carrying out joint actions, and learning from each other’s experiences. It holds monthly ‘democracy cafes’ – opportunities to meet up to discuss political issues in an unstructured, informal and agenda-free environment. It also holds more formal monthly meetings and the website is an important source of information for advertising protest events (Sheffield Social Forum 2005). London Social Forum, initially concerned with democratising the ESF, is organised around the issues of economics/alternatives, peace, war, civil liberties, the media, Palestine and transport. It aims to foster networking among concerned individuals, NGOs, trade unions and voluntary groups and is, at the time of writing, coordinating campaigns against the 2012 Olympics bid (London Social Forum 2005). Although similar social forum initiatives are developing in East Anglia, and Durham, the social forum movement is not especially well developed in Britain.

Although the social centres movement on Italian or Spanish lines has been relatively slow to develop in Britain, there are longstanding, if not always permanent, centres reliant in part on public funds, and covering a variety of campaigning and community activities, in most major cities and many small towns. In Oxford, for example, there was a centre called Earth ARC in the early-mid 1990s. Later the suite of offices housing Corporate Watch, Undercurrents, the Ilisu Dam campaign, the activist legal and housing projects, and others, became the locus of activist sociability, though without the public events that one might associate with a social centre. In Bangor, North Wales, the Greenhouse provided a venue for events and the meeting place for campaign and voluntary sector groups, but it had no specific political project. In Manchester, MERCi was a project by which some Earth First!ers hoped to create something positive and to engage politically, albeit in the limited ways permitted by the charity laws. CND and other groups rent offices in the MERCi building, EF! and other related groups have postboxes, and many activists work in MERCi or on projects there. There are also many MERCi projects promoting grassroots forms of sustainability (see http://www.bridge-5.org/ ). A process of institutionalisation has changed MERCi so that it no longer resembles an anarchist social centre, but it is still an activist's resource centre. Also in Manchester there were squat cafes of variable duration – ten or more in the years from 1998-2002. Called OK Cafes and offering films, music, touring

57 Students at Durham University coordinate the North East Social Forum.

58 Brian Doherty (email 7 March 2005) reports that the small social forum network in Manchester has been troubled by sectarian divisions between trotskyites and leftist greens, and it is an Italian woman with recent activist experience in Italy who is mainly responsible for keeping it going.
radical theatres, and free food, these were not, unlike the next generation of squatted centres, inspired by Italian social centres (see http://www.kickstart.x21.org.uk/).\textsuperscript{59}

In 2001, the London Social Centres Network was established with the aim of addressing the ‘lack of cohesion and focus amongst the anti-capitalist and anarchist community’. This move towards improving the role of social centres in London was inspired by the Italian social centre movement\textsuperscript{60}, but it was also an attempt to move away from mass street protests and the repression, intimidation and surveillance that direct activists have increasingly associated with them. The main principles of social centres in Britain are non-hierarchy and autonomy. Those involved with the London network of social centres regard them as a response to a need for a political and social space that is free from the confines of capitalism:

As more of our time becomes capitalised with the commodification of everyday life in the new ‘social factory’ it becomes vital to create places where people aren’t judged by their ability to consume or to produce, where real human action and discussion takes place. (Wombles 2003).

Frequently squatted, but at other times paid for by community financing initiatives, loans or grants, social centres provide a wide range of activities including film nights, yoga, women’s self defence, benefit gigs, open mic nights, language lessons, seed swapping, radical libraries, vegan cafes and workshops on sustainable living. Perhaps most importantly, they serve as meeting places for activist networks and groups, and provide internet access, phone lines and mail boxes for campaigns. Outside London, new social centres have emerged in Manchester, Nottingham, Brighton, Leeds and Luton (London Social Centres Network 2005).

2.6. Conclusion

2.6.1. Organizational structure

There is a wide variety of types of organisations involved in the British global justice movement/s. Some are formally organised NGOs, others are networks, and some (especially radical networks) are merely temporary projects that last only the lifetime of a particular protest. For example, local networks of activists usually coalesce around a particular protest, as they did with J18 local action groups that formed across the country and, more recently, with the Dissent! network. These networks are cross-issue and biodegradable (Doherty 2004), and can be contrasted with Oxfam, FoE and WDM which are, at least to some extent, hierarchically structured, bureaucratic and formal organisations.

Direct action groups organise spontaneously, but their themes for protest are in part set at the annual Earth First! gathering and anarchist bookfairs, which are organised efforts to meet, discuss and set agendas. The ESF and WSF are contributing to this process of agenda setting and have the additional benefit of including more formally organised NGOs.

\textsuperscript{59} We are grateful to Brian Doherty for the information on which the foregoing paragraph is based.

\textsuperscript{60} Social centres of various kinds and duration have, however, been a feature of the counter-cultural and radical political scene in many English cities since the 1960s. Doherty (2000, 2004) outlines their role in Manchester and Oxford from the 1970s onwards.
However, the ESF has not been without conflict between the ‘horizontals’ and the ‘verticals’ (Smith et al. 2005).

Perhaps most characteristic of all are the broad campaigning coalitions – Jubilee 2000, the Trade Justice Movement, and Make Poverty History. The latter two, in particular, are ‘virtual’ organisations that scarcely exist beyond their web-sites and the particular campaign events they organise.

2.6.2. Action repertoires

The action repertoire of the movement ranges from the conventional, insider strategies of some of the most well respected pressure groups (including WWF), to the window smashing behaviour of (usually drunken) anarchists at anti-capitalist demonstrations. Most of the movement’s activities lie between these poles, and include non-violent direct action (commonly blockades and sabotage), mobilizing public opinion through the press (using mediagenic stunts), petitioning and letter writing. Some of the actions that can be seen in the present day movement have been adapted from the tactical repertoires of previous generations of activists. 1980s anarchists engaged in occupying buildings, maintaining squats, acts of sabotage, festivals of resistance and blockades of the city, just as anti-globalisation protesters have in and since the late 1990s. Overwhelmingly, however, the repertoire of those who identify with the movement and act in its name is non-violent and non-confrontational.

2.6.3. Ideology

The ideology of the movement could be classified as anti-neoliberalism, one that is especially opposed to the ‘Washington consensus’. Some parts of the movement focus on one particular issue (for example the environment or human rights) and campaign against the effects of neo-liberalism upon it, often identifying neo-liberalism as the ultimate cause, and focusing their campaign effort upon the international financial institutions they see as responsible for advocating neo-liberalism. Other organisations or networks focus on a range of issues, regarding them all as symptomatic of an unhealthy neo-liberal agenda. This is not to imply that all organisations in the movement agree about the causes of and solutions to economic, social and environmental problems. For example, although both the direct action movement and the SWP are broadly ‘anti-capitalist’, they have very different conceptions of an alternative society, and the means appropriate to getting there. For direct action activists, the common themes of the movement are anarchy (rejection of hierarchies, authority, the state and party politics), communitarianism (seeking a world composed of genuine communities) and ecologism (questioning ‘progress’) (VER 2000f). The SWP, on the other hand, believes in building a revolutionary movement from the top down, organising hierarchically, and in seizing the power of the state to build a better world. Although the direct action part of the movement shares some aims with other ecological groups such as FoE and Greenpeace, there is a gulf between them because of the focus of the latter on reforming capitalism and their hierarchical structures. The chasm is even greater between CONGOs (coopted non-governmental organisations), which are involved in close dialogue with international financial institutions such as the WTO and IMF, and those that seek to challenge the legitimacy of such institutions from the outside (Bond 2000).
2.6.4. Movement alliances

The different movement families that have come together to form the global justice movement are linked to one another via inter-organisational and interpersonal networks at both elite and local levels (Rootes and Saunders 2005). Radical ecologists have links with those engaging in direct action against the war, campaigning for animal rights and supporting (especially environmental) refugees. Sometimes the same activist will be active in all three of these movement arenas. Trade unionists have made links with Reclaim the Streets activists. EMOs have forged links with a similar range of campaigning groups, and are even joining up in short term alliances with radical environmentalists. FoE for example, is part of the No New Oil coalition that includes the direct action group Rising Tide that itself consists mostly of former Reclaim the Streets protesters. The anti-war protests have involved broad alliances incorporating the old and new left, anti-racist groups, environmentalists, pacifists, feminists and third world activists. Most impressive of all are the large coalitions that the aid/development movement has assembled, including most recently, the Make Poverty History coalition with its nearly 400 member organisations including religious groups / churches, trade unions, environmental groups and other trade/aid/development organisations.

Reflecting on May Day 2000, one activist ruminated on the thin gangplank upon which the alliances within the ‘movement’ were perching:

If this ‘new anti-capitalist movement’ that everyone is getting so excited about develops and grows … then all the problems that have been identified with regard to May Day will recur on an increasing scale. We will get increasing attention from the police and the state. We will have to deal with the left in all its various guises. People will want to get involved and will turn up to our events who we don’t like. Problems of communication, misunderstandings and clashes of different ways of working will become clear. We will have to work with people who share different backgrounds and want different things. Also the vitriol of the media and perhaps also of some of those who we might consider to be on our side will have to be dealt with.

(Anon. 2001)

Such anxieties have informed the wariness of many supporters of the broad aid and trade coalitions toward more radical campaigners, including the SWP, and perhaps explains why the new movement does not describe itself as an ‘anti-capitalist movement’. If there is a master frame, it is ‘global justice’ rather than ‘anti-capitalism’.

2.6.5. Is this a movement?

Although groups like the SWP, radical environmental networks and Jubilee 2000 all travelled to Prague to campaign against the IMF and World Bank, there was no coordination among them when they arrived. Jubilee 2000 held its own separate demonstration on 25 September, SWP was only interested in participating in an ‘A to B’ march, and radical networks were involved in the grassroots protest for the whole duration of the summit. However, there is clearly some sense of shared identity, expressed by a recognition that global financial institutions are at the root of many of the single-issue
problems. Networking and alliance-building is increasing among different types of organisations, and there is some sense of participation in collective action, be it on an anti-war march or at a G8 summit event or the equivalent.

Brooks (2004, 562) suggests that ‘the master frame [of the movement] is a democratic one designed to increase … accountability and input into the decision-making processes of organizations perceived to be promulgating the negative effects of globalisation’. This is broad enough to allow a variety of SMOs and activists to participate, from anarchists, socialists and communists, to those concerned with environmental, peace, religious, feminist, homeless, indigenous rights, migration, race and social justice issues, the labour movement, urban squatters and others.

But if some strands of the movement appear to be focused upon building democracy from below in order to counter the increasing power of international financial institutions, others – notably the aid and development NGOs that mobilise the big battalions of demonstrators and petition-signers – are more pragmatically focused upon policy reforms than upon radical institutional change. The movement is not simply ‘anti-globalisation’ (George 2002, Chesters 2004) because in many ways it is pro-globalisation:

We want to globalize equity, not poverty, solidarity not anti-sociality, diversity not conformity, democracy not subordination, and ecological balance not suicidal rapaciousness (Michael Albery cited in Chesters 2004, 5).

The movement (or at least parts of it and in theory) respects difference, and seeks unity in difference.

Although Shukaitis (2005, 14) calls the ‘global justice movement’ a ‘movement’, he adds that:

This is not to say the global justice movement functions as a unified whole or has anything which could be identified as a coherent subject position. Rather it is through the process of constructing forms of collective identity and frameworks for shared action, forming and reforming relationships through which various movements can act as a converted multiplicity, that one can understand the global justice movement as a movement.

Empirical research is required to shed further light on the extent to which this is true for the British part of the movement. Graeme Chesters (2004a) has suggested that:

To capture the dynamics of this movement(s), one must literally be adrift within the network, engaging with movement actors in material and immaterial spaces and sensitized to the emergence of qualities that are irreducible to the sum of the parts of that network.

That may well be right, but it is a tall order for a time-limited project on a tight budget.

3. The British movement in perspective

At this early stage of our research, our account of what is distinctive about the global justice movement in Britain is necessarily provisional. The sheer organisational
diversity and complexity of the movement is particularly striking. Make Poverty History alone is an extraordinary coalition of a wide variety of groups and organisations, but it is by no means simply an umbrella organisation of the whole movement, for it is determinedly non-political and does not include the more radical groups. The state of the movement at present is well illustrated by the front page of the Globalise Resistance website: as well as detailing its own activities, it displays links to G8alternative, a network of Scottish groups organising protests against the G8 meeting, and to the Dissent network, on the one hand, and to Make Poverty History on the other. Globalise Resistance, which makes no secret of the fact that almost half its steering committee are members of the SWP, is, however, held at arms length by both.

Thus, although Attac is negligible in Britain, the global justice movement in Britain resembles that in Germany in the extent to which the aid and development charities and NGOs and religious groups are prominent and highly mobilised, and they have a well-developed globalist agenda. But Britain also has a well-developed and still lively – if relatively small – direct action movement that has lately come to cohere about the global justice issue, albeit one usually framed in terms of ‘anti-capitalism’ or opposition to ‘neo-liberalism’. And, uniquely, the development of the movement in Britain has been marked by the presence of the SWP. However, much as the SWP has been enterprising, energetic and, as ever, organisationally innovative, it has not, as it would almost certainly have liked, been able to hegemonise the movement. Its many initiatives, local as well as national, have undoubtedly contributed to the dynamism of the movement, but suspicion of its motives as well as aversion to its brand of socialist politics has led radicals and reformists alike to keep a wary distance even when campaigning against a common enemy. But if the SWP has been unable to hegemonise the movement, nor does it appear that its presence has divided and poisoned the water for the movement. The movement is divided, but it is divided according to the prior histories, commitments and preferred values and action repertoires of its diverse constituents, and to these the SWP is a mere sideshow.

Purists may object that there is a difference between a campaign and a movement, and that while coalitions are characteristic of the former, identity is required before we can be confident of the existence of the latter. However, it would seriously underestimate the present movement in Britain to represent it as a mere campaign coalition of national organisations. The preparations for the protests against the G8 have made visible an extremely broad and diffuse movement that, perhaps especially in its many local manifestations, transcends the divisions between and among the campaign coalitions and other campaigning organisations. It seems to us that the importance of ‘identity’ to social movements has been much over-estimated. As in the environmental movement of the 1990s, the non-identity of groups and organisations campaigning for a broadly conceived common purpose is a strength rather than a weakness of the global justice movement in Britain. Whether there is indeed a ‘master frame’ that transcends the specific, but already broad, campaign themes is, however, a moot point. At the present time, however, that seems unlikely.
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1. Left-wing social movements in Italy from the 1960s to the 1990s

1.1. From protest to institutionalization?

Italy in the 1960s and 1970s went through a period of sustained protest, with the development of quite radical social movements (della Porta 1995; 1996). From the mid-1960s up to the early 1970s collective action expanded into different sectors of society in what Tarrow (1989) has described as a “cycle of protest”. The social movements which developed in this period were characterized by universalistic identities, strategies of action founded on protest, and reticular organizational structures. In the mid-seventies protest declined, leaving small and radicalized groups in its wave. At the same time, however, some organizations active especially on ecological and women’s issues survived. In the eighties, protest did not reach the peaks of disruption attained in the sixties and seventies, but we witness instead the growth and “institutionalization” of movement organizations active on single issues (gender, environment, peace, students, etc.).

In the 1990s the dense networks of social movement organizations were characterized by a continuing process of apparent specialization of discourses, moderation of tactics and organizational structuration. These processes involved, with different characteristics, the environmental movement, the women’s movement, a “solidarity” movement that developed especially on the rights of migrants, as well as youth social centres and neighbourhood groups. The classical social movements of the 1970s seem to evolve toward four different forms:

a) public interest groups: characterized by universalistic identities but with a focus on single issues; strategies of intervention based on lobbying and concertation; bureaucratized organizational structures with paper-membership;

b) voluntary associations: characterized by universalistic identities, strategies of intervention based on the supply of services; permanent organizational structures, participatory and reticular;

c) citizens’ committees: characterized by localistic identities; strategies of action that privilege protest; participatory organizational structures, flexible and with low levels of coordination;

d) countercultural communities: characterized by universalistic identities; strategies of intervention based on cultural (sometimes commercial) activities and, sporadically, protest; spontaneous and reticular organizational structures.

1.2. Italian social movements in the 1960s and 1970s

Italy since its unification has been divided by pronounced social and political conflicts, with the Italian state responding with an exclusive strategy to new challengers: a
partial inclusion of the (communist dominated) labour movement did not develop before 1960 and remained incomplete for the following decades. If on the one hand the Italian security forces intervened against popular protest in a repressive and at times brutal way, on the other hand radical and violent repertoires were widespread among opposition movements. It is against this background that the protest wave of the 1960s and 1970s evolved.

Compared to other European countries, the Italian “1968” was longer and more conflictual and characterised by a strong involvement of the workers’ movement, peaking in largely spontaneous protests in the big factories of the North during the “hot autumn” of 1969 and the following “biennio rosso”. These protests expressed also discontent with the trade unions and the demand for direct representation by a working class whose composition had changed significantly during the years of the economic miracle, with the influx of a large number of young and unskilled workers from the south of Italy without previous working experience in a factory.

From the mid-sixties on, new types of social movements of the left-libertarian family emerged (della Porta and Rucht 1995), but until well into the second half of the seventies the Italian protest movements were characterised by the prevalence of a traditional Marxist stance. At the beginning of their protest in the 1960s, the students used forms of action that combined traditional means of exerting pressure (that is, within the institutions), with more innovatory forms of action (sit-ins and go-ins). The repertoire of action and the ideology of the protest gradually changed as the movement interacted with other groups: from the hostile right-wing groups to the supportive factory activists.

Of particular importance for the development of the new movements was the reaction of the Italian state. Since the early 1960s, centre-left governments (based on a coalition between the Christian Democrats and the Socialist Party) had followed a (timid) liberalisation and modernisation approach which had brought about an at least partial normalisation vis-à-vis the labour movement. Faced with the 1968-protests, the Italian state fell back to its traditional position and the old protest policing style of a particularly harsh version of “escalated force” increasingly reaffirmed itself. In addition, the Italian state was perceived (and not only by activists) as pursuing a “strategy of tension” against the movements, formenting insecurity with the aim of provoking the call for a strong state. A key event, repeatedly underlined in autobiographical and scientific accounts, was a bomb attack in Piazza Fontana in Milan on 12 December 1969, for which anarchist activists were blamed but which apparently was carried out by neo-fascists with the participation of “deviated” parts of the secret services (della Porta and Reiter 2003, 255f.).

In Italy, more than in other European countries, the left-libertarian movements—under the hegemony of the New Leftist discourse—used symbols and frames of reference that were known and accepted by the Old Left, dominated by the PCI (Italian Communist

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1 The escalated force protest policing style gives low priority to the right to demonstrate, more innovative forms of protest are not tolerated, communication between the police and the demonstrators are reduced to the essential, there is frequent use of coercive means and also of illegal instruments (like agents provocateurs). According to the negotiated management style, to the contrary, the right to demonstrate peacefully is considered the priority, also disruptive forms of protest are tolerated, the communication between demonstrators and the police is considered fundamental for a peaceful evolution of the protest, coercive means are avoided as far as possible and in any case used selectively (McPhail, Schweingruber and McCarthy 1998, 51-54; della Porta and Reiter 1998a; della Porta and Fillieule 2004).
Although the Old Left and the New Left competed for the support of leftist activists, and cultural incomprehension did exist between the left-libertarians and the traditional left, goals and strategies to a large extent coincided. The larger part of the left-libertarian movements perceived the Old Left, and in particular the PCI, as their main ally and support. Trade unionists, PCI activists, and New Left activists launched campaigns on such themes as housing conditions and the price of public transport. Generally, the hope for radical political change fuelled co-operation between the left-libertarian movements and the Old Left, while a fierce antagonism characterised the movements’ attitudes towards the state. As a long-term development, the tendency to rely on the PCI and its collateral organisations led to an organisational weakness of the movements.

Important for the movements in Italy was also the fermentation inside the Catholic Church (Tarrow 1989). If the second Vatican council had signified an opening up of the official church, it fell however short of the expectations of many grassroots groups and also of many members of catholic youth and student organisations. One can speak of a block recruitment from their midst on part of the movement, fuelled on the one hand by an anti-church reaction and on the other by radical Catholic thought like the southern American liberation theology. A component of the catholic trade union CISL was deeply involved in the workers’ protests of the “biennio rosso”.

The co-operation between Old and New Left progressively deteriorated during the 1970s, the period of the greatest electoral victories of the PCI. “Cultural” incomprehension reached new dimensions with the short-lived but radicalised “movement of 1977” which challenged among others the communist work ethic. The prospects for an alliance against the state and for radical political change decreased since 1973, when the communist party secretary Enrico Berlinguer launched the strategy of a “historic compromise” with the Christian Democrats, which in 1977 led to the governments of national solidarity (with the PCI in a first step abstaining in the confidence vote on an all Christian democratic government, and then elaborating a common government program with the Christian Democrats). A clear sign for the change was the PCI’s position on incidents between police and protesters: if up to that point the communists had followed the traditional position of the Italian left in defence of the right to dissent and protest, they now shifted to an increasingly pro-government and pro-police position (della Porta and Reiter 2003, 257ff.).

By the mid-1970s, however, mobilisation was on the decline and the radicalised “1977 movement” was in this respect but an interlude. Political violence and terrorism developed especially in this period of demobilisation and escalated in Italy more than anywhere else in Western Europe (della Porta 1990; 1995). The process of radicalisation did not involve all components of the left-libertarian family: it is, in fact, during this period that we witness an increasing strategical differentiation between movement organisations. Some wings of the movements criticised the use of violence, even for defensive ends, as this tended to increase the risk of isolation; whereas others thought that “the best form of defence is attack” and shifted to a model of organised violence. Small groupings of the New Left radicalised their ideology and strategy, preparing the ground for the development of the autonomous type of violence. In particular, a new form of radicalism--more anarchist and spontaneous than its predecessors--developed in the groups that intervened among marginalised youth. It was in this environment that the radicalised leaders of the previous movement wave sought their new recruits.
1.3. The 1980s: Changing movements in a changing environment

In the second half of the seventies, in the face of demobilisation, terrorism, and the virtual absence of institutional allies, many militants retreated from politics in the strict sense. In the early eighties most of the terrorist organisations disappeared, and when new mass mobilisations occurred at the beginning of the 1980s, they developed in a significantly changed environment. Prospects for radical political and social change waned: throughout the 1980s the PCI experienced electoral decline and the workers’ movement in general suffered a series of symbolically highly significant setbacks, for instance the defeat of the Fiat strike in 1980 or of the referendum to reverse the decision to cancel the “scala mobile” (index-linked wage increases) in 1985.

The characteristics of collective action in the eighties developed quite differently from those of the previous decade: the impact of socialist ideology waned with the decline of the New Left groups, and many of the organisational and cultural characteristics often described as peculiar to the New Social Movements emerged (network structure, emphasis on individual freedom) (Melucci 1996). It is in this period that we see an increasingly autonomous development of the women’s movement, which up to and including the great battles of the 1970s for the introduction of divorce and abortion had largely developed within the Old and especially the New Left (Hellman, J. 1987; Hellman, S. 1987). A similar development can be observed also for the emerging ecological movement, characterized like the women’s movement of the 1980s by a decentralised structure and a pragmatic political orientation, foreshadowing the rise of single issue organisations and the evolution into voluntary associations in the following decade (Diani 1988; 1995).

The only significant mass mobilization of the 1980s is connected with the protest campaign against the NATO plan to deploy cruise missiles in Italy and other European countries. The peace movement that developed and remained highly visible throughout the period 1981-1983, especially in a first phase expressed a strong critique of delegation (Battistelli 1990; Lodi 1984; 1991). With its nearly 600 peace committees and a few co-ordinating meetings, it was able to (re)mobilise the collective actors active in previous years--student activists, feminist groups, squatted youth centres, and environmental groups. Unlike the mobilisations of the previous decade, this campaign relied on conventional forms of pressure (petitions, parliamentary initiatives, conferences, tax boycotts) together with non-violent direct actions (for example, the occupation of the military base at Magliocco in January 1982); violence was rare.

Changes are evident also in the relation between the social movements and its main institutional ally: differently from the movements of the 1960s and early 1970s, the peace movement did not seek a strategic alliance with the PCI for radical social and political change, but a temporary alliance on a single issue, albeit connected to values central for both the Old and the New Left. In the following decade the Old Left played above all a brokerage or patronage role for the movements. The relationship however was never free of tension with accusations that the party tried to cooptate the movements.

The government formula of the “pentapartito”, a centre-left coalition including the smaller laic parties, largely lacked the reformist and modernising intent of the early sixties. However, a more relaxed attitude of the Italian state towards the social movements found expression above all in a changed protest policing style which shifted towards the “negotiated control” model. This shift was however informal and protest policing remained selective, with forceful interventions against small radical groups like (above all in the
1990s) the social centres (della Porta and Reiter 2003, 287ff.). Evidence for a changing attitude of the state towards the movements can be found also in the increasing collaboration with movement organisations both by contracting out of services to them and by increasingly including them in consultation processes. Both trends were to continue in the following decade.

1.4. Social movements in the 1990s

In the 1990s social movements operated in a radically changed political environment, characterised by the collapse of the Italian party system as it had developed since the end of fascism. The fall of the Berlin wall led to a definite break of the (in reality already for years social democratic) majority of the PCI with the communist tradition and to the change of the party’s name. It also contributed to the fall of the Christian democrats, socialists and other minor government parties by eliminating the anti-communist legitimation. These parties were virtually wiped out by the corruption scandals of the early 1990s which led to a level of “Parteiverdrossenheit” unparalleled in Europe. On the one hand, this resulted in the growth of populism (Lega Nord, Berlusconi); on the other hand, in growing trust in NGOs and social movement organisations, mirroring also a growing role of voluntary associations in the Italian society (della Porta 2001a).

1.4.1. Public interest groups: Environmentalism

Several studies indicated the development of formal, centralised, well structured organisations lobbying for the public interest in some policy arenas -- environmental policy is a main example. For instance, a part of the EU-sponsored research on “Transformation in Environmental Action” focused on national environmental organisations, concluding that they are, to a large extent, in an advanced process of institutionalisation (della Porta and Diani 2004a; see also Diani and Forno 2003). As for the identity of these environmental actors, research suggests a weakening of the "ideological cleavage", noticed in the 1970s and the 1980s--with a conservationist approach, where “the relationship between humankind and nature is mainly framed in ethical and esthetical terms, with low attention to its social implications” (Diani 1988, 47), and an “ ecological approach” that shifted the discourse “from defence to the transformation of the structural element responsible for the environmental decay”, singling out the enemy in the capitalistic world of production (ibid., 58). In the 1990s, these differences seem to be less relevant.

At the organisational level, environmental associations gained widespread public support, which in turn provided rich material and human resources for their organisations. As large as the differences between ecological associations and the traditional image of SMOs appear to be, we have to observe however that the former resemble even less the typical “special interest” groups. Ecological organisations often have a large membership and consistent material resources that led to a structured form of organisation, with formal statutes and membership cards. Notwithstanding these characteristics and a diffusion throughout the national territory, these organisations continued to rely mainly upon activism, with a very small paid staff. The largest source of money are members’ contributions; public money is usually procured in exchange for services contracted out by the state. In many cases, the national organisation is not much more than a co-ordination
committee for semi-autonomous local groups. Even formal organisations are often just “networks of networks” of local groups.

As for their action strategies, environmental associations became more and more involved in both moderate and policy-making-oriented forms of action. They have frequent contacts with public authorities—contacts that are not mediated via protest: they are involved in consultation and receive material support from public sponsors. The forms of pressure are varied. Besides lobbying (understood as action of delegates of interest groups, in direct contact with MPs, members of the government, bureaucrats, etc., with the goal to influence political decisions), techniques of action often used by these groups are public opinion campaigns; more rare is the recourse to legal action. They also have channels of access to the media that are not “mediated” via the news-power of disruptive action.

Notwithstanding the tendency towards institutionalisation, the associations still combine the recognition as interest groups with many elements of a social movement structure and strategies—among which the emphasis on participation, an internal network structure and the frequent appeal to public opinion. However, especially in the last years of the last century, the institutionalization of the most visible environmentalist associations was challenged by more radical groups. Associations like Legambiente and the WWF, for instance, were severely criticized by local citizens’ committees mobilized against the implementation of the High Speed Railway project (della Porta and Andretta 2002).

1.4.2. New voluntarism in the women’s movement

Together with forms of lobbying, a main path for social movement organisations has been towards what, with an awkward neologism, was called Ngo-ism. Many movement organisations developed in fact in the direction of voluntary associations, via the supply of services, either to the members or to the reference public. This path seems to be particularly widespread, for instance, in the women’s movement (della Porta 2001b; 2003b).

In the 1990s, the discourse of the women’s movement moved towards a “politics of presence” (Phillips 1995, 2). The dominant discourse, combining parity and diversity, is that of a new citizenship with equal rights, respecting and considering the differences between different groups. The consequent claim for special rights for certain groups of citizens in order to reach effective equality is approached with a high degree of pragmatism: ideological divisions are less and less important, while there seem to be growing optimistic attitudes. In the new groups which formed in the 1980s, women from different backgrounds cooperate: feminists from the small consciousness raising groups together with women with a "double presence" in the left-wing parties and in the women’s movement. Although the women’s groups are more heterogeneous, the “historical” ideological splits that had divided the movement in the 1970s are (almost) forgotten. Attention to outward-directed action grew since the 1980s. As an Italian feminist stated: "We have transformed ourselves into co-operatives, cultural centres, centres for documentation; we propose to find an audience and support within institutions ... The female world of these new aggregations is a world of pragmatic women, long involved in political circles, giving, on the whole, little importance to the ideological side of the male-female contradiction" (D’Amelia 1985, 124-128, passim).

Together with this pragmatic approach, in the 1990s the women’s involvement in the Third Sector pushed rank-and-file feminist groups to transform themselves, from the
organisational point of view, into voluntary associations, oriented towards the provision of various services. Cultural and welfare associations that rose from within the women’s movement share some common characteristics. First of all, there is a choice for formal structures. Delegation of tasks is an accepted principle. There is moreover a search for professionalisation—even though there are often conflicts between efficiency and democracy – with many associations also using external expertise. Notwithstanding increasing formalisation and professionalisation, the emphasis on participation is however maintained. Formal rules are not always respected (Carlucci 1999, 50): decisions are often decentralised and the groups are small in size. Moreover, the “style” of consciousness raising remained in many groups, although with some relevant differences if compared with the 1970s, with a continuing insistence on the relevance of personal relationships but a focus on practical projects. What also remained from the 1970s is the reticular structure of the movement. Besides coordinatory committees for specific campaigns, there are many networks of local groups active in various regions on the same issues and of women’s groups active on different issues in the same town.

As far as repertoires of action are concerned, in the 1990s “institutional” political action became less and less stigmatised: many women’s movement organisations focused on pressure politics—with systematic contacts with the media and “entryism” in political parties. Visibility derives mainly from press campaigns or a skilled use of the internet, and it is linked to the sponsoring of single projects (Carlucci 1999, 262). Thanks to the “brokerage” function of the Old Left, the women’s organisations have been available to open negotiations with the state institutions, in particular at the local level. In the movement, the idea developed of a “gendered mediation”, that is of relationships with the institutions mediated by women: “to do things among women, to think among women”, to single out modalities of political activities not imposed externally (Libreria delle Donne 1989, 5, in Valenza 1999, 371). Especially female members of left-wing local governments started to be considered as important channels of access to the institutions, and the presence of women in the institutions “as a new value, because it offers the possibility of improving and innovating them [the institutions] with transversal interventions, that is interventions above political and party-line division” (CDI, Progetto, 1987, in Valenza 1999, 338). In general, there is “a growth in the relationships with the institutions, relationships that are based upon collaboration and bargaining, in particular at the local level” (Carlucci 1999, 384). In some cases, women inside the institutions are also members of movement organisations. Interactions developed with such institutions as the neighbourhood council, city council, the district council, the regional government, the national government and its administration, the university, the prison administration, the European Union, as well as various research centres, banks and foundations.

Women’s organisations accept and solicit public financing of specific projects and use public infrastructures for their activities. In fact, the mentioned transformation of women’s groups into voluntary associations providing services for associates or clients led to important changes in their strategies. They organise courses on family problems, consultation of archives, legal counselling, homeopathic medicine, music, theatre, photography. Services like “friendly telephones” are offered on homosexuality as well as on violence against women. Movement organisations moreover tend to have frequent contacts with other organisations as well as with the mass media. However, protest is used sometimes and the supply of services is perceived as advocacy, not as charity.
The women’s movement organisation, in fact, remained quite different from the traditional charitable organisation. In the “new” type of voluntary organisations there is a shift from the neutral category of “poor” to the socially bound category of “marginalised” people; in a parallel move, the goal changes from charity to the struggle for the implementation of citizens’ rights. Especially for new organisations, contacts with the public administration are frequent and often involve material incentives—especially in the form of the contracting out of specific services. The groups act locally, and only in a few occasions there is a co-ordination of associations active at a city level.

1.4.3. Solidarity-movements: The pro-immigrant mobilisations

Also the pro-immigrant mobilisations in Italy are an example for the “new” type of voluntarism, evolving however differently from the women’s movement, especially as far as their relationship with the Old Left and with Catholic voluntarism was concerned. In the 1990s, with the increase in immigration flows, migrants’ rights movements started to mobilise, opposing racist attacks and also performing services for the migrant groups, who had difficulties in getting organised themselves (della Porta 2000). Many of the pro-migrant groups developed as voluntary associations, with an advocacy tune.

The main characteristics of the pro-immigrant mobilisation in Italy have been the patronage role played by the institutional Left and trade unions; the high involvement of the Third Sector in the implementation of integration policies; and the very weak autonomous presence of immigrant-based groups. In fact, in Italy “the unions, the Church and voluntary associations have the same functions that, in other countries, are delegated to immigrants’ associations” (ISMU 1998, 209). The first claims in favour of immigrant rights came indeed, in the mid-1980s, from a coalition of catholic groups, other associations once active with Italian emigrants, and the unions (Campani 1994; Veuglers 1994). These groups developed an inclusive discourse of solidarity, “using a strategy of ‘interest mediation’, whereby the diverse organisations ‘unified’ to lobby their different patrons in the parlycratic system. This had the important effect of making immigration a cross-party but relatively non-thematised political issue” (Statham 1998. 27). Both the Communists and the Christian-democrats had politicians involved in the pro-immigrant mobilisation.

Another main peculiarity of the Italian case is the leading role the unions played in the pro-immigrant coalition. In fact, “the unions were, in these years, one of the actors who paid more attention to the immigrants’ conditions … always aiming at their normative and retributive equalising [to the Italian workers]” (Bonifazi 1998, 89). The egalitarian Italian unions acted in order “to avoid abuses against the weak part of the labour force, but also and above all, to avoid an international competition among workers” (Zincone 1994, 9). Since the very first legislation on immigration, the unions made up for the visible weaknesses of the public administration, offering information and legal protection to immigrants. Due to a low degree of unionisation of the immigrants, however, the unions had an advocator function, more than a representative one (Zincone 1994, 83).

Besides the unions, many voluntary associations offered services to immigrants: courses of Italian language, housing, social and cultural activities. The traditional weakness of the Italian welfare state, together with the high rate of participation in black markets made the immigrants often totally dependent on this supply of services. As in other areas, the role of the voluntary associations proved to be all the more important in granting
informal rights to groups that are not recognised by the welfare state—irregular immigrants in particular (Zincone 1994).

Summarising, the discourse of the pro-immigrant coalition focused on an equality frame, typical of the traditional Left, while claims for a “differential citizenship” were late to develop. The idea of a multiethnic society emerged only well into the 1990s. An important role in the mobilisation was played, in the beginning, by formal associations (among them, the trade unions and the large charity associations close to the Catholic Church). Only in the last few years, rank and file groups grew at the local level, often from within the left-libertarian movement family. Although the various associations in this front make appeal to universal human rights, they act mainly “locally”: often present as voluntary associations, the pro-immigrant groups offer services and legal support to the immigrants living on their territory, leaving to the parties or (few) national organisations a more general struggle for citizens’ right for immigrants. Only in a few occasions, there is a co-ordination of associations active at a city level. The main repertoire of action consists in the provision of various services to the immigrant population as well as educational activities for tolerance in a multicultural society. Protest is used only occasionally.

1.4.4. Citizens’ committees and social movements

The organisational form of spontaneous citizens’ committees, rooted in the territory (at the level of county, district, or often also only of a single street), saw a strong expansion in the 1990s. Protest was often organised around these committees, expressing dissatisfaction with decisions taken “above” without involvement of those directly affected.

As for their identity, the committees are formed on ad hoc themes, often addressed in a reactive way (opposition to decisions of the public administration), asking limited interventions. In this picture, the citizens’ committees have sometimes been seen as the expression of a NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) attitude, as moved by conservative, selfish and materialistic motivations, potentially resisting social change. Other times they have been seen instead as forms of "grass-roots" organisations, essentially democratic, moved by the desire to have a certain influence in the local development of their community (Gould, Schnaiberg and Weinberg 1996, 4). Research on citizens’ committees in Italy indicated that they share the objective of defending the quality of life on their own territory: security and environment, from this point of view, are not alternative but complementary themes (della Porta and Andretta 2001; della Porta 2004a). Looking at their social background, they are not typical of the dormitory districts or the poor ghettos of the big cities (Petrillo 1999, 7). If the leaders of the committees primarily originate from the middle class, with high levels of education, the membership is socially heterogeneous and characterised especially by a rootedness on the territory. The main interpretative schemes are the defence of the local identity, the defence of the quality of life, and the call for a larger participation from below in decision-making processes.

Of the movements of the past, the committees imitate an organisational structure that, also in the presence of formal statutes, is non-hierarchical and flexible, with rare moments of coordination for occasional city-wide mobilisations. From the organisational point of view the committees seem to be weakly structured: the active members are rarely more than ten, the budget is tiny and it originates directly from the members; only very few possess a statute. Coordinatory activity among citizens’ committees is rare--although
apparently growing. At the origins of these committees are friendship ties and previous experiences in neighbourhood initiatives of various types. Participation in parties, associations and labour unions, as well as social movements provides many activists with the necessary knowledge for collective organisation.

As far as the forms of action are concerned, protest remains a fundamental resource for these organisations, but it assumes a moderate form, is very mediatized and privileges influence on public decision-makers over the construction of collective identities. The structure of the mobilisation is accordion-like, widening in the moments of mass mobilisation and tightening again in the phases of latency. The forms of action also recall the repertoires of the left-libertarian movements, reaching from mass demonstrations to symbolic provocations. Manifestos and fliers, together with a notable ability of interaction with the local press, are tools of communication often used by the committees, together with petitions, shows, speeches, and concerts. Although the relationships with the public administrators, with the parties and the political institutions, are considered as more important than the relationships with other social movement organisations, links with environmental associations and the global justice movement/s did develop. The critical attitude towards the forms of the existing political representation does not prevent the committees from lobbying the public powers and, even more important, despite their low level of formalisation, to take part in consultation and political mediation. The committees seem to have a certain success in their interactions with the institutions. They find allies in the local institutions and in the bureaucracies, and often succeed in blocking decisions (for instance, the installations of infrastructures with a high environmental impact) and attract public investments in their area (Bobbio and Zeppetella 1999).

Although they could be interpreted as an extension of traditional neighbourhood associations, with the hope for the creation of social capital and the fear for selfish interests they evoke, our citizens’ committees present however several peculiarities. In particular, their emphasis on protest and political intervention “from below” brings them quite close to the traditional images of the movement organisations of the past—in particular what Kriesi (1996) defined as “local nuclei”—although they lack their universalistic appeal.

1.4.5. Countercultural communities and social movements

The residual signals of radical conflict, at least on the symbolic level, remain especially visible in the juvenile subcultures. Especially in the metropolis, so-called juvenile spectacular gangs -- punks, heavy metal kids, skinheads -- developed between the end of the seventies and the mid-eighties, contributing to the development of countercultural communities. The identity of these groups has been often considered as based on a “negative identification” (Leccardi 1986, 215-221). Particularly in connection with the punks, a possible politicisation, with a radicalisation of the subculture "on the Left", was suggested (Beccalli 1986, 13). Nevertheless, also the juvenile subcultures of the eighties are described as characterised by realism, pragmatism, and emphasis on the leisure time (Calabrò 1986, 272-3).

First signs of renewed unrest, however, were visible at the beginning of the 1990s, with a new student movement rising in the universities. Critical of the educational reform favoured also by the parliamentary Left, its claims have been described as “politically ambiguous”. In fact, in concordance with a general trend against “old” politics, the
*pantera*-movement refused to “take sides”, defending its independence from political parties. Subsequent campaigns, however, found the *pantera* activists consistently mobilized within the left-wing camp. Known above all for their media consciousness and their use of (at the time) modern technology to realize coordination without delegation – the occupied universities communicated via the fax machines of the presidential offices – the students contributed to the innovation of action repertoires. Together with other movements of the nineties like the one against the mafia they broadened the use of highly symbolic repertoires, bent at sensibilization and information, but also at the demonstration of an intense participation, “practicing” the objective to be realized.

The "self-managed social centres" formed the bases of mobilisation of the most radical wings of protest campaigns in the nineties --from those on peace to those against racism, and, in recent years, of the post-Seattle mobilisations. The juvenile social centres have been described as movements of "defection", "impossible to represent in the given forms of politics" (Bascetta 1994, 17-19). Most militants of the centres present themselves as critical of all the expressions of the left, old and new, accused of attempts at “normalisation”; one of the more popular slogans at the demonstrations of the centres is "against the mafia of the parties, self-managed social spaces ".

The organisational structure of the social centres is extremely decentralised. Although constituting a diffused phenomenon--a recent investigation has counted over one hundred of them in Italy--the centers are only very loosely co-ordinated, mainly via magazines (Adinolfi et al. 1994). The assembly is the main decision-making body: "the political form of the Commune of Paris, rather than the quarrelsome and useless central committees" (ibid., 9). The theorised organisational model is in fact the net "constituted of knots, independent one from the other, but connected by a web of knowledge" (ibid., 12).

Although efforts to co-ordinate the social centres regularly failed, research has pointed out three main areas, each one with a dominant frame (Berzano, Gallini and Genova 2002): the anarchist area with an existentialist conception of occupations as liberated spaces and closure towards the external world; the autonomous area which sees itself in continuity with the *autonomia operaia* of the 1970s (which had called for the organisation of the working class in an autonomous way, independent from the Old Left) and which took an anti-institutional stand also at the local level; the “disobedients”, who moved out of the autonomous area in the mid-1990s, opening up towards local institutions and pursuing visibility in the media, and whose main ideological reference point became the Zapatista revolt in Mexico.

Their main form of action--the occupation of spaces in disuse to be transformed into "temporarily autonomous zones"--has brought the young people of the social centres in conflict with the authorities. Repeatedly, waves of occupations were followed by clashes with the police, that often assumed almost ritual dynamics. If we take for instance the Italian case that received the greatest echo in the national and international press, that of the social centre Leoncavallo in Milan, occupied since 1976, it is characterised by repeated skirmishes with the police, that escalated in 1989 and again in 1994. In those occasions, both sides accused each other of brutality.

However, the large majority of today’s social centres are not characterised by a violent repertoire. Significantly, even the judges in a trial against members of the Leoncavallo that had opposed the order of clearance of the squatted centre recognised that the defendants "acted for motives of high moral and social value" (in Ibba 1995, 121-22).
The conclusion of that event, with the assignment to the Leoncavallo of new spaces in free use (after a tug-of-war during which the prefecture and the local police headquarter opposed a coercive intervention) together with the choice of the occupants to use methods of non-violent resistance, testifies of a practice of de-escalation. Although occasionally clashes with racist groups escalated, no spiral of radicalisation comparable to the escalation of violence involving the new left and neofascists in the seventies seems to evolve.

The relationships between social centres and public administration multiplied. Some of the social centres receive public funds for specific services or projects. Social and cultural activities developed within the autonomous spaces often found support and alliances among the local population. The social centres nurture new musical trends and launch groups destined for success and popular acclaim. However, activities are oriented not only to young people, but also to the elderly and weak social groups (among them, the immigrants). According to recent research, those who take part in the activities of the social centres do not originate from marginal social strata (in Italy, 43% of them work and 34% are students) and they have middle to high levels of education. What they look for in the centres is a different culture and a different use of leisure time, as well as social activities (Consorzio Aaster et. al 1996, 29, 31, 41ff.).

Research on the Italian centres further observed that "a certain heroic era of the social centres seems to be declining, with its baggage of proud claims of 'marginality' or, according to others, of believers, generous, and intelligent custodians of the memory, of the practices and of the struggles of the seventies" (ibid., 9). Inside the social centres, in fact, a debate developed on whether to enter the no profit and third sector, securing in this way necessary material resources. This led to the cultural or social role often being privileged over the political one. Whereas the centres initially claimed to be different from and extraneous to (political) power, they later developed and used in public initiatives specific knowledge and skills for intervention in fields such as drugs or juvenile unemployment.

The traditional category of youth sub/countercultures, although very useful for the analysis of the "cultural" identity of the social centres and their profile on the cultural market, remains however insufficient. Although considered as radical, the social centres are not isolated from other movement organisations, and often also from political parties of the left, and they in fact claim to be part of a political movement. This claim reflects important aspects of the identity, organisations and strategy of the social centres that indeed go beyond the category of youth sub/countercultures.

1.4.6. Social movements, the left and labour

In the 1990s, relationships of social movement organisations with the Left were based on a sort of "division of labour". Especially at the local but also at the transnational level, movements retreated to the "social", entering into occasional alliances with the institutional left (especially, with single city counsellors or representatives of political parties). There was however also tension in this relationship, as the PCI evolved into the DS and the centre-left coalition of the Ulivo formed: although civil society groups occasionally mobilised in support of the centre left political events (e.g. against the first centre-right government lead by Silvio Berlusconi and in the following electoral campaigns), social movement organisations expressed (more or less open) dissatisfaction with the moderation of the political discourse of the centre-left parties and, especially, with
a conception of politics as more and more reserved to professional politicians and concerned with little more but “good administration”. The political scandals linked to corruption produced, also in the Left, a retreat from politics. Moreover, the determination of the centre-left government of Romano Prodi to enter the European Monetary Union, with the connected need of “austerity policies” implying cuts in public services, privatisation and flexibilisation of the labour market met with opposition in movement organisations.

Open conflicts with the “old left” developed in particular on labour issues. Since the beginning of the nineties, the traditional unions CGIL, CISL and UIL took part in concertation tables, negotiating on austerity policies. Although not a neocorporatist country, Italy had seen in the early nineties a trend towards trilateral concertation, perceived by “technical” and centre-left governments as a necessity in order to implement austerity economic policies and enter the EMU. The development of concertation in Italy could be understood as a convergence towards a European model of industrial relations (Regini 2000), often emphasised also in EU papers. In Italy, as in most European countries, protest against policies of privatising public services like transport, schools and health arose (Moody 1997). Strikes on salaries and working conditions and industrial dismissals developed above all in the large factories and in the public sector. Especially during the Berlusconi-led governments (1994-95; 2001-), general strikes mobilised millions of workers against a reform of the pension system, cuts in the welfare state, and reforms which would have reduced workers’ rights.

These waves of protest affected the unions. Grassroots trade union organisations such as Cobas and SinCobas, which developed especially during the 1990s (above all in the public sector), stressed the defence of the “dignity” of the workers, but they also criticised the bureaucratisation of the established unions and called for more direct democracy in the election of workers’ representatives (della Porta 2004b). Emphasising participation, they introduced organisational principles such as turn-over of delegates and qualified majority for decision-making and they were able to increase their membership at the expense of the official unions. Inside the leftwing union CGIL, rank-and-file discontent found expression in the “Cambiare Rotta” [Change Course]” fraction. In recent years, and in part stimulated by these developments, criticism of neoliberal economic policies has been voiced also within the traditional trade-union confederations (especially the CGIL) that started to stigmatise the social dumping brought by unrestrained competition among nations based on reducing the cost of labour and flexibilizing (and precarization) of employment. In fact, despite initial distrust, closer relationships started to develop between the CGIL and the global justice movement/s.

1.5. The heritage of national left-wing social movement families

Notwithstanding their differences, the various forms of movements that developed since the 1980s seem to have some elements in common. First of all, movement organisations seem to share a pragmatic, very “concrete” language, an emphasis on specialisation with a prevalence of the “experts” upon the “ideologists”, and a stress upon the non-partisan nature of their claims. Another common feature of social movements in the 1990s is a tendency toward an organisational institutionalisation or at least structuration, although often a precarious one. Adopting legal statutes, introducing formal and informal divisions of assignments, etc., are often preconditions to get access to public
institutions—both in terms of participation in the policy process and resource mobilisation. Forms of protest seem to become, overall, more moderate. Demonstrative actions of small groups tended to rely more upon innovation than upon violence. When there was confrontation, tactics of civil disobedience and non-violence prevailed. Mass action was rare, and when used, there was often a preference for forms that require low individual investment (as, for instance, petitions).

In view of the involvement of social movement organizations from previous generations in the emerging global justice movement, however, it is important to underline also another set of elements common to the movements we have been looking at. First, an emphasis on differential rights and continuing demands for participation from below, against the corruption of representative politics. Notwithstanding the tendency towards organizational institutionalisation, social movement organizations continued to rely mainly upon activism. The social movements of the 1990s did continue to use protest, with radical forms of action surviving at the margin. In addition, especially some movement organizations showed themselves open to the criticism of their institutionalization, professionalization and moderation, increasingly voiced by radical grassroots groups in the last years of the last century.

Another element that seems common to the different types of movements we observed is the ability to use channels of access to the institutions. Movement organisations became more and more involved not only in the formation but also in the implementation of public decisions. This development brought them into increasing contact with traditional third sector organizations. Voluntarism in Italy had developed within the communist and the catholic subcultures, with close ties with the PCI and the Christian Democratic Party. The collapse of the Italian party system in the beginning of the 1990s had largely liberated these associations from strictly political allegiance and had made them open towards formerly unconsidered alliances, preparing the field for the collaboration and contamination between social movement organizations, solidarity and voluntary associations and radical grassroots groups (Marcon 2004; Rosi 2003).

These processes were favoured by the changing political environment: throughout the 1980s and 1990s we see a weakening of the Old Left, the main institutional ally of the movements, with the main successor party of the PCI, the Democrats of the Left (DS) moving to an openly reformist position in the social democratic tradition. The relationship between the movements and the Old Left, which in the 1980s and 1990s was characterised above all by temporary alliances on specific issues, became increasingly conflictual since the mid-1990s, when a centre-left coalition returned to government, implementing austerity policies. Social movement organizations in alliance with traditional voluntary associations repeatedly opposed policy decisions of the Centre-Left governments, which also by legislative measures had favoured an “outsourcing” of social service and development aid projects to third sector associations.

2. Characteristics of the Italian “movement for a globalisation from below”

2.1. Introduction

For the emergence and the success of the Italian “movement for a globalization from below” both international and national developments were of importance. Especially in the emerging phase of the movement, the zapatista insurrection in Mexico provided an
important point of reference. The collaboration and contamination between groups coming from diverse cultural and political traditions was favoured by and gradually developed in the organization of a series of counter summits promoted since the 1980s by civil society organisations in occasion of the official summits of international governmental organisations (Pianta 2001) and of international campaigns like Jubilee 2000. In the Italian case, of particular importance for the success in building a broad network was the fact that two large international movement events (the Genoa G8 counter summit and the first European Social Forum in Florence) were organized in the country. The mass appeal of the “movement of movements” in Italy was certainly favoured by the national political situation, i.e. the presence of the centre-right government led by Silvio Berlusconi.

It was the success of the protests against the third conference of the WTO in November 1999 in Seattle and the broad coalition realised in that occasion that increasingly led Italian SMOs with quite different backgrounds to concentrate, for the sake of common campaigns, more on the uniting elements than on potential divisions. This led to various successful co-ordination efforts which in 2000 brought together social centres, laic and catholic solidarity and voluntary organisations and a movement sector closer to the traditional left in protests against, among others, the NATO, the OECD and a fair on biotechnology in Genoa.

These experiences formed the basis for the organisation of the protests against the G8 in Genoa in July 2001, launched at the first World Social Forum (WSF) in January 2001. More than 800 groups came together in the Genoa Social Forum (GSF), characterised by a very light structure and an inclusive approach, which relied largely on the resources put at its disposal by the member organisations. The GSF managed to attract organisations which previously had refused to adhere to similar co-ordination efforts. This attraction could not be taken for granted because adherence to the GSF required the signing of a “work agreement” specifying what type of protest initiatives were accepted under its umbrella and what kind of action repertoires were banned. Earlier versions of the “work agreement” excluding any kind of violence had been agreed upon already in occasion of several co-ordinated protests in 2000.

The GSF (as later the ESF) functioned as a structure linking a galaxy of small groups, typical for new social movements whose organisational structure has been described as segmented, multicentric and networked (Gerlach 1976; 2001). Compared to its precursors, however, the “movement of movements” is characterised far more by the presence of weak ties between groups which maintain differentiated organisational models. It is in fact the co-presence of different traditions which makes more structured models of co-ordination obsolete: the condition for an effective collaboration of groups with different social, cultural and political backgrounds in a global mobilisation seems to be the capacity to co-ordinate and cooperate through ties which allow to keep ones own specificity. From the very beginning, in fact, the GSF considered this plurality a positive factor and one of its strengths.

The plurality of organisational models, social, political and cultural backgrounds within the movement has been seen as evidence that we are not in the presence of a global justice movement, but of distinct movements forming temporary and shifting alliances on global justice issues and for specific protest events. In the following we will look at the Italian “new globals” or “movement for a globalisation from below”, the networks and activists contributing to it, their frames and action repertoires, arguing that, at least in Italy,
we are in the presence of a movement. In a further section we shall discuss the political opportunities for the movement and the reaction of the state and the political parties to its sudden rise. This part of the report is based upon our past research (Andretta et al. 2002; 2003; della Porta et al. 2005), in particular on the activist surveys we conducted at the Genoa anti-G8 mobilization and the European Social Forum in Florence (for the tools of empirical measurement see annex).

2.2. The organizational networks of the Italian “movement for a globalization from below”

The network is an organizational structure that facilitates the emergence of transnational movements: in the case of the Italian global justice movement the network structure also typifies the various sectors forming part of it, albeit with sometimes considerable diversity in organizational strategies. This is immediately apparent if one considers the Italian organized components that joined the mobilization against the G8 in Genoa in 2001. The various “souls” of the movement aggregated into thematic sectors, notably around the Catholic and secular associations of the Lilliput network, the organizations of the more traditional left in the ATTAC sector, and the social centers in the area of the Disobedients and the Network for Global Rights. As can be seen from figure 1, however, the GSF did not represent the whole spectrum of groups challenging the G8. Some more radical groups in fact chose to remain autonomous, sharply criticizing the GSF’s attempt to present itself to the public opinion as the representative body of the movement and to lay down which forms of action were acceptable and which not. These networks of anarchist and anti-imperialist inspiration (among them the Black Bloc) also criticized the WSF charter of principles, regarded as too moderate and reformist. The more moderate religious groups also remained outside of the GSF, marking their differences with an initiative that, according to them, did not exclude methods of a violent character. They met two weeks before the G8 in Genoa to make public their manifesto to the leaders of the summit which they saw as the institution most appropriate to present with their demands for a “globalization of solidarity and responsibilities”.

Figure 1. Key Genoa protest networks
As we shall see, competitive and cooperative dynamics at work within existing SMOs and networks and between them led to the configuration (and reconfiguration) of the movement for a globalization from below. Rather than a weakness, this organizational flexibility seems to represent a strong point of a movement based upon differing identities, which are valued rather than being suffocated.

2.2.1. ATTAC and the institutional left: Controlling the market through politics

One of the organizations created ex novo for the anti-neoliberal mobilization, and undoubtedly the most influential at transnational level, is ATTAC: set up in France in 1998 with the aim of exercising democratic control over the supranational institutions that guide the process of economic globalization, ATTAC spread to dozens of countries with national sections enjoying a high degree of autonomy. Present in Genoa and then in Florence, ATTAC-Italy began forming in 2001 (concluding the process in early 2002 with the first national assembly), as a national network incorporated in the wider international one (Finelli 2003a; 2003b). It is supported by the left-wing daily "Il Manifesto", and by a broad area of associations traditionally close to the left, even if they are not affiliated members. Close to ATTAC is for instance the ARCI, the historic recreational and cultural association of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), "refounded" in 1994 as an autonomous "new association".

In Italy, as in other European countries, also currents of social-democratic and communist, or post-communist, parties (especially Rifondazione Comunista (RC) and its youth organisation) and trade unions, which feel particularly close to the idea of political control of the market congregated around ATTAC. In this context, the importance of the development of grassroots unionism during the 1990s and growing criticism of neoliberal politics inside the established unions has to be underlined. Competition and tension between institutional and more radical unions generated a radicalization of the conflict around labor issues that involved many workers, who in turn appropriated the more institutionalized trade-union structures as vehicles of mobilization. Organizations are in fact also conditioned by their social base of reference. Especially during periods of high mobilization, the more structured organizations may lose control of the protest. In some cases the base manages to “reappropriate” these organizations as instruments for mobilization (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, 44). The Italian case is emblematic. In July 2001, the confederated unions (CGIL, CISL and UIL) decided not to take part in the days of mobilization in Genoa. While the CGIL (the major left-wing union) called for distance to be taken from the violent fringes, the call from the CISL (the catholic trade union) was “not to join initiatives of the GSF” ("Il Manifesto" 24/07/01). On the contrary the FIOM, which organizes the CGIL metalworking sector, fully joined the initiatives, and many of those demonstrating on 21 July 2001 carried the CGIL flag. Subsequently, not just the FIOM but also the internal current “Cambiare Rotta [Change Course]” convinced the CGIL of the importance of a global movement for workers’ rights. The CGIL was present at anti-war demonstrations, and the new global movement took part in various strikes called by the confederated unions. Relations between the movement and the CGIL intensified in occasion of the general strike called in spring 2002 against the reform of the workers’ charter proposed by the centre-right Berlusconi government, culminating in full adherence by the CGIL to the Florence ESF.
2.2.2. Between ethical commitment and nonviolence: Solidary ecopacifism

In the last few months of 1997, some of the Italian organizations which since the late eighties had coordinated to promote joint campaigns against the imbalances brought by globalization, decided to give rise to periodic meetings with an eye to avoiding "repetition of similar initiatives that disperse the scarce energies of each organization/campaign, whereas encounter and dialogue might produce a multiplier effect" (Bologna et al. 2001, 9). The setting up of the "inter-campaign table" as a place for coordinating organizations engaged in campaigns focusing on different issues but with the same general objectives enabled representatives of the various Italian organizations to meet, get to know each other, and compare and define work methods based on a process of consensual decision making and common pathways. The project to create a network called Lilliput was launched officially in July 1999, and from then on began to define an organizational structure (a network of local nodes) that was to prove particularly serviceable to the objectives of mobilization (Veltri 2003b). Lilliput thus took its first steps before the Seattle protests, although it gained visibility only after the failure of the WTO summit and active involvement of local groups in the project started only after the drafting of a manifesto in the first months of 2000. The network's name derives from Jonathan Swift: the idea of the little Lilliputians immobilizing the giant Gulliver symbolizes the strategy of uniting the strength of many tiny groups to block the giants of neoliberal globalization.

The Lilliput network consists of dozens of local nodes, with a few internally more homogeneous elements. First, we have the environmentalist area, including the Italian section of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and other well established environmentalist and animal rights organizations. The participation of these organisations seems to invert the tendency to institutionalisation that typified the environmentalist movement in the eighties and nineties in Italy, as in other European countries (Rootes 2003; TEA 2000; Diani and Donati 1998; della Porta and Diani 2004a). The tension between the institutionalized environmental associations and more radical groups which emerged especially towards the end of the 1990s has certainly not diminished today, but the movement against neoliberalism sees more moderate, but well organized, environmentalist organizations coming together, cooperating and talking with radical ecologist groups with few resources.

Alongside the "Green" component of the network we find the area of the Catholic-inspired associations, well represented by Mani Tese [Outstretched Hands] and Pax Christi. Mani Tese, born in 1964, is a lay association dealing with awareness-raising and development cooperation, without ignoring political pressure actions. The Italian section of Pax Christi, founded in 1954, changed radically in the late seventies, becoming involved in annual peace marches. Often critical of the ecclesiastical hierarchies, it defines itself as "a leaven within the church" and regards the G8 as a "structure of sin" (interview with Fabio Giunti, in Marradi and Ratto 2001, 31). These organizations actively promote critical consumption, organizing boycotts of multinationals violating workers' rights and environmental protection standards. Also part of the Lilliput network are many NGOs operating in the world's South, which are often committed to promoting fair, solidarity-based trade with peasants and craftspersons in poor countries.

In recent years, religious-based organizations have been more involved in international as well as national politics, cooperating with different sectors of local and global civil society. In Italy (as probably elsewhere) this development in part can be attributed to the continuing influence of those catholic grassroots currents that we saw
becoming involved in the movements of the 1960s and 1970s. For our case, we also have to underline the consequences of the collapse of the Christian democratic party, whose position in the party system was taken over by Berlusconi’s “Forza Italia”, which culturally remained alien to large sectors of the catholic voluntary associations. Within the religious world, as within the environmentalist movement, mechanisms of organizational appropriation were particularly visible. The involvement of religious based organizations in the movement can also be connected with general trends. According to John Clark “many religions have experienced declining membership and mounting questions of relevance. In response, they increasingly engage in issues of morality and society beyond narrow questions of faith” (2003, 12). Thus, not only have inter-faith initiatives accelerated, but “religious leaders are increasingly willing to join networks with secular organizations” and “inter-faith activities today tend to concentrate on issues of peace, sustainability, human rights, poverty, education and - more recently - economic globalization” (ibid., 13; see also Livezy 1989, Keck and Sikkink 1998, Gadner 2002). The importance and extent of the involvement of religious based organizations emerges, for instance, from the participation of Caritas Europe in the promotion of the ESF in Florence.

2.2.3. Against capitalism: The area of “antagonism”

A third area that joined the GSF is that of the social centers, characterized by a low level of internal coordination. While today the Italian social centers are numerous (some 200), they are also very heterogeneous in cultural background, objectives and forms of action (Dines 1999). A pioneering study in the early eighties on the social centers in the Milan area had already identified the relationship with the institutions (negotiation, or else confrontation/refusal/distance) as a particularly problematic point, observing for some social centers of processes of institutionalization and professionalization, through transfer of resources by institutions in exchange for carrying out socio-cultural activities (Grazioli and Lodi 1984). In the last decade a sizable proportion of the Italian social centers has undergone an organizational evolution which might be interpreted as a process of "commercialization," whereby some organizations put growing emphasis on offering services paid for by member-users (della Porta and Diani 1999). This process, though not implying renunciation of activity of a political and social nature (Berzano, Gallini and Genova 2002), is marked also by increasing interaction with the political system and the adoption of more institutional action repertoires.

An evolutionary process of this type characterizes the social centers from which the “tute bianche [White Overalls]” evolved, notable for moderation in action repertoires and abandonment of a classical revolutionary vision. Some members from social centers close to the White Overalls have participated in municipal elections (and in some cases been elected) or supported particular candidacies. Some of the social centers that mobilized in the White Overalls have gradually become "legalized" and established and maintained good relations with such parties as the Greens, and especially RC. Among the groups that participated in creating the White Overalls is the Ya Basta association, founded in 1996 after the first intercontinental meeting against neoliberalism, held in the Lacandona forest in Mexico.

Other social centers have dissociated themselves from a process of legalization and institutionalization they stigmatize as a “reformist drift” (Berzano and Gallini 2000). Starting in March 2001, with the Naples mobilization against the Global Forum on e-
government (organized by the United Nations), the Network for Global Rights, a coordination between the COBAS (grassroots unions) and some social centers mobilized on labor, the environment and immigration, began to form. Differently than in previous mobilizations, when the radical social centers had not joined forces with the more moderate groups, the Network for Global Rights participated in the GSF, although with internal tensions (some social centers linked with it claimed their own independence).

After Genoa, the White Overalls (which already at Genoa had decided to dissolve in order to promote a broader entity, coordinating the “antagonist” groups and student collectives) and part of the Network joined in the “Disobedients”. For a considerable period close to the Disobedients were also the Giovani Comunisti [Young Communists], the youth organization of RC which can count on 10,000 members. The Giovani Comunisti constituted "one of the main vehicles of encounter between the Seattle people and RC" ("Liberazione" 22/12/01). At the ESF in Florence, the Disobedients opted for a more “loose” presence, taking part in the official forum events, but also organizing parallel discussion groups that took place separately and distinct from the forum.

Concluding, in the anti-capitalist area internal competition has led some groups to join the movement’s coordination structures – even if they sometimes, like the Disobedients in Florence, feel the need to underline their own profile – while others have chosen to remain "autonomous", severely criticizing the institutionalization of the movement. The latter groups, in fact, started to organize meetings alternative to the official European Social Forums.

2.2.4. Local social forums

At the local level, activists from the three networks we have just described, as well as from other organizations, often meet in Social Forums. Many local Social Forums developed a few months before the protest against the G8 in Genoa in order to coordinate the mobilization. In most of the cases, they survived and many more were formed in the same year and in 2002. In the Spring of 2003, 170 Social Forums were catalogued in Italy, not only in cities, but also in rural areas (della Porta 2004c; 2005).

The Italian local Social Forums usually define themselves as open, public arenas for permanent discussion: a forum is, in this interpretation, “a tribune for the local civil society” (Fruci 2003, 174). To take just one example, the fundamental document of the Florence Social Forum states: “We are citizens, unions and associations, movements and self-organized groups, political and social actors that meet each other in the Social Forum of Florence. We feel part of an international movement that aims at challenging oligarchies and they anti-democratic procedures, represented by the big world economic and military organizations” (see del Giorgio 2004). The role of the forum is defined as “a network structure composed by individual and collective actors that share the principles and the analysis contained in the Charta. It is an instrument to act at various levels. It is first of all a table for confrontation, not a monolithic political actor. Its subjectivity is expressed in movement forms and it refuses dogmatic positions”. Also other fundamental documents of the Italian local Social Forums state that the movement is composed of “a kaleidoscope of colors and experiences” (Catania Social Forum in Piazza and Barbagallo 2003, 6). In the different areas, the local social forums have taken different forms, often involving also some center-left parties against center-right local governments.
2.2.5. Internal democracy

The question of internal democracy is of highest importance for a movement having among its objectives democratic participation and the democratization of the institutions of globalization. The three main organizational networks of the Italian movement all make explicit reference to the themes of participatory and deliberative democracy (Finelli 2003a; Veltri 2003a; Becucci 2003). The principles of participation and dialogue, low recourse to voting, time-limited delegation on specific questions, control of delegates, and the consensus method are met with again in the functioning of the social forums at various territorial levels, often marked by absence of leadership, presence of thematic groups, horizontality, etc. (Fruci 2003).

Table 1. Organizational characteristics by networks

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE</th>
<th>Networks</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attac-Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Formalization</td>
<td>Defined in a constitution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Specialization</td>
<td>High (national working commissions)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Main decisional organism (other than assembly)</td>
<td>National council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Composition of decisional organism</td>
<td>Defined by common agreement between local and national level</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center-periphery relationship</td>
<td>Local level contributes to selection of members of National council</td>
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MODEL OF DECISION-MAKING

| Type of leadership | Concentrated (but not individual) | Diffuse (with rotation according to different issues) | Concentrated (charismatic and individual) |
| Decisional method | Majority rule | Consensus method | Unanimity |

The dilemma of how to reconcile efficacy in decision-making with participation and deliberation has, however, been tackled, by recourse to various solutions. Table 1 summarizes the main findings of the comparison among the three organizational networks. We see that the degree of formalization and specialization is highly differentiated: ATTAC-Italy has a constitution, fee-paying membership, individual membership cards and an organizational structure with a clear division of labour and a high degree of specialization. The Lilliput network does not have a constitution, but rules and procedures have been clearly defined in a manifesto and a formally approved document of fundamental values. Membership is not formalized, but considerable specialization developed inside the network. The degree of formalization of the Disobedients is extremely reduced: there is no official document defining the organizational structure and functioning of the network, and the functions of the various organizational structures are not clear. The local social forums
usually define themselves as arenas for discussion, collaboration and contamination, not as organizations. They are structured on the basis of a “work agreement”, not a formal constitution, often foreseeing (quite autonomous) working groups, focusing on specific issues (migrant rights, casual works etc.).

In all three organizational networks (and in the local social forums) the assembly is formally the main decisional body, but various forms of executive or coordinating committees also evolved – often (especially in the case of Lilliput) after intense discussion – with different degrees of (formal and informal) power. ATTAC-Italy follows a more “associational” model, bent, however, on assuring a high level of participation by guaranteeing the involvement of the local level in the selection of the members of the National Council. The Disobedients are an example for a “assemblary” model, with a national assembly meeting every two or three months, but have never made known the way members of the national council are selected, nor indicated when or where it meets or what decisions it takes. In their case, in addition, efforts to improve internal democracy similar to those of the other two networks are not known. Lilliput tried to assure that the sub-node (its coordinating committee) remained restricted to a purely service function, leaving all “real” decisions to the national assembly and the assemblies of the thematic groups. The sub-node, however, has considerable autonomy in emergency situations.

Leadership is of diffuse type in the case of Lilliput (and of local social forums) and concentrated in ATTAC and the Disobedients, in the latter case also individual and charismatic. The different attention paid to deliberation emerges if we look at the modes of decision-making adopted by the three organizational networks: ATTAC applies the majority criterion, whereas the Rete Lilliput practices the consensus method (typical also for the local social forums), and the Disobedients seek to reach unanimity. It is important to stress that the Disobedients’ unanimity does not coincide with Lilliput’s consensus. The consensus method is above all a (often time consuming) process for reaching a decision acceptable by all. It is not unanimity (the outcome may not be everybody’s first choice) nor a majority vote.

In the cases of both Lilliput and ATTAC, a tension remains between the horizontal (local nodes, territorial committees) and the vertical (sub-node, national council) element, tied up with the trade-off between participation and efficiency: in both cases the organizations operating at the local level ask for full sovereignty, and criticize the arbitrariness of the bodies operating at national level and the concentration of power at the top. In the case of the Disobedients, by contrast, no such tension seems to have emerged, even if the opacity of the decision-making process and of the organizational structure reduces the visibility of dissent for outsider observers.

2.3. Activists and networks: From bloc recruitment to the “movement for a globalization from below”

The organizational networks in the movement play a fundamental part in the mobilization of activists and sympathizers. 26% of the activists interviewed in Genoa stated that they got to know about the movement through the organization they belong to, and 36% stated that the organizations had a significant role in informing them about the anti-G8 demonstrations.

Not only the organizations as such but also the cooperation among them, the
networks they form and the dialogue they set going, encourage participation. In the movement against neoliberalism, participation by individuals not belonging to the organizations that call for the mobilization is particularly marked: among participants, only 44.6% at Genoa and 49.3% at Florence reported belonging to any of the organizations that had mobilized in those two events. The spread of individual participation indicates the movement’s capacity to attract sympathizers from outside the “bloc recruitment”, also reflecting the stress on a new type of militancy seeking to combine the need for individual expression typical of post-modern societies with the development of collective identity. In the movement against globalization the presence of this form of activism appears particularly significant.

Considering only those demonstrators belonging to organizations formally adhering to the GSF and the ESF, and focusing on the most visible and important networks, according to our activist surveys demonstrators affiliated to the area closest to the traditional left represented 39.5% at the Genoa anti-G8 mobilization and 36.4% at the Florence ESF; respectively 29.9% and 23.0% were members of ecopacifist organizations; while 24.5% at Genoa and 34% at Florence belonged to the more radical area of the anti-capitalist left. Other activists stated to take part in the activities not of one organization in particular but of a local social forum, i.e. a network of organizations and individuals active on the issue of globalization (3.8% at Genoa and 6.6% at Florence).

Table 2. Past and present organizational affiliation of ESF participants by country of origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization type</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
<th>(N)</th>
<th>Cramer's V</th>
<th>Cramer's V (no UK)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political party</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>(266)</td>
<td>.41***</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>(278)</td>
<td>.40***</td>
<td>.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Movement and/or Network</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>(396)</td>
<td>.34***</td>
<td>.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>(329)</td>
<td>.21***</td>
<td>.20***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women association</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>(187)</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental association</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>(261)</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td>.32***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary group (charity)</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>(319)</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants' association</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>(287)</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreational and sports association</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>(316)</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student group</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>(367)</td>
<td>.29***</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Centers</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>(166)</td>
<td>.25***</td>
<td>.22***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious group</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen committee</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>(174)</td>
<td>.20***</td>
<td>.21***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N) (142-6) (137-42) (76-81) (112-4) (147-9) (623-31)

Note: Table entries are the distribution of responses to the question of which type of organization ESF participants belong or have belonged to, by country of origin. The percentages add to more than 100 percent because multiple responses were possible.

Legenda: *** = significant at the 0.001 level; ** = significant at the 0.01 level; n.s. = non significant.
Though many participants do not belong to organizations formally part of the movement, many of them are or have been in the past members of some sort of political or social group. The ESF data show that even those who are not actual members in any movement organization have past organizational experiences similar to those of the organized militants. Out of 13 types of political/social/religious groups listed, the non-organized declared they were or had been members, on average, of 4.8 types of organization, and the organized of 5.3.

What is striking is the variety of groups that the activists declare to have been part of. Participants of the ESF stated they had been a member in the past or were a member of (see table 2): social movements (63.4%), student collectives (58.5%), NGOs (52.9%), social voluntary associations (51%), recreational and sports associations (50.5%), pro-migrants’ organizations (46.1%), trade unions (44.3%), political parties (42.4%), ecological groups (41.5%), feminist groups (29.6%), neighbourhood committees (27.8%), social centers (26.8%), religious movements (16%).

As emerges from studies of social movements using network analysis, multiple participation in various organizations favours interorganisational exchanges, facilitating relations among the different groups (Diani 1995). From this viewpoint it is interesting to note that the militants that participate in the activities of various groups form networks similar to those making up the organizational sectors analysed. This can be seen from the clusters showing up in a multiscaling analysis (see figure 2). To understand how the clusters are produced, it should be borne in mind that proximity reflects overlapping membership.

In the diagram we find at the top right a cluster made up of religious movements, NGOs, environmental organizations, and voluntary associations, constituting the linked archipelago we have called the ecopacifist sector. Overlapping the two left-hand squares we find party organizations, trade unions and the political movements forming the sector of the anti-neoliberal left. Finally, at the bottom we find the social centers, sometimes overlapping with the student collectives that represent the anti-capitalist element of the movement. The multiscaling analysis enables us to identify two latent dimensions distinguishing the clusters. While the vertical dimension of the diagram seems to define generational distance (which separates younger members of social centers and student organizations from older ones in more structured organizations), the horizontal one clearly distinguishes between politics-oriented organizations (parties, unions and political movements) and society-oriented ones (especially ecosolidarity organizations), with social centers and students’ associations in between.²

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² On the distinction between politics-oriented and society-oriented groups see Kriesi (1996).
While the movement networks take shape on the basis of ideological or political affinities, this progressive integration of the individual networks is the outcome not just of organizational decisions but also of an “integration from below” brought about by men and women who have participated in the activities of various groups, contributing to the creation of channels of interorganizational communication, facilitating linkage among different sectors.

One could argue that we are in the presence of individual networks integrated only within movement sectors more or less homogeneous from the ideological and political viewpoint. In reality, if we aggregate individuals on the basis of the clusters that formed using multiscaling, distinguishing among those who participated in activities of ecopacifist, traditional and antagonistic left organizations (as shown in figure 2), and check the overlap

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3 We placed all participants who stated they belonged to NGOs, voluntary or environmentalist associations, or religious movements or had done so in the past in the ‘eco-solidarity’ category; members of a political party or trade union in the ‘traditional left’ category; and those involved in social centre and student collective
among these three aggregates, we note that individuals not only join different organizations in the same sector of the movement, but also organizations forming part of movement sectors with quite evident cultural differences. In fact, 51.2% of the activists have shared experience in both traditional-left and antagonistic organizations, while 54.8% have been in both the traditional left and ecopacifist organizations, and 54.2% have been associated with both antagonistic organizations and ecopacifist associations. In practice, while 16.3% of activists have been or are in organizations of a single movement sector, 36.2% participate, or have done, in the activities of organizations of two sectors, and no less than 41.3% have been or are members of groups belonging to all three sectors.4

The widespread experience of multiple affiliation points to the prevalence of militants characterized by a complex identity and open to diversity, which fits the identity of the movement. At the same time, the existence of a network of activists with experience of participation in organizations of various sectors has certainly facilitated interorganizational relations. We can accordingly conclude that the movement of movements is not a mere coalition among organizations, but a social movement in the strict sense, in which identities are interwoven at both meso (inter-group) and micro (inter-participant) levels.

2.4. The construction of a master frame

The basis of a “common view” of the movement against neoliberal globalisation has been built by way of what Snow and Benford have called “meaning work” (1992, 136). Through “meaning work”, social movements symbolically construct a collective subject (the working class, the people, the nation, environmentalists, women, etc.); integrate the structural mobilisation potential; convince sympathisers to become involved in a collective action, and convince broader public opinion that the movement’s claims are “fair” and that the status quo is “unjust”. As Gerhards and Rucht (1992, 572, emphasis added) underline, “promoting public definitions of problems and their solutions is not just one of many components of protest campaigns and social movements that have to be considered in an analysis; instead, to the extent that movements can exert influence only through mobilising the public, it is the key factor”. Although the meaning work is important in every social movement, be it “old” or “new”, it has a particular importance for the “movement of movements” because of the heterogeneity not only of the social constituency addressed by the movement and the constituency that actually mobilises but also of the set of potential mobilising structures (NGOs, SMOs, political parties, trade unions, voluntary associations, activities in the category of ‘antagonistic left’. It is to be remembered that the analysis deals with all those activists who had organizational experience, and not only those who belonged to organizations that were formally part of the ESF.

4 The remaining 6.2% belong to none of these sectors but sports associations, groups in support of migrants, etc.

5 For an analysis of the social construction of the working class see Thompson (1980); for a cultural approach to the formation of the working class see Somers (1992) and Steinmetz (1992), and for the importance of symbolic construction in new social movements see Melucci (1996). Hunt, Benford and Snow (1994) provided a theoretical framework for the identity formation through framing process.

6 Gerhards and Rucht call this function “cultural integration” (1992, 559).

7 Gamson claims that “collective action frames are injustice frames” (1992, 68, emphasis in the original).
Snow and Benford (1988, 199-200) underlined the following dimensions of a master frame: a) the diagnostic dimension - “diagnostic framing involves identification of a problem and the attribution of blame and causality”; b) the prognostic dimension - “a proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done”; c) the motivational dimension - “a call to arms for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action”. In addition, as Hunt, Benford and Snow pointed out, “identity constructions, whether intended or not, are inherent in all social movement framing activities”, and frames perform this difficult task by “situating or placing relevant sets of actors in time and space by attributing characteristics to them that suggest specifiable relationships and lines of action” (Hunt, Benford and Snow 1994, 185).

2.4.1. Organizational frames

If we look at the definition of the “self” in documents elaborated by organisational actors belonging to different sectors of the movement from Seattle up to the second WSF, we see a change from “international civil society” to “social movements”. The heterogeneity of the movement became a factor which was attributed symbolic and positive value and the stigmatising label “no global” was countered by the declaration “We are global”. That we are dealing with the construction of a collective identity is evident especially in the ESF call, where actors reveal a long “memory”: a “narrative identity” of the “Self”, devoting a relevant part of the document to the “representation” of a collective identity. A collective actor needs a memory in order to perceive the continuity of its existence: “The memory is history in action” (Bauman 1982).

The frame is fleshed out when actors provide a logical connection between themes, so that the causes of problems (grievances) are explicitly defined. Different problems can be perceived as having different causes, but if different actors want to mobilise together they must negotiate the logical chain of events that imputes causes to problems. In the case of the movement against neoliberal globalisation, this imputation of common causality has been socially built through what Sidney Tarrow (2002) defined “frame condensation”, through which different targets, perceived as causes of the problems, are “condensed” in one “meta target”. Condensing the target upon neoliberalism (or neoliberalism-capitalism-imperialism) allowed a logical connection between the different sectorial problems attributing them to the same macro-cause.

Another essential function of the master frame is to find shared solutions for the problems “represented”. The movement documents focus especially on democracy from below and on social justice, linked to the principle of solidarity and to environmental justice (after September 11, peace became a dominant and unifying issue). The cognitive connections reinforce the relations between different organisations and sectors: social justice is directly linked with the frames of “old” social movements (unions, leftwing parties and radical anti-capitalist movements); environmental justice links all the frames which emerged with new social movements; the solidarity frame is widespread among

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8 We analysed five documents: the calls for protest against the WTO in Seattle 1999 and against the G8 in Genoa 2001, the call for participation in the first ESF, and the two final documents prepared during the world social forums in 2001 and in 2002 (for details see della Porta et al. 2005).
religion-based movements. The master frame provided the symbolic basis for unifying the old with the new social movements, the religious with the secular movements, the workers with peasants movements, the anti-authoritarian women and student movements with the more established and bureaucratic unions and leftist parties, the “polite” and professionalized NGOs with the “impolite” and very loosely connected radical grassroots movements, and so on.

Having defined causes and effects, and having stated that “another world is possible”, people are called to mobilize in collective action. The documents selected often use words such as struggle, mobilization, and resistance. Also very often stressed is the need to strengthen the network of movements, to widen the network, by building new alliances and broadening the collective identity, once again for more mobilization and more protest campaigns. Struggle and mobilization are at the core of the call for action and the question of which kind of protests social movements should perform is explicitly treated in the charta of principles, approved by the WSF International Council in June 2001 and then voted at the second WSF, which states that the movement is against violent practices. This charta of principles is explicitly quoted in the ESF call. The call for struggle, mobilization, meetings and communication both inside and outside the movement expresses de facto demands for democracy. Since mobilization is becoming more and more constrained by government-implemented public security policies, and participation in them inhibited by violence between some activists and police, the meta-question of the right to protest becomes central (see also below).

2.4.2. Activists’ frames

If a collective identity process is really at work, the meaning work of mesomobilization actors should resonate with that of activists and supporters. In order to analyse individual schemas of the mobilisation we asked ESF participants an open question about what was, in their view, the main goal of the movement. The answers were then classified according to the “dimensions” stated by respondents.

ESF participants mostly referred to the diagnostic and prognostic elements of the master frame structure: only 2.0% of respondents referred to a mere “antiglobalisation” schema. As many as 40.9% of respondents pointed to the social dimension of the problem and interpreted the movement as a struggle for social rights, workers rights and social justice. 39.5% of participants express the need for a democratisation not only of authoritarian regimes but also of IGOs and existing democratic systems. They also underline that such democratisation should be achieved from below. Participants also often (34.5%) stressed the need for a moral change, of values which are consistent with human relations based on solidarity. The anti-neoliberal schema as such was mentioned by 21.1% of participants, other respondents (23.7%) referred instead to a classic anti-capitalist schema. The ecopacifist schema resonates with 16.3% of participants.

The schemas of the activists in Genoa in 2001, before September 11 were very similar to those of Florence: as many as 40.8% referred to democracy from below, 37.2% to social justice and 29.8% either underlined an ecopacifist frame or stressed ethics and solidarity as the main goals of the movement; 16.2% expressed the anti-neoliberal frame, 11.1% referred to anti-capitalism, while only 4.1% referred to an anti-global schema (Andretta et al. 2002, 99). This relative continuity of the way in which activists frame the
world from Genoa to Florence indicates that a collective identity with shared ideas is really at work. This is confirmed also by the fact that the activists adopted frames which are relevant in the structure of the master frame: neoliberal or capitalist globalisation is identified as the problem, and the solution is indicated in more social justice and more democracy, more solidarity and more environmental justice.

If the meaning work of the mesomobilisation actors resonates with individual activists, one can still argue that this may be the result of the coalition of different sectors, and that participants mobilise following their own sector, on the basis of their own sectorial frames. If what we observe is, instead, a real social movement, then the diffusion of new and similar ideas, values and frames should be found cross-sector.\(^9\) If we check the relationship between sector affiliation and individual schemas (see table 3), we can see that participants do not only adopt sectorial frames. All frames are present in each sector, and, especially, social justice and democratic participation are the most central frames in each sector. What is more, the structure of the individual schemas of participants with no organisational affiliation is similar to that of participants with organizational affiliation, except for the scant presence of the anti-capitalist schema. In short, we observe the minimal condition for a social movement to exist: shared ideas and frames.

Table 3. Schemas of ESF participants by sector affiliation (dummy variables)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Schemas</th>
<th>Eco pacifist</th>
<th>Anti-neoliberalist</th>
<th>Anti-capitalist</th>
<th>Local Social Forums</th>
<th>Total (%</th>
<th>Cramer’s V(^a)</th>
<th>Un-organized</th>
<th>Cramer’s V(^b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-neoliberalism</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Justice</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-capitalism</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>.17***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecopacifism</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy from below</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N) (160) (242) (231) (48) (681) -- (672) --

Legenda: *** = significant at the 0.001 level, ** = significant at the 0.01 level; n.s. = not significant.

\(^a\) Cramer’s V of cross-tabulation between organized participants.

\(^b\) Cramer’s V of cross-tabulation between unorganized participants.

In their answers, however, activists often referred to more than one dimension. In other words the ideas single individuals hold concerning the world are also built by bridging different schemas. Most of the frames appear to be bridged with others, especially those on social justice, ecopacifism, and ethics (see table 4). The two most connected frames are ethics and ecopacifism; this link is the basis of the alliance between new social movements and religion-based associations. Social justice is especially linked with

\(^9\) A crossnational analysis (data were collected and elaborated for the Italian, French, Spanish, German and British participants of the ESF in Florence) shows that the distribution of frames seems to reflect the characteristics of the national social movement sector which, in each country, mobilises against neoliberal globalisation. However, social justice and democracy from below are dominant everywhere. The only exception are the UK participants, with a high percentage (50%) of anti-capitalists. Additionally, we find a higher percentage of anti-neoliberals among French and German participants, and ecopacifism is somewhat more concentrated in the UK and Germany.
ecopacifism, while both anti-capitalism and anti-neoliberalism are connected with the idea that global problems can be solved through democratic participation. This is not only a left-wing view, since those interested in ethical issues also believe that democracy is important. All frames appear connected with each other. Moreover, democracy from below and ecopacifism emerge as “broker-frames” which mediate the connection between other important frames (see fig. 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4. Individual frame bridging</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frame bridging</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecopacifism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-neoliberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy from below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-capitalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Most bridged frames**

| Ethic/Ecopacifism                 | .24**                   |
| Social Justice/Ecopacifism        | .19**                   |
| Anti-capitalism/Democracy        | .13**                   |
| Anti-neoliberalism/Democracy     | .11**                   |
| Ethic/Democracy                  | .10**                   |

(N) (1,030-1,384)

**a** dummy variable (0 = one frame; 1 = two or more frames).

*Legend:* ** = significant at the 0.01 level; * = significant at the 0.05 level.

**Figure 3. The network of activists’ schemas**

*Note:* The arrows reflect existing significant correlations.
Our analysis confirms that the master frame integrated the mesomobilization actors of the transnational movement. What is more, the master frame resonates with the system of meanings shared by most of the activists and supporters, as the schema analysis of participants at the Genoa protest and the ESF of Florence demonstrated. Our findings suggest that the master frame bridging of social justice, democracy from below, ethics and environmental justice provided the symbolic umbrella under which “old” and “new” social movements, issues and organisations have been linked. The result is not a uniform collective identity, which is in any case something the movement opposes, but a strong identification with a collective process. In fact, activists identify more with the movement than with the single, well-structured organisational bodies that take part in it.¹⁰

2.5. Media-conscious and nonviolent? Protest repertoires

Research into social movements in democracies in the north of the world has singled out a trend towards the “normalization” of protest. On the one hand, unconventional forms of action have gained greater legitimation within a variety of social and political groups; on the other, more extreme forms of protest tended to give way to moderation, with many SMOs shifting towards more conventional forms of action (such as lobbying), commercialization and getting involved in voluntary work. Finally, it has been noted that protest has become ever more media-conscious in the sense of it being organized as a media event. How does the movement against neoliberal globalization fit into this framework?

The results of our activist survey at the ESF in Florence (here only for Italian participants) demonstrate that the movement for a globalization from below can count on activists (including those not belonging to any organization) who have a rich and varied repertoire of action, which in part can be traced back to previous waves of mobilization: participating in public meetings (97.3%), in strikes (95.3%), in sit-ins (82.9%), in boycotts (69.9%), signing petitions (91.2%), leafleting (73.2%), occupying schools or universities (74.8%) or abandoned buildings (26.9%), convincing someone to vote for a party (54.4%) or party activism (35.1%). Some interviewees also include violence against property in their action repertoire (6.1%). Our preceding survey at Genoa had shown a similar picture. The degree of similarity of the protest experience acquired by activists among the various organizations and networks seems to be high; however, some types of experience are more widespread in some sectors than in others (more squatting among social centres, more party-based activity in the ATTAC-sector, etc.). It seems that movement activists are used to many ways of protesting and being “politically active”, combining both conventional and non-conventional action.

To the existing protest repertoire, the movement has added forms of protest such as boycotts and campaigns. Especially the latter encouraged the emergence of cross-national links, but also of links among groups on the national level, as the development of the Rete

¹⁰ In Genoa, 75% of our interviewees responded that they identified (enough or much) with the movement as a whole, a finding reflected by the participants in the ESF in Florence, 77.2% of whom share high identification with the movement as a whole. It is worth noting that such a high identification with the movement as a whole, coherently with a multiple and layered identity, does not exclude identifying with both a specific sector (about 57% in Genoa and as much as 75% in Florence), and a specific organisation (44% and 67% respectively).
Lilliput shows. An equally efficient networking resulted from counter-summits, organised in occasion of the official summits held by major international organizations. Present already since the eighties in the repertoire of protest, these, however, have changed over time, and now greater emphasis is placed on street demonstrations. Lobbying has come under increased criticism and the perception spread that the reformist approach of large NGOs had failed (Brand and Wissen 2002). Participation in counter summits has grown notably over time between 2001 and 2002; in one third of the cases there were marches with over ten thousand demonstrators and in seven with over 80 thousand (Pianta and Silva 2003).

Since Seattle, counter-summits increasingly became places of confrontation between demonstrators and the police and the movement was repeatedly accused of being directly or indirectly responsible for violent incidents. Our surveys of activists, however, indicate that in comparison with the Italian movements of the 1970s, the movement for a globalisation from below takes a far clearer position of nonviolence. In Genoa, the "work agreement" of the GSF bound the signatories to respect all forms of direct, peaceful, nonviolent expression and action declared publicly and transparently. As many as 90% (95.7% for the "Rete Lilliput, 92.7% for the area of ATTAC but also a high of 78.9% for the social centers) of the demonstrators interviewed in Genoa declared never having resorted to violent tactics.

For one part of the movement the option for non-violence is a matter of values, a question of coherence between means and ends. This position is especially strong in the ecopacifist sector. At Genoa, the activists of Rete Lilliput had painted their hands white, holding them above their heads as a sign of their non-violent intentions and some groups tried to form a cushion between the police and the black bloc. In general, Rete Lilliput underlines awareness raising via information or denunciation, critical consumerism, boycotts and “experimentation with alternative economic initiatives and less exaggerated lifestyles to prove that fair-based economics are possible”.

The action repertoires of ATTAC, among whose activists a more strategic attitude on the non-violence question prevails, aim at spectacular protests with high media impact following the example of Greenpeace. At Genoa, ATTAC together with left-wing political parties and trade unions proclaimed their intention of penetrating the "red zone" with music, noise, balloons, banners, eggs and garlic. Two activists from the ATTAC square managed to get past the perimeter fence protecting the summit site and were immediately arrested by the police.

The direct action strategies dominant among the social centres, variously connected with a particular conception of social or civil disobedience, are also highly media-conscious. The White Overalls (who at Genoa evolved into the “Disobedients”) see themselves as “a nonviolent movement, which does not, however, mean Ghandi-type pacifism" and define their civil disobedience as nonviolent but “protected, collective and self-organized". They aim at staging conflict by simulating street clashes, “in order that the real, planet-wide conflict gets talked about” (ibid.). The action consists in reaching

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police lines and trying to move into the out-of-bounds 'red areas': "we attempt both symbolically and in reality to push forward during demonstrations towards places where civil society is barred" (ibid.). The White Overalls cover their bodies with protective materials; they use car-tyre inner tubes to create a distance between their ranks and the police, and plastic shields held overhead like a turtle-shell to protect themselves against police batons. They proceed with their hands up as a sign of non-aggression and are prepared to resist police charges without hitting back, using "only instruments of collective and personal defence, never offence" (ibid.).

In recent years, many Italian social centers which had previously supported open clashes with the police have been won over to the strategy of "protected civil disobedience", transforming physical clashes into a normally prevalently peaceful ritual.

At the fringes of many demonstrations on globalization there are the small splinter groups of the black bloc (BB) that practice forms of urban warfare using offensive weapons to attack property and, less frequently, in clashes with the police. The BB, marginal in Italy, may be considered a coordinating structure among small groupings which, when participating in marches and demonstrations, resort to the same form of action: in fact, they themselves talk of the black bloc as a tactic, not an organization. Although the various BB nuclei find their common ground in the acceptance of, or even exalting the destruction of the symbols of globalization, variously justified as a response to the "violence of the system", they remain distinct from each other in the forms of action they consider acceptable. The violence in Gothenburg was defined by some BB websites as "brainless militancy, militancy as an end in itself" (quoted in Rösemann 2001, 7). From Seattle to Genoa, these small groups appear better organized, but also increasingly isolated from the movement – which, in Genoa, built barriers to keep them out of the march, besides unequivocally branding them as not only damaging but also 'extraneous' to it.

Setting up focus groups enabled the evaluation vis-à-vis violence to be analysed in depth. In the opinion of the activists that took part in our focus groups, violence is not a problem (any longer): "it seems like no one mentions it any more, also because in the end only the Black Bloc are violent but they're not even part of the movement" (FG 3i, 84). The success of the ESF in Florence, despite a virulent media campaign on the alleged risks of vandalism (Cosi 2004), is attributed to a fundamental agreement within the movement. This does not mean, however, that there is a uniform opinion in the movement as to what constitutes legitimate forms of protest. There is, first and foremost, a split among militants as well as among the different organizations on the option of nonviolence, which some define as a tactical option (violence is rejected because "it plays into their hands") and others as an ethical belief. At the same time, there is growing criticism in the movement against violence as a form of action typical of the power of the declared enemy. Moreover, while nonviolence "is a tactic everyone agrees on" (FG 4f, 107), debate is still open on

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13 Despite this declaration of intent, it should be pointed out that in Prague (September 2000) the 'yellow' march headed by White Overalls used sticks against police lines. In later mobilizations, however, the promise not to carry objects of aggression seems to have been kept.

14 The focus groups included a total of 45 people of whom 23 were women and were organized by different age cohorts: 1) from 16 to 18 years old; 2) from 22 to 27 years old; 3) from 26 to 35 years old; 4) from 35 to 41 years old; 5) from 48 to 59 years old; 6) from 65 to 77 years old. Quotations from focus groups will be made using the acronym FG followed by a number (indicating the age cohort) and a letter (indicating the person speaking).
"how to apply this to street marches". Forms of action which can be both effective in attracting attention and also non-stigmatizing are still to be developed. While the activists agree that violence is counter-productive, there is a perceived risk of rejecting more disruptive and thus somehow more visible and effective forms of action outright – "in my opinion this is a mistake on the part of the movement, precisely because there are fundamental differences between so-called violence and civil disobedience, and there is the tendency, thought out or spontaneous, I don't know, to leave it a bit to one side" (FG 3f, 58).

While after Genoa the issue of modes of action seemed to have a disrupting effect on the movement, subsequently the differences were perceived as being on the decrease. In particular, while the social centers have given up using protective materials in post-Genoa demonstrations, the ethical nonviolents have declared legitimate even disruptive forms of disobedience. The focus groups noted this perception of growing consensus, emerging also through a learning process in which the mistakes made in Genoa are recognised. After Genoa, but even more so after September 11th, the greater attention demonstrators have paid to the self-organization of the marches and the renewal of negotiations with the police have reduced the chances of escalation: the ESF in Florence among others went off without a trace of violence despite real fears and exaggerated scaremongering beforehand.

2.6. The reaction of the state: Protest policing

After decades of apparent “normalization” of the confrontation between police and protest, what was seen by many as the consolidated “post-68” standard, no longer in debate, proved fragile faced with the new challenge of a transnational protest movement (della Porta and Reiter 1998a; 2004). Indeed, in the history of the movement for “globalization from below”, clashes between police and demonstrators have been frequent, the incidents around the Genoa G8 in 2001 being a particularly harsh example. The authorities mostly attributed responsibility for those clashes to the extreme fringes of the movement, alleged to have used urban guerrilla tactics, but also to the movement as a whole, accusing it of ambiguous positions on the question of violence. The police have, on the other hand, been criticized by the movement and a sizeable part of public opinion for disproportionate or even brutal actions infringing the civil rights of the great bulk of peaceful demonstrators.

What factors can explain the process of escalation? According to a first interpretation, it is the public-order problem that has to be tackled, namely certain features of the movement, that determines the police response; a second stresses the importance of internal features of the police, like their professional culture or organizational structure, both filtered through police knowledge, i.e. the way the police perceive their role and outside society; a third focuses on such external factors as the role of government or the size of the “civil-rights coalition”, counterposed as defending the right to express dissent to the “law-and-order coalition”. After Genoa a supranational level of public order to explain Italian police conduct has also been evoked.

15 The “trainstopping” actions against military transports in the period preceding the outbreak of the Iraq war, for instance, were conducted jointly by the disobedients and moderate sectors of the movement. On the protests against the Iraq war in general see della Porta and Diani 2004b.

16 For a detailed account of the Genoa days see Gubitosa 2003.
2.6.1. The movement as a public order problem?

For Italy, research has underlined that rather than the presumed violence of the movement – which, as we have seen, on the contrary takes a far clearer position of nonviolence than the movements of the 1970s – it was the novelty of the new globals, their organizational heterogeneity and the heterogeneity of their action repertoires which created challenges for the police. The movement’s novelty – in the most ordinary sense of its (perceived) unexpected, overnight appearance – tests police capacity to properly assess its numerical strength, cohesion and the objectives of protest actions. Moreover, in the new globals, we are once again, after a long period of social and political tranquillity, seeing a great “street” movement challenging not so much a particular political decision as a model of development for society.

The movement’s networked, heterogeneous structure, more marked than in the past, the emphasis as a positive value on the absence of leadership in the name of the capacity for self-administration from below, and the renunciation of unity in the name of contamination may make dialogue with the police forces more complicated. Police spokesmen heard by the Italian parliamentary commission of enquiry in fact repeatedly stressed the difficulties of dialogue with an entity like the GSF, made up of 800 components and unable to guarantee any real representativity in relation to the totality of demonstrators.

As we have seen above, also the action repertoires of the movement are heterogeneous, a diversity internally accepted in the name of tolerance for different lines taken, and also, perhaps, of the tactical advantages that might arise from complementarity between symbolic provocations and non-violence, play and civil disobedience. If the range of accepted action repertoires seems to have been confirmed in the post-Genoa debate inside the movement, the debate on single episodes of (also verbal) excesses and the greater attention paid to the self-organization of marches since 2001 indicate a process of self-criticism.

Finally, it has to be underlined that trust in the police within the global justice movement is very low: only 10.3% of the Genoa demonstrators, though mostly interviewed before Carlo Giuliani’s death, trusted the Italian police greatly or sufficiently, and the figure remains extremely low even for the most moderate groups (barely 9.3% of the Lilliput pacifists, for instance). These results were confirmed at the Florence ESF. However, more than highlighting the difficulties of implementing “policing by consent” these results underline the necessity of following a strategy of dialogue. In fact, activists’ verdict on police presence on the streets, even if marked by diffidence, nonetheless indicates that the police role as guarantor of a good outcome to the demonstration is broadly accepted. However, for a high percentage (29.2%) of activists interviewed on the occasion of the Florence ESF, violence as self-defence in the event of violent repression of a protest demonstration is necessary, and for over one third justifiable in any case. This position is especially widespread among the activists who had participated in the Genoa counter summit.

In conclusion, the characteristics of the movement, above all its organizational

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17 For instance, rejection of militarization and organizational fluidity had made the movement reluctant to set up stewardship services (on the role of such services in the escalation of the 70s which led to terrorism cf. della Porta 1995, 90-94, 153-158). After Genoa, this position was largely reversed.
heterogeneity and the wide range of action repertoires, did pose a challenge to police forces. They had to prepare flexible responses adapted to the various action strategies coexisting within one and the same demonstration. In addition they had to intervene against the violent actions of the black bloc, guaranteeing at the same time the right of the peaceful majority to demonstrate. However, at Genoa and at numerous other protest events organized by the global justice movement, the strategies which in the 1970s had been developed exactly in the face of increasingly heterogeneous movements with violent fringes, i.e. “negotiated management” or “de-escalation”, were applied at best incoherently.

2.6.2. Factors internal to the police forces

If the incoherent application of the negotiated management strategy can not be explained sufficiently by certain characteristics of the movement, which internal features of the Italian police may have contributed to the reappearance of many elements of an escalated force strategy in occasion of the G8 in Genoa?

First we have to underline the importance of the image that the police forces have of the movement. The literature has, in order to explain police conduct, stressed the importance of their professional culture, particularly the aspect that many police actions are provoked by situations of the moment, not by well-defined rules or orders. The need to take on the spot the decision whether or not to intervene leads policemen to develop stereotypes of people and situations perceived as possible sources of difficulty or danger. These stereotypes, filtered through police knowledge, become a sort of guideline for the actions of individual policemen and the force as a whole, with distinctions, for instance, between “good” demonstrators (peaceful, pragmatic, with a direct interest in the conflict and a clear aim, etc.) and “bad” demonstrators (predominantly young, misinformed, destructive, professional troublemakers with no direct interest in the conflict, etc.) (della Porta 1998; della Porta and Reiter 1998b). An important aspect of “policing by consent” therefore is to inform the police forces to be deployed about the protest event, the groups participating in it and their objectives, and to overcome the potentially strong internal resistance against a negotiated management strategy.

The information strategies used for the Genoa G8, with indiscriminate, widespread collection of information, led the police to an undifferentiated image of the “no-globals” as “bad demonstrators”. The alarmist notions underlying this image influenced already the preparatory training of the Italian police forces for Genoa and had noteworthy effects on their attitudes during the days of the G8. As one policeman said: “The tension among us was sky high: for the whole foregoing week we had been told that the demonstrators would have pistols, and would be throwing infected blood and ball bearings covered in acid at us. On the Friday evening after that lad’s death they told us that a carabiniere had died too” (cit. in “Diario” 32-33/2001, 18). More important still, the alarmist information influenced police tactics and personnel deployment: the warning that police personnel might be kidnapped and used as “human shields” led to the reversal of the initial option to use small groups of policemen in order to facilitate mobility and to the setting up of bigger squads.

Inappropriate police intervention has often been facilitated by difficulties in the police communication and command structure, especially when units from different police forces were deployed in the case of big protest events. In Italy, the existence of various national police forces – two of which, the state police and the carabinieri, general police
forces with a historical rivalry and imperfect coordination – renders the organization of police operations particularly complicated. The carabinieri, in fact, although for public order duty always “directed” by plain clothes state police officers (*funzionari*), retain their separate command structure and communication system.\(^1\)

Further internal factors influencing public order strategies concern organizational characteristics like the degree of militarization, of centralization and of accountability, held to be important for the democratic quality of police forces. A historically consolidated feature of the Italian police is that they continue the model of the “King’s police”, or police of the monarch, traditionally present on the European continent, by contrast with the “citizens’ police” of the Anglo-Saxon tradition. The Italian police were built up and legitimized as above all a political instrument, formed and utilized chiefly for public-order tasks, with close links with central government. This tradition, repeatedly criticized also internally, nonetheless seems to have kept its heritage. The Italian state police was demilitarized only in 1981, while the second national police force, the *carabinieri*, are still today an integral part of the armed forces. The Italian police forces are also characterized by a low level of democratic accountability and accentuated centralization, with a police “knowledge” extremely sensitive to the political attitudes of the majority (della Porta and Reiter 2003).

### 2.6.3. External factors: Politics and protest policing

In these circumstances the public-order response is heavily influenced by the political response made to the movement. Particularly in evolved democracies, it is not just the government position that is important: a first sign of an opening towards new challenges has often been the formation, following street incidents, of a *civil-rights coalition* defending the right of dissent and protest and opposing a *law-and-order coalition* ranked in defence of the police and of order.

Institutional political actors during and immediately after Genoa displayed difficulty in recognising the movement as a political subject and an attitude of closure to its basic identity, even more than to the issues its components were raising. To the movement that disputes the legitimacy of the eight "giants" to decide on behalf of everybody—“You G8, us 6 billion”—the Italian government responded by refusing to acknowledge the movement as a partner to be talked with, seeing and presenting it instead mainly as a problem of public order.

This holds true largely also for the centre left government, in power until shortly before the G8. In fact, first clashes between the police and the movement occurred at Naples in March 2001 in occasion of the Global Forum on *e-government*. Regarding the G8 in Genoa, the Amato government initially had raised great expectations, but in a second stage its apparent decline in interest and lack of input greatly embarrassed particularly the more open section of the movement in relation to a more intransigent wing that asserted the uselessness of dialogue with the institutions. No progress was made in talks between the

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\(^1\) In addition, it has to be underlined that the public order units of the state police at the time of Genoa were undergoing a period of reorganization, after internal review had discovered deficiencies in training and professionalization (Audizione 5/9/01, 29ff.).
authorities and the GSF after the latter had refused the centre left government’s proposal to hold the counter summit a week before the G8.

The “line of dialogue” decided by the new Berlusconi government appears to have been chiefly instrumental, triggered by the Gothenburg events (at the European summit in June 2001) and dictated by the “need to avoid the worst by providing an outlet for non-violent challenge, offering room for dialogue and promoting visibility for the peaceful sector of the movement”.\(^{19}\) Decisive talks between the national police leadership and the GSF on the demonstrations planned, but also on the accommodation of the thousands of activists expected for the counter summit, commenced (as had been the case in Gothenburg) just a few weeks before the event. The relationship with the GSF progressively worsened during the days of the protests and the government and the centre-right parliamentary majority assigned the full blame for the disorders to the organizers, accusing the GSF of having tolerated the violent and subversive part of the demonstrators and of not having taken any concrete initiative towards making known, isolating or expelling violent or subversive elements. Police violence was reduced to single minor episodes for which the inevitable “rotten apples” in a generally blameless police force were held responsible.

The centre-left opposition has explained the Genoa events as a political option if not of the whole government at least of a part of it — in particular, the most right-wing party of the coalition, Alleanza Nazionale (AN). Main responsibility for the errors in controlling public order is assigned to instrumentalization of the police forces by the Right, most visibly expressed in the presence of Deputy Prime Minister Gianfranco Fini and three MPs from his party in the carabinieri operational command room at Genoa.\(^{20}\) Declarations by AN speakers, including Deputy Prime Minister Fini, before the summit are said to have dwelt on the confrontational atmosphere, told public opinion and the police forces that every street demonstration was by violent and subversive groups, and guaranteed that in the event of clashes no responsibility would on any account be allotted by the government to the forces of order (Relazione II, 103ff.).

The scepticism and the uncertainties, however, that the Ulivo [centre-left coalition] had shown versus the movement while in government continued when it went into opposition. Before the summit, the Ulivo sought the path of a bipartisan stance on the G8, with motions voted by crisscross abstentions by majority and opposition. As regards the Saturday demonstration, on 19 July the Ulivo was still divided on whether to take part or not; after Carlo Giuliani’s death the Democratic Left [DS] withdrew its support. On live television, the candidate for national secretary, Fassino, read a communiqué inviting DS party members not to go to Genoa.

Subsequently, the Ulivo was not to line up as decisively in defending dissent as Italian left parties had traditionally done and many DS figures criticized the GSF and the movement’s strategies, in particular “protected civil disobedience”. In its criticisms of the

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\(^{19}\) Thus Margherita Paolini, charged by the Amato government with negotiating with the GSF, adding “I perfectly recall that these were the words pronounced” (Audizione 4/9/01, 11).

\(^{20}\) Because of the disorders around the barracks, both the three MPs and Deputy Prime Minister Fini were allegedly forced to continue their presence until the march dispersed (Relazione I, 225). Colonel Graci, commander of the carabinieri operational division, in Genoa five years already, states that this was the first time MPs had come into the operational command room (Audizione 29/8/01, 52).
police operations in Genoa – insufficient psychological preparation of officers, unselective information activity, lack of coordination among the various police forces – the center-left minority report made no reference to problems or gaps in the Italian police system, but attributed the blame to the government’s non-existent or mistaken input. It is important to bear in mind that the political responsibility of the center-left, in government until a few weeks before the Genoa summit, extended to those reforms of the public-order system that some saw as not done or wrongly done: it was in fact a center-left coalition legislative measure that had further strengthened the traditional autonomy of the carabinieri. According to the minority report, by contrast, the lack of coordination among the various police forces in Genoa was not to be regarded as a structural problem (Relazione II, 85ff.). Moreover, its list of previous clashes between movement and police significantly did not refer to Naples (ibid. 98). The head of the DS parliamentary group Luciano Violante, interviewed in “La Repubblica” (30/7/2001), attributed the beating and harassment of demonstrators to “small groups of violent individuals”, embracing the same “rotten apple” theory as the center-right. In the investigative commission, the center-left did not call in question the exclusively internal nature of the review power (Relazione II, 68), and only Rifondazione Comunista (RC) asked for measures aimed at allowing personal recognition of individual police officers (Relazione III, 166). Finally, while the center-left on the one hand called dialogue an “essential factor in the success of a public-order activity” (Relazione II, 88), on the other it ruled it out for public-order ends specifically for the new-globals, a heterogeneous movement without “a recognized capacity to control the street” (ibid., 98).

The lack of institutional allies was balanced at least partially by the significant consensus that the movement seems to have in society, confirmed specifically in the debate on the violence at Genoa. While Genoa divided public opinion in its verdict on the movement, the police conduct was in any case denounced by a broad range of associations forming a strong, if fluid, coalition supporting civil rights. Some surveys, moreover, indicate a certain concern on the part of public opinion.21 These concerns reflect the stances of professional and volunteer associations, which even if not ranked directly behind movement demands nonetheless criticized the breaches by the police of the right to demonstrate. Civil society in Italy and abroad mobilized in defense of the right to dissent, organizing numerous demonstrations denouncing police conduct in Genoa. At least in an initial stage, the international press, if not always sympathetic to the globalization themes, was critical of the way the police acted in Genoa.22 Under the pressure of national public opinion, European governments too put some pressure on Italy. It seems to have been above all the mobilization of national and international civil society, together with self-critical reflection inside the security forces (triggered also by the patent failure of police operations at Genoa), which led to a return to negotiated management in occasion of the ESF in Florence in November 2002 (della Porta and Reiter 2004).

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21 According to a PeopleSWG survey, for instance, 57% of those interviewed held that “the violence and beatings suffered by the demonstrators on the streets and in the jails were really serious”, as against 28% regarding them as largely media exaggerations.

22 Indeed the coverage of international summits in Seattle, Prague and Genoa focused on police issues and violence (Rucht 2002, 72-3).
2.6.4. A supranational level of protest policing?

Many of the elements that emerged at Genoa can be explained as a partial reaffirmation of the traditional response to new “challengers” in Italy: an overall strategy tending to exclusion instead of inclusion; as regards political power, a mistrust of more direct forms of political participation and a tendency to see in public demonstrations an attempt to overthrow the parliamentary majority; as regards the police, organizational gaps like the lack of coordination among the various forces, low accountability, inadequate public-order professionalism and a public-order culture that does not favour the right to demonstrate (della Porta and Reiter 2003). However, police operations at Genoa, although particularly harsh, seem to fit into an international trend of at least partially abandoning negotiated management, especially in the case of protest events organized by the global justice movement. Moreover, both the public order problem and the response to it clearly have international characteristics.

A European level of protest policing did emerge particularly after the Gothenburg and Genoa summits (della Porta and Reiter 2004, 19f., 70ff.), part of the co-operation among European Community police forces started in the mid 70s, which with the Maastricht (1993) Treaty became the EU’s “third pillar”, retaining, however, even after the Amsterdam (1999) Treaty its intergovernmental characteristics. The intergovernmental character of police cooperation between member states greatly enhances the difficulty for the citizen to individuate those politically and juridically responsible for restrictive measures and to find redress (Peers 2000, 188). The single measures of police cooperation have to be seen on the general background of developments in the justice and home affairs field within the EU, characterized by deficiencies in accountability and scarce involvement of national parliaments and the EU parliament, largely confined to a purely consultative role. Given the institutional set-up of the EU in the field of home affairs and security and the weakness of a European public sphere, the danger exists that these definitions and therefore the conception of the transnational right to demonstrate are exclusively shaped by the executive power, i.e. the European Council for Justice and Home Affairs and its (in part informal) bureaucracy.

The emergence of terrorism with the drama of the attack on the Twin Towers limited the room for the civil-rights coalition, as well as giving rise to attempts at both national and supra-national level to link the new global movement with subversion. However, newly introduced security measures in April 2005 led to the launch of a

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24 For an account of the risks to international terrorism may present for civil rights (repeatedly emphasized also in the European Parliament’s reports on human rights in the EU) cf. the thematic comment “The Balance Between Freedom and Security in the Response by the EU and its Member States to the Terrorist Threats”, drafted on request by the European Commission and submitted on 31 March 2003 by the EU network of independent experts in fundamental rights (CFR-CDF).
campaign sustained by more than 100 civil liberty associations and NGOs, sign for the
formation of a coalition in defense of transnational civil rights.\textsuperscript{25}

2.7. Political opportunities, institutional politics and the movement

2.7.1. Political opportunities: global and national factors

Studies on social movements have often highlighted the role of political
opportunities in promoting collective action, the underlying concept being that participation
increases as access to public decision-making becomes at least in part more open. As
regards political institutions, access is generally considered to be more open, as the
administrative unit becomes more decentralised and the legislative, executive and judiciary
powers more distinct. Furthermore, it has been noted that protest cycles coincide with an
opening of the political system: the availability of allies, divisions within the government,
or institutional reforms making bottom-up access easier (Tarrow 1994; della Porta and
Diani 1999). In particular, an important role in the development of social movements has
been played by potential institutional allies, in particular left-wing political parties.

The movement for a globalization from below seems to contradict these hypotheses
since it grew quickly at a time when political opportunities diminished. In fact, by
subtracting decision-making from the nation-state, globalization automatically challenges
the principles and institutions of representative democracy that have been built up around
the nation state (Dahl 1999; Pizzorno 2001). The traditional forms of legitimization of
democracies were indeed challenged by internal and external factors, among which:

- a shift in the axis of power from politics to the market, with neoliberal economic
  policies increasing the power of multinational corporations and reducing the capacity of
  traditional state structures to control them (Pizzorno 2001);

- a shift in power from parliament to the executive, and, within the executive, to the
  bureaucracy and to semi-independent agencies/authorities (Moravcsik 1999);

- a shift in the locus of power from national to both supranational and regional levels,
  with increased power wielded by a number of international organizations, especially
  economic ones (WB, IMF, WTO), and a number of macroregional organizations (first
  and foremost the EU) (Haas 1964; Scharpf 1999; Held and McGrew 2000).

There is also another challenge facing contemporary movements. Social movement
theory stresses the role of political allies — especially that of left-wing political parties —
in favouring mobilization. During the protest cycle of the late sixties and early seventies, if
the emerging New Left criticized the institutional Left for the alleged betrayal of their
original “revolutionary” values (Pizzorno 1996), the traditional left-wing parties however
channeled many of the emerging demands into the representative institutions. Since the
eighties, a \textit{de facto} division of tasks developed: social movements “retreated” to the social
sphere and political parties “represented” them in political institutions. The recent

\textsuperscript{25} On the “International Campaign Against Surveillance and Registration”, launched by Statewatch, the
American Civil Liberties Union, Focus on the Global South, Friends Committee and the International Civil
Liberties Monitoring Group see \url{http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/apr/ICAMS_supporters.htm};
acceleration of the evolution from mass-parties to “base-less”, “professionalized” parties, however, has reduced the potential for contacts and alliance between left-libertarian movements and left-wing parties (Katz and Mair 1992; della Porta 2001a). The potential for forging alliances in the party system also declined, at least in the Western democracies, with the crisis of Keynesian economic policies and the hegemony of neoliberal ideology (della Porta 2003a).

In terms of national opportunities, the Italian centre right government can count on a rock-solid parliamentary majority in the functional carve-up of power, and this curtails legislative-executive dialectic. In addition, since high-profile personalities are the subject of judicial inquiries, the executive seems intent on extending its control over the judiciary. Furthermore, a centre-right government whose main coalition partner has strong neoliberal leanings and whose next strongest partner has a long-standing law-and-order electoral platform is faced with an opposition composed of a centre-left alliance, weak in organizational and until very recently electoral terms, whose two largest components – DS and Margherita – compete for the centrist electorate.

2.7.2. The institutional left and the movement

Despite the almost natural premise for dialogue if not alliance with the institutional Left on the issues of social justice and sustainable development, the recognition of the movement as a legitimate political actor in fact seemed uncertain on part of the Italian centre-left. The debate on the preparatory phases of the G8 demonstrations evolved without any interaction between the movement and the main centre-left parties who, except for RC and some Greens, seemed to turn a blind eye to or be ignorant of the growing mobilization on the issue of globalization. Considerable time after the Genoa event, a spokesperson of the GSF spoke openly of an attempt staged by the centre-left to split the movement into “good guys and bad guys” and of the “illusion that they have of being able to build their own fortunes by allowing the right wing to defeat the movement” (Agnoletto 2003, 157).

Even after profound changes in the structure of the party, the traditional tendency of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) of disowning any autonomous opposition movement to its left is reflected in the hostility expressed by the majority of the DS towards the globalisation movement which it criticised in both form and content. In terms of the proposals it put forward, the movement was stigmatized as being unable to accept the unavoidable progress of which globalisation is one aspect, ingenuous, if not Luddite. Fassino, the DS secretary, tied the recognition of the movement as a valid partner to the possibility to open “a political debate to help it on its way out of pure antagonism” ("Corriere della Sera" 22/7/01). As the movement was able to focus attention on the issue of globalization and in particular neoliberalism, the social democratic parties were in obvious embarrassment, in particular on the issue of their involvement, at local and national government level, in the privatisation of public utilities and the flexibilisation of the labour market.

Even before the G8, however, the movement had enjoyed some support from within the DS—in particular its youth section (Sinistra Giovanile) and the thematic area "Altrimondi [Otherworlds]", that even were members of the GSF. After the events of Genoa, criticism of the party’s vacillations became more acute in areas close to the DS. At the “Feste dell’Unità”, the party’s fundraising kermesse held during the months of July and
August, debate on the decision to pull out of the Saturday demonstration was intense. Persisting mistrust notwithstanding, an albeit rocky dialogue between the Italian institutional left and the movement did develop. The leaders of the left minority within the DS were to appeal for dialogue and collaboration with the movement and a resolution going in that direction was passed at the party congress of November 2001.

It was especially through the organizational process of the ESF in November 2002 that a part of the institutional left got closer to the movements. First and foremost the Florence meeting enjoyed the support of the Tuscan regional president, Claudio Martini of the DS. Secondly, the CGIL trade union took part in the forum as did the left-wing of the DS and a number of politicians from the Margherita party. The former CGIL secretary general, Sergio Cofferati, who did not go to Genoa, was instead in the march organized as the closing event of the Social Forum, and said “the left and politics look with great attention and sympathy at this movement. I believe that we have an obligation to dialogue with it (“Corriere della Sera” 10/11/02).

However, mistrust regarding the movement continued to be strong in the institutional left. DS participation in the ESF proceedings was “more unofficial than official” with a position defined as “embarrassed, and vacillating: between the fear of losing out at the centre to the Margherita party who (with few but worthy exceptions) snubbed the forum and losing out at the left to Sergio Cofferati who quite some time previously had announced his intention to take part in the Forum’s closing demonstration” (“Il Manifesto” 6/11/2002). Neither were the two main parties of the centre-left coalition present at the ESF closing demonstration. Commenting on the absence of the two party leaders, Fassino and Rutelli, Tuscan Regional President Martini observed that “they would have done better to have been here” (“Corriere della Sera” 10/11/02). DS Party Secretary Fassino responded that he had not taken part because his presence “would have signified unreserved alignment with a movement on the part of a party whose confines stretch well beyond the demonstrators” (“Il Manifesto” 12/11/2002). Rutelli, leader of the centre-left coalition declared he wanted to do everything possible so that the movement “wouldn’t close in on itself in futile anti-Americanism”, all the while “warning” against resorting to violence and repeating that movements and parties “must learn to live together staying separate” (“Corriere della Sera” 11/11/2002).

The concept the institutional left had of the movement, even those who were sympathetic to its aims, remained that of a phenomenon that spurred politics, “being a marker” for the problems. At the same time it continued to insist on its political monopoly, denying the movement any role in working out the answers. That “parties and movements should not get mixed up” was repeated by the DS secretarial coordinator Vannino Chiti, while the small Party of Italian Socialists warned of a split between “maximalist left” and the “governing left” (“Corriere della Sera” 11/11/2002). Indeed, the movements are still mainly considered as stimulants to politics but themselves incapable of developing answers to the world’s problems. The reawakening of interest in the more participative forms of politics is, therefore, viewed by social democrat parties as a danger. On the one hand part of the electoral reservoir of the institutional left, activists on the other hand are challenging a new party model, one which is built round elected representatives and privileges a relationship with the electorate managed by mass media communication experts and opinion pollsters (della Porta 2001a). A closer proximity to the movement was shown only by the smaller parties of the Italian left, like the Green and especially RC.
2.7.3. The movement and representative democracy

The self-definition as "a movement for a globalization from below" emphasizes, first and foremost the stigmatization of a "top-down" representative democracy. The movement is critical of both national institutions, thought to be powerless or at best inadequate to guide globalization, and of supra-national ones because of the specific policies they adopt and their structures characterised to a greater or lesser extent by a deficit of democratic accountability.

Activists internalized the criticism of representative democracy. Among the demonstrators in Genoa, trust in representative institutions tended to be low with however significant differences regarding the single institutions (see table 5; for the ESF in Florence see table 6). In general, some international organizations (especially the EU and the United Nations) are seen by activists as more worthy of respect than their national government but less so than local bodies. On this point there are also differences between the activists of the three organizational networks. On local bodies, trust scores (a relatively high) 40% which rises to 61% for the Lilliput network activists, but which is halved for those belonging to the ATTAC sector (32.9%) and lower still for the social centre activists (26.7%). Trust, instead, is very low for parliament (19.5%), probably through its identification with the centre-right majority and here, too, registers higher for the Lilliput network (36.8%) than for ATTAC (24%) or the social centers’ activists (11.5%). These differences emerge also in the rating of the EU and the United Nations, which approximately a quarter of the interviewees have trust in, rising to one third for those belonging to the Lilliput network but dropping to a fifth for the demonstrators who identify with the other two networks.

Table 5. Trust in political actors and in representative institutions, by sector affiliation (Genoa 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bodies trusted a lot or quite a lot</th>
<th>Eco pacifist (%)</th>
<th>Anti-neoliberalist (%)</th>
<th>Anti-capitalist (%)</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
<th>Cramer's V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local bodies</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>.21***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade unions</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>.26***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social movements</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(107-110)</td>
<td>(113-117)</td>
<td>(69-71)</td>
<td>(291-295)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legenda: *** = significant at the 0.001 level; ** = significant at the 0.01 level; n.s. = non significant.

Differences in the judgement on the various supra-national governmental institutions emerge in the varying degrees of willingness to negotiate with them. As for the GSF, no less than 75% of interviewees responded that in general they would be willing to negotiate, the percentage falling dramatically when the question referred to specific institutions. Almost half the interviewees, however, believed that negotiating with the UN
and the EU was useful (50.2 and 47.8% respectively), a lot more than those who thought it worthwhile negotiating with the Italian government (35.3%) or with international organizations involved in furthering neoliberal policies (14%), the G8 (8.2%) or NATO (6.6%).

Table 6. Trust in political actors and institutions by country of ESF participants (data in italics refer to entire population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin (in %)</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
<th>Cramer’s V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Bod...
representatives of local institutions, often alongside the WSF, testify to this greater trust. What is considered particularly dangerous for democracy is, instead, the greater delegation of power at supra-national level to institutions with no democratic accountability. The activists of the ESF, however, did not express refusal of global governance but a strong interest in its reform and in the building of new institutions (see table 7).

Table 7. To achieve the goals of the movement would it be necessary (ESF, reduced sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (in %)</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
<th>Cramer’s V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>a) to strengthen national governments?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enough</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very much</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>b) to strengthen the European Union and/or other regional institutions (Mercosur, Arab League, etc.)?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enough</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very much</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>c) to strengthen the United Nations (giving them power to make binding decisions)?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enough</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very much</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>d) to build new institutions of world governance?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enough</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very much</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(140-3)</td>
<td>(123-37)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: *** = significant at the 0.001 level.*

2.7.4. Openings and perspectives for the movement

The timid openings on the part of the Italian centre left parties assuredly mirror the more consistent criticism levelled at neoliberal globalisation by trade unions, and, on a more general level, by public opinion. Indeed, protests against globalization seem to have been successful in awakening public opinion. In June 2001, a short time before the G8 summit at Genoa, a CIRM poll revealed that 45% of Italians felt sympathetic with the movement’s arguments, 28% did not and 27% had no opinion (“La Repubblica” 17/6/01). A later survey by Simulation Intelligence Research showed that 81% of Italians were in favour of cancelling third world debt, 79.7% in favour of “equality of economic and
working conditions for workers worldwide”, 73.8% were unconditionally opposed to war, 70.4% were in favour of the battle against GM food, 70.4% in favour of doing away with tax havens, 63.5% were in favour of the Tobin Tax, 55.3% in favour of freedom of movement for migrants. Overall, 19% of those surveyed replied that the “noglobal” movement was very positive and 50.9% quite positive (only 16.1% felt it was quite or very negative). In Italy, again, a 2003 survey conducted by the Demos and PI agency showed that 52% of the population had taken part in political and protest demonstrations over the previous year, with an especially high percentage among the young. This same survey revealed that 33% of Italians had taken part in peace marches during 2003, 15.5% had taken part in boycotts against certain brand names, while 65% were concerned about the possible effects of globalization. While unemployment was the most serious problem signalled by the interviewees, private institutions (the stock exchange, banks, industrialist associations and privatised health care) saw public faith in them drop sharply (74% of those interviewed replied that “the state should not ‘make room’ for the private sector in health care and education”) (In "Venerdì de La Repubblica" 19/12/2003, 27 ff.). In 2004, the position of rigorous pacifism (“against the war, without if and without but”) was supported, according to a Demos survey, by two thirds of the Italian population and about one third of the sample declared to have taken part in protest against the Iraq war (“La Repubblica” 23/5/2004). Dissent concerning neoliberal strategies is also emerging within the political and non-political elite.

What can explain the fact that social democrat parties have to a certain extent taken criticism of globalization on board is also the potential competition they face in electoral terms from the parties of communist and green derivation, which seem favoured and transformed by the movement. Indeed both communists and greens have always been open to initiatives for another globalization, with the green parties interested in denouncing environmental disasters resulting from deregulation, and the communist parties more oriented towards criticising the social effects of neoliberalism. Although quite a few initiatives launched by the movement explicitly excluded political parties in order not to be used, both greens and communists, and especially their youth federations, were present at both the GSF and the ESF.

In the face of challenges from the assertion of “multi-level governance” to old models of representation, the movement for globalization from below finds itself facing the difficult search for democratic institutions that are not just participatory, but also effective in influencing public policies towards principles of social justice. One “older generation” activist asked if “this indispensable networking that constitutes the vitality of this movement … is it enough to fully express political projects?” (FG 6e, 161). And the political effectiveness of the movement is at any rate regarded as a problem even by the youngest – “the great strength is that there are big issues around on which there is strong convergence. The problem now is where do we go next in the sense of providing answers and doing things” (FG 2e, 39).

The problem of building political alliances within the institutions is perceived by the activists, but is certainly far from solved. Nevertheless, the movement seems to have reflected, or even accelerated, some shift in the public opinion as well as among experts expressing growing concerns with social inequalities and increasing demands for state (and multilevel) steering of economic processes. These emerging concerns have opened up some debates about the “dark side” of globalization even in a defensive institutional Left.
3. Conclusion

As in the other national cases, some of the characteristics of the Italian global justice movement can be traced back to developments within the left-wing social movement families during the 1990s: a diminishing importance of (new) left ideology; an increasing pragmatism with concentration on concrete projects, accompanied by the development of specific skills and expertise; the willingness to forge alliances with groups with different political and cultural backgrounds, but involved in projects with similar objectives. Important were also phenomena emerging more at the margins of the dominant social movement organizations: the growing importance of grassroots union organizations; the affirmation of a new generation of activists; a return to direct action.

For the Italian case, the importance of the collapse of the traditional party system – to be attributed to the fall of the Berlin wall on the one hand, and to the political corruption scandals on the other – has to be stressed particularly. This “liberated” large sectors of communist and catholic inspired voluntary organizations from their traditional party allegiance. At the same time, with the increasingly moderate course of the DS (the largest successor party of the PCI) the role of the Old Left as an ally, a patron or a broker for social movements diminished. It was during the period of the centre-left governments in the second half of the 1990s that third sector associations and social movement organizations formed alliances against austerity measures, while at the same time being advantaged in terms of resources by the “outsourcing” of social services.

As a peculiarity of the Italian global justice movement above all its great heterogeneity – in cultural, political and ideological terms, and also in action repertoire – has to be stressed. For the successful networking necessary for the emergence of a movement with this trait, the importance of the fact has to be underlined that two big international movement events, the Genoa G8 counter summit and the first ESF, were organized in Italy. In addition, the particular characteristics of the centre-right government which came to power in 2001 and public opinion reaction to the repression witnessed in Genoa contributed to the success of subsequent mass mobilizations.

Notwithstanding its heterogeneity, the Italian global justice movement seems to have developed a common master frame, rotating around the claims for more democracy and more social justice, which are dominant in all the movement sectors we have analysed. Especially important for our project are the experiments in internal democracy, bent at strengthening, in varying degrees, participation and deliberation, conducted by organizations from all movement sectors. Despite occasional tension, developing especially around incidents of radical direct action, the networking between different sectors of the Italian global justice movement continued in specific protest campaigns and various initiatives at the local level, notwithstanding the recent decline in mass participation.
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Relazione II. Parlamento Italiano. Proposta alternativa di documento conclusivo ai lavori della commissione d’indagine conoscitiva sui “fatti accaduti a Genova nei giorni 19, 20, 21 e 22 luglio 2001 in occasione del vertice G8” presentata dai deputati Luciano Violante et al., allegato alla seduta del 20 settembre 2001. (Minority report of the parliamentary investigative commission on the Genoa G8, presented by the centre-left coalition of the Ulivo).


Annex

During the days of the G8 in Genoa we administered some 800 questionnaires to Italian demonstrators, distributing the interviews over the various initiatives (“theme-based piazzas”, debates, campsites, etc.), so as to be able to construct a representative sample of the various "souls" of the movement. We did likewise in Florence where we gathered some 2,400 questionnaires which in this case had been translated into English, French, Spanish and German, and distributed also to non-Italian activists. The issues touched on in both surveys, through mainly semi-closed questions, concerned associative experiences, forms of political participation, confidence in the institutions and identification with the movement.

In both cases, the representativeness of the sampled interviewees was monitored in relation to the known dimensions of the universe. In Genoa, we confronted the composition of our sample by organizational areas with the estimates of the number of participants from the different networks provided by the organizers on the eve of the protests. Since the figures were used for logistical purposes (such as providing lodging for the incoming activists), they can be expected to be quite reliable. In Florence, we compared the distribution of our sample according to nationality with that of those enrolled at the Forum. In both cases, our sample was well-balanced and also maintained an equilibrium between male and female. From the ESF full sample we excluded the Tuscans (863 participants) because they had a very different profile from other participants in terms of socio-demographic dimensions (gender, age, education, social condition): geographically close to the event, Tuscans needed in fact a lower degree of commitment than Italians from other regions in order to participate in the ESF. We will refer to this sample when we will test hypotheses without referring to the countries of origin. However, for cross-national comparisons, we weighted the responses in order to compensate for having oversampled the Italian population—randomly extracting a reduced sample of the Italian activists.

We selected seminars and workshops of the ESF according to the type of proponent organization (ecologist, religious, pacifist, feminist, trade unions, left-wing political parties, and anti-capitalist groups). Interviewers were asked to distribute questionnaires at random, seeking however a balance among gender and age of the respondents. As for the nationality of the organizations at the ESF, we focused on the Italian, French, Spanish, German, and English ones. Of the total number of interviewees, 1668 were Italian, 124 French, 77 German, 88 Spanish, 118 British, and 309 from other countries. The different sizes of the country samples are proportionate to national presence at the ESF.

The participants in the two surveys that declared affiliation to organizations were grouped in organizational macro-sectors of the movement: ecopacifist, anti-neoliberalist and anti-capitalist (see chapter 2). The category "ecopacifist" includes environmental and pacifist groups, religious associations, lay volunteer organizations and NGOs; the category "anti-neoliberalism" covers ATTAC, trade unions, the institutional leftwing parties, their youth organizations and student organizations close to them; the category "anti-capitalism" includes various kinds of social centers, White Overalls/Disobedients, radical unions, neocommunist organizations, anarchist groups and autonomous organizations.

Although the distribution of most socio-demographic characteristics (education, age, and social situation, such as whether student status or not) was significantly different between the Italian sample and the overall population of Italy (Likelihood ratio chi square test), the Italian sample was not stratified for these conditions, because the distributions of some other countries also differed from their respective populations. Varying the Italian sample would have meant reducing the Italian sample to a median category and foregoing variation. However, the gender distribution was equal among all the other countries; only the Italian gender distribution deviated from this (males dominating). Therefore, a stratified reduced sample was drawn from the Italian sample which respected the equal distribution of men and women in the population. Furthermore, the Italian
In our analysis we have used standard correlation indexes (Pearson). In the case of nominal data (cross tabulations), "Cramer’s v" is used which is a standardization of the more commonly known ‘phi coefficient’ in order to get values between -1 and 1 and to make results comparable to each other. Respecting the ordinal character of most of the variables, we have also used Mann-Whitney-U-tests (for dummy independent variables). As for the significance test, following the usual convention in statistics, we labeled values having a significance level < 5 % with *, values having a significance level < 1 % with ** and values having a significance level < 0.1 % with ***.

subsample was reduced in numbers, since overrepresenting the Italians would have biased the results and made some types of statistical analysis less applicable.
1. Introduction

The purpose of this report is to portray the evolution of the left wing social movement families in Spain in the last decades in order to understand the characteristic of the most recent cycle of protests linked to the global justice movement (GJM) in Spain. The features of the GJM in Spain reflect both the legacy of past experiences in the leftist social movement’s families but it also can be considered as an expression of new trends in the Spanish social movements’ sector.

The report is divided into two chapters. The first chapter focuses on leftist social movements in Spain (first section) and describes the most relevant social movements in the 1990s (second section).

The second chapter deals with the origins and evolution of GJM in Spain taking into account the patterns of evolution of leftist social movements previously described. This part of the report is organised into four sections. In the first section, the main organisational structures of the GJM in Spain are discussed. In the second section, the use of the alternative media is described briefly, while the principal campaigns or events staged by the movement are discussed in the third section. In the fourth section, some of the internal debates regarding the organisational model are examined, the strategies of political parties towards the movement are presented and finally the question of the GJM’s public image in Spain is analysed.

2. Leftist social movements and 90s mobilisations patterns

2.1. Leftist social movements in Spain. Origins and legacies

Under the broad collective action frame of the opposition to Franco’s regime (middle 1970s) there was a convergence of diverse social movements, among which, together with the workers movement, the students, neighbours’ associations (movimiento vecinal) and nationalist groups (that had just come into being) were particularly active (Castells 1986; Laraña 1999). Since the late 1960s, those groups had carried out a “basic task of substitution force of, and later complementary to, political parties” (Pastor 1988, 73). However, the democracy institutionalisation process involved a gradual demobilisation of these actors as many of their claims were included into the new policy agendas and relevant leaders incorporated into the new political institutions, specially on those administrations that gradually occupied by the left (and the nationalist).

The model of “transition pactada” involved a tacit agreement among elites on the need to demobilise civil society in order to ensure a successful political transition. The demobilisation strategy had a decisive impact on the design of the new rules of the political game. One of the goals of this strategy was to reduce the number of social actors that
participated in the political process (to a limited number of parties and trade unions) and to confined politics to the electoral contest. This consensus favoured an ideological and programmatic approach among main political parties (Gunther 1992, 40) as well as putting off the institutional reforms for the development of a democratic civil society. Therefore, beyond the vote, participation was almost nullified (Pastor 1999). Furthermore, the restrictions and defects of Franco’s administrative and juridical framework were “de facto” prorogued (Gomà y Subirats 1998, 9). Even more, an important part of the staff in charge of the administration continued in their jobs along with their traditional practices. In the case of security forces this led during the first years of democracy to a policy of repression inspired by dictatorial methods (Jaime-Jiménez and Reinares 1988).

Spanish democratic transition did not only established a closed political opportunities structure for excluded interests (as many of those represented by new social movements), but also, as the literature on transitions have underlined, those decisions on the institutional design, taken as temporary measures, remained unaltered over time, determining the functioning of democracy once the new regime consolidated (Karl 1990). Therefore, the reduction of competitors in the political arena that pursues to guarantee the success of a political transition turned out to be a structural feature that determined the development of the democracy itself. In this sense, in the case of Spanish political parties, the consolidation of democracy did not involve the expansion of their organisational relationships with civil society, but just the opposite.

The evolution of the neighbours and workers movements illustrates this pattern of societal demobilisation. The demands for better conditions in those cities that had grown up very quickly as a consequence of intense migrations from the countryside played a major role in the protests against Franco. Political parties found in these protests a platform to channel their political action and to establish a nexus between these material problems and the demands for democratisation. During the 1960s, the movimiento vecinal became the most important (and the biggest) in Europe (Castells 1983). Nevertheless, the victory of the socialists and other leftist parties in the first local elections paved the way for the co-optation of this movement: movement’s leaders got into the public administration and movement’s demands were (partially) incorporated to local political agendas. As part of the strategy of demobilisation, local associations were not recognised as groups of public interests in the Constitution as was demanded by the movement. Not even when the socialists came into power, in spite of what reflected its political programme, government paid attention to the movimiento vecinal and citizen participation in general. From then onwards, the movimiento vecinal declined, decreasing its activism and its capability to remain independent of parties (Álvarez Junco 1995; Castells 1983, 225, 236).

During the 70s, the workers movement expanded in Spain as it is shown by the increase in the number of strikes: 250,000 days in 1964-69, 850,000 in 1970-72, 1,550,000 between 1973 and 1975 (Maravall 1985). As Cortavitarte (2000) points out, the sign in 1978 of Pactos de la Moncloa (a social accord that included control of salaries based upon evolution of price index, reform of the labour and industrial markets) by the peak trade unions (UGT and CC.OO) and political parties paved the way for a split between those organisations favouring a continuous negotiation with governments and those smaller organisations that were opposed to those agreements and subsequent reforms implemented

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1 An account of the student movement during this period can be found in Laraña (1999).
by the PSOE when it reached power in 1982. Since then on, we can talk of a (major) sector in favour of reaching compromises under the new labour umbrella mainly traced by European Union (Maastricht treaty, European Constitution), and that sector opposed to the policies advocating reforms in labour markets and social services.

After political the transition to democracy, the panorama in the Spanish trade unions confirmed that:

- CC.OO (Comisiones Obreras) and UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores) were the most relevant organisations, in terms of visibility and adherents. The first was the most important one and linked to the communist party PCE (Partido Comunista de España) and created during 60s had a relevant role in promoting a base-oriented trade unionism that gave way to a series of workers cicles of protests that eventually included democratic demands against Franco’s regime. The second one had ties to socialist party of PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español).

- The old anarchist network CNT (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores), a particular target of repression under Franco’s regime, and that had counted with one million militants in the 1930 had almost vanished, with a few thousands of partisans. Partially, the libertarian culture of trade unionism in Spain found in CC.OO an organisation in which to work during 60s and 70s.

Along with the CNT, and according to the local and decentralised landscape of Spain, a vast number of organisations emerged or were reconstructed, under libertarian roots (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Enseñanza or the old Solidaridad Obrera) or with strong ties to nationalist parties especially in Basque country (LAB, ELA).

Along with these set of genuinely “anti-franquistas” movements, in the latter phases of the transition, the democratic opposition favoured, and was also fostered by, the activity of a new series of (new) social movements, that to a different degree and form, survived the (demobilisation trends of the) process of political change (Alvarez Junco 1995). Some of them, particularly the feminist or the environmentalist, become more visible in the declining phases of the democratisation cycle of protest².

Basically, Spanish social movements are distinctively marked by their late emergence under a political context characterised by a cycle of mobilisation of opposition to a dictatorial regime and the subsequent transition. In this sense, their roots are well differentiated, by at least three features, from the European new social movements that came into being during the 1960s and 1970s. Firstly, links among different movements are weaker as they did not experiment a common contracultural wave as in other countries (Álvarez 1995; Rucht 1988). The absence of overlaps in militancy among different movements as well as the scarce experiences of collaboration reduced patterns of mutual (inter-movements) identification and solidarity. Secondly, violence did not figure in the protest repertoire of these movements, a feature of the Spanish protest culture configured during the transition. Furthermore, both libertarian roots of some of these networks (particularly present in some ecologist groups) and local nationalisms favoured decentralised organisational models and localism, making difficult to advocate for stable coordination on a statewide basis.

² 1978 would mark, attending to the number of strikes, the beginning of this period (Maravall 1985).
Being these features shared by most of the emerging social movements, there exist also significant differences among them. According to the literature on social movements, we can consider three factors that can help to explain movements’ organisational structure and their collective identities: their territorial origins, the nature of links with pre-existing social and political organisations and type of leadership. While, in relation to the later factor (type of leadership), the marked *personalismo* is a cultural feature that quite often characterised these movements (and whose influence will be notice in their organisational patterns until the last decade), the other two factors allow us to establish the differences and particularities of new social movements and, more important, to account for their different patterns of development. We will illustrate this by comparing the evolution of the ecologist and the feminist movements introducing some references to others movements.

The democratisation process opened the door to the constitution of a great variety (in terms of ideology, organisational models, etc.) of feminists and environmental organisations. This fact did not prevent the incipient configuration of collective identities (public statements of status and affiliation) as indicated by the proliferation of the “ecologistas” and “feministas” labels among new organisations as well as by the self-definition as “movimientos” (despite of the negative meaning of the term as it had been extensively used by Franco’s organisations).

The environmental movement (both its antinuclear and conservationist strands) was built up by a constellation of local organisations. Political parties and other supralocal organisational infrastructures structures did not played a relevant patronizing role. Indeed, citizen’s reactions to local environmental problems were the primary reason that generated them. This type of emerging conditions reduces the importance of party affiliation of activists in the organisational models. In fact, the only political strand that can be identified during the first environmental campaigns is rooted in libertarian grounds. Both libertarian and conservative trends fed an ecologist identity that emphasised (local) autonomy of the different organisations and refuses to be framed by or under political parties.

In contrast, the organisational roots of an important part of the feminist movement were not tied to concrete issues or local conflicts. Most of them responded to initiatives of particular groups of women militants of political parties and the scope of their demands and activities were defined in national terms (Escario et al. 1996, 206-207). “Double militancy” was an organisational feature particularly important in those groups identified with the “feminismo de la igualdad”. In contrast, there was a second strand of feminist groups, inspired by the “feminismo de la diferencia”, which rejected any kind of collaboration with parties.

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4 For instance, the *Movimiento Democrático de Mujeres* (Democratic movement of women) was linked to the Communist Party (PCE), the *Unión por la Liberación de la Mujer* (Union for Women Liberation) was linked to the ORT (*Organización Revolucionaria de los Trabajadores*), etc… Furthermore, there were also other women’s groups where party affiliation was heterogeneous, but still the double militancy (parties and feminist group) was a critical organisational feature (as in the case of the *Frente de Liberación de la Mujer*, Women Liberation Front.)

5 The emergence of other new social movements during the transition as the antimilitarist (military objectors) or international solidarity (*Movimiento de Cooperación al Desarrollo*) find (part) of their roots in the Christian movement (*cristianos de base*) as a consequence of the new orientation of the Catholic church after the *Concilio Vaticano II*. In this sense, as in the case of workers movement and the *movimiento vecinal*, the
The first experiences of coordination at the state level for these new social movements took place as a consequence the opening of the political system and, concretely the prospect for political influence generated by the debates and the open hearings that accompany the writing of the Spanish Constitution\(^6\). However, in few years, as political expectations to have a real influence started declining, the rifts among different sectors rose, and coordination became troublesome. The consequences of this process varied, however, among the different movement according to their diverse organisational origins/profile. For the environmentalist, major discrepancies centred on the organisational territorial model (how to organised at the national level), but did not affect to their collective identity (mutual identification, solidarity and potential common action). For the feminists, however, the bulk of the debate focused on the “double militancy” issue (the nature of their collective identity). While in the case of the environmental movement these (negative) political conditions did not affect the core elements of their collective identity (although based on patterns of weak territorial coordination), in the case of the feminist, it signified the split between those linked to political parties and those (the minority) that opposed to the double militancy.

In all cases, these new social movements had to face the dilemma of how to interact with political authorities. Institutional flexibility during political transition, particularly under the first government (centre-right), allowed political access of some demands promoted by new social movements. Under this political landscape, environmentalist and feminists oriented a great part of their work to lobbying activities, obtaining by means of public support legitimisation as social representatives, information and economic resources. Political authorities benefited too from this situation, as movements gave them visibility, issues to be included in their agendas and social legitimisation. The new political architecture that developed local powers (as regional parliaments) helped to reproduce these patterns of resources exchange.

However, despite of these common patterns, the first experiences of political interaction with authorities under democracy also reflected the distinctive nature that in the following years will characterise the interaction of each (type of) movement(s) with the authorities. In this sense, while the political participation of feminist organisations was orientated to the provision of social services the interaction with environmental groups maintained a high political (and conflicting) profile\(^7\). These different patterns can be explained by their mentioned different organisational and ideological (identity) profiles, as well as by the different nature of their demands (or their different fitting into the dominant discourses and policy agendas during the first years of democracy). In this sense, environmental demands clashed against the dominant economic modernisation discourse.

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\(^{6}\) This would be the case of Federación del Movimiento Ecologista and Plataforma de Mujeres de Madrid (El País 8/12/1977 and 10/12/77). The anti-militarist Movimiento de Objección de Conciencia emerged to defend the recognition of the right to conscientious objection to military service (Sampedro 1997).

\(^{7}\) This is especially true in the case of the anti-nuclear movement. Energy policy was marked by its continuity with the past, maintaining its pro-nuclear orientation. During the transition, nuclear power stations were highly contested by the Spaniards, coordinated under the State-level antinuclear Coordination Committee (Coordinadora Estatal Anti-nuclear 1978), facing a strong police repression.
and the (neo)liberal orientation of economic policy. On the contrary, many of the feminist demands were inserted in a wider set of democratic rights much easily assumed by the new political elites. Debates on these demands took place in the parliamentary arena and were promoted by lefties political parties (as mentioned, with many feminist members). Demands for women equal rights were not only easily articulated into proposal of legal reforms, but also the approval of these new pieces of legislation was considered consubstantial to the process of democratic institutionalisation. Furthermore, the need for domestic legitimacy and international recognition favoured the adoption of measures such as amnesty and recognition of military objection.

To sum up, transition to democracy constituted a learning ground for new social movements. The existing (but limited) political opportunities (flexibility, openness of new politicians in charge and mass media) helped to the movement emergence and first experiences of state-wide coordination in order to gain influence or to shape the political agenda during the initial phase of democracy.

2.2. The PSOE in power: from “radical reformism” to “structural closeness”

The period of institutional accessibility during transition for social movements was, however, brief. The reconstitution of ministerial cabinet in 1979 diluted the open style of the first government. However, social movements’ political influence and social visibility will be partially maintained by the socialist’s redefinition of their electoral strategy in order to win the national elections in 1982. To oppose to the conservative turn of the government in 1979 and to gain additional support, the PSOE defined a “strategy of mobilisation” in order to “assume the leadership of citizens’ hopes of change and progress” (Maravall 1985, 191).

As a consequence of this, PSOE elaborated a programme of “radical reformism” that made room to social movements demands: abortion law, measures about violence against women and maternity protection in the case of feminist movement; general environmental law and creation of a presidential organism to approach ecologist movements; military objection law and referendum about the entrance in NATO in the case of pacifist movement; international cooperation law in the case of international solidarity movement, etc. Apart from being part of the programme, some social movements gained visibility as socialists defended them in the Parliament (stoppage of nuclear waste disposal at the North-Atlantic sea, prohibition of whaling, etc..)

Social movement organisations also benefited from the temporal support of the socialist party. Relevant demonstrations against NATO (as the crowded one of November 1981) and the articulation of peace groups (MPDL, APD, Mujeres por la Paz) contributed to create an active civil society around peace campaigns. Previously, the peace movement had significantly relied on ecologist organisations (Fuente 1984; Gómariz 1984; 1987; Prevost 1993). Specific social networks involved in peace issues were pretty weak yet. Ecologists and anti-militarist movement, along with Christian sectors, the communist party

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8 Few years later, the constitution of Coordinadora de Organizaciones Pacifistas del Estado (1983) and the political group of Los Verdes (1984) was prompted by the campaign against the entrance of Spain into the OTAN. Similarly, the creation of the Coordinadora de ONG de desarrollo in 1986 can be related to the desire of the Administration to implement a new development cooperation policy.
and extreme left wing groups, that had obtained quite bad results in first general elections, joined to constitute a network of local committees against NATO (comités anti-OTAN).

In 1982, PSOE took power. After a short period the programmatic openness was transformed in government closeness (the support to Spanish NATO entry illustrates quite well the modification of its strategy towards social movements). Previous dynamics of consensus vanished, fluent interaction with social movements was cut and the close nature of the political system acquired a structural character. After the transition, the state grew notably, increasing their areas of public intervention but also adopting a commanding (close) policy style (Subirats 1998, 18).

2.3. Social movements in the 1980s

In 1983 the Instituto de la Mujer (Institute for Women) was created as a public autonomous organism under the umbrella of the Ministry of Social Affairs (Ministerio de Asuntos Sociales), originally headed by a socialist feminist. This fact gave way to the institutionalisation of women politics, configuring the so-called “State feminism” (Valiente 1994).

The phenomena of institutionalisation of gender politics implied also the institutionalisation of feminist movement: cooptation by means of financial support and institutional engagement of activists, organisations were converted in providers of social services. Beyond short time benefits⁹, the movement political influence declined in the medium term. Even the institutional channels of participation turn out to be not very useful in promoting women policies as prove the low political profile of the Women Advisory Committee (linked to the Instituto de la Mujer) or the lack of participation and surveillance of policies for gender equality (planes de igualdad). Furthermore, this process sharpened the internal division between those sectors close to institutions (and parties) and the minoritarian sector of radical feminism, quite often linked to the feminismo de la diferencia.

Similarly, the evolution of the international solidarity movement (mainly ONGD - NGOs for development) was tied to the institutionalisation of a new development aid policy area (and the Secretaría de Estado para la cooperación y el desarrollo, a department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), as Spain became an international donor. Whereas in the case of other social movements initial coordination efforts responded to movements’ own initiatives, the creation of the Coordinadora de ONGDs was promoted by the administration in order to formalise contacts between this sector and the government. We cannot explain the growth of the ONGD sector (number organisations, social support) during final 80s and 90s without taking into account the increase of financial support by Spanish state (from 20 millions in 1983 to 800 in 1992 and to 2,000 millions of pesetas since the voluntary quote was established in the main income tax).

Along with the institutional branch of the international solidarity movements, and creating two poles, in a similar way as described for the feminist movement (institutionalised and radical), it was developed since 1993 a network called Plataforma 0,7% (a state-wide platform, linked to grassroots Christian organisations) whose most

⁹ Feminists did influenced the elaboration of an abortion law (Barreiro 2000, 95-6).
remarkable action was the establishment of a protest camp, occupying the central avenue (Paseo de la Castellana) in Madrid during several weeks and a demonstration of 100,000 people in 1994.

In contrast, the nature of the interaction between State and the environmental and peace movements was far away from leading to institutionalisation and an eventual scenario of cooptation. After the transition, although the number of environmental activists that entered into public service was equal or greater than the feminist’s militants, it did not produce a sort of “State ecologism” (ecologismo de Estado). The administration did not put in motion any public organism similar to the Instituto de la Mujer, nor did it started a relevant programme of financial aid to these organisations in order to orient environmental organisations towards the provision of social services\textsuperscript{10}. On the contrary, environmental policies were absent of the political agendas until the mid 1990s. Consequently, the environmental movement did not experience strong pressure towards institutionalisation and maintained its highly political profile and its status of political “outsider”. In this sense, it can be stated that, during the 1980s, the environmental movement got through an “institutional desert”, encountering conjuctural “institutional oasis” in which allies were found to give impulse to some demands. The access of environmental movement to decision making processes was limited to regional or local scopes, depending on the different environmental issues and its capacity to introduce conflict through social protests.

During this period, the main features of its organisational base and its collective identity were consolidated. A key defining feature will be its decentralised nature of the networks and the scarce number of statewide organisational infrastructures. After the transition, the environmental movement did invest much energy in attempts to coordinate at the state level and preferred to concentrate their resources on fighting (reacting to) environmental threats at the local level. The “regionalisation” of environmental organisations, also a characteristic of disruptive (and partially libertarian rooted) movements as pacifism, was reinforced by the political decentralization of the State environmental policies, making room for local institutional pressure. Nevertheless, this process of decentralisation did not affect shared identity. Internal solidarity and cooperation patterns were maintained by informal networks, allowing punctual common collective actions.

2.4 Spanish leftist social movements in the 1990s: organisational consolidation and confluences towards the global justice movement

The 1990s signified the consolidation of this new set of social movements. This process is to a great extent influenced by the features that characterised their emergence during the political transition. In this sense, there can be identified two major tendencies. On the one hand, some movements have oriented their activities to the field of social services: the workers movement (“co-management” sector), the movimiento vecinal, the development aid movement, the feminist movement, and later on, the movement for immigrants support. Obviously, there are differences among them, but in general they are

\textsuperscript{10} Compare financial support given by the administration to social actors: 3 millions of pesetas to environmental organisations, far away from 20 millions to NGOs for Development and 70 millions to women associations.
characterised by a high degree of professionalisation, a weak collective identity (not very cohesive) and by a low profile in terms of contention.

On the other hand, another set of movements that have not tended towards institutionalisation (or this process is not very consistent and varies through time) and their interaction with authorities has been based on conflict: environmentalist, antimilitarists/peace and the squatters’ movement. For the first two movements, we generally come across scarcely formalised organisations, a decentralised structure with different levels of inter-territorial coordination/integration and protest repertoires oriented towards social mobilisation (although, as mentioned within the parameters of a moderate protest culture). For the squatters movement, the disruptive character of its practices has led to a sharply antagonist relationships with authorities, being their scope of action and reproduction locally as a consequence of its practices and the scarcity of coordination experiences. In the following pages, we examine all these movements although we concentrate in those that cases that will have a greater influence on the nature of the Spanish Global Justice Movement (GJM).

The international solidarity movement (or the ONGD sector, Organizaciones No-Gubernamentales de Desarrollo), as mentioned, experienced remarkable organisational growth, thanks to the public and social support. As stated before, during the first socialist mandate, a new area of development cooperation policy is created (organised around the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation) that attribute to ONGDs an important policy implementation role through public funding of development projects in poor countries and citizens sensitisation campaigns). This gave way to the constitution between 1985 and 1989 of more solidarity organisations than ever. Along with the social aid sector (not analysed here), the ONGD sector comprises the most professionalized organisational infrastructure: being characterised by dynamics of inter-organisational competition, weak mutual identification, business-oriented management, etc.

The ONGDs’ boom during the 1980s and the 1990s paralleled the spectacular growth of volunteering among the Spanish youth (from which a new generation of social activists will come up). Initially, the ONGDs movement is pretty much centralised around Barcelona and Madrid. The Spanish NGOs Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora de ONG para el desarrollo de España) has channelled the movement relationship with authorities. Formal access to the decision-making process has taken place through the National Advisory Council for development cooperation (1989). This led to the fact that more politicised sectors (usually represented in smaller organisations) would have similar weight than large professionalized (and more moderated) ONGDs, somehow smoothing the strong institutionalisation pressures.

Also acting as counterbalance of institutionalisation pressures, a grassroots movement emerged in 1993, the Plataforma 0,7% claiming for the governmental implementation of a United Nations mandate: to destine 0,7% of GNP to development aid. 1994 represented the peak of this movement (being the African humanitarian crisis a supportive mass media background and the World Bank summit that took place in Madrid) with the articulation of spontaneous and diffuse networks of local camps that last for weeks in several cities of Spain and that had a weak structure of coordination. Apart from a more

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11 21% and 67% of the organisations engaged at the ONGD Coordinating Committee were respectively rooted in Barcelona and Madrid.
radical protest repertoire (employing, for instance, symbolic civil disobedience actions),
these networks also redefined the discourse (frame) around international solidarity beyond
the claim for development aid, criticising World Bank, IMF and later on, the neoliberal
globalisation.

More recently, during the conservative government of the Partido Popular (1996-
2004), the strategy of authorities attempting to dilute the power of the Spanish ONGDs
Coordinating Committee, led to some more political and critical responses of some ONGD
sectors, left wing oriented some of them. This politicisation trend could be also due in part
to the arrival of new generations of activists unsatisfied with the exclusive orientation to the
implementation of cooperation projects and the acceptance of the orientation of the
cooperation policy. There is also an increasing tendency towards decentralisation as a
consequence of the decentralisation of official aid policy.

Both branches of the international solidarity movement (ONGDs and Plataforma
0,7%) will develop a role in the promotion of the GJM. On the one hand, the ONGDs have
opened the discourse to critics to the conditional aid to favour Spanish exports (arms
included), the neoliberal politics implemented by IMF and World Bank and fair trade. They
have also adhered international campaigns against landmines getting involved with other
international organisations as Greenpeace, International Amnesty or Doctors without
Borders. On the other hand, the Plataforma 0,7% will constitute the bases for the
development of the RCade (Citizens network for debt relief), a very active network on the
“alterglobalisation” protests.

In the same way, the organisations of the feminist movement become the most
institutionalised ones among new social movements. Not only due to the consolidation of
the “state feminism” but also, and differentiating here from the ONGDs sector, because of
their interaction with authorities takes place through an organism of a low political profile
(Instituto de la Mujer) and movement’ voice has not being channelled by an unique
interlocutor (as for instance the State Coordinating Committee of women organisation
(Coordinadora de Organizaciones de Mujeres, which as a consequence of movement
internal divisions maintained a very low profile during the 1980s and early 1990s).

Folguera (1988) points out that from 1982 onwards (with the socialist in power) a
great dispersion of groups and organisations took place. In 1987, the Instituto de la Mujer
published a catalogue of 600 organisations, and just 10% of them defined themselves as
“feminists”. The majority of these feminists’ organisations did not have a political strategy
nor had a social project. They were plural and heterogeneous organisations that included
different tendencies of feminism (radical, de la diferencia, lesbianism) and whose activities
were characterised by short-term objectives: non-sexist education, abortion rights
extension, end of violence against women.

However, during the 1990s it is possible to talk of a process of extension of the
movement collective identity (beyond those groups that defined themselves as feminist in
the previous decade) on the bases of new spaces of confluence among feminists that have
been active in other kind of movements: lesbianism, antimilitarism, ecologist. Maybe, the
most remarkable tendency in Spain (and perhaps in other contexts) is the configuration of a
wide network of women, with a variety of discourses and practices, in which feminist
perspectives coexist independently of political parties (Cruells 2001). From this point of
view, diverting from the legacies of the past, the feminist movement would have being able
to construct a collective identity beyond ideological or political affiliations. As an indicator of this process, it is possible to find the feminist discourses permeating the “alterglobalisation” protests, and a feminist participation through collectives such as *Mujeres contra la Guerra, Mujeres de Negro, etc* (the latter, involved in the antimilitarist movement).

The increase of political contention with authorities would be also a new feature of those women organisations that have traditionally oriented their activities towards the provision of social services. An example of this trend can be found in the constitution in 2002 of the Feminist Organisations Network against Gender Violence, whose purpose is to press government about a kind of violence that puts a serious obstacle in the development of democracy. Similarly the *Coordinadora de Organizaciones Feministas* has gained also greater public visibility in recent years. The higher political profile of many of these organisations has been favoured by the political context, as the conservatives were in power and leftist groups were recurrently demonstrating against governmental policies, facilitating the promotion by PSOE of a Law against gender violence in 2005.

A high degree of institutionalisation is also the main organisation feature of the *immigrants and antiracist movement*. This movement grew up in the 1990s (along with the immigration phenomenon) over the NGOs networks involved in social solidarity. These organisations have centred on public funding campaigns of citizens sensitisation and social assistance for immigrants. Their interaction with the authorities has been channel through the *Foro para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes*, created in 1995. Immigrants associations, major trade unions and NGOs of social assistance or human rights take part in this Forum that has limited to the “management” of the public funding programmes of immigrants assistance (Veredas 2003).

However, the different mobilisations in favour of immigrants’ rights (since 2000) have been mainly the result of self-organisation processes of different groups of immigrants lacking of official documents (*sin papeles*) in areas of a great concentration immigrant population (Barcelona, Murcia, Huelva, Sevilla). These mobilisations signified a social backlash against conservative policy reforms aiming at the regulation of immigrants’ rights. They received the support of alternative trade unions (mainly CGT), networks involved in “alterglobalisation” protests, students, and neighbourhoods associations. Their mobilisations mirrored those of the “*sens papiers*” movement in France during 1990s, with lock-ins in churches and universities buildings, hunger strikes and demonstrations.

Last, there are human rights organisations that have come round in support of the immigrants’ mobilisations and their demands (*Asociación pro-derechos humanos de Andalucía*), and others that specifically are a confluence of groups involved in GJM or “alterglobalisation protests” (*Derechos para Todos*).

After the institutionalisation of *movimiento vecinal* during the transition, the landscape of these organisations have been characterised by fragmentation and

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12 Although the campaign started during the 1990s.

13 Nevertheless, under the new political context with the socialist back in power, representatives of solidarity and immigrants organisations have been taken actively part in the elaboration of 2005 immigration law.

14 The different reforms were being criticised by social sectors, mainly NGOs involved in social services for immigrants. Nevertheless, their claims did not reach visibility.
heterogeneity (to such extend that it is dubious to name it as a “movement”). Their activities have been trapped into the delivery of local services with a significant party bias, usually PSOE and Izquierda Unida. This orientation has kept these organisations from establishing links with their potential participants: the neighbours. The lack of a common collective identity (and the presence of rifts derived by ideological differences) could explain the weakness of supralocal organisational infrastructures.

However, neighbours groups are responsible of most of the protests events in Spain (Adell 1999). Usually these demonstrations have a reactive character (demands for better social services or infrastructures, opposition to projects that consider to be affecting to their interests, Not In My Back Yard dynamics). Consequently, they do not have always a “progresista” character. Protests tend to organise around punctual platforms in which there are confluences with other movements. Among them, there are significant experiences of collaboration with the environmental groups (defence of natural spaces, opposition to infrastructures, protection of historical places). In some cases, this has led to dynamics of more intensive protests and to the configuration of a wider social agenda of demands (education, immigration, housing). This patterns of cooperation with local allies and social movements has produced new experiences of neighbours’ participation in local politics as illustrated by the platforms formed around Planes de Desarrollo Comunitario and other citizens initiatives (Rodríguez 2002, Rebollo 2001).

As stated before, the “pacted” nature of the democratic transition caused the division of workers movement, with an institutionalised sector around the tow peak trade union (UGT and CCOO) and what can be called the alternative union sector. Since then on, institutionalised unions have followed a strategy of compromises, accepting successive labour market reform (but with occasional general strikes) under the labour policies framed by European Union (Maastricht treaty, European Constitution). In this context, the alternative union sector has grown up in terms of organisations as a consequence of internal divisions that lead to the creation of new organisations (CGT, Central General de Trabajadores out of CNT at the end of 80s, Co.Bas or Sindicato Ferroviario from CC.OO in 2000) or the articulation of new local platforms (Intersindical Alternativa de Catalunya). CGT is currently the third union force with around 50.000 activists and with strong. This sector will constitute one of the pillars of the alterglobalisation protests during the 1990s and particularly after Seattle.

The divorce between the “management oriented” and the “alternative” sectors is evident in their different approach to European/global issues, both in terms of action and discourse. Euromarches (1997-2000) have found adherents and promoters among alternative trade unions, mainly supported in Spain by CGT. The action day promoted by People’s Global Action in 2000 during the meeting at Prague of World Bank and

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15 More critical and leftist coalition, created in 1986 under the aegis of the Communist Party (PCE), with a small representation at parliament.

16 In 1991 it was created an State-wide Coordination Committee of Neighbour’s Associations (Coordinadora d de Asociaciones de Vecinos del Estado) but it disappeared a decade later without being able to construct an interterritorial coordination of the local groups. In spite of its weakness, it has contributed to establish interconnections with other social movements.

17 In March 2003, 100 platforms of Valencia (governed by PP) gather together to rally against the urban policies and in demand of more participation (Diagonal 2004, n. 0, November-December: 8).
International Monetary Funds officials marked a “formal” confluence between the those networks involved in global protests and the alternative trade-union sector. From then onwards, these trade unions have been quite active at the Global Justice Movement. On the contrary, CC.OO and UGT (except for some minoritarian groups) decided to support big summits, as the World Social Forum. The counter-summit of Barcelona against UE Council meeting (March 2002) made clear the division. Alternative syndicalism took part of the “Platform against the Europe of the Capital and the War” that sharply opposed to European Constitution, while the alternative union sector organised autonomously their rallies. In 2001, was developed the First Meeting of workers against capitalist globalisation, in which alternative unions confirmed their support to “anti-globalisation” movement.

Also, during the 1990s there are a new set of mobilisations of workers affected by firms closings characterised by the limited role played by established unions, the increasing reference to the negative consequences of economic globalisation and the adoption of disruptive repertoires of action18. These sporadic outbursts of disruptive labour protests with global problems in the background (i.e., multinational companies that move from one country to other), however, it is not enough to bridge the gap between more grass-rooted and active sectors at the GJM and the more institutionalised trade unionism (CC.OO and UGT). In Spain, the confluence between institutionalised unions and the GJM have taken place in demonstrations scenarios as the opposition to the National Hydrological Plan, the reform of immigrant laws, the opposition to against Iraq war…..

In the 1990s, the organisational panorama of the environmental movement in Spain reveals the coexistence of different type of organisations, generally reflecting the typical profile of a social movement organisational base. From a rather modest starting point in the late 1980s, professionalized organisations have grown as have participatory organisational alternatives. In general terms, growth has been more significant in terms of the number of groups, which grew quickly in the second half of the 1980s, but has been more modest in terms of resources19. The increased resources are unequally distributed through the organisational landscape. Professionalized organisations such as Greenpeace account for a large proportions of this growth, while the rest of the gains in resources are dispersed among a number of local/regional groups20.

However, this pattern of limited growth has impeded intensive professionalization of the type seen in the Spanish ONGD sector, which require a minimum of resources concentration, and favoured the prevalence of organisational participatory models. Simultaneously, the environmental movement has widened its issue agenda, first, to

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18 This has been the case of the Campo de la Esperanza “Camp of Hope”, an initiative of fired workers of SINTER (a firm linked to Telefónica) that established a camp in the middle of Madrid during 187 days (2001). Also, the close of a biscuit factory in Palencia (March 2001) led to important rifts between workers and police. The workers retained for 13 hours to former managers of the company that have been recently taken over by multinational United Biscuit.

19 At the end of the decade membership in environmental organisations is about 2,5% of adult population. It represents an advance with respect to mid 80s: 1%. But it is far away from European levels in 1991: Holland (17%), Germany (7,5%), UK (4,7%) and France (2,4%).

20 Greenpeace has capitalised the biggest quota in the increase of ecologist affiliation: from 16.000 (1984) to 72.000 (1997). This process has derived in the adoption of a greater responsibility of the Spanish branch at the Greenpeace-Europe, and at the same time, it has favoured the integration of this organisation in the Spanish environmental movement.
environmental quality issue that, due to the movements’ original conservationist and antinuclear, had traditionally received little attention, and later on to global issues. The limited number of state-wide organisations has impeded, however, this process to producing a high level of organisational specialisation. The division of labour among the main environmental organisations seem to respond more to tacit operational agreements on inter-organisational co-ordination and mutual-respect according to the contingent availability of resources. At the local level, the movement’s organisational expansion has covered the landscape of “generalist” (in term of issues) local groups.

It is also possible to see a trend towards political repertoire moderation and the increasing relevance of institutional and media scenarios to exert political pressure efficiently. There is pressure towards movement political institutionalisation, and environmental organisations are aware of such pressures and suffer from the organisational tensions associated with them. However the organisational response from part of the movement is intended to increase their political leverage without losing some of the features of the participatory organisational model, or giving up the (potential) resort to social protests. The increasing political relevance of conventional forms of action has been coupled with a more efficient use of disperse resources and a limited process of professionalization. In this sense, organisational evolution has been driven by a process of movement internal cohesion through the configuration of territorial and sectoral structures of coordination (as exemplified by Ecologistas en Acción), and increasing collaboration among state-wide organizations (Ecologistas en Acción, Greenpeace, WWF-ADENA,SEO/Birdlife) and between environmental groups and other social movement groups.

It seems that the Spanish environmental movement increased its political efficacy (trying to overcome traditional reactive approach to environmental problems, adopting a pragmatic attitude towards political opportunities, but without discarding social mobilisation) with an organisational solution that combines voluntary work and professional staff on the base of dense and cohesive movement networks. The nature of the different organisational cultures and the evolving features of the movement identity, among other factors, account for the particular patterns of organisational evolution.

Thanks to these organisational transformations, during the 1990s, the movement will increase its capacity to manage environmental conflicts in order to influence decision-making process. Its opposition to water management policies and industrial wastes illustrate this (Jiménez 2005). Nevertheless, the dynamics of interaction between the state and the environmental movement remains anchored on the conflict-access logic.

As a consequence of both territorial extension and cohesion, and the notable presence of political ecology discourses, above all after the constitution of Ecologistas en Acción, the environmental movement have been a major pillar of GJM, and particularly of “alterglobalisation” protests. The international campaign of 50 Years is Enough! (to protest against commemoration of the birth of IMF and World Bank) arrived to Spain by means of ecologists groups such as Aedenat, now in Ecologistas en Acción. An international counter-summit was held during official acts of World Bank in Madrid. The protests included a

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21 Since the 1990s, the environmental movement has been the most important promoter of alliances and platforms against national policies like the industrial waste policy or the national hydrological plans. Particularly, in the later case, movement capacity to mobilise and put pressures over authorities can only be compared with the protests against nuclear power during political transition.
symbolic blockade and were participated by a great variety of organisations, ranging from pacifists to minor political groups and international solidarity networks. Later, Ecologistas en Acción will act under the banner of political ecology, considering current process of globalisation as a major obstacle to environmental policies. For this reason, and due to its horizontal and very extended structure, Ecologistas en Acción will play a major role in promoting links (like the State encounter of 2001 in Girona of “alterglobalisation” networks) and activities inside GJM (protest campaigns).

As we have already mentioned, the peace (against NATO) and antinuclear movement can be compared to similar new social movements in Europe. Among their achievements we can consider the moratoria nuclear and the cultural impact of the campaign against Spain's entry into NATO (that contribute to develop citizens anti-war culture). Also, given its duration and success, the campaign against compulsory military service can be considered as the most relevant peace campaign in Europe during 1990s.

The opposing campaign to Spain’s entry into NATO (1981-1986) paved the way for the statewide coordination of the peace movement. However, this coordination did not rest upon solid bases, but turned out to be depending on contingent political conditions, and particularly by the dominant role played by political parties (as feature characteristic of the mobilisations during the transition). When the PSOE changed completely its position, from opposing to strongly supporting the Spanish incorporation into NATO, the movement lost a critical political ally and the political opportunities drastically shrank. As the political environment became less and less favourable, internal discrepancies become more important. Divisions developed around questions such as the definition of militarism, civil disobedience and non-violent actions or the organisational designs…. After the referendum the movement demobilised as fast as it growth few years before.

However, through the 1980s the main lines of action that will constitute the bases for the re-emergence of the peace movement in the following decade are already present: opposition to civil and military nuclear energy, conscientious objection to military service and against paying taxes that are going to be used for military purposes, education for peace values. Issues that, however, are carry out through unconnected campaigns. Low degrees of campaigns coordination is also a common feature in other movements in the 1980s as the environmentalist, however, in contrast with the latter, in this case low coordination reflects the existence of profound internal divisions (or a weak collective identity). The lack of visibility of the State Coordinating Network of Pacifist organisations and its scarce vitality and continuity after anti-OTAN mobilisations illustrates this “identity crisis” within the peace movement.

During the last decade, although we cannot talk of the existence of a common state-based organisational infrastructure (as in the case of the environmental movement), there are several networks (of groups and individuals) that begin to share a common collective identity (as in the case of the feminist movement or the squatter movement). This collective identity is (re) produce through a series of networks that provide continuity (and coherence) to a more pro-active agenda of activities and campaigns (in contrast to its “reactive” nature of previous decades) while group’s autonomy from political parties is preserved.
Two of the most relevant sectors within the peace movement are the movement against war and the antimilitarism²².

Movement against war: After anti-NATO campaign, the opposition to Gulf War reflects a characteristic element of mobilisations against military interventions, and in general, of peace movement in Spain: they have not led towards the articulation of state-wide platforms (for instance, the Pacifists Organisations Coordinating Committee that acted during anti-NATO campaign has not been reedited). Instead, mobilisations can be seen as a consequence of singular initiatives, either local or promoted by ideological families (extreme left groups and parties, autonomy and libertarian groups, pacifist movements as MOC, etc.).

These mobilisations have found different degree of support of major parties (PSOE, IU) and peak-trade unions depending on the changing political configuration of power. For instance, the period of conservative governments (1986-2004) favoured (implicit) alliances among PSOE and IU and social movements (as reflected in the in their active role during the 15th February 2003 international demonstrations day against war) forcing the entrance into electoral agenda of Iraq’s invasion question. In contrast, demonstrations against Gulf War (with the PSOE still in power) only counted with the support of IU²³. Political configuration of power has influence also the size and extension of demonstrations, since alliances with institutional actors guarantee access to media and other mobilisation resources.

In the case of Balkans war protests the characteristics of the conflict (communist regime against Western intervention in the middle of a genocide) created divisions among social movements, some favouring military intervention, others adhering more strict anti-violence messages. Because of that, the support of IU was diffuse and even divided. This division among the left and the different perspectives towards Balkans intervention reached population, although surveys pointed to a greater opposition to NATO intervention compared to other Western countries (see Gordillo 1999). These protests impacted on discourses about militaries interventions, as some of those supporters of the use of force made up their minds for alternative participatory peace policies, relying on dialogue and negotiation to reduce the socially bases roots of violence (in line with the proposal defended by Mujeres de Negro or the International Peace Brigades).

Protest platforms against Iraq war confirm, on the one hand, the fragmentation of anti-war movements, which were locally rooted and some times composed by different ideological blocks. In Barcelona the Aturem la Guerra (Stop the War) platform served as common links of a variety of initiatives, whereas in Madrid the atomisation was bigger with at least 5 spaces tied to social actors such as: left wing groups parties (Asamblea contra la Globalización Capitalista y la Guerra, Foro Social de Madrid), autonomy (local

²² It can be outlined the more frequent involvement on peace sensitising campaigns (against commerce of weapons or military expenditures) of NGOs for Development, whose message seemed to be permeated by a pacifist and antimilitarist discourse.

²³ Some figures: in 1999 demonstrations against Kosovo intervention counted with 18.000 activists (Madrid); during the Afghanistan war reached 20.000 participants in Barcelona; Iraq’s invasion in 2003 led to a great number of demonstrations, summing up the six bigger protests around 1,5 millions (according to the, probably very conservative, police estimations). According to the officials surveys of CIS (April 2003), about a 25% of population had been involved in some act against military intervention.
assemblies against war and some social centres), radical democratic networks (*Consulta Social Europea*, *Cultura contra la Guerra* (artist promoted platform) and peace networks (*Espacio Horizontal contra la Guerra*). On the other hand, the fragmentation did not prevent form maintaining common initiatives (calls for international demonstration days coming from European Social Forum) reflecting new trends of movements’ confluence, a characteristic feature of the GJM.

The antimilitarist movement: military disobedience campaigns: The conscientious objection of military service and *insumisión* (total resistance to military and alternative social service) campaigns begun in 1988 and can be regarded as one of the most significant protests in the history of antimilitarist movements (*Ajangiz* 1999; Prat 2003). They succeeded in abolishing compulsory military service, previously de-legitimating the social service offered by authorities as substitution of military service. The campaigns success relied on their capacity to gain youth support to such extent that rendered impossible to satisfy the necessities of the Spanish Army. The number of those applying for military objection grew up to 738,832 people from 1976 to 1998. In 1999 there were 20,000 *insumisos*. A supportive public opinion also helped in the development of this massive campaign, with around 63% of people in 80s and 75% in the 1990s opposed to compulsory military service (*Ajangiz* 2000). These campaigns contributed also to solidify the peace values among the Spanish society.

The main promoter of these campaigns was the organisation *Movimiento de Objeción de Conciencia* (MOC), created in 1977, as the projects to legislate objection to military service were considered quite restricted. In 1979, during its first congress, MOC defines itself as an antimilitarist movement advocating for non-violent strategies, incorporating latter on its critic a second reference with the opposition to patriarchal societies. In 1986, after the approval of a military objection law, it is created a division between those supporting objection (and allowing the practice of social service) and those promoting insubordination.

The MOC’s strategy generated the apparition of new organisations, of regional-scope (*Asociación de Objeción de Conciencia de Catalunya o Euskadi*). These organisations continued to put pressure on the authorities by means of leftist and nationalist parties that defend their positions in parliaments.

In terms of organisation, some of the features of social movements found here its more radical expression: “assemblearism” and autonomy of local groups are key characteristics. The decentralisation did not keep up the movement from maintaining a state campaign that made use of insubordination, and posterior reaction to repression, as the main tool to confront authorities at high levels. Hundreds of judgements and imprisonments help the movement to maintain tension alive (Pérez and Expósito, 2001).

Nowadays, the strategy of public opinion sensitisation of the MOC (renamed *Alternativa Antimilitarista* in 2001) focuses mainly on promoting education in peace

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24 Initially, the MOC relied on Christian networks (as pre-existing organisational infrastructure). *Justicia y Paz* gave support to this objectors up to the creation of the MOC. Social origins of objection movement, as in the case of the environmental movement, are quite critical and independent of political parties, and they come, apart from Catholics branches, form libertarian groups, extreme left wing collectives or ecologist and solidarity networks.

25 During this period appeared also other organisations linked to left wing groups (as *Mili-KK*).
values, objection to military expenditures and promotion of dialogue and social models to prevent violent conflict. Apart from promoting an antimilitarist culture, MOC has had a considerable impact on the repertoire of protests of other new social movements, and currently, in “alterglobalisation” protests, by training and extending a civil disobedience inspired by actions characterised by non-violence, participation, imagination and humour.

Although *movimiento vecinal* had already occupied buildings to draw attention from authorities about living problems during 70s, it can be said that as a specific new social movement the **squatter movement** come into birth in the middle of the 1980s. Then, discourses and demands started moving from living conditions to political expressions with a mixture of anti-capitalism (with a deep impact of Italian autonomy ideas), social ecologism or counter-cultural spaces among others. Occupation became a central tool in the repertoire of action of a very conflictual movement where squads were progressively converted in centres for an alternative socialisation and common experimentation of practices oriented towards material “re-appropriation” and social “autonomy” (Martínez 2004, Herreros 2004, Calle 2004).

Mainly big conurbations, but also countryside experiences in Catalonia and Euskadi, have been the places in which this movement extended quickly in the 1990s. Its activities (and public visibility) crested around 1996. Then, PSOE government decided to punish more severely occupation by including them in the Law as punishable with prison. Subsequent repression and attraction by counter-cultural experimentation in social squads of young people made squatter movement gather social and media presence.

This movement have been by far the more decentralised of any other. Due to its local nature and their libertarian roots (anarchism, autonomy) coordination among squatters of the same city have been very unusual. At the same time a lot of groups have made use of occupation as a tool for their demands, being squads confluence of ecologists, antimilitarists, anarchists, and even local networks of *movimiento vecinal*. This resulted in a very weak collective identity, and even poses the problem of regarding these practises in Spain as coming from “a movement”.

However, the impact of the squatter movement has been very important in the support of a great family of movements with libertarian roots (some ecologist groups, political autonomy, antimilitarism and radical feminism). This helped to expand non-moderate repertoires of action built upon civil disobedience. In the case of GJM, and more specifically of “alterglobalisation” protests, squads served both as cultural and political spaces to promote ideas that radicalised preferences for horizontal organisations, assembly methodologies in decision-making or anti-capitalism. At the same time social squads served as an operational resource to get funding from concerts or to get room for social meetings. For instance, the MRGs groups (*Movimiento de Resistencia Global*) operated in occupied social centres in Barcelona, Madrid or Zaragoza to organise their protest campaigns against World Bank and IMF meeting in Prague (September 2000).

### 2.5. A note on ethnic movements in Spain

In previous pages, we have stressed the highly decentralised organisational structure of many leftist social movements. We have also pointed out that political decentralisation has favoured, to a different degree and form, this process. However, we have neglected the influence of nationalism in the configuration of leftist social movements.
Nationalism has been a two fold phenomena with respect to social mobilisation. On the one hand, nationalism (but also regionalism) represents a cultural opportunity to promote collective identities, helping the constitution of an “us”, and to share common views about the world. In the case of Spain, along with the process of political decentralisation, nationalism has contributed to the establishment and the strength of campaigns platforms in places like Catalonia or Basque country. On the other hand, nationalism could be a major social cleavage that keeps collective action from exploring new discourses and alliances (Kriesi et al. 1995). For instance, in the Basque country, different views about the “national matter” keeps the “Foro Social de Euskal Herria” to go beyond one meeting.

In terms of both alliances and repertoire of actions, the influence of nationalism is probably most notorious (and introduces, to a greater degree, territorial specificities) in the case of the Basque country, where nationalism has signified a differentiated pattern of evolution of leftist social movements. The major different would be the relative success of violent, separatist, and anti-capitalist forms of nationalism in the Basque case in comparison with the predominance of democratic and autonomist trends in Catalan nationalism. The ETA nationalist framing of the Basque reality, as one in which the – Spanish- political oppression over the Basque people is hampering both its development and its expression as such“ (Tejerina 1997, 12) has often aligned with leftist social movements demands and frames.

A series of interrelated characteristic syntheses the peculiarity of the leftist social movements sector in the Basque country. The presence of the terrorist group ETA, its political branch, Batasuna, and a whole set of organisational infrastructures which are very active in most of the social sector of the Basque civil society (mainly the so-called Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Vasco, MLNV). The MLNV goals has focused on coordinating the social movements activities following a twofold strategy: either trying to co-opt already active groups and campaigns as well as creating their own groups in those cases where they do not exist (Tejerina 1997).

We do not find in other place in Spain such a mobilisation effort from political parties/forces. As a consequence we find a relative higher level of protest (see Casquette 2004) and a more confrontational political repertoire with a more frequent resort to violence. A second type of consequence concerns the debates and dilemmas that leftist social movements confront to. Here we find a twofold debate related to the nature of relationship with organisations and activists from the MLNV and to the resort to violence.

As far of the debate about the nature of relation with the MLNV sector, one has to take into account that many activists and organisations in the leftist social movements sector are also part of (or are close to) the leftist nationalism (izquierda abertzale). There is a confluence in campaigns based on collaboration between activists from the leftist social movements and the MLNV. The problem arises at the organisational level due to the attempts of ETA to control the movements (see Barcena 1997). Associated to that, the intervention of ETA, with violent actions, in certain campaigns with higher levels of mobilisation, has been a source of tension between the leftist social movement sector, that reject the resort to violence (causing deaths) and the MLNV.
The trend overtime, however, seems to be one of increasing independence of leftist social movements from the non-democratic nationalism movements situated in the ETA environment (Ibarra 2005).

3. The Spanish Global Justice Movement

3.1. The organisational structures of the GJM

The organisational structures of the GJM are characterised by what is known in these spheres as “networking”. In other words, work is carried out in a highly horizontal and decentralised manner by the diverse groups (ATTAC, RCADE, MRG) and during state-wide actions (i.e. opposition to the Spanish Presidency of the European Union in 2002, anti-war demonstrations). Members gather in common assemblies where decisions are reached through consensus and where a minimum of shared elements such as protest actions or slogans are agreed upon in such a way as to allow groups holding a wide variety of political views to converge on common ground. These dynamics facilitate the exchange of information and resources (common lists and websites on Internet, shared spaces of reflection such as the meetings in Girona in 2001, the Tinto de Verano school after 2003 or workshops on the European Social Consultation in Madrid in 2003 and 2004); thus allowing issues of a different nature to come together under a common umbrella (critique of democracy, the ecological debt, anti-war protests, boycott of multinational companies, etc.)

In addition to networking strategies, the repertoires of action have become increasingly broad and incisive. While on the one hand the synergy forged with key parties and trade unions have strengthened classic repertoires such as large mass demonstrations, actions within the framework of non-violent civil disobedience are also on the rise.

3.1.1. The Anti-Maastricht Movement (MAM)

Founded in 1996, the Anti-Maastricht Movement was composed of diverse anti-capitalist activists linked to the ecologist and peace movement, minority trade-unions (such as the anarchist CGT) and extra-parliamentary parties. The origins of this organisational structure can be traced back to the successful campaign against the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the World Bank and the IMF (“50 Años Bastan!” –Fifty Years are Enough!) that took place in Madrid in 1994, and the campaign against unemployment and the Europe of Capital during the Spanish Presidency in 1995. To a large extent, the political repertoire and discourses of the current Spanish GJM were already present in this initial organisational structure. Thereafter, its activity was aimed at taking part in the protests organised during various international summits (Copenhagen, Naples, etc.) and the Euromarches against unemployment (Amsterdam, Köln, etc.).

As part of this process, the anti-Maastricht movement was renamed the “Movimiento contra la Europa del Capital y la Globalización Económica” (Movement Against the Europe of Capital and Economic Globalisation) in 2000. From that moment onwards, it functioned as a network for the exchange of information which, in practice, 26 Many of them had already campaigned together in 1992 under the slogan (“Desenmascaremos el 92” – Unmasking ‘92) in opposition to the Five-hundred Year Anniversary celebration of Columbus’s first landing in America (around events such as the World Expo of Seville).
dissolved after the protests at Prague (September 2001). Although this informal network did not give rise to specific actions, it did serve to foster the creation of new spaces (encounters between activists, the exchange of formats for action and discourses similar to those taken up following the protests in Seattle), as well as diverse MRG (Global Resistance Movement) groups.

Initially, the MAM platform brought together a large variety of organisations (Aedenat/Ecologistas en Acción, IU, CGT, CAES, Baladre, Squatters, individuals, neighbourhood groups, etc.), although it progressively lost momentum after 2000. The most active groups state-wide were Ecologistas en Acción and Baladre, albeit many groups played a very important role at the local level as well. The MAM had organising committees in Andalusia (with members from Malaga, Seville, Cordoba, Antequera and Cadiz), Madrid, the Canary Islands, Pamplona (with some members from the Basque Country) and Murcia.

At the European level, The MAM collaborated with groups that had been preparing actions and elaborated an anti-EU discourse, especially with groups from Holland under the Play Fair Europe! Platform and those from TEAM (an anti-EU organisation at the European level from which the MAM has recently withdrawn to attract right-wing groups). The MAM was also the principal liaision with the organising committee of the European Marches against Unemployment and Social Exclusion.

The MAM’s organisational philosophy was based on the decentralised coordination of the distinct territorial platforms, holding two state-wide meetings a year. The principal aim of the MAM was to distribute information to the large number of groups registered in their data base, although it also worked to oppose social exclusion. In addition, in places such as Andalusia, Madrid or Catalonia, it has served and continues to serve as the chief driving force behind the Global Resistance Movements. The discourse of this movement can be defined as “radical”.

3.1.2. The RCADE: Citizens Network for the Abolition of Foreign Debt

The RCADE (Citizens Network for the Abolition of the Foreign Debt) was founded in 1999 to participate in the Jubilee 2000 international campaign. This network originated in the mid-1990s as the “Plataforma del 0.7%”, a movement that grouped together both church and secular associations working to increase aid to the Third World, as well as groups supporting the Zapatista movement, Ecologistas en Acción, NGDOs, Justicia y Paz, etc. Coinciding with the general elections, RCADE organised a “consulta popular” (non-official referendum) on 12 March 2000 to cancel the debt, in which over a million voters took part.

The precursor to the campaign to abolish the foreign debt was the Deuda externa ¿Deuda eterna? (Foreign debt. Eternal debt?) campaign, that took shape after 1998 under the leadership of Manos Unidas, Intermón-Oxfam, Cáritas and Justicia y Paz. However, this first campaign was completely eclipsed by the one launched by RCADE. The non-official referendum enjoyed great success. Indeed, polling stations were set up throughout the larger part of Spain and more than a million votes cast. The preparation of this non-

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27 In 1994 the movement organised solidarity camps which occupied the streets of many Spanish cities.
official referendum brought together wide sectors from various social movements in Spain. Almost 23,000 activists participated in 458 municipalities (many of them, some 200, in Catalonia alone)\textsuperscript{28}.

Despite the tremendous success of the event and the high level of participation, it was given scant media coverage. According to the press analysis by Jerez and Sampedro (2001), the diffusion of a collective action opposed to institutional party platforms was considered to be of little “interest to their political ally” (see also XCADE 2001, 175)\textsuperscript{29}.

One year later, RCADE membership had dropped to some one thousand activists, thus demonstrating the weak ties between local groups and the ebb and flow of participants to and from their spaces of origin (particularly in the case of the NGDOs).

Although the principal aim of the network’s campaign was, as their very name indicates, to abolish foreign debt and promote a radical participatory democracy\textsuperscript{30}, their discourse has taken on an increasingly wider scope and today endorses a critique of globalisation in general. In fact, several members of the RCADE have collaborated in forming many of the groups under the Global Resistance Movement.

The RCADE is run in a highly decentralised manner. The “nodes” (groups located in towns or city neighbourhoods) are free to decide how to organise themselves and whatever events and campaigns they choose to take part in. Most of the time these nodes bring together organising committees and groups of individuals. In order to coordinate the different groups, regional meetings are held from time to time (depending on the area) and state meetings once or twice yearly. E-mail also plays a fundamental role in the RCADE. Indeed, the RCADE set up an office and hired a part-time employee first in Barcelona (until 2002) and later in Bilbao (until 2004).

At the international level, the RCADE currently coordinates with the CADTM in sharing discourses or attending meetings. However, given the wide range of repertoires and discourses endorsed by the RCADE activists, they have taken part in such diverse actions as the IMF and World Bank counter-summits at Prague, the World Social Forum at Porto Alegre or meetings of the European Social Forum.

After 2004, the RCADE continued to function as an informal network of contacts in order to launch decentralised initiatives such as the Popular Legislative Initiative in favour of international solidarity or the European Social Consultation. According to Calle (2002), “rather than viewing them as pressure groups, the contribution of these networks should be seen as laboratories for activities or experiences within a new culture of mobilisation, thus

\textsuperscript{28} The Zapatista consultation of 1999 on indigenous rights served as a reference and an impetus to those who organised pilot consultation experiences on municipal debt in June 1999 (Lleida, Argentona, Córdoba). It was also linked to discourses by international NGOs such as the Committee to Abolish Third World Debt which viewed the debt issue in the context of financial globalisation and a neo-liberal agenda requiring the economic control of countries in the South.

\textsuperscript{29} The non-official referendum was equally repressed by political authorities and prohibited by the state election committee with the exception of Catalonia. Security forces intervened on 12 March to shut down the polling stations.

\textsuperscript{30} According to their ideology. Let us recall that it was the non-official referendum that led to the creation of this network.
giving new meaning to democratic radicalism and serving as a catalyst for repertoires of action founded upon civil disobedience.

3.1.3. Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens

ATTAC-Spain originated in an appeal made in 1998 for a Spanish version of Le Monde Diplomatic, and was finally founded in the year 2000. However, it is a weak platform that has not been capable of drawing together many activists. Individuals number among the members of ATTAC, although it is also supported by groups such as the Espacio Alternativo. ATTAC groups are located in Andalusia, Catalonia, Madrid, Granada, Albacete, Aragon, Asturias, Majorca, Valencia, Galicia and Castilla y Leon as well as other parts of Spain. Although local groups work independently to set out their strategies, ATTAC-France is a key reference for the movement in terms of the media coverage it enjoys and its discourses and campaigns.

Local groups are defined as “citizens movements” whose discourse is aimed at the democratic control of markets, the struggle to recapture the democratic space belonging to citizens and favour democratic and transparent structures (see www.attacmadrid.org and www.attac-catalunya.pangea.org). Aside from promoting the idea of the Tobin Tax (a 1% tax on currency speculation), ATTAC campaigns to outlaw tax havens and the privatisation of goods and public services promoted by the WTO under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).

In general, ATTAC is based on a network of members, who in the most classic style of traditional ONGs, give their support to the group but do not take part in the decision-making processes. Their dynamics of action are mostly directed at media and institutional pressure rather than the local or “grassroots” work that is more characteristic of the MRGs or the RCADE.

ATTAC has more successfully brought together social-democratic sectors rather than anti-system activists, including many intellectuals and liberal professionals. Without a doubt, their well-established information networks on Internet have played a key role in their success as they created a privileged link to certain social groups. Furthermore, their documentation networks such as the ATTAC-France Scientific Council have also aided in this process as they provide well-founded structural analyses on market dynamics, thus giving added impetus to their proposals for institutional pressure.

E-mail is their main tool for coordination and the exchange of information.

3.1.4. The Global Resistance Movement in Spain: MRG

The MRG, which stands for “Movimiento de Resistencia Global” (or Global Resistance Movement in English), was initially launched with the aim of sending Spanish activists to Prague in September 2000. It originated through somewhat formal networks that had been established earlier such as the Anti-Maastricht Movement or the “7 days of social protest” campaign that took place in the cities of Madrid, Valencia, Córdoba or Barcelona under the name of “Rompamos el Silencio”31 (Break the Silence). Depending on

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31 These campaigns were first founded in 1998, with groups in Barcelona, Madrid, Córdoba and Valencia. “Rompamos el silencio” met once annually for a week at a time. Each day the protests revolved around a
their location, the MRGs were initially endorsed by people from the RCADE, the MAM and individual groups, successfully attracting many young people.

Using Internet as a means of interaction, the MRG groups arose spontaneously, first in Catalonia 32 and later all over Spain. It soon became a reference for the AGM at the international level and was invited to participate in the International Council of the World Social Forum. Reluctant to become a formal (static) organisation, the MRG-Catalonia decided to dissolve in March 2003. This decision reflects its rejection of “those organisational models represented by both the Social World Forum or the supposedly ‘radical’ self-referential vanguards” (MRG public report, January 2003).

The first MRG was founded in Barcelona. Later, through networks such as the MAM or the RCADE, more groups were set up throughout Spain (see Calle 2004, 192 and 227). The squatters’ movement, ecologists, students and pro-Zapatista groups met to create a space that would allow them to link “anti-globalisation” to “local action to develop the everyday” (Herreros 2001, 5). In the spring of 2000, several encounters in Cataluña laid down the groundwork for the MRGs at the state-wide level. The first meeting was held at the Ateneu Candela in Terrassa and the second at the occupied social center, Hamsa, in Barcelona. Three times as many people attended this second meeting, including members of Xarxa (RCADE in Catalonia). In the third meeting held in Lleida, the group took the name of Moviment de Resistència Global (MRG).33 In Madrid, the MRG meetings were held at the headquarters of El Laboratorio 02 with members from the CAES, CGT and CNT, Ecologistas en Acción and autonomous sectors and others taking part. In places like Badajoz, the MRG worked on specific campaigns aimed at the Prague meeting and included members from sectors of the leftist party Izquierda Unida, RCADE and the grassroots Christian movement.

Following the summit in Prague, many of the groups took part in demonstrations against the EU summit at Nice (groups from Cadiz and Catalonia), the World Economic Forum at Davos (groups from Catalonia and Madrid), José Bové’s trial in Montpellier (groups from the Basque Country and Saragossa), rallies against immigration law (groups from Catalonia and Madrid) or even endorsed such issues as Christmas consumerism (groups from Madrid and Saragossa). On the whole, these groups adopted the name of “Movimiento de Resistencia Global”, although in other places such as the Basque Country, they called themselves “Hemen eta Munduan”.

Some of the MRG groups, such as those of Cadiz, the Basque Country and Catalonia, were formed as platforms. These MRGs included a very long list of affiliated organizations, encompassing everything from local groups to others at the state level such as the CGT trade union, the left-wing IU party, the Communist Party, Espacio Altenativo particular issue (unemployment, immigration, women’s rights, etc.) and were organised in much the same way as the marches against unemployment.

32 The first MRG was founded in Terrasa (Barcelona) in Mayo 2000.

33 “The MRG is organised as a horizontal and common space for assembly allowing members to mobilise, train, raise awareness and exchange information, while reinforcing, respecting and maintaining the autonomy of the participating groups and individuals” (MRG, document of December 2002). The MRG of Catalonia holds an assembly every four months in which activities are agreed upon and the work carried out is evaluated. The day to day work of the MRG is done during technical meetings and through e-mail communications.
or *Ecologistas en Acción*. Others, however, were formed simply by autonomous citizens. In these last groups, anarchist views were in the majority, although not the only ones.

Given that there existed no type of structured state-wide coordination, international coordination was limited to that undertaken by the groups themselves; a coordination that was generally restricted to attending meetings outside national territory. In general, the People’s Global Action served as a framework for action: a marked anti-capitalist discourse, calls to action in their places of origin and civil disobedience such as blocking the Prague summit or reclaiming the streets.

In addition to the qualitative impact that this movement had in reviving certain practices and discourses, its quantitative effect was equally notable: between 1,000 and 1,500 demonstrators travelled to Prague, while some 20,000 and 30,000 protestors took part in diverse actions in their own cities and towns during the demonstrations at the end of September. The movement quickly drew younger sectors to its ranks: calls to action and anti-system discourses functioned as powerful magnets to attract student networks.

By 2003, many of these MRGs had dissolved, albeit they continued to function as common assemblies in Valencia, Lleida and certain parts of the Basque Country and Navarra as Hemen eta Munduan. However, this did not mean that the newly created structures attempted to “inherit” the GJM’s legacy of mobilisations such as the case of the Xarxa de Mobilització Global in Catalonia, founded principally by Trotskyist groups.

### 3.1.5. The new committees for international solidarity: The Zapatista and MST movements

International initiatives for solidarity in the 80s, especially in Central America, led to a boom in networks and platforms encouraged, to a large extent, by the political opportunities and access to resources a result of the PSOE’s rise to power and EEC membership. These new groups became formalised as classic Non-Governmental Development Organisations (NGDOs) with vertical state-wide structures of coordination (based on volunteers and members). Their activities were aimed at raising citizen awareness of the situation of impoverished countries or at placing institutional pressure on the government regarding policies on development and cooperation as well as implementing development projects.

In the late 90s, new dynamics for international solidarity were introduced into Spain. This would greatly contribute to the *II Encuentro Galáctico* held by the Zapatistas in 1997 in diverse cities of Spain. In particular, two networks of pro-Zapatista and pro-MST groups emerged. These groups not only supported solidarity with those abroad, but also intervention in the dynamics of mobilisation at home. Thus their work went beyond the traditional role of NGDOs in terms of awareness raising or institutional pressure. Specifically, the MTGs, RCADe or other specific initiatives in the sphere of the so-called “alter-globalisation” protests maintained contacts and promoted new structures of participation. These new forms of organisation were more horizontal (and less structured) and based on occasional encounters between local group networks as a means to coordinate at the state level.

On the other hand, from 1994 onward, groups in solidarity with Chiapas were launched in various parts of Spain (see [www.pangea.org/ellokal/chiapas](http://www.pangea.org/ellokal/chiapas)) from very diverse political spheres. In Madrid, for example, the Platform for Solidarity with Chiapas was
founded in November 1994 and included NGOs (ACSUR, Friends of the Unesco and the Pro Human Rights Association among others) and people linked to parties and trade unions (PCE, IU CGT). Later, in 1996 a sector of this platform created the Zapatista Support Network which launched the first initiatives that would later lead to the formation of the Transatlantic Social Forum in Madrid in opposition to the European Union and Latin American summit of chiefs of state (May 2002) or the so-called Aguascalientes initiative. This last initiative was staged in Madrid in November 2003 and included workshops, debates and concerts to create a space for dialogue between numerous people and groups (many of whom were from Europe) on a variety of issues, among them “How to live and construct rebellion in a time of permanent world war without converting rebellion into war” (www.aguascalientesmadrid.org).

As regards the MST Support Committees, there are local groups (independent or under the umbrella of other collective groups) in Saragossa, Barcelona, Santa Eugenia, Madrid, Iruña, Asturias, Majorca, Cordoba, Galicia and parts of the Basque Country. The Barcelona committee, which was founded in 1994, is the oldest and was the largest and most important one from 1998 to 2002. According to an internal survey, the groups valued their links to other social groups “very positively”, especially regarding specific issues involving their support for the MST (platforms against the Free Trade Area of the Americas or FTAA, campaigns against the WTO or the rejection of genetically modified foodstuffs).

3.1.6. Local social forums

After 2002, many local social forums emerged as spontaneous initiatives promoted by a wide variety of groups that attempted to transfer the key principles and objectives of the World Social Forum at Porto Alegre to the local sphere.

Aside from the symbolic significance of the World Social Forum, these new structures of participation share the common goal (a goal that was achieved with varying success) of bringing together groups with a variety of views as well as organising discussions and debates to examine diverse analyses and proposals concerning the concept of “democracy”. Thus, in its charter of principles, the Social Forum of Navarra declared itself to be “an open space for encounter”, while the Social Forum of Palencia appealed directly to the radical democratic framework of the new global movements by affirming in its presentation that it seeks “to find the common critical denominator, that which is shared by transforming groups: social participation to achieve an alternative society, one that is more just” (italics ours).

Democratic radicalism is also perceptible in the way in which these groups coordinate. Normally, these social forums are organised around common, plural assemblies where a number of issues are defined, citizens are viewed as a driving force behind change and there is a permanent search for open spaces of dialogue.

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34 This section is fundamentally based on Pérez, 2004.
35 There does not exist a complete listing of the Social Forums in Spain. Although by no means an exhaustive list, Pérez (2004) cites 26 different forums.
36 The groups frequently work in the sphere of immigrants, students, parents associations, social movements (ecologists, anti-militarists, feminists, etc…), social organisations, NGDOs, political parties, trade unions and so on.
In the day to day running of these forums, however, we encounter the same debates that gave rise to tensions within the GJM in Spain.

- Tension between more radical sectors (anti-system) and reformists. While the former oppose integration into the systems of more institutionalised organisations such as NGDOs, trade unions or political parties, more moderate sectors argue that these critiques come from minority and marginal groups attempting to maintain a vanguard position that discourages wider sectors of society from participating. These internal confrontations have often stopped more radical groups from participating in the social forums (as we shall see below, this is the case of the Social Forum of Barcelona).

- A second source of tension was brought on by the presence of nationalist parties and groups pursuing their own demands through these spaces.

- Another example of this tension has to do with the participation of political parties. In Spain, political parties take part in almost all the forums, thus raising the question of their use for party purposes or electoral opportunism. The relationship between the political parties and the GJM is analysed below.

3.2. Counter-information and press coverage in alternative media

Unquestionably, Internet has constituted a technological resource which has served to reinforce the dynamics of horizontal representation and episodic convergence between physical spaces within the “alter-globalisation” networks.

The central server for all of the networks that converge in the GJM, the Nodo50, is without a doubt the most important provider of services (e-mail, web pages, Internet courses) and information (bulletins, news, contacts and notifications) and functions as a virtual space of reference for this network of networks. The incorporation of tools for the transmission of electronic data for the circulation of information during the 50 Años Bastan campaign in 1994, would later lead to the consolidation of a group that endorsed the creation of a server at the service of social movements (see López, Roig and Sádaba 2003). Today, the Nodo50 contains the websites of some 900 organisations and provides e-mail services to over 2000 users.

In the late 90s, and especially following the protests at Seattle, other alternative servers similar to Indymedia emerged. This is the case of Pangea, Eurosur, Rebelión, Sindominio and LaHaine as well as additional Indymedia servers which were launched in a decentralised manner following the norms of collective action in Spain: Madrid.indymedia.org, Barcelona.indymedia.org, estrecho.indymedia.org or euskalherria.indymedia.org, among others.

The availability of alternative information on Internet has been accompanied by hardcopy publications in the world of alternative syndicalism. Some examples of these include the CGT’s journal Libre Pensamiento, Izquierda Unida’s El Viejo Topo, Espacio Alternativo’s Viento Sur, the autonomous Molotov and libertarian reviews such as Letra A. The Diagonal newspaper (www.diagonalperiodico.net) has also been launched recently.

\[37\] We say reinforced because these dynamics of horizontal convergence had been tried out in Spain since 1992 during the “Desenmascaremos el 92” campaign, the 1994 campaign against the World Bank and the 0.7% campouts that same year.
(the first edition will come out in March 2005, although free editions had been available up to this time) in an attempt to provide GJM groups with the opportunity to appeal to wider sectors of society.

Although fewer still than the Italian network of alternative television stations, new audiovisual experiments (in terms of content and preparation) have begun to emerge in Spain in order to provide channels of expression for democratic radical viewpoints (participation is open to different collective groups) in line with the wide range of positions endorsed by the GJM: free radio (*Red con Voz*), information agencies (ANIA), local television stations (in Barcelona the *Asamblea de Comunicació Social* is an initiative to demand television time for social movements).

3.3. The principal campaigns or events launched by the movement (2000-2004)

In this section we will trace the evolution of the GJM by describing the main events in which it has taken part in Spain: the IMF and World Bank meeting at Prague (2000), the campaign against the (unsuccessful) World Bank meeting at Barcelona (2001), the Spanish presidency of the EU (January-June 2002) and opposition to the war in Iraq (2003). In addition to other campaigns such as the social consultation on debt staged by the RCADE, the experience in Prague gave rise to the creation of various groups and networks within the movement. It also constituted a key learning experience to put the counter-summit models in practice in Spanish territory: first in Barcelona 2001 and later throughout Spain (during the Spanish EU presidency). The organisation of these campaigns marked the GJM’s moment of greatest activity and visibility in Spain within a context marked by political opportunities that allowed for closer collaboration between the PSOE and the movement.

Furthermore, as a consequence of the newly emerging cycle of mobilisation, the groups that were most active in launching “alter-globalisation” protests met not only to organise common campaigns at the national level (Barcelona 2001, Against Europe of Capital and War in 2002, worldwide protests led by international forums in 2003, the Platform to reject the European Constitution after 2004), but also to foster joint spaces of reflection (the meeting of social movements at Girona 2001, the *Tinto de Verano* school of social movements in 2003 and 2004).

From 2003 onwards, however, a period was initiated that could be classified as “ebbing” (González 2003; Calle 2005; Echart et al. 2005), in which the intensity of the protests diminished and the movement’s capacity to call people to action markedly decreased during events such as the World Bank meeting held in Madrid in 2004 and rallies against the Iraq occupation or the Referendum on the European Constitution. Several factors go towards explaining this situation: 1) the activists were discouraged by the lack of visible progress on the global issues endorsed by the GJM; 2) difficulties were encountered to coordinate the different networks at the national level during the campaign Against the Europe of Capital and War in 2002 and anti-war demonstrations in 2003; 3) increased activity took place at the local level and 4), many of the political and media fronts used by the more radical sectors of the GJM were shut down following the PSOE’s victory in the general elections.

Nonetheless, under the framework of democratic radicalism, the cycle of protests reflected an ever widening sphere of mobilisation, thus spreading and promoting the phenomena of collective action characterising the GJM. Some examples of this include the
foreign debt campaign ¿Who owes who?, which was jointly launched in January 2005 by
diverse networks (RCADE, Justicia y Paz, Ecologistas en Acción, NGDOs), the continuing
search for common spaces through very active local forums (Palencia, Seville, Vigo) and
the opposition to the lack of transparent, democratic structures in international institutions;
themes which were very present in the GJM campaigns against the European Constitution.

At the organisational level, the diminishing levels of protest confirmed the inability
of critical sectors (new social movements, new global movements, most radical workers’
movement) to form stable state-wide structures. With the exception of the local social
forums and common spaces on Internet (Indymedia, Nodo50), the new structures of
participation have shown themselves to be too weak to sustain their protests (ATTAC,
RCADE) or have disappeared all together (MRG, certain forums like the Social Forum of
Barcelona). However, the ebbing tide of protest has not meant that the movement’s
discourse or their repertories of action have become less radical. Indeed, they continue to
critique the democratic system head on, endorse anti-capitalism and reject militarism and
patriarchal systems through non-violent actions of civil disobedience.

3.3.1. “Prague 2000”

As we mentioned above, the ‘Prague 2000’ campaign on the occasion of the World
Bank and IMF summit, gave a decisive boost to the organisation of the GJM in Spain. The
preparation of this campaign, with the creation and later consolidation of the Global
Resistance Movement (MRG) led to the construction of a unitary working space for
collective groups that had already denounced the consequences of globalisation and
capitalism.

As Gomà et al. (2004) point out in the case of Catalonia (although this argument can
be extrapolated to the rest of Spain): “participation in the Prague 2000 campaign brought
with it a series of innovations that affected the ranks of the GJM: new ideas were adopted
regarding the repertoire of collective action which would be put to the test in Spain (i.e. the
emphasis on non-violent direct action, creative actions, blockades, media guerrillas, etc.).
New ways of taking the protest to the streets were discussed in order to rework the classic
protest model and make it more effective. Special notice was taken of the counter-summit
model as a space for debate, critique and alternative proposals. Actions were more
thoroughly prepared and a qualified legal and anti-repression committee was set up.
Importance was placed on counter-information and press releases in the alternative media
(with Indymedia at the centre of activity). Disobedience workshops were held and affinity
groups were organised, etc. Although it is true that all these instruments and tools had been
used previously, the Prague experience was undoubtedly key to their diffusion. Finally,
connections were made with important organisations and movements that were active on
the European scenario (i.e the Italian Ya Basta, the English Reclaim the Streets); groups
with whom they forged international contacts and exchanged ideas”.

3.3.2. Barcelona 2001: The first experience in organising alternative summits.

The experience of the Prague Campaign had an immediate impact on the Spanish
context in the Campaign against the World Bank summit on development held in Barcelona
in June 2001. As Gomà et al. 2004 have concluded from interviews, the activists themselves stated that “this campaign constituted one of the most plural and unitary spaces for people and groups to come together to participate in recent years in Catalonia and Barcelona, as much so for the social movements as for the participating organisations. Following Catalonia’s participation at Prague, the group successfully formed a wide space of coordination that endorsed typical anti-globalisation discourses, thus connecting with the cycle of protests occurring around the globe.”

The first meeting to prepare the unitary mobilisation in opposition to the World Bank visit to Barcelona took place in January 2001 and was organised by the coordinating committee of the MRG. A wide range of groups and individuals, mainly from Catalonia, but also other groups from the rest of Spain who had been involved in diverse mobilisations in recent years took part in this initial meeting. Among the agreements reached, the most important one was the decision to become a “Campaign” and not a “Platform”. The aim of this decision was to put an end to the eternal debate regarding whether or not to publicly list the names of all the participating organisations and facilitate decentralisation.

As Gomà et al. (2004) explain, the work in small decentralised groups as well as in unitary spaces was always carried out in assemblies. These were moderated on a rotational basis and information circulated on Internet. Although this organisational structure drew together a wide range of organisations and groups with diverse political cultures and ideologies (sometimes more than 200 people attended the assemblies), it was not free of conflict. Even so, according to interviews of those who attended, the Barcelona 2001 Campaign was a very positive experience, especially in terms of learning collective decision-making strategies.

3.3.3. The European Presidency of 2002: A decisive moment for global contestation in Spain

During the Spanish semester of the EU, the GJM prepared a state-wide campaign called “Campaña contra la Europa del Capital y de la Guerra” (Campaign Against the Europe of Capital and War). The European Councils at Barcelona (15-16 March) and Seville (21-22 June) were the two events upon which efforts were concentrated.

Although concerns about the planned anti-globalisation protests eventually led the World Bank to cancel the meeting, the GJM decided to carry on with its planned activities. In the course of the closing march that mobilised 25,000 people, there were violent clashes between a minority of violent demonstrators and the police. The conduct of the police was questioned by protesters, journalists and local authorities alike.

Those attending the meeting included members from political organisations of the alternative left, such as Batzac, from the independent left such as the PUA (Plataforma per la Unitat d’Acció), neighbourhood associations (Nou Barris), trade unions (CGT), spaces known as the new social movements (Women’s World March, pacifists from the CTD (Centro de Trabajo y Documentación), from the XCADE, from the l’Asamblea por la Objección Fiscal, from the Mesa Cívica, from the Asamblea Antimilitarista de Catalunya), from associations (Youth Councils of Barcelona and Catalonia such as the CJB and the CNJC) and political parties (EuiA i Los Verdes). By the time the process of organisation had finalised, more than 350 different entities had joined the campaign.

The campaign slogan was “Another World is possible. Globalise Solidarity, Globalise Resistance”.

For more on AGM activities during the Barcelona Council see www.pangea.org/campaya UE; for Seville see www.forosocialsevilla.org.
In practice, the campaign was organised in a decentralised manner in each of the cities that were to host the different meetings of the Spanish EU presidency (coordination was episodic and informal) in much the same way as the Campaign against the World Bank: assemblies were held to make key decisions, while work was carried out in independent committees and through Internet.

In Barcelona, the anti-globalisation front was articulated around four different sectors. The campaign “Contra l’Europa del Capital i la Guerra”\(^42\), was the principal initiative behind the alternative summit, including the mass demonstration held on 16 March in which two other existing platforms took part. On the one hand, the *Foro Social de Barcelona*, FSB, made up of traditional leftist parties such as the PSC (Catalonian branch of the PSOE, holding office in the city council) and global networks politically akin to them (ATTAC), NGDOs (*Intermon-Oxfam*) and the most important trade-unions (CCOO and UGT). On the other hand, the Plataforma Catalana contra l’Europa del capital, which included groups from Catalonia and the Basque *Batasuna* as well as other independent political forces. At the same time, sectors ideologically rooted in the Italian autonomous movement and articulated around social centres developed initiatives under the name of “Barcelona Tremola” and the Març-Attack collective.

This circumstance allowed the Spanish Government, and the media under its control, to articulate a discourse that associated the entire GJM and its protesters to violence and terrorism. In Seville, the GMJ campaigned around a single platform\(^43\) called the *Foro Social de Sevilla* (FSS) (Social Forum of Seville) which was made up of ecologists, anti-militarists, students, feminists, neighbourhood associations, minority trade unions (such as the CGT or SOC) and left-wing parties like IU or *Los Verdes*. In Seville, therefore, neither the PSOE nor the key trade-unions formed part of the anti-globalisation platform.

The main actions of the GJM during the Spanish Presidency were characterised by a hitherto unknown level of participation as well as by the absence of any (remarkable) violent episodes.\(^44\) These circumstances reinforced the positive image of the GJM in Spanish public opinion, despite the delegitimizing strategy pursued by the Spanish Government and the conservative *Partido Popular* (PP)\(^45\).

In spite of the campaign’s success, critical global networks expressed their doubts as to the sustainability of the movement. Some sectors defended the need for a sounder

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\(^42\) The campaign included ecologists, antimilitarists, leftist parties, and anti-globalisation groups like the MRG or RCADE, among others.

\(^43\) Nevertheless, some squatters of Seville promoted a “Reclaim the Streets” action, and autonomous/antagonist sectors held an encounter to debate civil disobedience in which Italian speakers as Casarini from Disobbedienti took part.

\(^44\) Some 300,000 protesters rallied in the main demonstration in Barcelona. The police used force at times, detaining 94 people. Levels of participation were also very high in Seville where 100,000 demonstrators took to the streets, although the police made only three arrests. In Madrid, another 100,000 marchers took part in the demonstration held during the EU-Latin America summit in May.

\(^45\) The criminalisation and repression of the social movements and other organisations opposed to capitalism began with the police repression during the G-8 summit in July 2001 held in Genoa (and the subsequent media debate on the use of violence). Repression increased as a result of the bellicose climate and world rearmament following the September 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent military intervention in Afghanistan.
organisational basis to create stable state-wide structures of coordination, while others viewed this proposal as a threat to the network’s flexibility, choosing instead to continue to coordinate only for specific mobilisations. The dissolution of the MRG in Catalonia can be explained by this last position.

Meanwhile, the internal debate regarding the relationship between the movement (particularly more radical sectors) and more institutional sectors (specifically political parties) was given fresh impetus. In Barcelona, for example, the creation of the Foro Social de Barcelona (led by political parties and trade unions) was regarded with a fair amount of distrust by key sectors of the Campaign, who viewed this event as an opportunistic, electoral ploy in an attempt to take advantage of the anti-globalisation movement’s discourse.

3.3.4. After 2002: the anti-war campaign and a changing political context

The mobilisations coordinated in 2002 by inner circles of the GJM served as a strong impetus for protests against the occupation of Iraq in 2003 and other initiatives such as the European Social Consultation. For example, the international meeting called during the I European Social Forum in Florence (November 2002) against the Middle East war brought close to three million people to the streets in Spain. The European Social Consultation (ESC) attempted to make democratic radicalism the focus of campaigns and issues to attract critical networks involved in the new global movements. Different lines, which were developed locally, had as their aim to establish synergies between people and networks; a process that concluded with the social consultation on the “Europe we want”, which was run parallel to the European elections of June 2004. In spite of the fact that this was a long campaign (it had been running since 2002) and included awareness raising workshops and debates led in the streets (the so-called demoplazas, “demosquares”) and three conferences on democracy, North-South relations and the European Union led by very politically diverse actors in places like Madrid, the initiative was not successful state-wide.

Furthermore, 2004 was marked by a notable fall in participation in events organised by the GJM. On the one hand, the fact that the PSOE had come into power lessened citizen’s motivation to protest in comparison to the political period when the conservative Partido Popular was in power. On the other hand, the fact that the cycle of global mobilisations had become increasingly less intense across the globe weakened the GJM’s capacity to call Spanish protesters to international action (against the occupation of Iraq or in opposition to international institutions). Nonetheless, in spite of this waning activity and participation, actions marked by democratic radicalism, a critique of global economic actors and new repertories of action continued at the fore of the movement. For example, in a search for more radical discourses on issues such as precariousness of employment, May 1st was celebrated in Barcelona by some 5000 people with a colourful and radical parade; a May Day in tune with similar initiatives carried out in other European cities such as Milan. Albeit with a marked drop in participation by people and groups in comparison to the meetings of 2002 against the Spanish Presidency, two state-wide meetings were held in 2004 by the Coordinating Committee against the European Constitution. Although most of the activity for the campaign was centred in Madrid and Barcelona, other people and groups belongin to cities and regions like Andalusia, Asturias, Murcia, Catalonia, Valencia, Euskadi, Cordoba, Extremadura and Galicia later joined the initiative. Following this
general trend towards demobilisation, the campaign was approached from a decentralised standpoint, organising protests around Shröeder, Chirac and Zapatero’s visit to Barcelona in February 2005 - the most relevant act carried out state-wide.

3.4. The dilemmas of the GJM: the organisational model, relations with political parties and the public visualisation of their demands.

3.4.1. The organisational model

The debate on the models of organisation and coordination carried out in the heart of the GJM are both extensive and complex. In order to achieve a better understanding of them, we will identify and examine two positions on two different sets of themes: analyses and proposals for transformation on the one hand, and coordination and actions on the other.

With respect to analyses and proposals, the new culture of mobilisation has progressively interweaved a variety of issues and problems into their discourse, thus facilitating the convergence of activists with different ideological backgrounds at the local level to defend or denounce topics of a local or global nature (Calle 2004, 150). Sectors allied with left-wing parties, such as the peak trade unions or even more radical networks such as ATTAC, promote a change in world structures to “govern” capitalism in line with the most social-democratic stances seen in the World Social Forum. Sectors that intervene locally (and which are generally linked to networks that work more horizontally) sustain that change must occur through the radical modification of everyday conditions considered devastating or precarious: the end of the current labour model (CGT and autonomous sectors), the rejection of patriarchy (feminists) or sustainable and local models of production and consumption (ecologists), to name but a few. Yet as we have said before, there are numerous nuances to these forms of organisation. Hence networks such as RCADE alternate their work on global issues (abolishing foreign debt) with more local work (some groups are active in neighbourhood networks or in processes to demand a direct democracy).

In terms of coordination, some sectors claim the need for a more stable structure (the reformist sector), while others are of the opinion that the fundamental objective of the network of networks is to multiply and spread these protests and dynamics of resistance (the radical sector). In fact, The MRG Catalonia’s decision to dissolve itself came about as a result of the desire of determined sectors of the GJM to establish formal organisational structures:

“The MRG of Catalonia was founded as a network, a space for communication between collectives and initiatives. However, it began to turn into an identity, a static structure. We felt that it needed to be destroyed! (…) We want to take steps forward, experiment, take risks. If there is one thing we have learned in these years of struggle it is that the time of hollow structures has ended. They form part of a past surpassed by the rich reality of movements and the participation of civil society in Catalonia. The wealth of this widespread network cannot be reduced to the confines of any umbrellas, even if certain objectives of the spaces of coordination have been useful at times (…). The movement is just that: something that moves. No static idea of forum, structure, organisation, could speak in its name, nor can it serve as a substitute.” (MRG public report, January 2003)
Nevertheless, the move towards hybrid models, whose most significant example can be found in local social forums, seems to be gaining ground: coordination and actions should be global and local, instead of challenging and confronting spheres and forms of intervention. In this way, the spaces will have to be forged from multiple repertoires of action.46

In any case, the end of certain political agendas and alliances with political parties such as the PSOE for electoral reasons, seems to have undermined the credibility of sectors of the GJM that advocate the institutionalisation of demands and repertoires (access to political spheres, debates with the administration).

3.4.2. The strategy of political parties towards the GJM47

As in other contexts, participation by Spanish social-democratic sectors has been conditioned by its position in the opposition. For example, it viewed the activities carried out on the occasion of the Spanish presidency, particularly when there was a true threat of war against Iraq and the world conferences of 15-F in 2003 favourably. As Pastor (2003) has pointed out “only on the occasion of the war in Iraq can we say that there has been a joint convergence between the PSOE and the GJM, although both maintain and will continue to maintain different attitudes regarding neo-liberal policies” We would be hard put to imagine a change in the parties’ position with respect to the prevailing economic and social policies in the EU today. While the presence of local social democratic organisations and many members and voters of these parties within the “movement of movements” is an undeniable fact, in all likelihood their relations will continue in the framework of conflict and not of integration within the movement, albeit certain alliances may be made on determined issues. The relationship between Izquierda Unida and the GJM dates farther back and is closer than that of other parties. According to Pastor’s analysis (2003), members of the IU maintain three attitudes towards the GJM: (1) those who feel themselves to be part of the movement, (2) those who conceive of the movement purely in instrumental terms and (3) those who regard themselves as the vanguard of the movement. Based on his experience from the inside (he was a member of Espacio Alternativo), Pastor considers that the first “model” is more in keeping with the position defended by Espacio Alternativo, the second responds to the line adopted by the leadership of the IU Federation in Madrid and the third follows the Corriente Roja (which abandoned IU at the end of 2004).

Espacio Alternativo’s attitude is reflected in the fact that they did not endorse any particular organisation within the movement, but instead opted for taking part in several of them depending upon the issues they adopted or their sectorial nature, while committing themselves to seeking channels of unitary coordination. In the document of their III Confederational Encounter, held in March 2002, they made the following reference to the anti-globalisation movement: “We feel part of the organisations, movements and networks that have been working towards strengthening the active role and autonomy of social

46 For example, the European Social Consultation made use of both repertoires of civil disobedience (a consultation which ran parallel to the European elections of June 2004) and classic awareness raising tools (distribution of materials, talks) as well as occasional alliances with sectors from a wide variety of ideologies (Campaign against the European Constitution, CGT, Baladre, etc.).

47 This section is based on Pastor (2003).
movements; we support broadening the radical critique of neo-liberal globalisation and all its consequences, (...) and the call to common actions by all international movements at the service of those objectives. Based on this commitment, we reject any ploys or manoeuvres that may put the movement’s autonomy at peril and support their right to take up the proposals and objectives that they freely agree upon, such as the contents of the Declaration of Social Movements adopted in the II WSF. With regard to Spain, work should be based on the unitary frameworks created in the latest demonstrations against neo-liberal globalisation, such as those in Barcelona last June (2001) or those of the current European semester.”

The second line is reflected in the creation of a self-denominated platform known as the “Foro Social Madrid”. This platform was launched by the IU-Community of Madrid, CCOO, UGT and later the Socialist Federation of Madrid, albeit without the presence of groups that had, until that time, represented the organised sector of the anti-globalisation movement. Although later attempts were made by its advocates to bridge the gap with these groups, they have thus far been unsuccessful due to the increasing lack of mutual trust during the entire process.

The position supported by the Corriente Roja in terms of their general guidelines is reflected in section 8 of their “Declaration of Principles”:

“We are convinced that the birth of the anti-globalisation movement today signifies the awakening of a social conscience opposed to capitalism. Without negating the coexistence of organisations and individuals within the anti-globalisation movement who do not consider themselves to be anti-capitalists, the overall nature of the movement, the injustices that it denounces, the social, political, and economic and other reforms that are discussed, and their very dynamics, in short, make this an anti-capitalist movement (...) Our participation in the anti-globalisation movement must be done in a horizontal manner, assuming its forms of organisation based on plurality, assemblies and democratic structures. However, we equally aspire to invest the movement with political content, strengthening its class and anti-capitalist orientation, in order to construct a socialist society for communism to become the underlying raison d’être of any truly emancipating movement. This obliges us to always bear in mind, in each and every action of the movement, our final revolutionary objective.”

In practice, however, this sector has been criticised by diverse groups because of their intent to control the structures of representation within the movement and endorse issues to mark the differences between them and other sectors or currents (i.e. issues such as the rejection of NATO in anti-war demonstrations with sectors of the PSOE that could not share the same ground). These differences have made it difficult for this sector to achieve the necessary “consensus for common work” with a view to unitary mobilisations.

3.4.3. The presence of the GJM in mass media

The mass media in Spain is characterised by a high level of partisanship and the absence of a media sensitive to the demands of social movements. Indeed, the activities and demands of social movements that are removed from the sphere of the main political parties have been given scarce media attention. For example, as we mentioned above, the social consultation on the debt in 2000 went unnoticed by the principal means of mass communication. However, after the protest at Seattle, the Spanish press has paid
increasingly greater attention to the mobilisations led by the GJM. The moment of maximum coverage occurred during the Spanish Presidency of the EU, during the first quarter of 2002. Unfortunately, as in other contexts, media attention has been principally centred on the issue of violence. Nonetheless, in spite of the media’s focus on violence and the strategy of criminalisation by authorities, Spanish public opinion views the GJM in a favourable light. Undoubtedly the improved relations between the PSOE and the social movements during the party’s final period in the opposition (2000-2004) have contributed in a significant manner to making this happen.

In the following section we will describe the key results of the study on the construction of the GJM’s public identity during the Spanish presidency of the EU (2002) based on a study of news items appearing in *El País* newspaper (Jiménez 2003).

During the Spanish Presidency of the EU, the GJM media coverage was bound to the violence, as it is shown by the high number of news about the security measures during the European Councils as well as by the repeated references to the GJM. In part, media interest was exacerbated by the police-based response to the movement. However, this circumstance did not impede the inclusion of the debate about the consequences of current pattern of economic globalisation into the media and political agendas. From this general perspective, the GJM success was undeniable. To a different degree, traditional leftist parties in Spain were incorporated movement’s critiques into their discourse.

In turn, these two different institutional responses to the GJM, the “repressive one” based on the security discourse and the “assimilative one” that, at the discourse level, incorporates the movement critique into the party competition dynamic, intensified the process of construction of the public identity of the movement. In this context, during the Spanish the movement managed to find an equilibrium among a wide number of varied actors from established political actors as the PSOE to radical groups. This circumstances permitted the movement to counteract the criminalisation strategy pursued by the Government. Eventually, the absent of violence seemed to consolidated a positive image of the movement.

However, the media coverage of movements demands and proposals did not correspond to the organizational efforts invested by the protest’s organizers. The committees of communication and press of both, *La Campanya* and the *Foro Social de Sevilla*, underlined this fact:

“The media were more interested in the events (data about the number of persons in the campsite, participation in the protest events) than in the alternatives ideas debated in conferences and workshops. This situation is illustrated by the attitude of journalist during the press conference on the 22nd during which, while prestigious personalities like Eric Toussaint or Paul Nicholson were speaking, journalists preferred to leave the conference room to interrogate one of the Foro’s spokesperson about the details of the demonstration that was to take place few hours later” (…) The media have covered the opinion of the FSS, mainly through press releases in which substantial information was displaced in favour of factual data”. (Comisión de Comunicación y Prensa, FSS, Report July 10, 2002)

“After the massive demonstration of 16th March we have the impression that media treatment have been correct, although the messages has lost force. It has been hard to face the resources of the FSB, which has tried to present the success as ‘its own achievement’. We made a enormous effort to counteract the criminalisation’s strategy, as a consequence
we have been portrayed as the most civic movement, but at the price of losing the substantive message (against the Europe from Capital)” (Campanya contra l’Europa del Capital, Assembly’s minutes, March, 2002)

In both cases, the GJM perception about its capacity to get their message into the media discourse reflect the dilemmas and challenges that the functioning logic of the media imposed to social movements (SM). In this sense, both assessments confirm and complement previous findings about the nature of SM-media interaction. Concerning the media preference for institutionalised sources of information, La Campaya’s considerations clearly reflects how the presence el PSOE and other institutionalized actor in the FSB diminished the media coverage of core organizations of the GJM.

The absence of violence in Barcelona reduced the prospect for violent acts in Seville. This circumstance is considered by the FSS as the main factor explaining the limited level of attention paid by the national media to the GJM activities during the Council in Seville.

“The protest actions and opinions of the FSS have had a notable echo in the local and the regional press, but not in the national press (…) The same occurred with respect to the coverage on TV (…) It seems that the limited attention paid by the national press was due to the absence of violence”. (Comisión de Comunicación y Prensa, FSS, Report July 10, 2002)

In this sense, the success of GJM efforts to countervail against the criminalisation strategy deployed by the Government 48, not only diverted resources to push into the media movements demands, but also, to the extent to what the GJM in Barcelona put forward a positive image, thereafter the attention of the (national) media dropped off. The more civic the GJM appears in front of the public opinion the greater the incentive of institutionalized actors to coming close to the movement and act as “interlocutors” of the growing number of sympathizers Despite the inclusion of the globalisation problem into the media and the political agendas, the GJM find difficult to participate in the debate.

4. Conclusions

In this report we have stressed some patterns of change in the Spanish leftist social movement sector that help to explain the features and evolution of the GJM in Spain. In fact, we consider the very GJM as an expression of changes, that took place from 90s onwards, in the sphere of social contestation in Spain. Some of the most relevant features of these patterns of evolution are:

- Consolidation of the movement’s collective identities based on (informal) networks and common campaigns. In this same sense, it is also possible to talk of the configuration of a meta-identity under the GJM or “alter-globalisation” networks that permits and fosters the convergence of different social actors under a shared self-perception of belonging to a “movement of movements”. This confluence is

48 During the organization phase previous to the EU Councils, both La Campanya and FSS carried out an intense activity to pact with the authorities the format and content of their protest activities. La Campanya not only organized their own security service during the large demonstrations but also managed to convince radical organizations, as those integrated in La Plataforma Independentista, to participate in the negotiation meetings with the police authorities.
evidenced in the Campaign against the Europe of Capital and War (during the Spanish semester of the EU in 2002) or the anti-war demonstrations of 2003.

- Following upon this, the organisational structure of many leftist social movements has been consolidated on the basis of decentralisation and local autonomy. Even groups that came into being under a state-wide, territorial scope (the Conscientious Objectors’ Movement MOC, and to some extent NGDOs) have experienced this trend towards decentralisation. State and political decentralisation has favoured, to a different degree and form, this process. Furthermore, there has been an overall increase in available resources (although with notable differences in terms of sources and amounts, public funding opportunities, membership, volunteering, relational resources).

- A new generation of activists has gradually gained a central role among these movements by providing not only new human resources, but also new practices and discourses. Thus the personalism characterising leadership in previous phases has been mitigated.

- In relation to this last point, the dominant protest repertoire has been gradually modified, giving way to civil disobedience repertoires and non-violent direct actions.

- Discourses merge and radicalise. For instance, NGDOs have taken on antimilitaristic or feminist demands, new collectives talk about debt relief and democracy along with ecological debts (RCADE), the antimilitarists have expanded their definition of violence from antimilitarism to include GJM critiques, etc. We could talk then, of the construction of a networked discourse (different conflicts which are linked but autonomous), fed from, and feeding into, the above-mentioned meta-identity.

- New resources are now available for radical and alternative mobilisation. Some of these such as Internet, which provides alternative information sites and virtual spaces for debate and the exchange of activities, are international and technological. Others are more specific to the Spanish context: the boom of social squads in the mid 90s, the increase of social and public funding for NGDOs or episodic alliances with major parties such as the socialist PSOE party in the form of greater media opportunities to inform about analyses and demonstrations when the conservative PP party was in power.

Although many of the characteristics that define this movement are conditioned by domestic politics and culture, the GJM in Spain shares common traits with experiences in other countries:

- From an analytical perspective, two trends or sectors that merge and are complementary in practice, as well as other contexts, can be distinguished in the Spanish GJM. On the one hand, there is a more reformist sector that endorses introducing changes in the institutions and rules governing the present economic model. This sector is represented by the World Social Forum and organisations such as ATTAC. They are characterised by the fact that they work within the institutions in which a sector of the NGOs develops strategies to influence determined issues. In addition to the Spanish section of the ATTAC, this line is represented by certain
development organisations (mainly in Latin America), especially grassroots Christian organisations which, as we mentioned above, are critical of the existing model of cooperation. The increasingly critical attitude shown by religious sectors has modified the discourse from one of charity to one of justice (Jérez 2001, cited in Echart et al. 2005). The signs of this change, as we have already said, were reflected in the 0.7% campaign and find their origins in the RCADE. Nonetheless, as we shall see, RCADE has quickly evolved towards more radical approaches, thus distinguishing a second sector of the GJM which is also present in the Spanish case. Through its clearly anti-capitalist discourse and a strategy based on contesting institutional pressure, this radical sector advocates a change in the system, including the disappearance of institutions that endorse the current economic model on the international front: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank (WB) among others. According to this sector of the movement, social protest is in itself a political proposal and non-violent direct action and civil disobedience is at the centre of their activity. The greatest proponent of this sector of the GJM is the PGA (People Global Action), represented in Spain by organisations such as the MRGs (Movimiento de Resistencia Global) or the MAM (Anti-Maastricht Movement). Other organisations that had already existed and came together in this sector include Ecologistas en Acción, MOC (Conscientious Objectors’ Movement), the CGT trade union, as well as autonomous sectors and the squatters movement.

Likewise, a series of traits that are common to anti-globalization movements throughout the world are applicable to the Spanish case and often reflect changes in the configuration of social contestation in Spain:

- The key role of new technologies as tools of communication and instruments of struggle.
- A revision of the protest repertoire, particularly the notion of active civil disobedience and non-violent direct action.
- The importance of decentralised, anti-hierarchical networking based on common assemblies and horizontal structures to facilitate work between different groups (norms of interaction based on collaboration and the socialisation of information).
- The linking of local problems to global problems, issues of a different nature (i.e. labour and environmental) or between north and south, etc.

In addition to these features which hold true for most of the GJMs, there are certain aspects that are specific to the GJM in Spain:

- Decentralisation and organisational structures which differ by region. These diverse organisational philosophies, as well as the strong presence of nationalistic elements, has not favoured the creation of a state-wide organisation. It has, however, permitted a space for networking and collaboration in the form of campaigns (Against the Europe of Capital and War, 2002; the European Social Consultation in 2004) or encounters (the Tinto de Verano social movements school that has been held yearly since 2003 in Ruesta (Huesca)49.

49 The school has attracted some 200 activists from a wide range of the most radical sectors of the GJM.
The traditionally weak organisational structure of those sectors supporting autonomous movements (especially compared to those in Italy) and in general the so-called new social movements. Nevertheless, as we have also mentioned, during the 90s, these sectors became relatively stronger, especially in the sphere of ecology, which alongside the rest of the trends of change mentioned above, favoured the convergence of alter-global networks and anti-globalisation events.

The absence of left-wing (parliamentary) parties with traditional ties to social movements (i.e. the *Refundación Comunista*) to provide the movement with an organisational foundation and resources.

Likewise, the GJM in Spain is not represented by a media that is sensitive to their demands. Thus their visibility in the public eye is limited to the varying presence of institutional actors that support them (principally the PSOE) or media coverage of their violent actions.

From 2001 to 2003, however, when the conservative party was in power, the political scenario favoured the episodic convergence of social-democratic sectors (i.e. the PSOE and similar organisations such as the MPDL - Movement for Peace, Disarmament and Liberty - or other social forums such as the FS Barcelona or the FS Madrid, major trade unions) with the most radical elements of the GJM in anti-war demonstrations and rallies against education laws or the National Hydrological Plan. Nonetheless, the PSOE’s rise to power, which led to the closure of media opportunities, and its withdrawal from social forums and platforms against the occupation of Iraq, have served to revive the traditional division between members of the “alter-globalisation” movement and “social democratic” sectors in Spain.
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1. Left-Wing Social Movement Families in Switzerland

1.1. Introduction

This part of the report describes the main trends and characteristics of left-wing social movement families in Switzerland as they developed from the late 1960s to the early 2000s. It is structured around two main parts. The first part depicts the general trends for each decade: the late 1960s and the 1970s, the 1980s, and the 1990s and the early 2000s. The second part deals in some more detail with the seven major movements as they developed in the 1990s: ecology, antinuclear, peace, solidarity, urban autonomous, women’s, and labour movements. The first six form the bulk of the so-called new social movements (NSMs) or left-libertarian movements.

Our discussion focuses upon three main aspects: the movements’ mobilization, their action repertoires, and their organizational structure. The presentation rests on data on protest events between 1975 and 1999 and includes excerpts from Giugni (2004a, 2004b) and Giugni and Passy (1998). The data come from previous research projects and was retrieved by content-analyzing the Monday issue of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (for more extensive discussions, see Giugni 1995, 1999, 2004a, 2004b; Giugni and Passy 1997, 1999; Kriesi et al. 1992, 1995). They include both conventional and unconventional events (except for the women’s and labour movements, for which only unconventional events were coded). In addition, we show the development of protest events of three movement families (NSMs, labour movements, and traditional movements) from 1945 to 1978 (Kriesi et al. 1981; see also Duvanel and Lévy 1984; Lévy and Duvanel 1984; for specific case studies, see Kriesi 1985). We discuss the development of the movements in relation to changes in the social, political, and economic context (most notably, to changes in political opportunity structures).

The political opportunity structure in Switzerland has the following features: a cleavage structure characterized by the pacification of traditional cleavages, open institutional structures, an inclusive prevailing strategy by the authorities, and stable alliance structures (Kriesi et al. 1995). This has a number of consequences for the mobilization of social movements in this country. At the most general level, social movements (including the labour movement) which are based on traditional political potentials have a relatively weak capacity for mobilization in Switzerland, because these cleavages are less salient. Conversely, the pacification of traditional cleavages affords a space for the mobilization of the NSMs. Among these movements, we can see that the peace, antinuclear, ecology, solidarity, and urban autonomous movements have all been very active in Switzerland, in terms of both events staged and people mobilized.

The social movement sector in Switzerland since the 1960s is characterized by a sustained level of mobilization, but mostly through moderate forms of actions. Exceptions
to this general rule are the locally based squatters’ movements in Zurich in 1980-1981 as well as in other main cities (most notably, Basel, Bern, and Lausanne) in other years, the separatist Jura movement asking for the creation of a new canton (for accounts, see Ganguillet 1984, 1985; Henecka 1972; Jenkins 1986; Rennwald 1994), and more episodic mobilizations by the antinuclear movement (in the 1970s) and by extreme-right groups (in the 1990s). Such a moderate action repertoire stems largely from the open political opportunity structure in terms of access to the institutionalized political system (namely, through direct democracy and federalism) and in terms of an inclusive prevailing strategy of the authorities (Kriesi et al. 1995). Social movements in Switzerland have made extensive use of the instruments of direct democracy (Kriesi and Wisler 1996). This holds especially for the ecology movement and the peace movement, but other movements, such as the antinuclear movement for example, have launched or supported popular initiatives and referenda. In addition, certain movements such as the ecology movement and the solidarity movement have benefited from important state subsidies, which has contributed to strengthen their organizational structure made of large, semi-institutional SMOs. Finally, the organizational structure of the movements is often strongly decentralized, reflecting the federal structure of the country.

I.2. General trends

I.2.1. The late 1960s and the 1970s

The study of Kriesi et al. (1981) on political activities in Switzerland since the Second World War has shown the explosion of the number of protest events between the sixties and seventies (see Figure 1). The social movement sector in Switzerland after the Second World War was characterized by a rather stable level of mobilization with two main exceptions: a wave of labour protests, accompanied by an important but sporadic mobilization by the peace movement and a new wave of peace protests in the mid-1950s (internationally oriented and addressed mainly against the war-making use of nuclear power). This increase in the level of activity is due primarily to the appearance of the NSMs following the wave of student protest (included here in the category of NSMs). However, all social movements have increased their activities during this period, a phenomenon which characterizes a cycle of protest (Tarrow 1989, 1998).

Among the movements rooted in the traditional cleavages, a central place is taken by the Jura conflict. This deeply rooted conflict erupted after the so-called Moeckli affair of 1947. From this point, the Rassemblement jurassien intensified its activities and in 1957 launched a cantonal initiative which envisaged the separation of the Jura from the canton of Bern, an initiative which was rejected in 1959. Subsequently, the conflict intensified, which led to the intervention of the federal authorities. Finally, thanks to the adoption of an additional constitutional clause by the canton of Bern, the canton of Jura was born in 1979. The intensification of the campaign around the constitution of the new canton helps to explain the increase of regionalist actions in Switzerland at the end of the 1960s and through the 1970s. Moreover, the exclusion of part of the land originally intended to be allocated to the Jura has ensured that the conflict has not been completely resolved by the creation of a new canton.
The explosion of extra-parliamentary mobilization since the end of the 1960s is equally due to the resumption of activities of the labour movement, which is certainly historically the most important movement in Switzerland. Labour protests, however, have remained weak in international comparison, mainly due to certain features of the political system and process, such as the permanent search for consensus among social partners and the government.

The bulk of the rise in protest activities in the late 1960s and early 1970s reflects the emergence of the NSMs. Like in other countries, they were preceded by a wave of student protests. However, student protest in Switzerland has never had the breadth and depth that it has had in other countries such as, for example, France, Italy, the United States, or even Germany. In Switzerland, this first wave of new discontent very quickly concentrated around the politicization of environmental concerns. The first half of the 1970s also witnessed the peak of antinuclear protests, which then faded rapidly in the 1980s.

The rise in mobilization during the late 1960s and early 1970s was accompanied by a certain radicalization of the action repertoires of left-wing social movements. Yet, compared to other countries, such as France or Italy for example, the movements’ action repertoires have remained rather moderate due to the general features of the institutionalized political system (openness, both formally and informally). Furthermore, Switzerland did not experience specific forms of political violence such as terrorism, which has remained very limited in scope (Wisler 1994).

Concerning the organizational structure, left-wing social movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s vary considerably. In general, these movements are composed of loosely structured and often informal organizations. However, this holds above all for the
antinuclear and peace movements, as well as for the student movements, while the ecology movement and the solidarity movement were already quite formally structured and resourceful at this time. The labor movement was also more formally structured through the existence of trade unions, although the union system in Switzerland is weak and highly fragmented.

1.2.2. The 1980s

The early 1980s witnessed an important protest wave produced mainly by the rise of mobilization of the NSMs (see Figure 2). The number of unconventional protest events by other movements has increased as well, but to a much limited extent (student and labor protests are included in the category of other movements).

![Figure 2: NSMs and other movements](image)

Notes: Unconventional actions only.

The single movements, however, have had different trajectories (Giugni and Kriesi 1990). The sudden rise of protests at the beginning of the 1980s was provoked by the mobilization of the peace movement, in particular concerning the question of euromissiles between 1981 and 1983, and by the urban autonomous movement, especially the Zurich squatters in 1980-1981. These two movements have to some extent taken the place of the antinuclear movement, which was at the centre of the mobilization of new social movements in the second half of the 1970s.

In the decade’s second half, the ecology movement and the solidarity movement (and, to a more limited extent and more sporadically the antinuclear movement in 1986 at
the time of the Chernobyl accident) have contributed to sustaining the level of mobilization of left-wing social movements. Ecology protests have remained strong all over the decade.

According to political opportunity theorists, changes in the configuration of institutional power and political alignments are conducive to shifts in the level of mobilization of social movements like the one observed in Switzerland at the beginning of the 1980s. Kriesi et al. (1995), for example, attribute the decline of the NSMs in France in the same period to the seizure of the power by the Socialists (the NSMs main potential ally) and in particular to their getting the presidency of the country. Following this view, especially in a situation of a divided left, when the Socialist Party is in the opposition it is able to support the mobilization of the NSMs, whereas when it is in the government it must subordinate their support to their institutional responsibility.

However, the case of Switzerland shows that sudden and significant fluctuations of the mobilization could occur without any change in the configuration of power at the national level. In Switzerland, the absence of any significant division within the traditional left, and the presence of the Socialist Party in the government since 1959, offers an ambivalent environment for the new social movements in respect of support from the Socialists. It is true that the minority position of this party within the government, and the opportunity for the movements to establish alliances with cantonal sections (a consequence of the extreme fragmentation of power in this country) allows them to benefit from some support. It is no less important, though, that the political alignments in Switzerland are extremely stable. The mobilization of the two movements which most influenced the wave of protest at the beginning of the eighties (the peace movement and the urban autonomous movement) were not caused by a change of political opportunities or in the configuration of power at the national level. On the one side, the pacifist mobilization of this period, contrary to the tradition of the movement in Switzerland (Bein and Epple 1984), was only marginally addressed to the national authorities and to domestic politics, but showed rather the indignation of part of the Swiss people at the decision of NATO. It also manifested solidarity with the pacifists of other countries who protested against this decision. On the other side, the movement of the Zurich squatters reacted to a local situation and therefore had little relation to the national configuration of power.

The strong mobilization of the Zurich squatters at the beginning of the 1980s has produced a radicalization of the protest. This feature, however, is largely confined to the local case of Zurich and, furthermore, is limited to the first years of the decade. In general, conventional forms of action have become more frequent during the 1980s, pointing rather to a moderation of the action repertoire of the NSMs and to a process of institutionalization these movements.

Another aspect of the progressive institutionalization of the NSMs (at least some of them) during the 1980s concerns their organizational structure. In particular, the ecology movement and the solidarity movement have witnessed an impressive organizational growth, both in terms of members and financial resources (Giugni 1995). Furthermore, some SMOs of these two movements have benefited from important state subsidies and have established privileged links with the political authorities, which has accelerated their integration into the institutional system. The latter remarks also apply to some SMOs of the urban autonomous and women’s movements.
1.2.3. The 1990s and early 2000s

The 1990s can be characterized as a phase of relative latency of the protest by left-wing social movements, as compared to the 1980s (see Figure 2). The overall level of mobilization has remained slightly higher than in the late 1970s, but lower than in the 1980s. In particular, the ecology movement and the antinuclear movement have progressively demobilized (although the former has remained quite active), and the urban autonomous movement has remained stable at a much lower level than in the early 1980s. On the other hand, the peace and solidarity movements have shown signs of a resumption of their mobilization after a strong decline in the mid-1980s, respectively in the late 1980s.

The mobilization of left-wing social movements seems to have found new vigor in the past few years, parallel to the emergence of the global justice movement which has staged a number of important protest actions. Protests concerning environmental, peace, and solidarity issues have multiplied. At the same time, labor issues have become more important than in the past three decades and have witnessed an unprecedented mobilization capacity since the early 1970s. Also, new issues have emerged (such as sustainable development) and old ones have taken on a new relevance (such as immigration).

Concerning the action repertoires, at least in the first part of the 1990s, left-wing social movements have continued to display mostly moderate forms of action, and even the urban autonomous movement in general has been less radical. At the same time, the process of institutionalization and organizational growth of certain movements (most notably, the ecology movement and the solidarity movement) of the 1980s went on as well.

In spite of their relative absence from the public domain during the 1990s, the NSMs have continued to grow and to build their organizational structure. This holds especially for the ecology movement and the solidarity movement. In addition, the global justice movement has created its mobilizing structures and organizational networks upon which it mobilization rests.

The next section provides a more detailed description of the main left-wing social movements in Switzerland from the late 1960s to the early 2000s.

1.3. Left-wing social movements from the late 1960s to the early 2000s

1.3.1. The ecology movement

The ecology movement plays an important role among NSMs in Switzerland (for accounts, see Giugni and Passy 1997: ch. 5; Kriesi and Giugni 1996; Zwicky 1993). Environmental claims (defined broadly and in opposition to traditional Left and New Left claims) began to rise right after the turmoil of 1968 to peak in 1973 (Kriesi et al. 1981). The level of mobilization remained quite high but stable up until the decade’s end. The number of protest actions dealing with environmental issues took a sharp upward trend in the 1980s (see Figure 3).

Transportation issues have largely contributed to the movement’s growth and sustained level of mobilization during the 1980s. Indeed, a typical characteristic of the Swiss ecology movement is the important share of actions targeting this policy area. About half of the protest events carried by the movement deal with transportation issues (Giugni 2004b). Among these, opposition against the building-up of the national highway system...
played a particularly significant role. The mobilization of the Swiss ecology movement around transportation issues has followed a pattern that we may call “institutional protest,” characterized by the extensive use of legal and institutional channels. During the whole process, the ecology movement has become increasingly involved in the decisional process and has acquired national relevance (Bassand et al. 1986).

The struggle against national highways highlights a second fundamental characteristic of the political action of the ecology movement in Switzerland: the use of direct democracy. The ecology movement has made a large use of popular initiatives to reach its goals. Indeed, if the level of mobilization of the ecology movement could remain high during the whole 1980s, this is also due to the proliferation of popular initiatives (and, to a lesser extent, referenda) in this decade, in particular those dealing with transportation issues.

The intense use of direct democracy reflects a more pragmatic way of mobilizing around environmental issues. As compared to the more ideological activism of the 1960s and 1970s, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a more eclectic and pragmatic environmentalism aimed at problem-solving rather than politicizing the issues. This new approach can be seen as a third stream of the ecology movement (after traditional nature protection and political ecology) (Rucht 1989), not only in Switzerland, but more generally in western societies. At the same time, however, the poor success of national initiatives has probably contributed to the demobilization of the ecology movement in the 1990s.

In contrast to other movements (such as the peace and antinuclear movements), the Swiss ecology movement has largely acted through conventional means such as lobbying, appeals, and public statements. Mass demonstrations are more seldom used as a way of
claim making and mostly at the local level. Mass participation occurred mainly through the signature of popular initiatives, referenda, or the less institutionally constraining petitions, much more rarely through direct participation in mass demonstrations. These characteristics became even more true in the late 1980s and in the 1990s, giving us a picture of an increasingly institutionalized ecology movement. The open political opportunity structure in Switzerland has favoured a process of integration of part of this movement into the institutionalized system, to the extent that one may wonder whether it has become more an interest group (following the logic of representation) than a social movement (following the logic of participation). In addition, like other countries, Switzerland has witnessed the emergence of a Green Party, that is, of an institutionalized branch of the ecology movement. Given the decentralized political system, the opportunities for the emergence of new small parties are relatively favourable, although the system of concordance erects a cultural barrier to this openness due to its stabilizing effect on the configuration of power. Thus, the first Green party was founded at the local level in 1972 (in the city of Neuchâtel) and then in the 1980s at the national level.

The Swiss ecology movement is the richest and more formally structured of the NSMs. Like the solidarity movement, it has a high degree of formalization, professionalization, and bureaucratization. Furthermore, in spite of the decline of mobilization in the late 1980s and 1990s (with the exception of 1997-1998), the movement’s organizations continued to grow steadily and has even accelerated in the 1990s. Some of the largest SMOs have entered the institutionalized system through consulting or task-delegation procedures. Thus, the organizational structure of the ecology movement combines some powerful and strongly formalized SMOs at the national level with a number of more smaller and more informally structured groups at the local level.

1.3.2. The antinuclear movement

If the story of the Swiss ecology movement is made of little popular mobilization and much institutional protest, the antinuclear movement tells us a story of both institutional and mass mobilization (for accounts, see Giugni and Passy (1997: ch. 2); Kriesi 1982; on the important protest against the planned nuclear plant in Kaiseraugst, see further Cudry 1988; Schroeren 1977). The Swiss antinuclear movement has mobilized above all in the mid- to late 1970s (up to 1981), then again in the mid- and late 1980s, and finally entered a phase of latency in the 1990s (see Figure 4).

Protest started in the late 1960s, principally directed against what was to become the focal point of the Swiss antinuclear movement for the two decades to come: a planned nuclear power plant in Kaiseraugst. The beginning of this opposition can be dated back to the creation in 1969 of a local group called Kaiseraugst Inhabitants for a Sane Habitat. From that moment onward, the history of the Swiss antinuclear movement can be divided in six phases. In the first phase (from 1969 to 1973), the movement used above all the existing institutional opportunities and channels, focusing on Kaiseraugst. In the second phase (1973 to 1979), it shifted to direct action, reached its heyday, and acquired national scope in spite of a first internal division. The third phase (1979 to 1981) witnessed a new fragmentation of the movement, but also a revival around the opposition to the nuclear plants planned in Kaiseraugst and Graben, followed by the beginning of a rapid demobilization. In the fourth phase (1981 to 1986), the movement continued its demobilization, but was revived in 1983, in the midst of the wave of antinuclear weapons
protest. During the fifth phase (1986 to 1990), the accident at Chernobyl brought the second important peak of antinuclear protests in Switzerland, which increased public awareness toward nuclear energy and favoured the acceptance in 1990 of a popular initiative for a 10-year moratorium on the construction of new plants. Finally, the sixth phase was characterized by a new demobilization after the success of the initiative and by a low level of mobilization.

The first antinuclear opposition went mainly through institutional means of action such as political and juridical appeals. These forms became very frequent in 1972 and 1973, targeting several plants or plant projects during this period. In addition, the first demonstrations were organized. The oil crisis produced a major change in the strategies of the antinuclear movement. The salience of the energy issue and the failure of conventional forms induced the movement to resort to direct action. It is in this context that a major occupation took place in 1975 in Kaiseraugst, after construction work had begun.

Although it targeted a specific project, this action became the catalyst for the mass mobilization and was instrumental in making nuclear energy a national issue, as a number of other “nonviolent actions” were formed nationwide and mass demonstrations became national in scope. The years from 1975 to 1979 and, to a lesser extent, up to 1981 were a period of intense mobilization of the Swiss antinuclear movement, in spite of two movement crisis occurred around 1976 and 1980.

As we can see in the figure, 1979 represented the historical peak in the number of antinuclear protest events. That year, the first national initiative against nuclear installations, launched in 1975, was rejected by Swiss voters. In addition, 1979 was also the
year of the accident at Three Mile Island, which had some repercussions also on the Swiss antinuclear movement.

The movement and its main allies (the parties of the left) also launched a number of popular initiatives, both at the national and the cantonal level. Here we see once again that direct democracy offers major political opportunities to social movements in Switzerland, and the antinuclear movement, like other new social movements, has made extensive use of these opportunities.

The second important peak of antinuclear protests occurred in 1986, provoked by the accident at Chernobyl. Before that day, the movement had continued its activities mainly through institutional means, but the accident revived the mobilization through mass demonstrations, though only for a short time. At the same time, it helped the launching of other popular initiatives at the national level in 1986 and 1987. As usually is the case in Switzerland, both the launching of the initiative and the campaign at the moment of the popular vote temporary revived the mobilization.

After the successful vote in 1990, the level of mobilization of the Swiss antinuclear movement went down considerably. Yet antinuclear opponents did not completely cross their arms, but revamped the conflict over nuclear waste disposal. This opposition, which presented some typical NIMBY features, became at times particularly disruptive, combining a mix of demonstrations, public petitions, direct actions, and so forth.

The organizational structure of the Swiss antinuclear movement is much less important and formalized than that of the ecology movement. Less rich both in financial resources and membership, the antinuclear movement is rather formed by a loosely structured network of SMOs. In addition, the movement has known a number of internal divisions which have further weakened it from an organizational point of view. Yet, at least during the period if its strong mobilization in the 1970s, most local groups were gathered around a national peak organization coordinating them. The latter, however, has always been poor in resources.

1.3.3. The peace movement

In spite of the neutral stance of the Swiss army, peace issues represent an important part of the mobilization of the NSMs, although the movement has mobilized less than in other countries, especially in regard to the nuclear weapons issue (for accounts, see Bein and Eppe 1984; Brassel and Tanner 1986; Eppe 1988; Giugni and Passy 1997: ch. 3; Tanner 1988). The development of the Swiss peace movement during the last three decades presents two large waves of contention in the early 1980s and early 1990s as well as a more sporadic mobilization in 1995 (see Figure 5).

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Swiss pacifists joined the international campaign for international distension and against nuclear proliferation. They did so basically in two ways. The first way is common to all other countries: staging mass demonstrations and protests. The second way is typically Swiss and consists in exploiting the institutional opportunities offered by direct democracy.

The years of the student movement were characterized also in Switzerland by intense peace movement activities. In the context of a renewed and more ideological engagement for the peace featuring a strong anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist discourse
typical of 1968 and which brought Swiss students to protest, on the external front, against
the Vietnam War, internal peace actions dealt in particular with three traditional issues:
military spending, arms export, and the civil service. All three, at some point, became the
object of popular initiatives in addition to other forms of actions such as mass
demonstrations and public statements.

During the late 1970s, peace movement mobilization was low. It started to rise
again in 1979, forming the beginning of the largest protest wave that has touched most
Western European countries. Of course, since Switzerland is not a member of the NATO, it
was not directly involved in the decision to station INF missiles in Europe. The Swiss
government was not in a position of having to decide whether or not to host the missiles. In
spite of this lack of a substantial internal target, however, the peace movement mobilized
massively to voice concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to call for a
distension of the international climate.

While the wave of antinuclear weapons protest follows a similar pattern in other
countries, there is an important difference concerning the content of claims. While most of
the mobilization in other countries (such as Germany or Italy) targeted nuclear weapons
and international distension, in Switzerland other important issues were raised toward the
end of the protest wave, showing that in general the Swiss peace movement typically
addresses internal issues (Bein and Epple 1984).

Among the core internal issues is the abolition of the Swiss army. The latter, which
was almost single-handedly carried by the 1982 formed Group for a Switzerland Without
an Army, became the leading peace issue in the 1980s and 1990s. This organization has

Notes: Conventional and unconventional actions.
acted above all through popular initiatives. The most famous is the one aimed at abolishing the army, launched in 1985 and rejected in 1989 by the Swiss population. However, more than one third of the Swiss voted for the initiative, a very surprising result given the central symbolic value given to the army in Switzerland.

The vote on the army initiative helps explain the length of the wave of contention that peaked in 1991. Reactions to U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf are the main responsible for this protest wave. Although the number of participants of the early 1980s was never reached again, the Swiss peace movement mobilized on the Gulf War. Yet the early rise in 1989 is the result of the voting campaign on the army initiative. In addition, the intensity, height, and length of this protest wave are also due to the launching of five other popular initiatives between 1990 and 1992.

The peace movement also fully exploited the opportunity of direct democracy. In the light of this extensive use of direct democratic means, some have spoken of the Swiss peace movement as an “initiative-movement” and warned about the institutionalizing effects of a too intensive use of direct democracy by social movements (Epple 1988, 1991). In addition, only once was the movement successful in using this form of action. This, however, should not make us forget its positive vicarious effects on the general public and on the movement itself (Giugni 1991).

The last peak of mobilization by the peace movement that we can observe in the figure is mostly due to a comeback of the nuclear issue. In 1995, the freshly elected French president Chirac decided to temporarily resume nuclear weapons testing. Once again, an international wave of contention occurred, led by a series of spectacular actions by Greenpeace in the Mururoa atoll and mixing peace and environmental issues. The Swiss peace movement participated in this protest wave, with some demonstrations reaching a considerable number of participants. Once again, this mobilization was short-lived, not least because the resumption of testing was explicitly temporary. Finally, Swiss pacifists did not mobilize massively to protest against the military intervention by NATO forces in Kosovo. In Switzerland, this event does not seem to have been able to rally a rather demobilizing movement. However, more important protests seem to have taken place against the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003.

The organizational structure of the Swiss peace movement resembles that of the antinuclear movement. However, peace SMOs are somewhat greater and have a larger membership. This is perhaps due to their older origin. The movement has traditionally been divided into a religious branch and a leftist (communist) branch, both with its main SMO. The religious branch is stronger. A third important SMO was added in the 1980s when the anti-army issue was raised and a specific SMO was created. The latter became the most important SMO of the peace movement in the 1980s and 1990s.

1.3.4. The solidarity movement

The solidarity movements is among the movements that have mobilized the most in Switzerland in the last decades in terms of the number of protest events produced (for accounts, see de Rahm and Martin 1976; Passy 1998). Its level of mobilization has remained rather sustained during the past three decades (see Figure 6). However, its action repertoire is made above all of conventional actions, and only rarely it has been able to mobilize large numbers of people.
This movement can be seen as being composed of four main branches (or thematic areas): development aid, human rights, asylum and immigration, and antiracism (Passy 1998). These four branches have mobilized unevenly since the 1970s. The most important one is the development-aid branch, followed from the asylum and immigration branch. The human-rights and, especially, the antiracist branches have been less active. After a decline in the late 1970s, the mobilization of the solidarity movement reached a peak in 1988 due to the increase in activity of the branch for development aid and of those associated with asylum policy. The latter is also in part responsible for the rise in mobilization between 1993 and 1995, following a sharp decline at the end of the 1980s. In the most recent years, protests in the field of asylum and immigration have become more frequent, in part as a response to the rise of the extreme right and following the emergence of immigration as a crucial issue in the public and political agenda.

![Figure 6: Solidarity movement](image)

Notes: Conventional and unconventional actions.

In addition to being, for obvious reasons, the most international among the NSMs, the Swiss solidarity movement is characterized by its high degree of institutionalization. In particular, some of its SMOs collaborate in a way or the other with state institutions. This holds in particular for the development-aid branch. In the early years, the collaboration between the state and the SMOs of the solidarity movement was based mostly on the provision of financial resources. The intervention of the state was mostly limited to providing financial help to private initiatives and organizations. This situation has changed starting from the 1960s. The Directorate of development and cooperation (DDC), the governmental agency in charge of policy elaboration and implementation in this domain, was formed in 1961. Since then, the role of the state in development aid has sensibly
increased. Today, cooperation between the Swiss state and SMOs dealing with Third-World issues is very strong on all dimensions, but especially on the operational level.

With regard to consultative procedures, cooperation in the area of development aid is noteworthy. The SMOs of the Swiss solidarity movement (specifically, those devoted to mutual aid) take part in policy formation in this domain. The DDC provides for a number of channels for the institutional dialogue with SMOs, both with respect to the significance in terms of development policy of various political issues and with regard to specific issues of development policy on the operational plan, mutual information, and negotiations about financial contributions to SMOs. Such institutionalized dialogue sped up in the 1990s, particularly in the aftermath of the United Nations Conference on environment and development held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, which gave a decisive boost to the collaboration between governments and SMOs in various countries. Today, several organizations have access to the Swiss state in extraparliamentary committees, both temporary and permanent, created by the government (such as the Committee for development aid).

If a dialogue exists in Switzerland between the SMOs and the state in connected but distinct policy areas such as development aid, the humanitarian aid, human rights, the aid to refugees (in addition to environmental protection), cooperation on the operational level is particularly strong in the first of these areas. It is here that a genuine cooperation takes place. The traditional policy, based on the provision of funds to SMOs so that they can carry out specific projects in Third-World countries or educational initiatives in Switzerland, has been complemented with a policy of operational collaboration, particularly starting from the early eighties. Indeed, development aid is the policy area in which sectors of the civil society actively intervene in the enactment of political decision, not only in the elaboration of those decisions. This cooperation occurs in two basic ways. On the one hand, the government contributes financially on an institutional basis to projects developed by the SMOs by means of the DDC. On the other hand, the Swiss government can also delegate the execution of projects or programs elaborated on the state level to one or more SMOs. In this case, cooperation between social movements and the state reaches its peak. SMOs that are seen as being of public utility become an instrument of the state in order to reach its goals in a given policy area. In the case of development-aid policies, this relationship is becoming so close that we may ask whether certain SMOs of the solidarity movement are not becoming part of the state.

Beside the resourceful SMOs that have a high degree of formalization, professionalization, and bureaucratization, there are many smaller and more informal SMOs that are active on various issues. Thus, similar to the ecology movement, the Swiss solidarity movement is characterized by an organizational structure that combines some powerful and strongly formalized SMOs at the national level with a number of more smaller and more informally structured groups at the local level.

1.3.5. The urban autonomous movement

The urban autonomous movement (or squatters’ movement) has represented an important part of the mobilization of the NSMs since the late 1960s (for an account, see Giugni and Passy 1997, ch. 4). The countercultural youth scene was active in several cities in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The most dramatic events in terms of confrontations with
the police took place perhaps in Zurich, but important protests occurred as well in Geneva and other Swiss cities. Among the central claims of the movement was the creation of alternative youth centers.

The mobilization of the movement was particularly intense in 1980 and 1981 in the city of Zurich (for accounts, see Kriesi 1984; Willener 1984). Indeed, this protest wave is responsible for most of the peak of mobilization in the early 1980s (see Figure 7). During nearly two years, the Zurich squatters mobilized to ask for the creation of an alternative youth centre. The mobilization went through several phases, most of them were characterized by strong confrontations with the police. The particularly violent protest raised a public debate and was discussed also outside the country.

![Figure 7: Urban autonomous movement](image)

Notes: Conventional and unconventional actions.

After the Zurich movement had waned, the urban autonomous movement never reached a comparable level of mobilization. Important protests occurred in Basel, Bern, and again in Zurich in the late 1980s, but they were much less important. Other cities in which relevant protests took place in the 1980s include Geneva (for an account, see Buchs et al. 1988) and Lausanne (for an account, see Ménétrey et al. 1981).

During the 1990s, the urban autonomous movement has been relatively inactive, at least as overt protest is concerns. Activities were more internally oriented and focused on the functioning of youth centres previously claimed through protest actions (leading, for example in the case of Zurich, to internal conflicts and divisions). Thus, a part of the movement, already in the 1980s, went through a process of institutionalization. This holds for the branch dealing with youth centres. On the other hand, those groups active on the front of protesting against the housing crisis has remained more contentious.
This process of institutionalization, however, has not prevented the movement from staging radical and sometimes violent actions. This radicalization, however, varies from one city to the other depending on local political opportunity structures and in particular on the policing of protest at the local level. For example, in Geneva the squatters have preferred moderate actions, while the movement in Zurich at the beginning of the 1980s has become well-known for the radicalization and violence of its protest for the opening of an autonomous youth centre. This difference has been explained by the political contexts obtaining in the two cities, specifically by the open and negotiation-oriented attitude displayed by the Geneva authorities, in contrast to the exclusion and repression demonstrated by the Zurich authorities (Giugni 1995). In a more systematic fashion, Kriesi and Wisler (1996) have attempted a comparison aimed at showing the moderating influence of procedures of direct democracy, a key factor in the formal openness of the Swiss political system, on the action repertoires of social movements. According to these authors, the price of entry to direct democracy (in terms of the number of signatures required and the deadline for the collection of signatures) is lower in German-speaking than in French- and Italian-speaking Switzerland, and this generally helps to render actions more radical in the latter because there, the instruments of direct democracy, especially the popular initiative, are less accessible. At the same time, however, the lower cost of using instruments of direct democracy provokes greater exclusion and repression of marginal movements in the German-speaking part of the country, and this in turn can lead to an increased radicalization precisely in a context of greater openness of direct democracy (Wisler et al. 1996). The violence of the Zurich squatters could then be explained in part by this formal openness of the local political system, for a marginal movement often has no means or will to employ the instruments of direct democracy. On the other hand, when a movement decides to take advantage of the institutional possibilities of direct democracy, this has a moderating effect on its mobilization.

Not surprisingly, the Swiss urban autonomous movement, much like its counterparts in other countries, is characterized by a low level of formalization and by a network of loosely structured SMOs. However, due to the need to carry internal activities aimed at insuring the functioning of the existing youth centres, the branch of the movement dealing with this issue has become more formalized than the branch dealing with the housing crisis. This holds in particular for the case of Geneva, but also in other cities where the movement has succeeded in its attempt to force the local authorities to grant it a youth centre.

1.3.6. The women’s movement

Like other NSMs (most notably, the ecology movement and the peace movement), the Swiss women’s movement has strong historical roots going back to the nineteenth century and, like in other countries, women have struggled for political and social equality (for accounts, see Hardmeier 1997; Mesmer 1988; Vögeli 1997; Woodtli 1977). In spite of its historical roots, however, there has been only a low level of mobilization of the women’s movement, a movement which seems not to have exploited all the opportunities which the Swiss political system has offered it (Banaszak 1996), and which, moreover, has been progressively institutionalized since the introduction of universal suffrage in 1971 (see Figure 8). Since then, therefore, the level of mobilization of the women’s movement has remained very low. It should be noted that only unconventional actions are reported in the figure.
The struggle for political rights represent the first wave of the Swiss women’s movement. While, in other European countries, the women’s movement had already started to claim social rights, the Swiss feminists had overlooked this second aspect to focus on political rights. Once political rights (voting rights) were reached, the movement shifted its focus on social rights. Since then, new feminist issues have emerged, in Switzerland as elsewhere, such as abortion and artificial insemination (Moroni 1994), brought to the fore by the second wave of the movement. Although issues such as abortion, the revision of the civil code and of the penal code, maternity insurance, wage equality, education equality, and so forth had been addressed before the granting of voting rights, they went centre stage only after that.

![Figure 8: Women's movement](image)

Notes: Unconventional actions only.

In spite of the emergence of new issues, the movement’s mobilization has remained rather low. Most of the action has occurred within the institutions, not in the streets. Furthermore, the creation of the Federal committee for women’s questions in 1975 has represented a success for the movement, but as the same time has contributed to its demobilization.

The action repertoire of the Swiss women’s movements is typically a moderate and conventional one. Furthermore, since the creation of the Offices for the equality in the late 1970s, the Swiss women’s movement has transformed itself. The founding of the Federal committee for women’s questions marks the beginning of a new strategy of the movement. One part of the movement has continued the action within the political institutions, but has remained engaged in the feminists organizations. The creation of the Offices for the equality has represented a major step in the institutionalization of the movement. In addition to this channel of influence, the movement has opted for a strategy of political
lobbying on several issues. Finally, the entry of several women in the parliamentary arenas is a further channel used to bring the movement’s claims into the institutions.

Parallel to this process of institutionalization, the women’s movement has built a network of service organizations, basically targeting the women’s community, aimed at informing and helping women in need. This aspect has always existed, but it has been strengthened alongside the process of institutionalization of the movement.

Thus, starting from the 1980s, women’s mobilizations has taken two distinct but complementary forms: the political action within the system in order to concretize the political and social citizenship, and the supply of services to the women’s community. This has brought the movement between a logic of institutionalization and a logic of service supply.

1.3.7. The labour movement

The labour movement is historically an important movement in Switzerland (for accounts, see Degen 1991; Garbani and Schmid 1980; Groupe de travail pour l’histoire du mouvement ouvrier Zurich 1978; Gruner 1987-1988; Hardmeier 1970; Lezzi 1990; Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales 1973; Studer and Vallotton 1997a, 1997b; Vuilleumier 1973; Vuilleumier et al. 1973; Vuilleumier et al. 1977). The workers’ mobilization was very strong at the beginning of the century and, especially, around the General Strike of 1918. At this time, the labour movement was still radical, but its activities became progressively more moderate as its principal organizations (the unions and the Socialist Party) were integrated within the political system, a course which was already under way following the General Strike (Degen 1991).

There were many stages in this process of integration: the introduction of the proportional rule in 1919, following the General Strike of the previous year; the convention of 1937 which introduced a private arbitration tribunal of industrial relations and led to the so-called “Peace of Work” and the cooptation of the Socialist Party into the Federal Council, provisionally from 1943 and then definitively in 1959. Progressively established within the system of concordance, the labour movement made a first resurgence of activity after the Second World War, and a second at the end of the sixties, with the support of the new Left, only to return to a more latent position in the mid-1970s, after the most somber phase of the economic crisis. However, in view of the difficulties of the current situation and the erosion of social benefits which is occurring across Europe, the workers may mobilize yet again.

As a result of this process of integration, the Swiss labour movement displays a low level of mobilization, especially after the economic crisis of the mid-1970s (see Figure 9). The general trend during the past three decades shows a strong decrease in the late 1970s, followed by a period of fluctuations at a very low level. It should be noted that only unconventional actions are reported in the figure and that strikes are not included. However, the development of the number of strikes largely reflect that of the other forms of actions reported in the figure (see Giugni: 142). In addition, strikes in Switzerland are traditionally very limited in frequency and scope.

However, things seem to be changing in recent years, and the labour movement has taken on a new strength, especially in the early 2000s. This has occurred in the context of a
more polarized political system, the rise of neoliberal policies, a deteriorating economic situation, and the weakening of neocorporatist practices. Since the end of World War Two, Switzerland was characterized by economical and political stability based on two important compromises between important social and political actors: one between labor and capital and the other between export-oriented business and domestic producers (Bonoli and Mach 2001). Since the beginning of the 1990s this compromises have been under important pressures, and globalization is one of its sources. Since then, Switzerland has faced an important economical crisis and also a growing willingness of some actors to challenge the compromises of the Swiss model. The pressure on this model has both internal and external causes. During the 1990s, the economic situation worsened, unemployment rose sharply, and pushed for radical social and economic reforms. Growing international economic openness is another factor of pressure on the system which creates the condition for a transformation of power relations within the Swiss consensual system. This change in power relation has an important impact on the compromises of the Swiss model. The resumption of labour mobilization can also be seen in the light of these changes.

Notes: Unconventional actions only. Strikes are excluded.

1.4. Summary and conclusion: from contention to integration

The development of left-wing social movements in Switzerland since the late 1960s can be characterized as a process of progressive institutionalization. The history of political contention in this country shows the shift from contention to integration (Giugni and Passy 1997). The Swiss political system favours the incorporation of protest groups and the integration of the movements (Giugni and Passy 1997). The open institutional structure
(principally the instruments of direct democracy) and the prevailing inclusive strategy adopted by the political authorities favours the institutionalization of the movements and their claims. This process does not depend only on the structure of the political system and the opportunities which this offers, but is equally bound up with other factors, including the issues which are raised (more or less threatening to the political authorities and the system itself), the organizational structure of the movements (more or less formal and professional), and the range of their actions (radical or moderate). In some cases, the incorporation is so strong that we observe a transformation of the movements into interest groups. This is the case with certain sectors of the ecology movement and the solidarity movement. Especially in the case of the solidarity movement, relations of collaboration with the state have been established, to the point that we can speak today of these movements as being situated between conflict and cooperation (Giugni and Passy 1998). In other cases, such as the squatters, alongside the institutionalization facilitated by the strategy of negotiation employed by some local authorities (for example, in Geneva in the 1980s), there have been moments of radicalization which have led to the disappearance of the movement (for example, in Zurich at the beginning of the 1980s). It would seem, then, that in a political context like that of Switzerland, the choice which confronts a social movement is whether to become integrated and institutionalized, thus establishing bases for reforms from within, or to disappear after having produced a temporary wave of mobilization.

However, in recent years (in particular, in the 2000s), some signs of both a remobilization and a certain radicalization of the movements can be observed.

2. Characteristics of the Global Justice Movement in Switzerland

2.1. Introduction

This part of the report describes the characteristics of the global justice movement (GJM) in Switzerland since its emergence in the public domain in the late 1990s. We will consider the four main elements of what McAdam et al. (2001) have called the classic social movement agenda for explaining contentious politics: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, framing processes frames, and repertoires of contention. These four aspects are seen as mediating factors between social change (the ultimate origin of all contention) and contentious interaction (the “dependent variable”). Political opportunities refer to the signals to social and political actors that encourage them to form social movements (Tarrow 1996). More specifically, they refer to all those aspects of the political system that affect the possibilities that challenging groups have to mobilize effectively (Tarrow 1996). Here we focus in particular on the structure of national cleavages that are reflected in the Swiss GJM, the alliances of the movement with institutional actors such as political parties, and the state responses to the movement’s mobilization. Mobilizing structures refer to the formal and informal vehicles through which people engage in collective action (McAdam et al. 1996). We can distinguish between two basic types of mobilizing structures: formal organizations (e.g. Attac) and informal networks (i.e. the web of interpersonal contacts and exchanges among movement activists and participants). Here we focus on both types of mobilizing structures within the Swiss GJM. Framing processes refer to “the signifying work or meaning construction engaged in by social-movement activists and participants and other parties (e.g. antagonists, elites, media,
countermovements) relevant to the interests of social movements and the challenges they mount” (Snow 2004: 384). Here we focus in particular on the main claims made by the Swiss GJM and on the identification of participants with the movement. Repertoires of contention refer to “limited ensembles of mutual claim-making routines available to particular pairs of identities” (McAdam et al. 2001: 138). In other words, they are the array of available means of actions through which social movements mobilize. Here we focus on the forms of actions displayed by the Swiss GJM.

We will use these four concepts as a plot to outline the main characteristics of the GJM in Switzerland. The report has five main parts: (1) the main stages of the emergence of the Swiss GJM during the 1990; (2) the national cleavages and conflict lines that are reflected in the movement’s mobilization, the alliances with institutional actors, and state responses to the movement’s mobilization (political opportunities); (3) the organizations and networks within the movement (mobilizing structures); (4) the issues and frames on which the movement mobilizes (framing processes); and (5) the forms of action used by the movement to make its claims (repertoire of contention).

The characteristics of the GJM in Switzerland owe much to the social and political context in which it has emerged. In particular, certain aspects of the political opportunity structure, such as state responses and the configuration of power, have an impact on the amount and forms of the protest carried by the movement. As compared to other countries, we can speak of a relatively weak and moderate GJM. In addition, the Swiss GJM reflects the conflict lines and traditions of contention that have characterized the country in recent decades, in particular the weakness of class-based mobilization and the strength of the new social movements (NSMs). Finally, the picture that emerges is one of a particularly heterogeneous, if not divided, GJM. Two main branches coexist within the movement, each with its own strategies and forms of action: a moderate, relatively institutionalized branch relying mostly upon organizations and activists of the ecology and solidarity movements as well as institutional actors such as small left-wing parties and labor unions, and a more radical and less institutionalized branch pivoting around the autonomous, anarchist, and squatters’ milieus.

2.2. The emergence of the GJM in the 1990s

Unlike in other countries (e.g. France, Italy), the heritage of the new social movements (NSMs) has been very important for the emergence of the Swiss GJM. Organizations and activists of the peace, ecology, and solidarity movements have contributed to the rise of the GJM. However, the movement is not simply a continuation of the NSMs, but has emerged in a particular historical context. First of all, as in other countries, the international context of neo-liberalism and its impact on the national level has brought new issues, such as unemployment and neo-liberalism, in the public domain and has created new opportunities for collective action, both at the national and transnational levels. In Switzerland, the discussion about neo-liberalism moved from extreme-left circles to the public domain after the publication in 1995 of the “White Book” written by two economists. The authors advocate ultra neo-liberal policies as a way to reduce the debt of the state. One year later is published the “Black Book of Neo-liberalism”, which did not have the same impact on public opinion, but nevertheless opened the debate on neo-liberalism in Switzerland.
The remobilization and radicalization that occurred in the social movement sector in Switzerland in the late 1990s can be linked to a large extent to the rise of the GJM. The most important event staged by the GJM in Switzerland during the 1990s is probably represented by the demonstrations against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva that took place in May 1998 (Rossiaud 2001). In many respects, these demonstrations can be seen as a pre-Seattle event in the Swiss context and have had both a symbolic and substantial signification on the further development of the movement.

In February 1998, activists from the Zapatista movement met in Geneva for the foundation meeting of the Peoples Global Action network. The welcome committee is organized by the Geneva squatters and composed of local urban autonomous and solidarity organizations as well as labor unions. The organizations participating in the creation of the Peoples Global Action network in Geneva reflects the composition of the GJM in Switzerland in the following years. This constitutional conference also led to the preparation of the demonstrations that took place during the WTO conference in Geneva in May 1998 (which were part of a global day of action across the world called by the Peoples Global Action).

Although it is always difficult to locate the beginning of a new movement or protest cycle in time with precision, the four days of demonstrations that took place in Geneva in May 1998 can be seen as the starting point of the emergence of the GJM in the public domain in Switzerland, and the opening event of a cycle of protest that spans over the following few years and whose end is still unclear. These events marked a radicalization of the social movement sector, which already started at the local level a few years earlier with a series of actions by the squatters and with a protest against a parade of the Swiss army in 1995 that witnessed confrontations between demonstrators and the police.

Forms of actions that were more common in the late 1960 and in the 1970s (especially perpetrated by the peace and antinuclear movements), such as direct actions and civil disobedience, were resumed after having been put on hold during the 1980s and early 1990s, at least at the national level. These forms of actions were largely inspired from Reclaim the Streets and are very important in the Peoples Global Action, which organized the 1998 demonstrations.

Unexpectedly, at least for those who were inclined to think that collective action in Switzerland take mostly, if not always, a peaceful path, the 1998 demonstrations in Geneva turned violent. This has had important consequences on the future of the GJM in Switzerland, both positively and negatively. First of all, they had a symbolic impact, proving to opponents to globalization that the movement was indeed capable to mount a significant challenge. Second, however, the fact that the demonstrations turned violent created the basis for an internal division of the movement which will deepen later on, precisely on the issue of violence. Thirdly, the violent actions had large resonance in the Swiss media, largely putting on backstage the peaceful direct actions. The impressive media campaign centred around the potential threat of violence conducted during the months before the demonstration against the 2002 summit of the G8 held in Evian (which is a few kilometres far from Geneva across the French-Swiss border) is perhaps the most striking example of this (Commission extraparlementaire d’enquête / G8 2004). Most of the attention of the press has been directed at the threat of violence. Fourthly, they influenced the future reactions of the authorities and the repression that the protests against the World
Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos and other GJM demonstrations will face in the following years.

2.3. Political opportunities: cleavages, alliances, and state responses

We consider three aspects of the political opportunity structure influencing the mobilization of the GJM in Switzerland: the national cleavages and conflict lines that are reflected in the movement’s mobilization, the alliances with institutional actors, and the state responses to the movement’s mobilization.

Two main features of the Swiss social and political context play an important role for the structure and mobilization of the GJM: the weak imprint of the class cleavage and traditional social conflict line carried by the union sector (although labour unions do participate in the movement), and the strong presence of the NSMs. In particular, we must stress the strong presence of the ecology and solidarity movements (the two stronger and most resourceful NSMs in Switzerland during the 1980s and 1990s) within the GJM. These two movements, and the NSMs in general, have represented the main extraparliamentary force in Switzerland since the 1970 (Kriesi et al. 1995), as compared to other countries in which the class-cleavage has remained more salient and in which the labour movements and other more traditional movements have been dominant (e.g. France, Italy). In this, Switzerland resembles more to countries in which the NSM sector has displayed a strong level of mobilization (e.g. Germany). As a result, the characteristics of the GJM has inherited part of the actors and claims of these movements.

The main allies of the GJM within the institutional arenas are obviously to be found in the left. More specifically, the small parties of the left and extreme left (both old and new) actively support the movement’s claims and activities, and often can be considered as being part of the movement in a broader sense. The same holds for the labour unions, especially smaller and more radical ones as well as the public sector unions. The main leftist party, the Socialist Party, is less supportive of the movement, especially when it comes to the latter’s more radical wing and actions, although it is not opposed to it. This attitude resembles that traditionally taken by the socialists towards the NSMs (Kriesi et al. 1995). The quite ambivalent position of the party within the government (minority member of a broad governmental coalition) could explain this attitude. However, given the federalist structure of the country, the movement may find more support from the Socialist Party in the cantons in which the party is not in the government.

The state responses to the mobilization of the GJM have departed radically from the tradition of the policing of protest in Switzerland. While the Swiss state, in cross-national comparison, has traditionally been characterized by an inclusive prevailing strategy of the authorities and low levels of repression (Kriesi et al. 1995), except in certain local cases such as the repression towards the squatter’s in Zurich in the early 1980, its responses to the mobilization of the GJM is less facilitative and has often taken a repressive stance. This can clearly be seen in the important policing apparatus enforced every year when the WEF meets in Davos, when both police forces and the army are engaged in order to secure the place of the meeting, or during the summit of the G8 held in Evian, when the Swiss government asked for the support of police forces from Germany which helped the local police, police forces coming from other cantons, and the army in insuring that the summit went well. This repressive stance of the state was present especially at the beginning of the
movement’s emergence, when the authorities were probably taken by surprise by the level of disruption of the protest. More recently, the overreaction that has characterized the early phases has been replaced by more targeted and differentiated measures.

2.4. Mobilizing structures: organizations and networks

In considering the mobilizing structures of the GJM in Switzerland we must take into account two distinct dimensions: the origin of the organizations and networks, on the one hand, and their degree of structuring, on the other. Concerning the origin of organizations and networks, as a result of the importance of the new cleavage carried by the NSMs and the strong mobilization of these movements throughout the 1970 and 1980, and also in the early 1990, NSM organizations are much present in the GJM. Traditional leftist organizations (parties and labour unions) are also involved, but to a lesser extent. Concerning the degree of structuring of the actors involved, as a result of the strong imprint of the NSMs, the GJM is characterized by an important presence of quite formalized, structured, and professionalized organizations of the environmental and solidarity movements. Again, more informal and loosely structured organizations and groups are certainly very active within the movements (and are indeed at the core of its definition, just as they were for the NSMs), but this does not seem to be what characterizes the GJM, as compared to other countries (e.g. Italy).

To have a measure of the importance of certain types of mobilizing structures for the Swiss GJM at the individual level we can refer to existing empirical material. Table 1 shows the distribution of organizational networks of participants in the GJM (regardless of their level of involvement in these networks). The data come from a research conducted during two protest events against the WEF meeting held in Davos in January 2004 and were collected following an approach similar to recent studies conducted in other countries (Andretta et al. 2002; della Porta 2003a, 2003b; 2005; della Porta and Mosca 2003; Fillieule et al. 2005; Passy and Bandler 2003). A questionnaire was distributed to participants in the two events (a social-forum-like event held in Zurich on January 17 and a protest demonstration that took place in Chur on January 24). Although these figures should be taken with some caution and cannot easily be generalized, as the survey is not based on random sampling and the sample is relatively small, they allow us to show the main trends as to the organizational networks in which participants in the GJM are embedded.

Respondents were asked to mention organizations/groups in which they participate or have participates from a finite list of items. As we can see in the table, the larger proportion of participants in the two events are or have been members (or at least supporters) of environmental organizations (27%). Obviously, GJM organizations are also well represented, but they are ranked only second after environmental ones (19%). Many respondents have also mentioned membership in humanitarian and human rights organizations. Together with antiracist/promigrant organizations, the latter can be considered as part of the solidarity movement (Passy 2001). If we add up the percentages for all three items, the solidarity movement clearly emerges as the most important organizational network of participants in the two events at hand (41%). In fact, stretching a bit the definition of this movement, we could add welfare organizations and thus the solidarity movement becomes even more central (52%). Also important for participants to the two anti-WEF protests are more institutional actors such as parties (17%) and labour
unions (15%). Among the former, quite understandably, leftist parties are virtually unanimously mentioned.

Table 1: Organizational networks of participants in two protests against the WEF meeting in Davos in 2004 (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational networks</th>
<th>% responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental organizations</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GJM organizations</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian organizations</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor unions</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights organizations</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare organizations</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiracist/promigrant organizations</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace movement organizations</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous/squatters’ movement organizations</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth organizations</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenants’ rights organizations</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students’ organizations</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s organizations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood organizations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumers’ rights organizations</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers’ organizations</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious organizations</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gay and lesbian organizations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed’s rights organizations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Respondents were asked to mention the organizations/groups in which they participate or have participated. Percentages do not add up to 100% because of multiple responses.

In spite of their limitations, these findings offers us a clue as to the organizations and networks underlying the mobilization of the GJM in Switzerland. First, the mobilizing structures of the Swiss GJM reflect the strength of a previous cycle of contention carried by the NSM, hence largely reflecting the importance of the national traditions of contention. Second, more specifically, the organizations and networks of the environmental and solidarity movements play a central role. Third, at the same time, the presence of NSM organizations and networks is accompanied by that of more institutional actors such as left-wing parties and labour unions. However, these more institutionalized actors, although they are indeed present, are less important, reflecting the weakness of the class cleavage in Switzerland and the national traditions of contention.
The impact of the national traditions of contention on the structuring of the GJM in Switzerland can also be seen in a similar survey conducted by a team of French and Swiss researchers on participants in the protest against the G8 summit in Evian in June 2003 (Fillieule et al. 2005). This survey, based on the same approach as the one mentioned earlier, was conducted on both sides of the French-Swiss border near Geneva’s, where the protest events took place during about one week. The findings show that Swiss and French participants were embedded in different organizational networks. Specifically, GJM organizations were more present on the French side. This can be explained by the fact that France is one of the birthplace of the GJM in Europe, as attested by the founding at the strong development of Attac there. No equivalent SMO exists in Switzerland in terms of size, while environmental SMOs, for example, are much larger in Switzerland (Kriesi et al. 1995). Furthermore, NSM organizations (i.e. environmental, humanitarian, human rights, peace SMOs) were much more present on the Swiss side. Again, here we see the impact of the national context. In particular, the mobilizing structures in the protest against the G8 in Evian reflect the strength of NSM in Switzerland, as opposed to its weakness in France (Kriesi et al. 1995).

This picture made at the individual level, however, captures only part of the reality and disguises another important aspect that becomes visible when we look at the organizations involved in the GJM. Just as the NSMs include formalized, structured, and professionalized SMOs (e.g. in the environmental and solidarity movements) together with much more informal and loosely structured organizations and groups (e.g. in the peace and squatters’ movements), the mobilizing structures of the GJM are made both of formal organizations and informal networks.

Thus, the organizational network of the Swiss GJM can be divided in two categories which largely rely on the heritage of the NSM in Switzerland. We find on the one hand the environmental and solidarity movement organizations, which are very centralized and professionalized (e.g. the traditional environmental organization Pro Natura, the Swiss Coalition of Development Organizations). On the other hand we find more loose networks of informal groups mainly belonging to the squatters’ and autonomous, anarchist, and new left milieus, especially those active locally in the major cities (Basel, Bern, Geneva, Lausanne, Zurich). To these two categories of actors, we must add a third one, namely actors from the more institutionalized arenas represented by left-wing parties and labour unions (especially, the more radical ones). However, these actors are less important than in other countries (e.g. France). Finally, and even less important in the Swiss context, there are the organizations created during the emergence of the GJM in the 1990s (e.g. Attac, Swiss Social Forum, Lemanic Social Forum).

2.5. Framing processes: claims and identity

The framing perspective has taught us that a process of construction of the “problem” is necessary to activate the identities and motivations of actors to form social movements. However, this process is constrained and limited by previous mobilizations and ideas already expressed by previous social forces, most notably previous social movements. In this view, the collective action frames put forward by the GJM do not differ fundamentally from those of the cycle of contention that has preceded it, namely that carried by the NSMs. Indeed, although there certainly are several novelities in the nature and mobilization of the GJM (in particular, concerning the scope of mobilization and the
targets addressed), its claims are not entirely new and have been to a large extent brought about by the NSMs. North-South solidarity, for example, is a typical NSM issue. In addition, we also find more traditional claims. For example, the struggle against economic liberalism, which is at the heart of the mobilization of the GJM, is indeed a typical claim of both the old left and the new left.

Thus, the structure of social and political cleavages that characterize a given country as well as its national traditions of contention affect the ways in which global issues are framed in that country. In Switzerland, the pacification of the class cleavage that has historically occurred during the twentieth century, the strong degree of institutionalization of the system of industrial relations (reflected in neo-corporatist arrangements in the administrative arena), and more generally the consensual character of the political system, together with the strength of the NSM sector, has produced a GJM more oriented towards claims typically made by the NSMs than towards claims of the traditional left.

Table 2: Most important claims for participants in two protests against the WEF meeting in Davos in 2004 (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Claims</th>
<th>% responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suppress the Third-World debt</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant the free access to drinking water</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor the fair trade</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalize the freedom of speech</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make Bretton Woods institutions (WTO, IMF, WB) democratic</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a tax on financial transactions (“Tobin Tax”)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant union’s freedoms and rights</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor the access to studies for women in the South</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realize the demining</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledge the adoption and marriage of homosexual couples</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Respondents were asked to mention the three most important claims from a finite list of items. Percentages do not add up to 100% because of multiple responses.

We can get some purchase on the thematic priorities of the Swiss GJM by referring again to the research conducted on participants in two protest events against the 2004 meeting of the WEF. Table 2 shows the distribution of the most important claims as stated by participants in these events. Respondents were asked to mention the three most important claims from a closed list of items. The findings are very straightforward. Three claims clearly emerge as central for participants in the movement: suppress the Third-World debt (61%), granting free access to drinking water (59%), and favour fair trade (45%). All other items are much less important, perhaps with the exception of generalizing the freedom of speech (32%). However, when respondents were asked to say what they think should be done to really change the society (again with three possible choices out of a closed list of items), the two principal items mentioned are to establish democratic forms
alternative to the state and to abolish capitalism. These, indeed, are core issues of the GJM everywhere. To strengthen international law and to break radically with current models of economic development, two other general issues of the GJM, come next in the priority ranking.

What do these figures tell us about the claims made by the GJM in Switzerland (with all the caution that should be put in interpreting them)? They suggest, first, that participants in the GJM make a variety of claims. In other words, this is not a single-issue movement, but a heterogeneous movement not only in terms of the organizations and networks involved, but also with regard to the issues addressed. Second, the Swiss GJM seems to emphasize issues and frames that have traditionally been put forward by the NSMs and, more specifically, by the environmental and solidarity movements, that is, the two most important NSMs during the 1980s and 1990s. Taken together, these are issues relating to sustainable development, which in a way is a bridge between the environmental and solidarity movements. Third, some of the central issues of the GJM worldwide (e.g. fair trade) are also important, while others (e.g. democratizing international institutions) are more marginal.

To be sure, the focus of the mobilization of the GJM is on transnational and global issues. However, the movement also deals with national issues, and the degree to which the latter enter the movement’s agenda varies across countries. Given the relatively lower presence of labour unions in the mobilization of the GJM in Switzerland, national social issues seem to be less central than in other countries. Therefore, the movement tends to focus on global issues and to be less linked to the national situation and conflicts. Even the national issues are often framed in global terms. For example, the issue of bank secret is framed in terms of global justice and the issue of immigration in terms of global migration.

Table 3: Identification with the GJM of participants in two protests against the WEF meeting in Davos in 2004 (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of identification</th>
<th>% responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another aspect of the framing processes in the GJM concerns the degree to which participants identify with the movement. Table 3 gives us a simple measure of the degree of identification of participants in the two protest events against the 2004 meeting of the WEF. The findings suggest (always with the necessary caution in interpreting them) that more than three quarters of the respondents (80%) identify strongly or at least to some extent with the GJM and only a very small proportion (2%) do not identify at all with it. Of course, we do not have comparative evidence for other movements or countries, which makes the interpretation difficult. Yet we can say that in a few year people active in the
movement have come to create important identity bonds in spite of the fact that they belong to organizations of other movements or that they make claims that pre-existed to the emergence of the GJM in the public domain. This could form a basis for the survival of the movement in times of lower mobilization due to more unfavourable political opportunities or other external and internal factors.

2.6. Repertoires of contention: forms of action

Since the 1998 demonstrations against the WTO meeting, at every event that could be the target of GJM protests, an unprecedented police apparatus was organized by the authorities and confrontations with the demonstrators have become more frequent than in the past. In particular, since then, virtually all annual meetings of the WEF in Davos have witnessed a violent or at least confrontational opposition, both close to the place of the meeting and in other Swiss cities (even when the WEF meeting was held in New York in 2002). Furthermore, the protests against the summit of the G8 in Geneva and Lausanne have witnessed confrontations with the police (although they occurred before and after the main demonstration, while the latter went peacefully). The anti-WEF demonstrations of 2004, in contrast, have been characterized by both a lower participation and a more peaceful behaviour, perhaps marking a decline of the movement or at least the beginning of a new phase, more centred around consensus building (for example, through, social forums and other self-reflexive events) than overt protest activities.

As in other countries, the action repertoire of the GJM in Switzerland presents two main forms: mass demonstrations and protests activities addressed against major international governmental or private institutions or organizations, on the one hand, and parallel summits and social forums, on the other. The former are protest-oriented and has taken a radical or even violent turn when the more radical sectors of the movement were involved (and also when the authorities have made use of repression). The latter are more self-reflexive and are aimed at identity formation, consensus mobilization, and public sensitizing. Furthermore, somewhat simplifying a more complex picture, the latter see the involvement of the less institutionalized and more radical sectors of the movement (e.g. the autonomous, anarchist, and new left milieus more inclined to direct action and participatory democracy), while the former include the participation of institutional actors and the more moderate sectors of the movement (e.g. left-wing parties, labour unions, and the more formalized organizations of the environmental and solidarity movements more inclined to conventional and media-oriented strategies).

The radical organizations and groups were more important and visible in the early phases of the GJM in Switzerland. They were very active and contributed for example to the creation of the Peoples Global Action and the organization of the anti-WTO protests in 1998. They were also actively involved in the first anti-WEF demonstrations. However, during the past few years, the moderate wing of the GJM seems to have acquired importance and the radical or violent actions have decreased, as compared to the late 1990s and early 2000s, in particular in the anti-WEF demonstrations, but also during the protests against the G8 summit in 2002. Similarly to the evolution observed for the NSMs, the most radical sectors of the GSM are loosing visibility and are increasingly criticized by the dominant, more institutionalized organizations.
While the attitudes towards violent repertoires have until recently been ambiguous within the movement, with some actors clearly condemning it from the beginning and others being less straightforward in this regard, most of the GJM organizations and the organizations close to it are now more incline to condemn the use of violence and to opt for more moderate forms of actions. A significant indication of this is the creation in 2003 of the Swiss Social Forum.

The repertoire of contention of the GJM can also be assessed at the individual level using the data from the research on participants in two protest events against the 2004 meeting of the WEF (always keeping in mind the limitations of these data). Table 4 shows the unconventional forms of action which respondents have already used of are ready to use, distinguishing between three main forms of increasing radicalness: demonstrative, confrontational, and violent forms. Again, it is difficult to interpret these findings in the absence of comparative evidence. Some tentative conclusions can nevertheless be drawn. First, if we look at the forms of action already used by respondent, demonstrative forms are quite understandably those which have been most often used (92%). The most striking result, however, is the high proportion of respondents who have made use of confrontational (63%) or even violent actions (51%). Second, if we look at the forms of action which respondents are ready to use, demonstrative actions remain important (66%), but confrontational forms are even more often mentioned (73%). Violent actions remain an important potential form of action. If we confront these findings with the action repertoire of social movements in Switzerland, which, apart from some exception at the local level, is typically quite moderate (Kriesi et al. 1995), we can see to what extent the GJM displays a repertoire of contention that significantly departs from the main trends of other movements, although it probably remains less radical than in other countries.

Table 4: Actual and potential unconventional forms of actions of participants in two protests against the WEF meeting in Davos in 2004 (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forms of action</th>
<th>Already used</th>
<th>Ready to use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% responses</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrative</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confrontational</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.7. Summary and conclusion: a heterogeneous movement

Although the GJM, which in Switzerland emerged in the public domain in the late 1990s, certainly represents a new form of contention insofar as the scope of the conflict and its main targets are concerned (transnational or global rather than national), it did not come from nowhere. Quite on the contrary, it lies largely upon previous movement families and traditions of contention. In a way, the central conflict on which this movement mobilizes combines that of the labour movement and that of the NSMs. As a result, both new collective actors and actors that were formed during previous cycles of contention are present within the movement. Among the previously existing actors, those belonging to the NSM family and those, more institutionalized, of the left (leftists parties and labour unions)
are predominant. Furthermore, the GJM combines new issues and collective action frames with pre-existing issues and frames. Among the pre-existing issues and frames, those put forward by the NSMs and the left are particularly important.

While this is true everywhere, each country presents a different mix of these elements depending on the political opportunities for the movement’s mobilization. More specifically, in each country, the GJM reflects the structure of social and political cleavages as well as its national traditions of contention. In Switzerland, the main features of the national context that influence the emergence and mobilization of the GJM are a strong degree of pacification of the class cleavage (accompanied by the institutionalization of the system of industrial relations reflected in neo-corporatist arrangements in the administrative arena) and the imprint of an important NSM sector. The main characteristics of the Swiss GJM result in part from these features of the social and political context. In addition, the political alliances of the movement with institutional actors and the state responses to the movement’s mobilization determine its strength and action repertoires.

The mobilizing structures of the GJM in Switzerland are made of four main types of actors. First, we have NSM organizations, especially those active in the environmental and solidarity movements and having a high degree of formalization, structuration, and professionalization. Second, there is a more informal and loosely structured network of organizations and groups belonging to the squatters’ and autonomous, anarchist, and new left milieus. Third, but less important, is the more institutionalized leftist sector made of left-wing parties and labour unions. Fourth, and even less important in the Swiss context, there are the organizations created during the emergence of the GJM in the 1990s.

The framing processes within the movement are characterized by the importance of NSM claims, especially those which were previously made by the environmental and solidarity movements. Typical claims of both the old left and the new left as well as claims that reflect core issues of the GJM are also present, but to a lesser extent. A strong identification of participants with the movement should also be stressed.

Finally, the repertoire of contention of the movement presents two main forms of action not always linked to each other: mass demonstrations and protests activities (often taking a radical or even violent turn) addressed against major international governmental or private institutions or organizations, on the one hand, and parallel summits and social forums (more moderate and self-reflexive), on the other. The radicalness of the movement, however, seems to have decreased over time.

Taken together, these characteristics point to a heterogeneous, if not divided, GJM in Switzerland, both in terms of the actors involved and the actions carried by the movement. In addition, we are in presence of a relatively weak movement in cross-national comparison.
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